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ABSTRACT

INTEGRATION:
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND NATION IN THE NEW
GERMAN PUBLIC
Kate Zambon
Marwan Kraidy
This dissertation examines public discourse on culture and integration and asks how do
mediated public discussions about integration reproduce norms of national culture and
identity that operate to represent and manage “Other” (immigrant, minority, etc.)
populations in the German context? Through a case study approach, this dissertation uses
critical discourse theory to analyze public campaigns, media events, and mediated
controversies since the mid-2000s that sought to define the qualifications for cultural
citizenship. Although in recent years an increasing number of publications have
addressed Germany’s diverse and transnational population, examinations of processes
and policies of integration have tended to focus either on the level of the government or
on the level of everyday life. Although ideas about integration and multiculturalism are
predominantly forged through events and the surrounding representations in the media,
the mid-level processes of the media sphere have been neglected in scholarship. Using
Foucault’s theories on biopolitics, I argue that integration discourse divides the
population into normative nationals and candidates for integration, consisting of
individuals with apparent immigrant heritage. This division sets up a neoliberal
framework of perpetual evaluation that separates the productive from the threatening
vii

integration candidates while reinforcing normative foundations of Germanness. This
dissertation includes three sections. The first outlines two major foundations of German
national ideas: The Romantic nation represented by the idea of Heimat and the rational,
Enlightenment notion of Germany as a bastion of Western values. This section examines
the historical and theoretical underpinnings of these schemas of identity and the place of
“new Germans” within them. The second section examines the construction of “the new
Germany” in the first decade of the new millennium through the media’s celebration of
immigrant patriots and the emergence of “soccer patriotism.” The three chapters in this
section examine three different cases in the media that illuminate the relationship
between patriotism and productivity and the role of diversity in this new national
formation. The third section analyzes media events that construct boundaries separating
integration successes from failures. These cases expose the continuities linking
celebrations and condemnations of immigrants and new Germans.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the millennium, “integration” has become a dominant concept in
discussions about culture, politics and demographic development in Germany. Following
a trend throughout Europe, German politicians since the turn of the millennium have
condemned multiculturalism, claiming that it leads to social disintegration and parallel
societies. This backlash rejects the legalistic and difference-oriented approach of
multiculturalism, blaming it for harming social cohesion and preventing minority groups
from becoming normal and productive members of society. At the same time, critics of
multiculturalism also reject the assimilationist approach that was critiqued for repressing
difference during the rise of multiculturalism at the end of the 20th century.
Multiculturalism is framed as the opposite of assimilationism, which is portrayed as the
pursuit of equality through the stripping away of cultural difference. Integration is
proposed as the humane middle ground between multiculturalist segregation and
oppressive assimilationist forms of equality (Geissler & Pöttker, 2006). However, what
this middle ground looks like is almost never explicitly defined. Across the political
spectrum, integration is an extremely flexible signifier. As a result, integration is easily
instrumentalized for diverse political, social, and economic projects.
Integration is defined in the media using, on the one hand, “examples of
successful integration” and, on the other, tales and statistics of masses of “integrationrefusers” and socially deficient parallel societies. Representations of immigrants and
“new Germans” within integration discourse have also been crucial in creating the
conception of a new cosmopolitan period in German history: one defined by unity,
1

tolerance, and a renewed sense of national pride. At the same time, the celebration of
“beneficial” forms of difference co-exists easily with condemnations of threatening forms
of difference, often within the same discussion. Although integration has emerged as an
explicit political priority and as the leitmotiv of public discussions on citizenship and the
national character of Germany as in many parts of Europe, the term has attracted little
critical attention in scholarship.
This dissertation critically examines patterns and themes of mediated public
discourse on culture and integration and its role in constructing the normative national
core and managing difference. Discourse is the communicative space where meaning is
produced, reproduced, and modified (see Stuart Hall, 1997a). In this regard, integration
projects, campaigns, and debates have provided the framework for new constructions of
German identity. The selective inclusion and celebration of minority Germans and
immigrants has contributed to a new cosmopolitan version of Germanness, while at the
same time obscuring structures that support the reproduction of disproportionate social
and economic disadvantage among non-normative populations. Integration discourse is
part of a new iteration of citizenship in Germany guided by rules of utility and
productivity.

This

approach

rejects

the

legalistic,

rights-based

approach

of

multiculturalism, with its focus on the right to difference. Instead, it follows biopolitical
criteria that place the body and life at the center of politics (Lemke, 2011, p. 116). One
becomes part of the German population by contributing to the well-being of society.
From the beginning, citizenship was a mechanism of regulating populations
(Hindess, 2000). In Germany, the stability of citizenship laws and norms has been a point
of consistency in a nation-state that has undergone frequent, radical change. Through
2

Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and divided Germany, the
citizenship laws established in 1913 remained largely the same.1 Recent changes break
this stasis on two fronts: external pressure is introduced as freedom of movement for all
European Union citizens opens the possibility of poorer populations seeking opportunity
in the relatively wealthy Germany, and internal pressure results from the admission of
new populations of “strangers” (Simmel, 1950) to the roles of German citizenry. The
actual magnitude and empirical impact of these pressures is not as important as the
perception that these changes raise fundamental questions about who “we” are. As a
result of these changes, latent biopolitical underpinnings of citizenship have surfaced and
been made explicit through public debates on migration, integration, and patriotism.
What before was taken for granted in terms of citizenship is now explicitly
considered. While the question of the correct relationship between the nation (Volk) and
the German state was a perennial concern after the defeat of the fascist model of the
Third Reich, the descent-based definition of German citizenship was not contentious.
Whereas the primary question used to be if and how Germans can be proud to be German
(as opposed to having regional pride), the question is now, “Who are we?” In the shift
from the first question to the second, concern shifted from the limitation of state power
over subjectivity by emphasizing the distinction between nation and state (with the final
power in the hands of “the people”), to the character of the nation itself. In the space

1

An exception was the revocation and subsequent reinstatement of citizenship from Jews and other “nonAryan” Germans during the Third Reich.
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created by this shift, the State has stepped in with a new set of answers: “we” are those
who act for the good of the population. “You are Germany” (see Chapter 4) when you are
a productive, positive, and helpful citizen, regardless of race, religion, or ability.
The dawn of the new millennium in Germany brought the culmination of historic
changes related to several forms of integration. In the decade after the reunification of
East and West Germany in 1990, the unified Federal Republic solidified an external shift
toward supranational economic and political integration by adopting the new currency of
the European Union and by accepting of member state citizens’ rights to move and work
in Germany. At the same time, Germany addressed the internal integration of foreignnationals by providing, for the first time since 1913, territory-based jus soli citizenship
for the children of long-term immigrants born in Germany. Despite the rapid growth of
the foreign-national population in the post-war period, especially through guest worker
programs, until 2000 a child could only acquire German citizenship by descent from a
German parent. Naturalization was technically possible as of 1989, but was complicated
and rare (Abraham, 2008, p. 148). Since, with the exception of voting, permanent nonnational residents had the same rights and access to the same public benefits as nationals,
there was little motivation to pursue naturalization. With a few notable exceptions, the
naturalization policies of authorities in state governments ranged from ambivalent to
obstructionist.
The citizenship law that went into effect in 2000 broke new ground by
acknowledging that individuals born and raised in Germany were not, after all,
foreigners. However, the late acknowledgement of immigrants and their children as a
durable part of German society has also led to terminological awkwardness that persists
4

to the present. The terms guest worker, foreigner, migrant, and the oxymoronic foreign
co-citizen (ausländische Mitbürger) have been joined by the technocratic term “person
with a migration background” (Mensch mit Migrationshintergrund). More recently, the
terms “new German” and “post-migrant” have emerged as emic alternatives among
transnational Germans. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will generally use the term
immigrants for foreign-born individuals who have settled in Germany and minority as a
broad term for people of color or those with otherwise apparent non-German ancestry.
These terms are also problematic and hopelessly insufficient for capturing the diverse
histories and experiences of people who are not automatically identified as normative
Germans. In the United States and Great Britain, the use of the term minority has been
productively criticized as obscuring crucial differences between groups, as disempowing,
and as supporting the normativity of whiteness (Aspinall, 2002; Cross, 2009; Okolosie,
Harker, Green, & Dabiri, 2015). These debates over preferred terminology for nonnormative or minoritized groups are important opportunities to assess and critique current
dynamics of language and power. At the same time, a definitive answer as to the “right”
way to discuss white supremacy and racial categorizations is impossible, since discourses
of normativity and difference are dynamic and must be constantly revisited in context.
My preference for using the heuristic terms minority and normative is meant to draw
attention to the process of distinction and fragmentation, rather than to describe actual
groups of people. In this sense, they are meant as shorthand for the processual terms
minoritized and normalized. The emphasis on the process of fragmentation makes space
for considering commonalities across national and historical contexts without necessarily
erasing the particularity of each case or the phenomenological experience of this process.
5

While the barriers to legal citizenship for long-term immigrants and German-born
people of all backgrounds have fallen significantly, their representation in the public
sphere reflects the precariousness of their position in the national social imaginary.
Although access to citizenship brought this population into the legal framework of the
nation, national discussions about immigrants and “new Germans” have produced a
hierarchy of citizenship based on “efforts at integration” (Integrationsleistungen). In
practice, integration is used as a metonym for economic success. At the same time,
integration is framed as a choice, equally available to all. To refuse to integrate is to
choose a life of economic insecurity at the margins of society. The predominance of
Manichean models for the representation of minority Germans allows their co-optation
for the promotion of a “new colorful Germany,” even while simultaneously mobilizing
the image of the “bad migrant” to promote the normative legitimacy of the values of the
German majority. As such, these discussions are as much about the definition and
fortification of the German nation as they are about immigrants or new Germans
themselves.
This dissertation investigates the promotion and negotiation of the German nation
in a new age of supra- and transnational integration. It addresses questions including:
Under what conditions are new Germans—that is, those that have only been entitled to
citizenship since the introduction of jus soli citizenship and naturalization law—
celebrated and placed at the center of the national public? How has the admission of new
populations into the German social body, or demos, changed the categories of belonging?
Why do sports play such a prominent role in integration policy and public discussion?
What role do representations of new Germans play in processes of national narration?
6

How is integration implicated within projects to promote a “positive” and “healthy”
relationship between the population and the idea of the German nation? Encompassing
these concerns, the central research question for my dissertation is:
How do mediated public discussions about integration reproduce norms of
national culture and identity that operate to represent and manage Other
(immigrant, minority, etc.) populations in the German context?
Specifically, this dissertation analyzes public campaigns, events, and mediated
controversies that define the meaning of Germanness and the qualifications for national
belonging. In particular, it focuses on the function of mediated discourses of culture and
integration for the management and regulation of populations within Europe and its most
powerful member state: Germany.
The cases examined in this dissertation include the media campaigns that
promulgated patriotism in preparation for hosting the FIFA 2006 World Cup and
mediated discussions celebrating “soccer patriotism” during the tournament, the media
coverage of a battle between anti-nationalist activists and German flag waving
immigrants in Berlin, the dueling scandals following the release of an anti-Muslim book
by politician Thilo Sarrazin, and the mobilization of minority celebrities in media
industry programs in the name of integration. These cases, which I will outline in more
detail at the end of this introduction, represent key moments in the definition of
Germany’s approach to diversity and difference in the decade following the
implementation of birthright citizenship. Through these cases, I argue that the recent
development of integration policy and discourse can be best understood through

7

Foucault’s theories of biopolitics. Thomas Lemke consolidates the shifting notions of
biopolitics developed by Michel Foucault into three major uses:
First, biopolitics stands for a historical rupture in political thinking and practice
that is characterized by a rearticulation of sovereign power. Second, Foucault
assigns to biopolitical mechanisms a central role in the rise of modern racism. A
third meaning of the concept refers to a distinctive art of government that
historically emerges with liberal forms of social regulation and individual selfgovernance (2011, p. 34).
In relation to the first usage, integration provides an alternative to the politics of rights
and contestation proposed in multicultural and deliberative democratic approaches.
Instead of raising new political questions and proposing new political structures,
integration eschews deliberative political engagement in favor of goals derived from
social and natural scientific knowledge relating to the optimization of the life of the
population (Lemke, 2011, p. 33). Consequently, integration policy focuses more on the
self-governance and social regulation inherent in sports participation than on developing
better forums for political contestation and complex cultural dialogue (Benhabib, 2002).
Finally, the scientific and rationalist modes of evaluation used to determine a group’s
level of integration contribute to a form of colorblind racism that fragments the
population into the categories of the worthy and the unworthy.
Building on Foucault’s work, Agamben argues that biopolitics implies an ongoing
process of reassessment. “It is as if every valorization and every ‘politicization’ of
life…necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life
ceases to be politically relevant…and can be eliminated without punishment” (1998, p.
139). Although Sarrazin is not calling explicitly for the death of Muslim Germans—in
fact, his policy recommendations are quite moderate—he argues that their existence and
8

proliferation in Germany poses a fundamental threat to the nation. The implication is that
for the health of the nation, Muslims who fail to “integrate” must not be encouraged to
thrive. Whether the context is celebratory or condemnatory, integration involves constant
reassessment. The praise of the multicultural elements of the national team in a successful
tournament does not exempt differentially marked players from heightened scrutiny of
their dedication in the wake of a poor performance (see Chapter 2).
Sports in Germany have provided a forum for national self-construction since
their mobilization in the effort to educate and mold patriotic national citizens in the
Turner Movement beginning in the nineteenth century (Krüger, 1987). With the rise of
international sporting spectacles in the twentieth centry, German soccer and Olympic
sports became emblems of national power on the world stage—as in the 1936 Berlin
Olympics—and of the recovery of national pride on the domestic level—as with the
legendary upset victory of the West German national team in the 1954 FIFA World Cup.
With the emergence of integration discourse, sports have once again emerged as a key
forum for reconstructing German national identity in response to contemporary political
and social developments. With the help of familiar narrative forms in the field of sports,
integration has become a “nodal point” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) at the center of
discourses of nationalism and Otherness. This includes a complex of different chains of
association in which migration is not an action or experience, but the trace of foreignness
that remains identifiable by normative society. As this cases in this dissertation show,
sports and celebrity athletes emerge time and again within integration discourse. The
chapters in this dissertation examine why sports provide such an effective forum for
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explicating discourses of integration as part of the larger process of policing borders of
national identity and managing difference.
While sports provide a key forum, it is not enough to consider integration
discourse only in the field of sports. Discourse around sports and integration reveals how
particular forms of difference are rendered (temporarily) valuable and apolitical. At the
same time, we also need to consider how articulations of integration made explicit in
sports travel within a more dispersed field of public controversies and projects targeting
integration. These complementary cases reveal hierarchies and contingencies within
integration discourse. By viewing these cases together, we see that while integration
discourse addresses all those with identifiable traces of foreignness, it also supports a
distinction between minorities, with Muslims as the paradigmatic figure of difference.
Islam functions here not as a religion but as a racial distinction couched in the discourse
of cultural “differentialism” (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991).
The dichotomy of good patriotic immigrants versus problem immigrants depends
on an ongoing process of reassessment in the public sphere, one where the value of
persons to the nation is constantly under evaluation, depending on how well these persons
fit the ideals of integration. The key idea that sets the parameters for judgment, in both
celebratory and condemnatory modes, are the metrics of productivity defined in
integration discourse. As such it is possible to represent a segment of the population as a
threat, while still holding up and celebrating those that break the mold of their cultural
group to become fully integrated members of the healthy, productive national population.
This dissertation examines these associations as they emerge and reproduce themselves in
the context of media spectacles and controversies. These events, and related public
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campaigns, have created new national narratives based on the renegotiation of German
belonging to include civic nationalism and to take advantage of internal diversity. This
introduction outlines the theoretical and methodological frameworks for this dissertation,
concluding with an outline of the chapters.

Theoretical Framework
Across Europe, the past two decades have seen a concerted backlash against
multiculturalism. At the same time, integration has arisen as the new leitmotif of
discourse about immigration and religious and cultural diversity both in individual
countries and at the level of the European Union. To understand this convergence in
European discourse, I review the ideas about universalism and particularism to identify
continuities in European thought with ideas developed at the dawn of the modern age. I
also consider how these discourses contribute to an apparently paradoxical double notion
of culture that explains away the contradictions of capitalism as an economic system,
legitimating the disproportionate cultural and political influence of European and EuroAmerican states. But while discussions of the negotiation of universalism and
particularism dominate debates about how to manage internal diversity, a subtler form of
biopolitical rationality operates in parallel to justify the acceptance of some groups and
the exclusion of others according to notions of fitness. This flexible process of
categorization includes multiple forms of difference, but converges with, and is
ultimately inseparable from, racist projects.

Against Multiculturalism
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In October 2010, in a statement that echoed through the German media-sphere
and beyond, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared multiculturalism to be a complete
failure. Although this statement was widely discussed and repeated, it is hardly original—
neither in Germany nor in Europe’s other increasingly diverse countries. On the contrary,
one blogger outlined “the eternal death of multiculturalism,” linking to over a dozen such
proclamations by German politicians since 2001 (American Viewer, 2011). As Vertovec
and Wessendorf observe, “since the early 2000s across Europe, the rise, ubiquity,
simultaneity and convergence of arguments condemning multiculturalism have been
striking” (2010, p. 1). In these critiques, multiculturalism has been constructed as a
cohesive and dogmatic concept that fosters segregation and social disintegration by
catering to immigrants and allowing them to maintain their illiberal tendencies. The
frequency and strength of the multiculturalism backlash has made the word itself into a
political taboo.2
At the same time, despite the excision of the term from political and policymaking
discourse, throughout Europe the backlash against multiculturalism has not appreciably
changed the content of policies themselves (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010, p. 27). In
most cases, policy changes have been moderate, even as public debates have grown
increasingly hot. Although, as recent European Parliament elections and the UK vote to

2

For example, whereas the German government’s inaugural “National Integration Plan” from 2006 used
the word “integration” 1,215 times, “multicultural” appears only 3 times, and only in adjective form
(“Bundesregierung | Nationaler Integrationsplan,” n.d.).

12

leave the European Union suggest, heated debates and rhetoric against immigrants and, in
particular, Muslims may be eroding this moderation in policy. In these debates,
multiculturalism is typically rejected in favor of “integration.” As integration has become
a keyword in public discussions about internal difference throughout Europe (Joppke,
2007), it has remained a concept without a definition. Integration is a signifier that does
not have or need a signified to function. It is a floating signifier that “absorbs rather than
emits meaning” (Buchanan, 2010, p. 173), a vehicle onto which multiple, and even
contradictory, meanings are projected. Thus, the meaning it carries from case to case is
reflective of the social systems that created it rather than of any essential or real
phenomenon. Accordingly, within the process of national reproduction in Europe,
integration discourse provides a space for national self-reflection through and against
differentially marked internal populations.
Because of its fundamentally amorphous nature, integration must be examined
through its mobilization: through what it does as opposed to what it is (Lentin, 2014).
The fluidity of integration as a signifier is one of its strongest rhetorical characteristics.
Since the concrete impact of the public discourse against multiculturalism can be
difficult, if not impossible, to determine, an examination of discourses around integration
or against multiculturalism may be more productively considered in terms of their
contribution to the construction of public logics. By analyzing how integration is
deployed in German public discourse, this dissertation provides fresh insight into how
differentially marked populations are defined and discursively managed in Germany.
As the formal barriers to citizenship have become more permeable, integration
discourse has contributed to new forms of “exclusive inclusion” (Ong, 2003; Partridge,
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2012). Here I am not interested in integration as a process per se. Nor am I concerned
with determining whether it is failing or succeeding. Rather than judging the success or
failure of nation-states to integrate differentially marked populations, my concern is to
unravel the political and economic rationalities supported by integration discourse. In
short, this dissertation explores how integration talk functions to constantly reevaluate the
worthiness and value of a group or individual member, as well as to reinstate and
legitimatize the normative values of the nation.

Universalism and the Politics of Difference
From a theoretical perspective, questions around equality and difference have
traditionally revolved around the relative importance of universal human capacities and
needs versus the importance of the particular identity of the individual, and by extension,
the cultural group (Taylor, 2005). Both positions focus on the development of individual
capacity through the realization of a coherent subjectivity, but they differ in their
conceptions of the source of this true subjectivity. The cosmopolitan, universalist position
emphasizes a form of unifying inner rationality that can overcome differences between
individuals and groups. The particularist position emphasizes the differences between
peoples as the source of the unique abilities and capacities of group members. For the
former, group-based pressure to conform threatens to overwhelm the internal voice of
truth that is the source of subjectivity. For the latter, unique group-based modes of
thought and action enrich the soil in which the authentic self grows.
Charles Taylor outlines how this arises from a tension in the relationship between
two shifts in self-conception under modernity. The first change emerged from the
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collapse of honor-based social hierarchies. Against honor, the modern notion of universal
and egalitarian “dignity,” or eventually “citizen dignity” took hold (2005, p. 466). The
honor-based system depended on exclusivity. For honor to hold meaning, it must be
accorded only to the deserving few. Dignity, on the other hand, derived its meaning from
its universality. Dignity arises from the belief in the innate capacities of all people. At the
same time, the subjective turn of the 18th century bound the idea of “the good” to the
idea of being true to oneself. Taylor identifies Rousseau as the most influential articulator
of this shift. “Rousseau frequently presents the issue of morality as that of our following a
voice of nature within us. This voice is often drowned out by the passions that are
induced by our dependence on others... Salvation comes from recovering authentic moral
contact with ourselves” (Taylor, 2005, p. 467). As God and divine right lost their place as
the source of moral and social orders, the self became the source of the good. Morality
became a matter of heeding the voice of nature within us.
In this line of thought, it is a person's calling to live in an original way, not in
imitation of anyone else's life. “It accords moral importance to a kind of contact with
myself, with my own inner nature" (Taylor, 2005, p. 468). However, there is a
fundamental conflict within the ideal of inwardly generated selves, since the very
frameworks on which they depend are externally generated and dialogically maintained.
Since the identity of the individual is necessarily dialogical, this identity also involves
group identities. The languages of self-determination are acquired through interaction
with others and, I would add, in conversation with discourses circulating in the mediated
public sphere. Taylor argues that "we define our identity always in dialogue with,
sometimes in struggle against the things our significant others want to see in us" (Taylor,
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2005, p. 469). This mimetic mode of self formation (Taussig, 1992) also involves the
reification of the categories of difference that are organized under the banner of culture.
Building on Rousseau’s liberal Enlightenment ideals of internal morality, Herder
and other German Romantic thinkers reoriented ideals of individuality to apply to
differences between groups, introducing a hermeneutic circle between the cultural group
and the self as the source of morality and truth. The Romantics took over Rousseau’s
concept of popular sovereignty, but added to it the conviction that the source of the
authentic self springs from the distinct organic nation to which the individual belongs. As
William Wilson summarizes, “Herder believed that humanity was something man could
achieve only as a member of a nation and that nations could arrive at humanity only if
they remained true to their national characters, or souls” (1973, p. 823). This notion of
progress through national self-actualization requires each nation to develop its unique
abilities to contribute to the larger progress of humanity. Thus, the ideal of authenticity
framed the differences between human beings as a matter of moral significance since the
failure to live an authentic, fully realized life is to betray one’s duty to the nation, and by
extension, humankind. However, as Robert Young (1995) shows, this conceptualization
of progress through the contributions of unique national cultures also produces a
fundamental paradox.
While on the one hand colonization and racial mixture are regarded by Herder as
introducing a fatal heterogeneity, on the other the very progress of mankind
comes as a result of diffusionism, or cultural mixing and communication,
whereby cultural achievements of one society are grafted onto another. (R.
Young, 1995, p. 38)
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In other words, for each culture’s unique talents to contribute to progress at the level of
humanity, those contributions must be picked up and incorporated into other cultures.
This diffusion and the necessary hybridization that results are both necessary and
dangerous to the mission of humanity as Herder conceptualizes it. Young uses Herder's
work to show how the idea of culture has always been fraught, ambivalent, and divided
against itself. Moreover, hybridization has always been desired and feared, characterized
both as the great hope and the potential downfall of Western “civilization.”
Whereas Rousseau’s universalistic and cosmopolitan conception of culture
dominated in France, as German intellectuals sought to construct the historical and social
legitimacy for the unification of German speaking states, they relied on Herder’s
universal national particularism as a normative foundation. These two approaches to
constructing modern nationalism involve divergent positions regarding questions of
difference. The liberal French position, which was famously elaborated by Ernest Renan
in the late 19th century, focused on the primacy of voluntaristic association. For Renan,
linguistic, historical, religious or geographic difference was not essential for the
foundation of the nation (1990). In this view, the difference is irrelevant for public issues;
the cultural neutrality of the public sphere ensures the freedom and equality of all
citizens. The nation necessarily includes difference within its borders. However, that
difference is not a threat to the nation since it is subordinated to the “daily plebiscite”
through which the people identify with national memory and grant their consent to be
governed.
For the German Romantic approach, however, difference posed a more
complicated challenge. As Young observes, Herder considers contact—the exchange of
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ideas between distinct groups—as necessary for human progress. However, difference
that was deemed “out of place” or improperly consolidated posed a threat to the full
realization of a people’s potential. Individuals and groups who were separated from their
nation geographically, and who acquired the languages and customs of other nations were
a sign of the failure of their true nation to develop its own authentic virtues. “The stability
of a nation,” said Herder,
which does not forsake itself, but builds and continues to all build upon itself,
gives a definite direction to the endeavors of its members. But other peoples,
because they have not found themselves, must seek their salvation in foreign
nations, serving them, thinking their thoughts; they forget even the times of their
glory, of their own proven feats, always desiring, never succeeding, always
lingering on the threshold." (quoted in Wilson, 1973, p. 823)
It follows that the immigrant or national minority group is doomed to permanently
inhabit a liminal space, separated from their authentic selves and prevented from reaching
their full potential. Instead they must languish, longing for their true selves and
subordinate to the more fully actualized members of the autochthonous nation. German
speaking Romantic intellectuals saw this as defining the fractured, dispersed and stateless German nation in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Although the dangerous and even
genocidal possibilities of this type of national ideology became clear during the age of
European fascism, Romantic conceptions of authentic, organic nations remain influential.
For example, while the essentialist and eugenicist implications of this type of nationalism
were harshly critiqued in the aftermath of the defeat of National Socialism, the idea of the
homeland as the source of the fully actualized, authentic self persist in the idea of
Heimat, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
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While the development of French and German approaches to nationalism
emphasize different aspects, nationalist frameworks necessarily contain both voluntaristic
and primordialist elements. Attempts to draw a hard distinction between them often end
up reinforcing the familiar normative distinction between bad nationalism and good
patriotism (Yack, 1996). However, the tensions between and within these two lines of
thought still characterizes debates over how to conceptualize and respond to diversity
within the nation-state. In states where national projects have been most successful, these
debates emerge most frequently in relation to debates about how to respond to national
minorities and newcomers or, in Georg Simmel’s terms, “strangers” (1950). In these
cases, the existence of the nation as a meaningful category is taken for granted. What is
up for discussion is if, and under what conditions, strangers should be allowed to
participate in and even possibly alter the national project.

Multiculturalism and the “Universalist Masquerade”
Among both proponents and critics of multiculturalism, the emphasis on culture
as a source of authenticity and social solidarity is burdened by a moralism and an
essentialism that is difficult to escape. As important as it is to maintain the “right to be
different” while still confirming the right to belong (Rosaldo, 1997), public talk about
cultural politics must inevitably overdetermine the outlines of culture in order to make
claims. Furthermore, the “right to be different” can just as easily be mobilized from the
hegemonic position to argue for the right to exclude those whose difference threatens to
enter and change its authentic national culture.
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As Immanuel Wallerstein argued in his influential essay, Culture as the
Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System (1990), the apparent paradox of
the universalist and particularist conceptions of culture is actually a symbiosis. Although
in different conceptions one definition may predominate over the other, both uses of
culture are at work wherever cultural politics are in play. The particularist usage (usage I)
defines culture as "the set of characteristics which distinguish one group from another"
(1990, p. 33). This usage, which Herder emphasizes, sees culture as based on the history
of each group. Each group has its own equally legitimate and historically grounded
culture. The second usage (usage II) is the evaluative and hierarchical type. This is the
universalist, transcendental notion of culture, the Arnoldian “sweetness and light,” which
holds that the products and values of cultures (in the particularist sense) can be compared
by universal measures.
Across these definitions, echoes of both Rousseau and Herder reverberate, of
Enlightenment and Romanticism. While different political philosophies prioritize
different uses of “culture”, Wallerstein shows how the presence of both elements is
necessary for the logics of the modern political, social and economic system. Here
“culture” is the idea-system that has resulted from our “collective historical attempts to
come to terms with the contradictions, the ambiguities, the complexities of the sociopolitical system” (1990, p. 38). Wallerstein writes that
we have done it in part by creating the concept of ‘culture’ (usage I) as the
assertion of unchanging realities amidst a world that is in fact ceaselessly
changing. And we have done it in part by creating the concept of ‘culture’ (usage
II) as the justification of the inequities of the system, as the attempt to keep them
unchanging in a world which is ceaselessly threatened by change. (1990, p. 39)
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Cultural politics set the parameters for how social problems are assessed and sustain the
logical framework for solving problems and assessing individual agency and
responsibility. This symbiotic but contradictory use of culture smooths over the
contradictions within the system, occluding the fact that inequality is not simply an
unfortunate byproduct of progress that will be ameliorated as the system expands, but is
rather at the very heart of the system.
Thus, a belief in universalism suggests that all people are equally able to achieve
success according to transcendent measures, while culture in the evaluative sense is
mobilized to explain the disproportionate success of some groups over others. But as
Taylor points out and Wallerstein elaborates, the universalism of modern liberal
democracy has thus far been a European Universalism. “It is not that there may not be
global universal values. It is rather that we are far from yet knowing what these values
are. Global universal values are not given to us; they are created by us. The human
enterprise of creating such values is the great moral enterprise of humanity” (Wallerstein,
2006, p. 28). Cultural politics form the foundation upon which the contemporary world
economic and political system is constructed as well as the tools for its maintenance and
reproduction. The move towards a more universal form of universalism requires a critical
approach toward claims made about culture and difference in the public sphere.

Moving Away from Culturalism in Public Discourse
From conflicts over the permissibility of certain forms of religious dress to the
right of parents to deny potentially life-saving care for children, liberal democracies face
increasing challenges in navigating the terrain between recognizing the claims of
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individuals or groups to maintain cultural traditions and protecting the rights of
individuals whose autonomy these practices threaten. To address these cross-cultural
challenges, Seyla Benhabib (2002) proposes a deliberative democratic model based on
contestation and justification in the public sphere. Benhabib’s conception of publics
resists automatically assigning cultural definitions to individuals over other forms of
identification that they may prefer. She also resists the idea of privileging a priori the
claims of ethno-cultural groups over those of other publics. For Benhabib, all groups
should have an equal right to contestation. This is particularly important since the
recognition of cultural claims often conflicts with the rights of disempowered groups like
women and children.
In this regard, I would propose that in thinking about deliberative democracy it
might be helpful to move away from “cultures” in political discussions in favor of the
term publics. This would help address Benhabib’s concern about the prioritization of one
group’s cultural claims over the claims of other groups. Also inherent in the idea of
publics is constituency not through birth but through action. To be a member of a public
is to actively engage. This is also conducive to the principles Benhabib outlines to guide
multicultural pluralist arrangements: egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription, and
freedom of exit and association (2002, p. 131). As Fraser (1990) argues, multiple publics
are not only possible, but essential to deliberative democracy. Benhabib’s framework
promotes the kinds of communications across lines of cultural difference that Fraser sees
as both problematic and highly desirable, and it does so without requiring the “bracketing
of differences” that Fraser rightly criticizes in the Habermasian model. Benhabib does not
advocate ignoring or suppressing differences, but instead sees the struggle to understand
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difference through complex cultural dialogue as holding the answers to multicultural
dilemmas.
One area of concern that Benhabib does not sufficiently address, however, is the
informal impediments to equal access to the public sphere posed by social inequality.
This is another aspect of the Habermasian deliberative democratic approach most
frequently highlighted by critics (Fraser, 1990). Even in the absence of formal exclusions,
and in a system designed to encourage the participation of multiple publics, factors
related to social status impact the likelihood of less powerful groups to participate.
Margaret Kohn addresses this in her critique of deliberative democracy. Kohn asks whose
voice predominates in public discourse, and answers with statistics showing that the more
intensive the form of participation,3 the greater the tendency to over represent high-status
members of society. Holding speech as the predominant medium of deliberative
democracy privileges parties with the greatest command of linguistic resources. Kohn
asserts that a whole repertoire of tactics must be included to achieve a more egalitarian
public sphere. To bring together and expand on Benhabib and Kohn’s theories, I would
argue that the key aspect of deliberation is reflective communication. There is no reason
the definition of deliberation must be limited to dialogic discussion. Deliberation can take
the form of political satire, grassroots mobilization, protest, or political art. It can be

3

By “intensive” Kohn and those she cites are referring to the level of active, original participation involved
in a political activity. Voting, which follows strict, uniform procedures, is one of the least intensive forms.
Forms that require face-to-face speech and public debate are considered the most intensive.
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enacted in films or on television, in the style of tragedy, comedy, or tragicomedy. The
essential characteristic that allows it to serve the cause of deliberative democracy is
reflective communication. Since many of these forms are broadly accessible, they are
more likely to engage a variety of affected parties. Meeting around a table or in a town
hall for verbal deliberation is no less important; however, to neglect to consider other
modes of deliberative communication is to see only part of the picture.
This brings me to the limitations of the present investigation. By focusing on
discourse in the mediated public sphere, this dissertation analyzes only part of the picture.
For the most part, the sorts of flexible and creative spaces for contestation hinted at above
will not be analyzed here. The justification for this critical omission is that my interest
and focus here are the strategic logics of normative, or hegemonic, publics. The
contribution of this type of analysis is to help clarify the evolution of predominant forms
of common sense and to highlight the strategic, rather than natural, logics that support
them. It is an attempt to follow Wallerstein’s call to historicize our intellectual analysis,
and
To place the reality we are immediately studying within the larger context: the
historical structure within which it fits and operates. We can never understand the
detail if we do not understand the pertinent whole, since we can never otherwise
appreciate exactly what is changing, how it is changing, and why it is changing.
(2006, pp. 82–83)
While in the present project I will not pretend to capture the totality of “the pertinent
whole,” I will attempt to follow the lines of thought and knowledge from their
articulation in the immediate context of public events back to the historical and
systematic discourses that make them make sense. At the same time, it is important to
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remember what this focus omits. The spaces of contestation outside of hegemonic
discourse are myriad. Counterpublics and alternative discursive logics exist alongside and
make frequent incursions into the discursive space of the normative public sphere (Fraser,
1990; Michael Warner, 2002). The focus here on the flexibility of hegemony in
incorporating and taming contestations is not meant to deny the possibility of resistance
and even of fundamental systemic change. As Wallerstein reminds us, the current
capitalist world system is historical (2006, p. 28). Like all such systems it has a life cycle
and, thus, at some point must also come to an end.

Difference as a Matter of Productivity
As Taylor (1999) and Wallerstein (1990) argue, the strategic logics of
universalism and particularism work in tandem to smooth out the contradictions of global
capitalism and to justify the hegemony of certain systems of value and knowledge.
Benhabib and Kohn provide two approaches to tackling the challenges of creating space
for difference in the face of the hegemony of the public sphere in the singular. They
move away from questions of cultural values to assert the need to support counterhegemonic public spheres and complex cultural dialogue. However, there is a third, and
perhaps more powerful perspective at work in the discourse of integration: the
biopolitical approach to governing that subverts dialogue and contestation in favor of a
rational and utilitarian approach to integration.
For the biopolitical approach, the question of difference itself is not the most
important issue up for discussion in debates about integration and difference.
Multiculturalism holds that the right juridical framework balancing the demands of
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universal equality with the right to difference can solve the problems of tensions between
groups. The rejection of multiculturalism is not necessarily the rejection of difference,
per se, but rather the rejection of the agonistic framework for managing difference. In
focusing on the negotiation of rights and exceptions, multicultural and deliberative
democratic approaches center on juridico-legal frameworks, focusing on particular cases
of right and wrong, of permitted and prohibited, rather than on the larger and, from the
biopolitical perspective, more crucial questions of the health and happiness of the
population. Integration discourse is not about particular conflicts or claims, but rather
about ideas of the health and vitality of society as a whole. The issues of particularism
and universalism outlined above still circulate within discussions of difference. However,
those who reject multiculturalism in favor of integration seek to replace practices of
contestation valued by proponents of deliberative democracy with a biopolitical
framework that values harmony, homeostasis, and productivity. This section outlines the
development of the biopolitical techniques and forms of knowledge most fundamental for
understanding integration as opposed to multiculturalism and deliberative democratic
approaches to negotiating difference.
Integration discourse has developed in Germany since the turn of the millennium
in reaction to the inclusion of German-born Others into the citizenry at the legal level.
However, the idea of integration as an issue does not appear for the first time in this
period. In fact, the first call in the magazine Der Spiegel for Germany to develop an
“integration policy” to address guest workers who were becoming “permanent guests”
appeared in a special report on social inequality in 1970 (“KOMM, KOMM, KOMM GEH, GEH, GEH,” 1970). Nevertheless, the imagined impermanence of the migrant
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population persisted well into the 1990s, enabling a politics of denial in regards to
Germany’s status as an immigrant country (see Süssmuth, 2001). It was only after
citizenship law was changed in 2000 that questions of integration became a persistent
public topic. Despite never having instituted a national policy regarding immigrant
membership in society—multicultural, deliberative or otherwise—Germany took up the
politics of integration just in time to join the wave of multiculturalism backlash crossing
Europe.
Despite its almost obsessive scrutiny of differentially marked groups, integration
is not primarily a way to think about difference. Multiculturalism is myopically
concerned with difference: the protection thereof, its representation and recognition, and
the moderation of harms that can result from making exceptions to universal norms for
this purpose. In contrast, integration is concerned with difference insofar as it relates to
productivity and the welfare of national society. Above all, integration is a framework for
thinking about the population, about the nation delimited by the territory of the state.
Integration purports to be a route towards the construction of a better, more productive
population. It is also a means of conceptualizing and managing threats to the population.
Both tasks use difference as their axis, but the first treats difference as a source of life
while the second revolves around difference as a threat to life that must managed or
neutralized. In both cases, the subject of concern is the normative population, the nation.
In contrast to multiculturalism and deliberative democracy, integration politics do
not stem from the legal discourse of public rights, but instead relate to a concept of right
based on productivity and a biopolitical notion of social value. Foucault (2003) correlates
the development of this concept of public right with the emergence of two new forms of
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power, disciplinary and biopolitical, which complement and partially displace sovereign
power. Sovereignty, which traditionally belonged to the king, was the right of life and
death. More precisely, it was the right to kill or let live since “sovereign power’s effect on
life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill” (Foucault, 2003, p. 240). In Europe
during late 18th and 19th centuries, industrialization and demographic explosion meant
that sovereign power was no longer sufficient to govern the economic and political body
of society. Such was the extent and rate of change that too many things were escaping the
old mechanisms of sovereign power, both at the level of detail and at the mass level
(Foucault, 2003, p. 249). Disciplinary mechanisms were introduced to take care of the
details, to surveil and train the population. Biopolitical mechanisms were introduced to
manage populations. Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, mechanisms of
regulatory and disciplinary power extended across the domain of life, aided by the
circulation of related norms. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I outline Foucault’s (2008)
work showing how biopolitics became even more central in Germany in the postwar
period as leaders in the West German Federal Republic sought a source of legitimacy for
the new state. I then argue that integration is an extension of these biopolitical and
neoliberal ideals through policies evaluating and managing difference.

Race as Discursive Fragmentation: Death in a Politics of Life
Since antagonism, war, and death can never be eliminated from the field of life,
Foucault poses the question, “How can the power of death, the function of death, be
exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?” (2003, p. 254). It is here that
Foucault argues that racism intervenes. Foucault defines racism as “a way of introducing
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a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what
must live and what must die” (2003, p. 254). Although racism existed long before the
modern state, under biopolitics it becomes a technology of power. Foucault defines race
not by what it is, but by its function. He defines two major functions. As an analytic of
history, in the approach to history as race war, race is the means of articulating
antagonisms, historical injustices perpetrated by the sovereign against the nobility,
understood as a race or nation. The second function arises when the discourse of race
struggle is incorporated within the state rather than oriented against it (Foucault, 2003, p.
81). Within state discourse race provides a means of fragmenting the population, of
determining which populations must be made to live while others are left to die.
It also transforms the older calculation of the relationship of war that “in order to
live, you must take lives.” Racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between
the life of the normative population and the death of the Other that is purely civil in
nature. It is not the military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but rather the
rational and civic calculation of the greater good (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). It eliminates
antagonism from this relationship by substituting a biological-type rationality that
converts the us-them conflict into a calculation whereby as the inferior species die out,
the stronger I—as a species rather than an individual—will be and the better I can live
(Foucault, 2003, p. 255). It is here, according to Foucault, that state racism appears: “a
racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own
products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of
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the basic dimensions of social normalization” (2003, p. 62). In this way, racism is a
requirement for the state to exercise sovereignty, which is to say, its right to kill.4
Following this biopolitical version of race struggle, which is internal to state
function, integration discourse eliminates conflict, since it denies the deliberative,
agonistic rights and representation approach. Instead, it builds its approach around
supposedly objective measures of population welfare. Integration itself becomes the
marker of race, the means of fragmenting the population. The population is divided into
two categories in relation to integration. First, there is the category of the nation, which
stands in for the population. The integration status of the national does not need to be
assessed. The national, the individual representative of the population, is the normative
subject whose life is an indicator of the health and well-being of the population. The
national is not evaluated in relation to integration since the national is the population.
However, nationals may lose their unqualified status if they betray the
evolutionary project of increasing national well-being. Although this form is rare in the
cases at issue in this dissertation, this category of the failed German national emerged in
the Sarrazin debate as a way to defuse the critique that Sarrazin’s book unfairly targets
Muslims (see Chapter 6). To show that Sarrazin’s work is not racist, reviewers on
Amazon point out that Sarrazin is just as critical of unproductive, low-intelligence

4

Here Foucault clarifies that with “killing,” he is not talking only about murder, but also indirect forms of
death, such as “the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or,
quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, p. 256).
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Germans. However, this practice of separating the unproductive members from the
valuable nationals is consistent with the population fragmentation Foucault outlines as
part of state racism. The place of these unproductive nationals is illustrated by the trope
of the Asozialen. The Duden dictionary defines asozial as 1) incapable of life in society,
not fitting into society; living on the margins of society; 2) damaging to community,
society; or 3) possessing a low intellectual, cultural level; uneducated and ill-bred
(“asozial,” n.d.).i Asozial, or the slang version, assi, indicates a type of person who is
harmful to society. Currently, it is primarily used in slang form as an insult.
This term emerged in politics and jurisprudence in the early 20th century. The
category of the asozial emerged as inseparable from hereditary and eugenicist thought.
Under National Socialism, it was used to describe and then deport to concentration camps
a category of social undesirables that included the heterogeneous groups of vagrants,
beggars, mentally ill, alcoholics, addicts, work-averse (Arbeitsscheuen), nutritionally
deficient, and prostitutes. Sinti and Roma were also grouped within the category of
“Asozialen” (Willing, 2003, p. 1). The term continues to be used today in relation to the
same referents. The Asozialer is not only outside the norms of society, but actually
threatens the well-being of society or the population at large. In addition, they are often
blamed for other social ills, such as racism and xenophobia (see Conclusion), relieving
normative society of the burden of answering for the violence of the fragmentation of
integration discourse. This term shares much with the American derogatory term “white
trash,” both in terms of its present day usage and its emergence in 20th century eugenicist
thought (see Newitz & Wray, 2013). The tropes of the asozial and of white trash
disqualify individuals or classes from belonging to the category of society or the national.
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As such, their life is no longer an indicator of the health of the population, but rather
exists as a threat to the health of the population.
Giorgio Agamben’s work on biopolitics helps to explain not only these
continuities between contemporary liberal democratic social categories and those of early
20th century totalitarianism, but also the fundamental stakes involved in rights, political
membership, and the construction and evaluation of social groups. Agamben argues that
liberal democracy, using the juridical framework of rights, includes from its outset the
possibility for totalitarianism. In the creation of the rights and protections of citizenship,
the modern state created a new form of exception: the condition of statelessness. Through
citizenship rights based in national membership, the nation-state separates bios—political
life—from zoe—natural life. This separation creates a “zone of indistinction” and a form
of life that lies beyond the protections of the political, but which, under conditions of
modernity, cannot return to a natural form of life. This is what Agamben refers to as bare
life—life that has been stripped of all other qualities except for life itself (1998, p. 171).
Furthermore, Agamben argues that it is not the qualified life of the citizen that modern
democracy has situated as its referent. Instead, it has affirmed bare life (the right to life,
health, happiness, satisfaction of needs) as the fundamental subject of politics. Politics
under biopolitics is concerned with the determination of the value or nonvalue of life
itself. This process of determination involves an ongoing process of boundary definition
beyond the formal legal distinctions established in citizenship norms.
Citizenship is invested with the task of optimizing life. Citizenship, and the right
to issue, withhold, or revoke it, “names the new status of life as origin and ground of
sovereignty" (Agamben, 1998, p. 129). The importance of citizenship relates to what
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Agamben sees as one of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics: “its constant
need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from
what is outside” (1998, p. 131). The implications of this became clear when, after the
start of WWI, many European states introduced juridical measures allowing for the mass
denaturalization and denationalization of portions of their populations who were
considered unworthy or as enemies of the nation. This reached its culmination with the
Nuremberg laws of fascist Germany, which concretized “the principle according to which
citizenship was something of which one had to prove oneself worthy and which could
therefore always be called into question” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132). Here we can see that
the fate of the racialized Other and the unworthy or asozial citizen converge as easily
under democracy as within totalitarianism. In the process of ongoing evaluation, both can
be reduced to bare life, that is, to life without political value. This process is so central,
that Agamben situates the work of answering the question of what is national (German,
French, American, etc.) as a critical political task of biopolitics. In fact, Agamben argues
that under most radical manifestation of the biopolitical regime, the German Third Reich,
the answer to the question “Who and what is German?” coincided directly with the
highest political task (1998, p. 130). This illustrates starkly how the work of belonging, of
defining and refining the essential nature of national life, cannot be separated from the
definition of life without political value.
Generations after the defeat of the Third Reich and the return of liberal
democracy to Germany, the question of who and what defines Germanness has continued
as a fundamental political preoccupation. Through the inclusion of immigrants and their
descendants within the political body of the nation in 2000, the question of what
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constitutes Germany and Germans arose again with new urgency. This dissertation
analyzes attempts to answer this question in the public sphere. Agamben argues that "in
modern biopolitics, the sovereign is he who decides on the value or nonvalue of life as
such" (1998, p. 142). Consequently, it is essential to focus on the institutions and
individuals positioned to assume the role of the sovereign and define who and what the
nation is, and the relative value of different forms of life for the national body. This work
is done above all within the mediated public sphere. Integration has emerged as one of
the fundamental tools in process of defining new norms for these “new Germans.” Lemke
has argued that “biopolitics is essentially a political economy of life” that goes beyond
the state and the juridical order (2011, p. 60). It is this political economy of life that
motivates the ongoing process of evaluation that divides integrants from nationals and
separates the worthy from the asozial.

Study Design and Data Corpus
Examinations of processes and policies of integration have tended to focus either
on the level of the government (Guild, Groenendijk, & Carrera, 2009; Joppke, 2007;
Penninx, 2005), or on the level of everyday life. Several ethnographic works on this topic
move between the macro and interpersonal levels, analyzing not just integration but also
the disjunctures between cultural policies aimed at managing difference and the lives and
practices of the minority groups who are the focus of those policies (Hinze, 2013;
Partridge, 2012). However, the mid-level processes of the public sphere have largely
been ignored, or only considered in passing. At the same time, as a number of scholars
have observed, ideas about integration and multiculturalism are largely forged through
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events and the surrounding discussions in the mediated public sphere (Lentin & Titley,
2011; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). This dissertation examines major events focused
on defining German identity and the place of diversity within it that took over the
mediated public in Germany since the turn of the millennium. It will also examine
several smaller, splinter events connected to these larger instances of media attention.
The primary source of empirical data for this dissertation is press coverage in the
print media, in addition to the content and documentation of public service campaigns
and projects, policy documents, and entertainment programs. Although industry experts
have recently announced the arrival of the global newspaper crisis in Germany (Doctor,
2013; Schnibben, 2013), print media remain at the center of the increasingly diverse
German media sphere. Print holds a particularly influential place in the German mediated
sphere based on two important indicators: First, journalists from across the field regularly
consume print sources more frequently than other media; second, print sources are cited
more frequently across the media sphere than other media.
The main criteria for selecting which periodicals to analyze for the print media
portions of this dissertation were the sources’ influence among journalists and their
influence on other media as indicated by the number of citations they generate.
According to the most recent large-scale study on the state of journalism in Germany, the
largest proportion of journalists are employed by newspapers (Weischenberg, Malik, &
Scholl, 2006). The same study showed that media professionals regularly consume print
media more frequently than other media. Among the representative sample of media
professionals surveyed, 35% and 34% of journalists regularly read the SZ and Der
Spiegel respectively. This compares to 19% who regularly watch the news program the
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Tagesschau on the public broadcaster ARD (Weischenberg et al., 2006, p. 359). The list
of periodicals most regularly read by journalists that appears in this survey was used to
determine the primary periodicals of interest for this dissertation. In descending order, the
top 11 periodicals read by journalists were the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, the Bild, Die Tageszeitung, Stern, Focus, Die
Welt, the Frankfurter Rundschau, and the Handelsblatt.5 The fact that media
professionals who are producing content are consuming these print sources most
frequently suggests that they are a critical site for analyzing public discourse in Germany.
Furthermore, in terms of overall citations within the media sphere, from July 2009
to December 2013 just two print sources, Bild and Der Spiegel, garnered over 40% of all
citations in the media. The only non-print outlets to make the top ten cited sources were
the public service broadcasters ARD and ZDF with 7% and 5% of citations (PMG PresseMonitor, 2014). Together, in descending order, the online and print versions of the
periodicals the Bild, Der Spiegel, the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (F.A.Z), Die Welt, Focus, the Handelsblatt, and Stern garnered 87%
of all media citations in 2013 (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). This suggests the strength of
print’s influence as the medium of reference across the media sphere. Audience numbers

5

These periodicals have different rules for capitalization. I have decided to adopt the common German
rules for capitalizing titles. Where articles (die, der, das) are included as official part of the periodical’s
title, I have included the German article as part of the title. For newspapers that do not use an article in
their titles, I have used the English article. For magazines that do not include the article in their title, no
article is used.
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also back up the importance of print. The most popular television news show, the
Tagesschau regularly reached 5.34 million viewers in 2010 (Schröder, 2010), while Bild
had 12.31 million readers in 2012, according to the media research group Media-Analyse.
While television news is also very popular, print is still the primary medium in Germany
both in terms of audiences and resonance. Print media are the center of public
deliberation and the primary space for the development of major arguments of national
significance. In addition to print media, I examine institutional structures, policy
documents, audio-visual and print publicity materials as well as examples from
entertainment media.

Search Methodology
Access to the archives of the most important German print media is difficult
outside Germany. The only periodical that maintains a fully accessible, comprehensive
online archive is Der Spiegel, which includes facsimile versions of all print articles
beginning with their first issue in 1947. Articles from Spiegel Online, which has been
producing original content since 1996, are also available in the archives. There is no
single newspaper database available that maintains a comprehensive electronic archive of
the most important sources of German print news. The best online archive of German
periodicals is maintained by GBI-Genios, which provides a university-oriented
subscription service called Wiso. Wiso includes access to 180 German print news
sources, not including the Bild, the F.A.Z., or the Süddeutsche Zeitung. The only
available option for access to an electronic archive of the Bild is to search the
newspaper’s website, which includes a limited electronic archive. The Süddeutsche
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Zeitung and the F.A.Z. each provide subscription-based access through university
libraries. I accessed Wiso and the full archives of the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the F.A.Z.
by visiting the library at the Free University in Berlin.
Table 1: Top Periodicals Read by Journalists and Description of Available Access
Percentage of Journalists
Who Are Regular Readers6

Type of Access

Süddeutsche Zeitung

35

Full access (library)

Der Spiegel

34

Full access (online)

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(F.A.Z.)

15

Full access (library)

Die Zeit

11

Full access (WISO)

Bild

10

Partial access (online)

Die Tageszeitung

7

Full access (online)

Stern

6

Full access (WISO)

Focus

5

Full access (WISO)

Die Welt

4

Full access (WISO)

Frankfurter Rundschau

4

Full access (WISO)

Financial Times Deutschland
(ceased publication 2012)

4

Full access (WISO)

Handelsblatt

3

Full access (WISO)

Title

6

Source: Weischenberg, Malik, and Scholl (2006)
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In order to capture a variety of content produced by periodicals with a crosssection of political orientations, I focused on the top newspapers regularly read by
German media professionals (Weischenberg et al., 2006). This list also contains the
highest circulating news and information periodicals and the most frequently cited
sources across the media sphere (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). These sources include a
wide range of political orientations. Rather than claiming to be apolitical or completely
impartial, news periodicals in Germany acknowledge their political orientation. The
selected periodicals represent a mix of perspectives, from center-right (Bild, Focus) and
neoliberal, center-right (F.A.Z., Handelsblatt, Die Welt), to center-left (Süddeutsche
Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Stern, Frankfurter Rundschau). The Bild provides insight
into the conservative, populist German public sphere, while the other sources form the
backbone of Germany’s quality press. In addition, the cooperatively owned Tageszeitung,
which has the smallest circulation of all the selected periodicals, represents one of the
most critical and progressive perspectives among legacy media in Germany. The
diversity of editorial orientations across these sources capture a broad range of
mainstream perspectives on the issues under study. For cases that produced a corpus that
was either too large to submit to detailed textual analysis or too small to get a full sense
of the case, the list of periodicals searched was limited or expanded accordingly. The
specific searches used and the rationale behind alterations of the periodical list are
explained in each chapter.

Methodology: Discourse Theory and Analysis
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As Ernest Renan argued in his seminal theory of nationalism, "the essence of a
nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have
forgotten many things" (1990, p. 11). But who decides on the form those commonalities
should take? How is it determined which are the things to be discarded in the
construction of social and political solidarity? As the age of authoritarianism waned in
the late 18th and 19th centuries and the democratic nation-state established itself as the
most important level of political organization in the West, maintaining a minimal level of
consent of the governed became the major problem of the national elite. As such, “the
battle for nationhood” became “a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak
for the whole nation and to represent the national essence” (Billig, 1995, p. 27). This
process entails the construction of a national identity, through which representatives, by
virtue of shared nationhood, are anointed with legitimate social authority. However, as
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) have shown, identity can only be constructed negatively
through emphasizing the construction of frontiers built upon the distinction from others.
Since these constructions are permanently contingent and perpetually vulnerable to the
challenge of competing rearticulations, normative groups must constantly reproduce the
“chains of equivalence” that support their attempts to establish their versions of “truth” as
normal.
Consequently, the construction of Others, both within and beyond the boundaries
of the nation-state, is intimately related to the construction and maintenance of the
collective authority of a normative national group. What we are must regularly be
defined by who we are not. Furthermore, the successful articulation of a hegemonic
discourse leads to the naturalization, and therefore the disappearance, of the normalized
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subject position. The analysis of these processes requires a theoretical and
methodological approach that locates and unpacks operations of power at the level of
their everyday reproduction. Discourse analysis, in its various forms, encompasses a
variety of methods and analytical forms that relate a specific case or event to the larger
structures that shape them. As Foucault pointed out, "in appearance, speech may well be
of little account, but the prohibitions surrounding it soon reveal its links with desire and
power" (1971, p. 9). In the next section, I outline some of these approaches to discourse
analysis, from its origins in linguistics to its adaptation in service of macro-level social
and political analysis.

Development of Discourse Analysis
Discourse Analysis, in its many forms, emerged from the union of
poststructuralist literary theory with critical linguistics beginning in the 1970s. At the
time, a divide had been growing between linguists interested in an increasingly abstract
and mathematical notion of language and those primarily interested in how language
shapes subjectivity and social reality. Debates on subjectivity in the analytic philosophy
of language and in literary studies have continued to diverge, the former focusing on
increasingly technical and abstract modeling and logical analyses of form which have
little practical value for the hermeneutics of desire and difference that concerns the latter
(Lee, 1997).
While critical linguistics increased the attention toward social and metalinguistic
forms, that is, "linguistic forms used to talk about and represent discourse" (Lee, 1997, p.
11) including reported speech, quotation, and indirect discourse, the founders of Critical
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Discourse Analysis (CDA) were concerned that sociolinguistics still paid too little
attention to issues of power and social hierarchy. Coming from diverse disciplines, these
scholars, including Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk, sought to
further open textual and discourse analysis to take advantage of the methods and insights
of multiple disciplines. According to Wodak (2001), most approaches to CDA have at
their foundation the social semiotic approach of Michael Halliday’s systemic functional
grammar.
Halliday distinguished three metafunctions of language that are continuously
interconnected: Firstly, the ideational function through which language lends structure to
experience (the ideational structure has a dialectical relationship with social structure,
both reflecting and influencing it); secondly, the interpersonal function which constitutes
relationships between the participants; and thirdly, the textual function which constitutes
coherence and cohesion in texts (Wodak, 2001, p. 8). Halliday’s structural framework,
while based in linguistics, leaves room to approach these problems from a number of
perspectives. Developing these insights, Fairclough argues for a
theoretical perspective on language and more generally semiosis (including
‘visual language’, ‘body language’, and so on) as one element or ‘moment’ of the
material social process, which gives rise to ways of analysing language or
semiosis within broader analyses of the social process. (2001b, p. 121)
CDA analyzes texts and interactions, but it does not start from texts and interactions. It
starts, instead, from problems that people face in their social lives and social issues that
are taken up within sociology, political science and/or cultural studies.
While practitioners of CDA make social hierarchy and power their central
concern, some scholars in cultural and media studies argue that CDA maintains a
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linguistic bias towards micro-level discourse. Bloomaert and Bulcaen argue that "CDA is
still burdened by a very “linguistic” outlook, which prevents productive ways of
incorporating linguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of semiosis” (2000, p. 461). To
move beyond narrow conceptions of textuality, they propose “a more ethnographically
informed stance, in which linguistic practice is embedded in more general patterns of
human meaningful action” (2000, p. 461). Furthermore, Threadgold (2003) holds that
theory and method cannot be divorced, and thus, a sustained engagement with critical
theory should be taken as fundamental for methods pertaining to critical discourse
analysis.
In order to more effectively illuminate structural levels of power as they operate
in media texts, Carpentier and De Cleen (2007) propose an approach they call Discourse
Theory and Analysis (DTA). DTA has much in common with Critical Discourse
Analysis, including a fundamental commitment to understanding power relations in
society and working towards emancipation. However, whereas CDA is more concerned
with micro-level linguistic analysis, DTA uses Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) discourse
theory to focus on a broader definition of text considering also non-linguistic forms. DTA
also utilizes a macro-contextual approach which refers “to the social as the realm where
the processes of the generation of meaning are situated” (2007, p. 277). While
practitioners of various forms of discourse analysis often make divergent claims about the
relative importance of the textual at the micro-level, and the intertextual at the meso- and
macro-levels, approaches to discourse analysis utilize a hermeneutic approach, which
seeks to understand structural elements of the formation of the social subject by focusing
on concrete events, embodied, mediated or both. As Fairclough writes, "the reason for
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centring the concept of ‘social practice’ is that it allows an oscillation between the
perspective of social structure and the perspective of social action and agency" (2001a, p.
27). In this way, discourse analysis shares much with interpretive ethnographic
approaches to culture and society, which conceive of culture as “webs of significance”
(Geertz, 1977, p. 5).
Although not traditionally situated within methodologies of discourse analysis,
some of the most productive approaches to the oscillation between structure and action
can be found in interpretive ethnography. Although Fairclough does not reference him in
relation to the idea of “social practice,” Bourdieu’s early ethnographic work was
foundational in outlining the structure-practice nexus. Contrary to objectivist and
structuralist approaches popular in mid 20th century anthropology, Bourdieu (1977)
argues that in homogeneous societies it is not explicitly understood rules that govern
practice, but rather “practical knowledge, based on the continuous decoding of the
perceived—but not consciously noticed—indices of the welcome given to actions already
accomplished” (1977, p. 10). This perpetual mechanism of checks and corrections ensure
the adjustment of practices to meet the expectations of other social agents.
This mechanism functions implicitly, without the need for active reflection or
theorization on the part of agents. It is a “discourse of familiarity that leaves unsaid all
that goes without saying” (1977, p. 17). Bourdieu critiques anthropologists who, when
asking informants to express what is implicit, take the explanations as reflective of the
informant’s process. In actuality, by turning practical knowledge into semi-theoretical
explanations in response to outsider questioning, informants reduce and unintentionally
conceal the true depths of practical knowledge (1977, p. 19). Instead, Bourdieu proposes
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that social analysts focus on the construction of “the principle which makes it possible to
account for all the cases observed…This construction, and the generative operation of
which it is the basis, are only the theoretical equivalent of the practical scheme which
enables every correctly trained agent to produce all the practices and judgments of
honour called for by the challenges of existence” (1977, p. 11). The implicit background
principles guiding background practices, which are known to all and are reproduced and
developed socially, provide both structure and space for strategic maneuvering. And yet,
“the imposition and inculcation of the structures is never so perfect that all explicitness
can be dispensed with” (1977, p. 19). In fact, inculcation through some form of
objectification in discourse or through the symbolic support of emblems and rituals is
“one of the privileged moments for formulating the practical schemes and constituting
them as principles” (1977, p. 20). Thus, examining these instances of inculcation can
reveal much about the otherwise largely implicit principles guiding practice.

Discourse and the Social: Analyzing Fixity and Dispersion
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) provide a set of tools to help apply these insights about
social practice and the invented nature of any articulation of culture to the analysis of
advanced capitalist societies. The apparently more complex and fragmented nature of
these societies as compared to their traditional counterparts is the result of the
fundamental asymmetry “between a growing proliferation of differences—a surplus
meaning of ‘the social’—and the difficulties encountered by any discourse attempting to
fix those differences as moments of a stable articulatory structure” (2001, p. 98). While in
more homogenous societies the knowledge of practice, or “the social,” remains largely
45

implicit, in heterogeneous societies the multiplicity of forms of the social raises difficulty
for those attempting to maintain their definition of the normal. It becomes more difficult
for the hegemonic group to “conceal from itself its own truth” and inscribe in objectivity
its representation thereof (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 22). Thus, increasing polysemy in
heterogeneous societies puts pressure on discursive structures that “the social” attempts
use to create the identity of society.
Laclau and Mouffe show that discourse is the ultimately futile attempt to tame
and fix this surplus meaning of the social. Through the concept of overdetermination,
they focus on every form of fixity as the object of critique. One possible conclusion from
Althusser’s early mobilization of the idea of overdetermination—the one that Laclau and
Mouffe aim to recover—is that every formulation of society is necessarily an
overdetermination. Overdetermination is the means by which the social constitutes itself
as a symbolic order. For Laclau and Mouffe, overdetermination is the process of creating
symbolic order by fixing a privileged meaning from the manifold possible meanings.
"Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities merely consist of the
relative and precarious forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a certain
order" (2001, p. 98). The attempts at fixation will always remain partial since “the
presence of some objects in others prevents any of their identities from being fixed”
(2001, p. 104). Discourse is a battle against the surplus of meaning that can only ever
partially succeed. This “surplus” is the terrain of every social practice - the field of
discursivity (2001, p. 111). "Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the
field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center” (2001, p.
112). They call the “privileged discursive point of this partial fixation, nodal points"
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(2001, p. 112). Thus, although Laclau and Mouffe argue for a critique of every form of
fixity, they do not deny the existence of fixity absolutely. Fixity can succeed to greater or
lesser extents, but can never succeed definitely. Thus, despite great efforts to hold onto a
coherent idea of society,
society never manages to be identical to itself, as every nodal point is constituted
within an intertextuality that overflows it. The practice of articulation, therefore,
consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the
partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a
result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude
of the field of discursivity. (2001, p. 113)
The partial successes of articulation provide an always incomplete, impermanent and
imperfect, but still potent sense of society. Just as a complete form of fixity is impossible,
it is also not possible to do away with fixity altogether. To do so would be to do away
with the conditions of possibility of social practice and even the social altogether.
This notion of the discursive field complements Foucault’s archeo-genealogical
approach to discourse. In The Archeology of Knowledge, which was originally published
in 1969, Foucault instructs that the first step for analyzing discourse is to question
familiar categories or groupings and other notions that provide continuity through readymade syntheses. "All these syntheses that are accepted without question must remain in
suspense" (2002, p. 28). Foucault seeks to unsettle the tranquility with which familiar
nodal points are accepted. Like Laclau and Mouffe’s exhortation to critique every form of
fixity, Foucault is not arguing that they should be definitively rejected. However, the first
step to understanding the operations of hegemony is to question the forms of knowledge,
the common sense that it supports.
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According to Foucault, we must show that these categories and continuities “do
not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of
which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized” (2002, p. 28).
The kinds of rules Foucault is talking about are not the juridical form imagined by
traditional structuralists that sees practice as a form of obedience to the rules. It is “rule”
in the polysemic sense, as Bourdieu also proposes (1977, p. 27). Beyond the explicitly
stated and recognized form expressed in the idea of norms, Bourdieu reminds us to
consider rules also in the form of theoretical models, or as a scheme immanent in
practice. So, in summary, the first step in analyzing discourse is to unsettle and examine
the foundations of its unity and continuity and ask under what conditions this unity is
made legitimate. Once having taken it apart, we have to ask if it can be put back together
again, or whether it could be reformed in another way.
Given their privileged position in formulating narratives, in selecting from the
universe of events fragments to portray, analyze and publically disperse, the media are a
prime site of analysis for discourse theory. Yet, according to Carpentier and De Cleen,
relatively few studies of the media have used discourse theoretical analysis. Instead,
studies of media discourse have been primarily undertaken under the more linguistically
oriented Critical Discourse Analysis. Despite the common ground between these
approaches, Carpentier and De Cleen argue that discourse theory allows analysis of the
media to move beyond “talk and text in context,” to use Van Dijk’s formulation, to
consider non-linguistic aspects of discursive formations.
Perhaps the most crucial allowance of discourse theory and analysis’s broader
approach is the theoretical support it provides “for the in-depth analysis of the
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construction of political identities, embedded in the sociology of conflict and
antagonisms” (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007, p. 278). Although CDA offers better tools
for the analysis of the specificities of language and form, in their comparison of
discursive approaches for analyzing subject formation Jørgensen and Phillips conclude
that “critical discourse analysis has the least developed understanding of self and identity
(2002, p. 146). Since my interest in this dissertation is focused more on how public
representations create and reinforce ideas of society, a discourse theoretical approach
provides the most focused framework for identifying points of fixity and pulling at their
seams to examine their constituent parts and to ask how it might be otherwise.

Chapter Outline

Part I: German National Ideas
The first section of this dissertation outlines two frameworks of identity formation
that inform basic assumptions about selfhood and belonging at various scales: the
affective Romantic and the rational Universalist. As was argued above, the particular and
the universal are both necessary to conceptualize and reproduce the particular disjunctive
hyphen of the nation-state. In the German case, the “twin concepts of power state and
romantic nation are constitutive but not fused” (Wæver, 2005, p. 39). The first chapter
analyzes the conception of the nation through the German idea of Heimat (homeland).
The second chapter traces the emergence of integration projects, relating them to the
development of forms of national identity and state sovereignty based on rationalistic
economic imperatives after World War II.
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Both sections consider the relationship

between normative and non-normative populations in each of these modes of collective
subjectivity.
Chapter 1 examines how the concept of Heimat (homeland) has helped to stabilize
the German sense of nationhood and national subjectivity across periods of political
rupture. While changes in German citizenship law have gradually extended formal
citizenship to those outside the imagined autochthonous population, informal
mechanisms of normative citizenship reproduce the category of the stranger, or the
candidate for integration, across generations. This chapter analyzes how the notion of
Heimat has functioned in post-war Germany in conservative and leftist narratives of the
past to separate the personal from the political in memory of past atrocity. It also looks at
the subtle ways that Heimat excludes non-normative citizens from participation in
collective memory and, thus, from full membership in the national citizenry.
Although Germany is traditionally seen as a paradigmatic example of
particularistic forms of national identity, the implementation of birthright to citizenship in
2000 has required the renegotiation of national belonging. Chapter 2 explores the
development of integration discourse as a means of including and simultaneously
managing diversity within the German population. Sports, and above all soccer, have
played an important role in the conceptualization of integration. I analyze documents
from the Federal Government, the German Olympic Sports Confederation, and the
German Soccer Association to explain the symbolic and practical value of sports in
integration discourse. This chapter argues that integration discourse is an extension of
biopolitical and disciplinary technologies for constituting and governing the national
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population, which have been a fundamental part of the national project since the
establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.

Part II: Integrants and the New Germany
This section examines the new forms of public relationships to the national that
have emerged in Germany since 2000. Since the first German state was established in
1971, there have been many “new Germanys.” In fact, since its foundation as a state
every generation has lived through the foundation of at least one new iteration of
Germany, from the rise of the Third Reich to Reunification. However, the newest
Germany, based on the inclusion of immigrants and their children, is the first to include
“new Germans” (Bota, Özlem, & Pham, 2012; Ezli, 2014).This section examines how
hosting one of the world’s greatest sporting spectacles contributed to a renaissance of
German symbolic nationalism and how the participation of “new Germans” has been
invoked by the media to create a break from the traumatic past. In this process, the media
frames integration and national pride as fundamental to the health and wellbeing of the
national population.
Global sporting spectacles provide an ideal forum for the “repatriation of
difference” (Appadurai, 1990, p. 307) and construction of the symbolic power of the
nation brand. This is particularly salient for the host nation. In 2006, Germany hosted its
first FIFA men’s World Cup since reunification. The desire for a renewed German pride
has long been stymied by the specters of German nationalisms of the past. Where past
efforts had failed, Chapter 3 examines how the 2006 World Cup finally succeeded in
breaking the perceived taboo against the public expression of overt national pride. At the
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same time, in the period leading up to the tournament, integration reached an
unprecedented level of importance in public policy and in the media. In 2004 the first law
governing immigration went into effect (Zuwanderungsgesetz). For the first time, in this
law “integration” became a matter of law. In both national self-reflection and integration
discourse, sports emerge repeatedly as a source of narrative and symbolism. Mentions of
the 2006 World Cup are often accompanied by passionate declarations about its personal
and national significance, evoking themes such as pride, freedom, national cohesion, and
the feeling of joining the world of “normal” nations. During the 2006 World Cup,
football was proposed as a model for national engagement. The first case study analyzes
how the features and expectations of this event were mobilized to legitimate a change in
German practices of symbolic nationalism.
In preparation for the tournament, several national media campaigns were rolled
out in a coordinated effort to use the wave of enthusiasm for one of the world’s largest
and most popular sporting events to usher in a new era of patriotism. The largest and
most successful of these projects was the social marketing campaign under the slogan, Du
bist Deutschland (“You Are Germany”), which is the focus of Chapter 4. The initial
campaign was one of several campaigns focused on promoting Germany developed in the
year running up to the 2006 World Cup in Germany. A related campaign, “Germany—
Land of Ideas” focused on promoting German innovation and industrial prowess to take
advantage of the global attention that hosting the World Cup would attract. But unlike the
international focus of the “Land of Ideas” campaign, Du bist Deutschland was focused
entirely on creating a “positive mood” and stimulating national sentiments among the
German population. This campaign illustrates the internal component of nation branding,
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which follows from the imperative to secure the buy-in of citizens for the success of
national projects of self-representation on a global stage. In the case of Germany, this
required the neutralization or at least the suspension of complicated domestic politics of
memory around national symbols and sentiments. By successfully executing this
spectacle following the established script for global sporting events, Germany was
fulfilling its duty as host. In this way, the global sporting spectacle of the World Cup
provided both the means and the justification for remaking German national pride. Given
the almost universal participation of German media companies in the campaign, as well
as the indirect support of the government and industrialists through Partners for
Innovation, Chapter 4 investigates the kind of idealized national construction imagined
by leaders in German industry, media, and politics.
After the 2006 FIFA men’s World Cup hosted by Germany re-established the
practice of public displays of national affiliation there, flag-waving became an almost
obligatory national sports tradition in the 2008 Euro Cup and again in the 2010 World
Cup. As commentators in the media enthused, the multi-ethnic German national team of
the 2010 World Cup inspired transnational Germans and immigrants to join in the
patriotic displays in greater numbers. Chapter 5 discusses a heavily mediated flag fight
between immigrant patriots and anti-nationalist Germans during the 2010 World Cup,
which exemplified the symbolic and pedagogical value of immigrant patriotism for the
promotion of a civic form of nationalism. The story of the display and adamant defense
of one of Germany’s largest flags by Lebanese immigrants in Berlin attracted national
and international attention. The story was framed in the media as a surprising reversal of
the expected: the flag’s attackers were ethnic Germans and its defenders were hyphenated
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Germans. Yet, the story is framed not only as a surprising reversal, but also as a critique
of many Germans’ distrust of symbolic patriotism. The fervor of the Lebanese-German
patriots is projected as a lesson to normative Germans about patriotism as a healthy and
natural form of social cohesion that is compatible with––and even necessary for––the
functional development of diverse societies.
This kind of instrumentalization of national sports teams and global sporting
spectacles is by no means unique to Germany. As Laurent Dubois (2010) shows, the 1998
World Cup victory in a tournament hosted in France was celebrated as the victory of the
“black, blanc, beur” (black, white, and Arab) team. The team represented the colonial
history and postcolonial present and future of France. The team’s diversity was subjected
to intense scrutiny, and was held as a symbol of the transformation of French society.
Like the French case, the German team was converted into a symbol of positive change in
German society. Moreover, the change in the makeup of the national team was used to
symbolize a break with the past. In both cases, international sporting events provide a
forum and a symbolic focal point for reckoning with the past and constructing an
idealized national trajectory. Unsullied by associations with nationalist crimes of the past,
immigrant patriotism authorizes and invites normative citizens to participate in
normalized forms of nationalist expression.

Part III: “Failures” of Integration
The two chapters in this final section analyze the construction and fortification of
divisions between citizens and integrants, between integration failures and successes.
They demonstrate how divisions made using biopolitical logics fracture the population so
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that the power to make live can be optimized by confining social ills to particular
segments of the population. While national pride and sporting integration define the
optimal forms of life for Germans and worthy integrants, this section investigates various
means for the assessment and condemnation of unfit populations. The precariousness of
the support of the new cosmopolitan Germany that was touted during the flag fight was
thrown into sharp relief just months after the national soccer team returned from South
Africa. In August of 2010, one of the most intense recent debates in Germany broke out
around the publication and runaway popularity of Thilo Sarrazin’s book titled Germany
Does Away with Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), which is the focus of Chapter 6. The
arguments of the book are built on nativist pseudoscience bolstered by statistics that
supposedly prove that while intelligent German women are not procreating, less
intelligent populations, particularly Muslims, are proliferating and dumbing down
German society.
Drawing on evidence from sources including Herrnstein and Murray (1996), Lynn
and Vanhanen (2002), and Francis Galton (1869), Sarrazin’s book borrows from a long
tradition of eugenicist social science. These authors combine pseudoscientific theories of
the heritability of aptitude and intelligence with state-generated statistics describing the
levels of education, criminality, and affluence to draw broad conclusions about the state
of society and the culprits of social ills. In many ways, this debate echoed the American
controversy around Herrnstein and Murray’s racially oriented book on the heritability of
IQ, The Bell Curve in the 1990s. According to an analysis of press coverage, The Bell
Curve, which “spent weeks at the top of the best-seller lists” (Schmidt, 2012), “was
accorded attention totally disproportionate to the merits of the book or the novelty of its
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thesis” (Naureckas, 1995). Like the media response to Sarrazin’s book, “media accounts
showed a disturbing tendency to accept Murray and Herrnstein's premises and evidence
even while debating their conclusions” (Naureckas, 1995). Similarly, although taking
issue with his tone, Sarrazin was widely praised for bringing to light an important and
“taboo” issue.
Finally, Chapter 7 examines two media projects that emerged around the time of
the Sarrazin debate, which illustrate the depth of entanglements between processes of
celebration and condemnation in integration discourse. According to his critics,
Sarrazin’s book was the antithesis of productive integration work. However, several
positively oriented integration campaigns and programs developed in the wake of the
debate bear a strong resemblance to many of the arguments and assumptions of Sarrazin
and his supporters. Although the projects analyzed in this chapter celebrate integrants
using celebrity examples, they also depend on a binary conception of integrants as either
willful failures or successes.
The first part of Chapter 7 examines the creation of a new prize category honoring
“successful examples of integration” by Germany’s oldest media prize institution, the
Bambi Awards. The Integration Bambi was first awarded in 2010, less than three months
after the publication of Sarrazin’s book. The inaugural recipient was German national
soccer player, Mesut Özil. The introduction of a prize category honoring integration was
uncontroversial, particularly with the soft-spoken Turkish-German soccer star as the first
recipient. However, the choice of successful Tunesian-German rap artist Bushido as the
2011 recipient became a national controversy. Bushido’s work draws on gangsta rap
conventions, including violent, misogynistic, and homophobic lyrics. He is also actively
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involved in youth charity work. The first part of this chapter compares the framing and
responses to these two award recipients, considering the logics of social prizes. These
recipients served to define the ideals of integration and the threat posed by its failure.
Controversy around the award only heightened the importance of the award and
strengthened the normative assumptions behind the category.
The second part of Chapter 7 examines another celebrity-oriented integration
program, the Raus mit der Sprache––Rein ins Leben (Out with language––Into Life)
campaign from Association of German Periodical Publishers with the support of the
Federal Government. The campaign features photographs of well-known minority
German athletes, artists, and politicians sticking out their tongues for the camera. Their
tongues have been digitally altered to display the colors of the German flag, indicating
their ability to speak German. In addition to the content of the campaign and its theme
song, this section analyzes the statements of campaign creators and supporters to
understand the goals and the logic of this campaign as it relates to integration, focusing
on the conception of language within integration discourse. Judgments about what counts
as valuable language reflect both the anxieties and the opportunism of broader
approaches to social diversity in an increasingly diverse population. This campaign
demonstrates how the frequent invocation of language within integration discourse and
policy engages in the politics and political economy of life examined in previous
chapters. Through the examples of the Integration Bambi and the Out with It campaign,
this chapter examines how minority celebrities act as models of and threats to integration.
The conclusion of this dissertation contemplates the future of integration
discourse, using reactions to the ongoing global refugee crisis to extend the implications
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of a politics oriented towards the cultivation of life. Public discourse and policy in the
European Union reacting to the crisis highlight again how biopolitics involves perpetual
decision-making about which lives are of value for the life of the population, which is
conceived in terms of the normative national. At the same time, the racist logics of this
process of decision making have been taken up by the growing populist right, threatening
to destabilize the moral balance of European Universalism (Wallerstein, 2006). In
response, mainstream politicians and public figures have scrambled to isolate racism as a
marginal social phenomenon, rather than an inherent part of integration discourse. The
conclusion turns to the critical voices writing from a minoritarian perspective to
challenge this move to confine conceptions of racism to the margins. These writers
propose a new way forward that insists on confronting racism as a structural and
institutional problem and that engages the complexity of cultural dialog in diverse
societies.

i

1) Unfähig zum Leben in der Gemeinschaft, sich nicht in die Gemeinschaft einfügend; am Rand der
Gesellschaft lebend; 2) die Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft schädigend; 3) ein niedriges geistiges, kulturelles
Niveau aufweisend; ungebildet und ungehobelt.
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PART I: GERMAN NATIONAL IDEAS
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CHAPTER 1 – HEIMAT AND GERMAN NOTIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY

This chapter examines one of the foundations of German national subjectivity that
has emerged from the critical analysis of German nationalism largely unscathed: the idea
of Heimat, or homeland. Biopolitics, with its focus on “the population” as a biological
corpus, imagines itself as operating above the social levels of national politics and law
(Lemke, 2011). However, the idea of the population which is politically relevant
continues to be cultivated through national discourses and norms. It is true that
conceptions of the population can easily scale to encompass all of humanity, as in
discussions of the geological impact of humanity through population growth and ensuing
environmental degradation. However, the political and institutional mechanisms for
implementing biopolitical policies and mechanisms still depend on nationally defined
states and the uneven power of the international system of nation-states, such as the
United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or NATO. Even in this global age, the
hegemony of the nation-state persists in politics as it does in popular imaginations. What
defines the nation as a social and political entity varies greatly, and that definition has
implications for determining the legitimate place and expectations of denizens of a state.
Recalling Foucault’s (2003) definition of biopolitical race war as a means of fragmenting
the population into the normative and the potentially threatening, this chapter looks at the
role of the affective concept of Heimat in defining German belonging through a shared
conception of an imagined personal and familial past. Heimat defines those whose
membership is assumed to be natural, emerging from a connection to an originary past
that concords with the present. It is a foundational part of the distinction between the
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grounded “national” and the dislocated “integrant,” who presumably suffers psychic
fragmentation because of the separation from their own harmonious Heimat.
In contemporary liberal democracy, tolerance is promoted as a public virtue and
racism is almost universally condemned (Brown, 2009). In this schema, Heimat serves as
a seemingly benign means of dividing the population at the apparently pre-political level.
However, the fact that this form of intimate division may cut deeper than overt acts of
racism was conveyed in two anecdotes shared with me outside one of Berlin’s popular
watering holes in the neighborhood of Kreuzberg. Since the early 1990s, if not before,
Kreuzberg has been the jewel in Berlin’s crown of cutting edge alterity.7 Germany’s most
famous Turkish neighborhood, Kreuzberg is a national symbol of both multicultural cool
and the threat of parallel (immigrant) societies (Parallelgesellschaften). Berem is a
university student from Dortmund, whom I had met while doing research in Istanbul two
summers earlier. She had been doing an exchange year there through the Erasmus
program, and I had interviewed her about her experience of living in Turkey as a German
of Turkish descent. To be specific, Berem is not Turkish, but Kurdish, although her
family, as she put it, was twice assimilated: her parents to Turkey and her to Germany.
As a result, while her family’s traditions varied significantly from many of her TurkishGerman compatriots, she shared with them both the Turkish language of her parents and

7

See, for example, Berlin for Young People, 1992 (qtd. in Soysal, 2004, p. 67)
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the German language of her birth nation. One thing that has never been ambiguous to
Berem was her subjectivity as German.
During our first conversation, Berem assumed that I planned to ask her about
rupture and crisis, the modes of subjectivity that have long been assigned to first, second
and third generation Germans or, as they are more commonly called, “migrants” or
“people with a migration background” (Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund). Her
assumptions, and the stories she told me when she realized that my conceptual frame did
not fit the presumed mold, revealed how frequently Berem was faced with pushing back
against narratives of deficiency, or fracturing and disintegration that others—primarily
normative white Germans—projected onto her.
Our second meeting was purely social, but we ended up talking again about
experiences of mismatched interpellation. One story she told me was of being on the train
in Frankfurt an der Oder, where Berem attends university. Pass checkers boarded the
train, and she handed them her semester ticket. The checker looked at it and, claiming
that it was invalid, took it away. Berem protested, and the conductor responded, “This is
how it’s done in Germany.”i Berem was utterly confused, and only upon later reflection
did she realize that it was a racist act: “I didn’t understand the comment. I see myself as a
German, and it never crossed my mind at the time that others might not see it the same
way.” The checker’s interpellation of Berem as a foreigner passed her by, and even when
she put the pieces together, her anger was short-lived. This was just an individual whose
racist aggression against Berem failed to hit its mark.
The other anecdote Berem offered was from the time of her preparations for the
Erasmus year in Istanbul. When she was getting the paperwork necessary for her student
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visa, the German official who was helping her exclaimed, “How nice! You’re going back
to your homeland.”ii Berem responded curtly that she was born in Germany and that this
was her homeland. The woman responded with a flustered apology. Of the two incidents,
this misguided friendliness was the one that most upset Berem.
The most obvious explanation for the less disturbing nature of the direct form of
exclusion is that the spontaneous malice of an individual is easily written off as a random
act of aggression from the margins of society, despite the checker’s status as a public
employee. The fare-checker’s act was so distant from Berem’s self-conception and her
conception of her home nation of Germany that, in the end, it was almost risible. On the
other hand, the sympathetic instantiation of exclusion came from the very center of
German social and institutional space. The official had Berem’s German passport in hand
as she simultaneously denied it as a signifier of true national affiliation. The fact that the
comment was meant to be understanding and supportive galled Berem even more. Part of
the depth of this affront also relates to the particular status of the Heimat in German
notions of belonging. Berem’s contrasting anecdotes express the subtle corrosiveness of
well-intentioned misapprehension and raise questions about how the local and personal
notion of homeland reproduce the abstract political notion of the nation.
This chapter investigates the forms of social cohesion and exclusion expressed in
the German idea of Heimat. Understanding Heimat’s role in the construction of a German
national subjectivity is essential for understanding the durable distinction between the
national and the integrant. Lentin and Titley (2011) borrow and elaborate on the term
“integrant” from an empirical study by Hvenegård-Lassen (2005) based on interviews
with bureaucrats involved in integration programs in Denmark and Sweden. Hvenegård63

Lassen defines the category of the integrant as the imagined recipient of integration
programming, the “subject for integration.” Focusing on the category of the integrant
allows for a division between conceptualizations of the subject of integration programs
and discourse and the actual people they refer to. Thus, discourse constructing the
integrant tells us more about the people and institutions who contribute to it than it does
about its referent. This chapter focuses on the category of the national which, as this
dissertation argues, only has meaning in relation to its Others.
The rootedness and permanence of the imagined Heimat, as well as its
conceptualization as the epitome of German harmony, reproduces the perception of
citizens and residents without German descent as permanent foreigners. Furthermore, it
does so within an affective framework that is difficult to criticize. The intimacy of
Heimat resists analysis. As Peter Blickle observes, “the tacit assumption is that Heimat
can only be understood from within. Therefore, true understanding can only come only
out of a form of identification, not from a form of analysis” (2004, p. 12). Heimat is
conceived as fundamentally constitutive of the self. It is the place of origin, the place of
individual sovereignty. Through its association with the individual and particular, it also
presents itself as apolitical and even anti-nationalist. At the same time, as we will see,
Heimat constitutes the nexus between the individual world of the experiential and the
abstract space of politics and, thus, forms the foundation of the German national
imaginary.

Heimat and Subjectivity: From the 19th Century to the Postwar Period
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The term Heimat combines a particular conception of the temporal and the spatial
in the definition of the affective and political German nation. Notoriously difficult to
translate, “homeland” is an insufficient, but tolerable approximation of Heimat. From the
Old High German term Heimoti, which signified the right to be present at a certain place
or locality (Schütz, 1996, p. 57), Heimat implies a deep affective bond of a person to an
original home. The possession of a Heimat is a key part of individuals’ possession of
their own person, their own interiority. Intimately linked to the possession of legitimate
claims to space, Heimat exists primarily, and perhaps exclusively, in retrospect. Heimat is
the imagined origin that is remembered in the process of the human becoming the
individual. Heimat encapsulates a place-world wherein portions of the past are brought
into being. It is the foundation of the German conception of indigeneity, a mode that—
although itself formed through the defamiliarization induced by change over time—
emphasizes rootedness and constructs temporal continuity. The intimate and individual
possession of Heimat is conceived of as an apolitical form of affiliation, as opposed to
communitarian and exclusionary forms of affiliation associated with nationalism.
Despite the wealth of popular and scholarly texts centered on the Heimat idea,
very few authors have taken a critical approach to understanding the term and its social
and political function. In her book, A Nation of Provincials (1990), historian Celia
Applegate was the first to seriously investigate the genealogy of Heimat, which she traces
to the foundation of the modern notion of Germany as nation-state. The primary
distinguishing

feature

of

the

modern

German

notion

of

Heimat

is

its

“mixture of practicality and sentimentality” (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). The idea emerged in
the first half of the 19th century, in conjunction with terms like Nation, Volk, Vaterland,
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and Staat to create new political imaginaries in the diverse and unstable German states
after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. As part of efforts to provide solid
ground for a German nationalism, writers and civic leaders reinvented the term, which
had long existed in the German language but was previously of little social or political
importance. The term was at the heart of a new mode of language, one that was aware of
its audience, which was imagined in national terms. As Applegate writes, Heimat “is a
term that dwelt in one world, that of the self-conscious centralizers, modernizers, and
nationalists of the General Estate, while evoking another” (1990, p. 8). Emerging from
the new bourgeois public sphere, it evoked an imagined, mythologized version of the
hometown—the secure society of childhood memory.
While focusing on the private and local, this evocation was mobilized to establish
the earliest membership policies of modern statehood in the German territories in the 19th
century. In the 1820s in the independent kingdom of Bavaria, the Heimatrecht (law of
domicile) was enacted as part of an administrative effort to unify the definition of
citizenship and extend it to the borders of the state (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). This law
established the right of citizens to settle in any Bavarian town they chose, and imposed
responsibilities such as self-sufficiency and adherence to laws. Heimatrecht represented a
new principle of state citizenship which superseded the right of local communities to
determine who belonged and who did not. “Heimat represented a thoroughly flexible
concept by which the state could reproduce itself at the local level of civic experience
characteristic of most people’s lives” (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). As urbanization and
industrialization overtook the real hometown, the deceptive antiquity of the word
increasingly obscured the administrative fiction of this reinscription of Heimat.
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The territorially grounded nature of this shared form of individual memory is
essential for it to function as a constitutive part of the political-cultural union of the
nation-state. As the example of early 19th century Bavaria shows, the foundation of
modern political institutions requires particularity to establish a new universal form of
liberal politics based on citizenship. Observing the growing hegemony of the modern
nation-state, Marx recognized already in the mid-nineteenth century that the state requires
particularity to justify its superiority,
Far from abolishing these factual distinctions, the state presupposes them in order
to exist, it only experiences itself as political state and asserts its universality in
opposition to these elements… it is only in this way, above the particular
elements that the state constitutes itself as universality” (Marx, 2005, p. 219).
The person living within the political state thus lives in a double life of particularity and
universality. As Marx observed in the case of the United States, the political
emancipation of the individual through granting democratic sovereignty to the figure of
the citizen does not require neutralizing difference. In order to construct the idea of the
species-being in the form of the citizen, the living individual is divested of “his real
individual life and filled with an unreal universality” (Marx, 2005, p. 220). The
scalability of Heimat provides a sort of affective continuity within this double life.
Although the concept of Heimat is built on deeply localized notions, these notions
were primarily a means of transferring the emotional and social attachments of the lived
world to a broader, more abstract level than ever before. As Applegate observes, “the
utility of Heimat lay in its capacity to obscure any chasms between small local worlds
and the larger ones to which the locality belonged” (1990, p. 10). At the same time, the
idea of provincial diversity of the German territory was maintained as a constitutive part
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of the new German state after unification in 1871. In this way, Heimat acted—and
continues to act—as a wedge that props up the uneven parts of the German nation to
produce an illusion of cohesion and continuity. The emptiness of the gap creates the
imaginary space necessary to generate a conception of community in the abstract. Heimat
is the power of the imagined but never experienced past: the original homeland. Public
invocations of Heimat involve the subordination of phenomenal experiences to collective
memory—or perhaps more precisely, to the collective individualized experience of
idealized memory. Reference to Heimat invokes idealized forms of personal memories
and associations to cultivate a collective affect in service of a shared political imaginary.
During the Nazi period, Heimat was used by the regime as part of a raft of terms
to express a highly-centralized form of Germanness, losing the provincial associations
foundational to its meaning. For the Nazis, Heimat was just another way to talk about
nation, race, and Volk. Thus, although it was a prominent part of nationalist discourses of
the period, the term was easily rehabilitated after the war through the reintroduction of
the local emphasis. “Pulled out of the rubble of the Nazi Reich as a victim, not a
perpetrator” (Applegate, 1990, p. 229), Heimat was revived after the war and once again
used to create a grounded and affective form of national cohesion. Since Nazism was
seen as an excess of centralized national power, the provincialism of Heimat was seen as
an antidote to “excessive Germanness” (Applegate, 1990, p. 18), while still providing a
powerful form of national sentiment. This conception held even though, as discussed
above, it was the very provincialism of Heimat that made it so crucial for creating the
double life of particularity and universality necessary for establishing a centralized,
modern German nationhood.
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Faced with the unbearable trauma of accepting the broad participation of society
necessary to commit National Socialist crimes, postwar Germans retreated to personal
memories of the Nazi period (Confino, 1998). As part of this, the intimate, local, and
experiential aspects of the Heimat concept were revived and its imperial deployment in
building the abstract political community of the nation were forgotten or ignored.
Heimat’s affective security and harmony became a refuge in postwar Germany, where the
bucolic Heimat film genre took over the German cinema, peaking in the 1950s (Kaes,
1992; Ludewig, 2014). Cinema quickly became one of the most popular leisure-time
activities after cinemas were reopened in the summer of 1945. The German public had
little appetite for films depicting harsh postwar realities, a genre that became known as
“rubble films” (Trümmerfilme). Almost immediately after the German film industry
began releasing original films again in 1947, there were appeals from the press and
German audiences to stop depicting politics and ruins and produce more positive,
unblemished representations of German life (Ludewig, 2014). Postwar Heimat films
largely reproduced the settings, narratives, and emotional arcs that defined Heimat films
during the Nazi period.
Still, the escapist and apparently apolitical nature of Heimat films allowed this
genre that had been an effective part of Nazi propaganda to succeed in West Germany’s
economically-driven postwar culture industry (Ludewig, 2014). In a newly divided and
occupied country, as Anton Kaes writes, “Heimat signified above all an experience of
loss, a vacuum that Germans filled with nostalgic memories” (1992, p. 166). This was not
only the personal loss of one’s original home and the imagined harmony it represents, it
was also the loss of the uncontroversial, unthinking simplicity of banal nationalism
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(Billig, 1995). This is not to suggest that nationalism disappeared in the German public
after the defeat of National Socialism; nationalism continued, for example, in strict,
descent-based citizenship laws and in policies of ethnic German “repatriation” discussed
below. However, the idea that Germans denied themselves symbolic nationalism and
self-confidence because of the Nazi past is essentially taken for granted in public
discussions of German nationalism (see Chapter 3). In the postwar period, Heimat offered
a simple and positive form of identification that public celebrations of symbolic
nationalism could no longer provide.

Coming Home?
If the ideal Germany should be, as one writer in the postwar period put it,
“outwardly as unified as necessary, inwardly as diversified as possible” (Schnath, 1958,
p. 20), it would appear that the concept of Heimat should be well suited to provide a new
pluralist form of identification in Germany as its population changes with immigration
and demographic shifts. Yet, as Berem illustrated in our conversation, the forms of
diversity compatible with claims to Germany as Heimat do not extend to those who are
perceived as exogenous. A decisive boundary constructed by the German notion of
Heimat is between those who live in the nation of their Heimat and those who are
perceived to have been displaced from it. The counter-image of Heimat is embodied by
the Ausländer (Räthzel, 1994, p. 89). Ausländer, which translates to foreigner, is
composed of the preposition aus- meaning outside, and Land, meaning country. It means,
consequently, a person who lives outside their country and, simultaneously, one who
belongs outside the country where they reside. The disturbing associations of the
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alienation from Heimat are also expressed in its antonym in adjective form unheimlich,
generally translated as uncanny. The Heimat is where the subject makes sense, and the
experience of the unheimlich is the suspension of that familiar regime of truth. Whereas
Heimat represents the place where one unquestioningly belongs, the Ausländer is one
who is deprived of that harmonious belonging in perpetuity.
The most dramatic illustration of the complex relationship between Heimat and
ethnic or racial notions of belonging is evident in the case of ethnic German Aussiedler
(resettler), whose ancestors had moved to parts of Eastern Europe and Russia from
German territories decades or even centuries before. The definition of citizenship
established in the 1949 Basic Law of the German Federal Republic included special
consideration of Aussiedler, originally referred to as Heimatvertriebene (expellees from
the homeland). To paraphrase the relevant statute, refugees or expellees of German
descent who found refuge in the boundaries of the German Empire in 1937 were defined
as German according to the Basic Law (Article 116, Paragraph 1).iii This designation was
clarified in the Expellee and Refugee Law (BVFG) of 1953 to define ethnic German
status through the verifiable self-designation as German as well as the ability to
demonstrate characteristics such as descent and the maintenance of language or cultural
norms. The inclusion of these ethnic German minorities in German citizenship was a
reaction to the expulsion of these populations from the lands they had long occupied as a
response to German invasions during the Second World War. In the first four years after
the war, eight million expellees settled in West Germany (von Koppenfels, 2002).
Numbers of Aussiedler entering Germany dropped to an average of 40,000 between 1950
and 1986 and then spiked with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, reaching nearly
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400,000 in 1990. Aussiedler were provided significant resources to aid their resettlement,
including housing aid, access to the pension system and free German language classes.
The laws and processes establishing the privileges of German Aussiedler further
codified the juridical meaning of Germanness through ethnic descent, although this may
have been an unintended consequence of a reactive policy responding to the ethnic
definitions used to expel minority Germans from Eastern Europe (von Koppenfels, 2002).
In addition to strengthening norms of jus sanguinis citizenship, the process of accepting
Aussiedler also depended on shared conceptions of the meaning of Heimat, which
includes descent but also depends on the demonstration of an active imagination of
territorially and culturally grounded origins. The injustices of expulsion and the pain of
the loss of one’s Heimat became part of a strong conservative narrative of German
victimization in the Federal Republic that continues in contemporary reunited Germany
in mainstream as well as extreme right circles (Brinks, 2000); it allowed postwar
Germans to position themselves as victims of the Nazi period due to the suffering of
“good Germans” expelled from their rightful homelands (Confino, 2005). Although it
was widely acknowledged that after generations living far from Germany there was very
little that could be clearly distinguished as “German” about the Aussiedler, with proof of
descent and a cursory demonstration of the maintenance of cultural ties “returnees” were
welcomed into Germany with citizenship and social benefits. But as Stefan Senders
(2002) argues, this was not simply a policy affirming biological, blood-based belonging.
More than that, the process of applying for Aussiedler status was an active mimetic
construction of the nation. Senders writes that in the process of repatriation,
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ethnic Germans are required to bring their life stories into conformation with
prototypic plots; they must claim to have had the proper kinds of relationships, to
have felt the appropriate pain, and to have experienced their own being in specific
and predetermined forms. (2002, p. 90)
Through “testing” Aussiedler to see if they qualify for repatriation, German jurisprudence
made the norms regulating the reproduction of normative German citizens transparent.
These norms affirm that to be German implies genealogical descent, but that genealogical
descent is not necessarily sufficient to be German. The peak in applications for
Aussiedler status in the 1990s established affinity across time and space at a historical
moment when the children and grandchildren of the postwar Gastarbeiter (guest worker)
generation were coming of age as foreigners in the territory of their birth.
Updates to the Expellee and Refugee Law in 1992 added the expectation that
Aussiedler demonstrate having suffered for being German as one key means of proving
the authenticity of the claim to Germanness. In fact, current guidelines for applicants
from outside the former Soviet Union must “demonstrate that they have experienced
discrimination or the effects of earlier discrimination as a result of their German
identification (Völkszugehörigkeit)”iv (Bundesverwaltungsamt, n.d.). Regardless of
whether it was a reasonable reflection of their lived experience, Aussiedler are required to
present documents and narratives demonstrating the endurance of their memory of their
German Heimat abroad in their written petitions to German bureaucrats.
More than a recovery of original belonging, however, the petition procedure
entails a narrative performance that produces the German citizen “in Germany’s own
image”, thereby excluding other forms of difference from the narrative of national
reproduction (Senders, 2002, p. 88). This process of claiming citizenship acknowledges
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the possibility of transformation. As Senders’ study of legal cases from the 1990s shows,
the children of individuals who qualify as ethnic German Aussiedler might not
themselves qualify if they are determined to lack the necessary experiences and traits,
from a grasp of basic German to the maintenance of religious rituals, such as celebrating
Christmas in the German way following the Gregorian calendar. But by rearticulating and
recounting these requisite experiences in written petitions for citizenship, the Aussiedler
can become German again through the process of repatriation. At the same time, by
emphasizing the link between suffering endured to maintain Germanness outside the
ancestral homeland, it confirms the perception of the incompleteness of the lives of
Ausländer living in Germany and deprived of access to the place where they truly belong.
This might explain the sympathetic enthusiasm of the German official as she imagined
Berem’s experience of “returning” to the place where she can finally belong.
The perception that those residents and citizens who do not qualify as ethnic
Germans live suspended between their homelands and their host lands rearticulates the
perpetual difference between the German self and the foreign other. For this reason, when
writing about pervasive portrayals of immigrants and their descendants as internally torn
or fragmented, Leslie Adelson argues that “the trope of ‘betweenness’ often functions
literally like a reservation designed to contain, restrain, and impede new knowledge, not
enable it” (2007, p. 266). The imaginary bridge “between two worlds” keeps apart that
which it pretends to unify. Rather than a mode of transit to someplace new, the bridge
keeps migrants suspended in a state of perpetual alterity. In this context, turning a critical
eye to the deeply naturalized and also ambivalent notion of Heimat reveals how the
emotional and affective requirements of modern citizenship cannot be separated from the
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political. Left unexamined, the cultural and temporal assumptions that undergird the term
uncritically reproduce the foreignness of those whose Heimat is presumed to be
elsewhere.

Heimat: The Making of German Nationals and Integrant “Strangers”
As we have seen, the Heimat idea forms part of the daily reproduction of the
modern nation by creating a link between the locality and the nation. However, the term’s
flexibility does not necessarily encompass all forms of particularity. The term’s openness
obscures its function in racializing groups who carry exogenous markers, from foreign
names to physical features such as “schwarze Haare” (black hair). These traces of
foreignness index individuals and groups as “strangers,” to use Georg Simmel’s term.
Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Simmel defined strangers as members of
society whose relations are defined by the synthesis of “nearness and distance” (2011).
The paradigmatic stranger for Simmel was the European Jew, who often settled in one
place, but who nevertheless maintained a kind of mobility through business as well as
familial and social connections across space.
Simmel emphasized that strangers are part of society, not truly outsiders. They
share many commonalities with their indigenous neighbors, but those commonalities are
universal and general in nature, as opposed to the particularities “organic members” share
with each other that distinguish them from the universal. Strangers’ mobility and the
general nature of their relations of commonality are the inverse of Heimat. Crucially,
however, while the stranger and the Heimat are incongruous, their relation is not one of
insiders as opposed to outsiders. Strangers are not the barbarians at the gates, but the
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neighbors whose status lies in between, simultaneously near and distant. Their ambiguity,
the complexity of their relations, opposes the simplicity, harmony, and clarity of the
imagined Heimat.
In our universal system of nation-states, strangers become particularly
problematic. States operate by abstracting the concepts of friends (insiders) and enemies
(outsiders) to the level of national collectives (Bauman, 1990; Schmitt, 2007). But, as
Bauman (1990) observes, strangers are others within whose status of friend or enemy is
unclear, and therefore unsettling. Whereas oppositions between friend and enemy “enable
knowledge and action; undecidables paralyze” (Bauman, 1990, p. 146). Strangers must
always be watched, their behavior scrutinized to determine whether they are friends or
enemies. Bauman writes that assimilation is a “war against ambivalence” 8 (1990, p. 155).
It is the attempt to either turn a stranger into friend, or clarify their status as an enemy.
However, when strangers are part of a distinguishable group, the actions of some reflect
on, and raise questions about, the whole class. So long as they are recognized as
strangers, the determination can never be settled. The process becomes an infinite loop
until it is forgotten that they are strange. By using the term integrant to refer to this
stranger status in Germany, I emphasize this infinite loop that maintains scrutiny on those
whose Heimat is assumed to lie elsewhere.

8

Without discussing the arguments about the differences and similarities between integration and
assimilation generally, in relation to the figure of the stranger, the two concepts play the same role.
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Migrationshintergrund (person with a migration background)—is caught up in the
discourse of integration, their status as stranger remains active. Even in his pessimistic
account, Bauman recognizes that a stranger’s status as strange may be forgotten. The
definition of classes of strangers is socially grounded and subject to historical change.
The Jewish stranger of Simmel’s time is no longer the paradigmatic stranger. Although
there is significant discomfort among normative Germans around Jewishness in
Germany, which manifests in part as Philosemitism, Ruth Mandel’s (2008) ethnographic
work in Berlin during the 1980s and 1990s shows that Jews are no longer the primary
internal Other. Mandel’s work draws parallels between the pre-war status of Germany’s
Jews and the contemporary perception of Turkish-Germans as the primary example of
“foreigners inside” (2008, p. 137). As new waves of refugees from Lebanon, Syria,
Palestine, Afghanistan, Iran and other majority Muslim countries continue to arrive, the
Turk as paradigmatic stranger has been joined by the designation as Muslim. As relations
change and new strangers are identified, the formerly strange may recede from notice
within normative society. However, some features identifying strangers are more durable
than others, phenotypical difference chief among them.
Heimat’s troubling continuity with the past lies not in the overt racism of the Nazi
period, but rather in its status as a conventional discursive practice that continuously reinscribes difference, even when the intent is integrative. Even at the heart of the term
‘integration,’ the assumption of the necessity of a social process to suture two or more
distinct elements reifies the very existence of the difference it seeks to overcome. It
denies the possibility that a person raised in Germany can become familiar with and take
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ownership of the various cultural spheres they are immersed in, regardless of their
heritage. This, I think, lies at the heart of Berem’s two stories of social exclusion. The
government worker’s inadvertent friendly exclusion cut Berem more deeply than the
overtly racist act of the ticket checker. This friendly exclusion marks her as a permanent
stranger within.
Indeed, the unimpeachability of Heimat is based in its perceived individuality. For
each person, the meaning and imagining of Heimat is unique. Often it is associated with
the distinguishing features of the landscape of one’s childhood. It is safety and
domesticity evacuated of conflict—that is to say—of other people (Räthzel, 1994). It is
the state of harmony that can only be achieved in the imaginary. This internal nature of
Heimat is what Isaiah Berlin calls “collective individuality” (1976, p. 200). This refers us
back again to the particularity of German national collectivity. It is a collectivity that
bases itself on collective individuality and views collective social formations—such as
those projected onto patriarchal Eastern societies—as threatening the harmony of the
internally constituted but shared possession of Heimat. Modernity, through the nationstate, has fused cultural and political subjectivities to the point that the betrayal of the
nation is tantamount to the betrayal of self (Yack, 1996). Heimat, a thoroughly modern
term dressed in primordial trappings, reveals that the tension between European
universalism and romantic particularism is not a conflict at all, but rather a constitutive
force of modern subjectivity.
Different national imaginaries combine these two frameworks of universalism and
particularism in distinct and historically specific ways. The generalization necessary to
sustain the imaginary of a national population is built on different conceptions of
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specificity. Everyone must answer the question of what it means to be a member and
what defines a nation as opposed to its neighbors, although the answers must always
remain internally contested. National imaginaries also interact with regional and global
divisions, such as the distinction between modern and developing nations, between the
East and the West. It is quite common in the literature on nationalism to divide nations
into categories according to the weight given to particularistic as opposed to political or
constitutional forms. In one classic example, Kohn characterized the development of
European nationalisms according to the battle between nationalisms based on claims of
historical community as opposed to nations based on “the dream of brotherhood and
equal peoples in a universal order of democratic justice” (1955, p. 51). German
nationalism is often seen as a prototype of the particularist nation, defined by
romanticism and Herderian notions of essential cultures and “communities of fate”
(Schicksalsgemeinschaft). In contrast, French nationalism is defined as a civic community
of consensus, where culture, religion, and other forms of individual or group-based
differences are theoretically irrelevant in determining who belongs to the nation. While
there is some truth in this characterization, it obscures as much as it illuminates. After all,
what national ideology does not claim to pursue universalist aspirations of democratic
justice and equality among its citizenry? What modern nation has been immune from
nativist chauvinism that seeks to protect an essentialized notion of national culture from
outside threat? Keeping these phenomena apart creates a normative distinction between
good and bad forms of nationalism, creating the illusion that positive civic nationalism
can fully displace the negative historical variety (Kuzio, 2002; Yack, 1996). The crucial
point is to determine the relationship between these two tendencies as they emerge in
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each context. As a concept, Heimat is one of the terms that facilitates the spatial and
temporal movement between universalist national imaginaries and personal experience
and affect. The shared conception of Heimat as a source of the self builds the national
from the personal, while also maintaining the positive normative valence of universalism.
After all, everyone can have their own version of what constitutes Heimat.
Although the deceptive naturalism and intimacy of Heimat makes it difficult to
analyze, in doing so we may understand and critique the assumptions that reproduce
everyday forms of exclusion that can sometimes cut deeper than a particular act of
explicit racism. In part, this would involve acknowledging that in Germany “cultural
contact today is not an ‘intercultural encounter’ that takes place between German culture
and something outside it but something happening within German culture between the
German past and the German present” (Adelson, 2007, p. 268). Even as citizenship rights
have finally been expanded to include the second and third generations born of the
immigrant “Guest Workers” of the postwar period, locating the source of subjectivity
within the Heimat marks those who carry traces of other homelands as strangers or,
borrowing from Partridge (2012), as “noncitizens.”

The Desire for “Healthy Normality”
Heimat is bound up with a discourse of longing for “normality” that establishes
confident and unequivocal national self-identification as a prerequisite for the psychic
health of the population. In this view, people and historical events that introduce
complexity and unruly plurality or that evoke ambivalence pose a threat to the well-being
of the national population. Along with the discourses examined in other chapters of this
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dissertation, Heimat is one means of reducing this social complexity, assigning it to the
individual level and managing the trauma of associations with the perpetrators of
historical atrocities. This chapter concludes with examples that elucidate this relationship
between the trauma of the perpetrators and notions of normality and national “selfconfidence.” Also circulating within these discourses is the crucial question of who has
the right to speak about the National Socialist past. My intention here is not to enter
discussions about the relative validity of different representations of the past per se. What
is important for this dissertation are the uses of these debates about the past as part of the
construction of the national present and its legitimate citizenry. The first two examples
come from discussions surrounding two of the most popular creative works of the 1980s
and 90s: Edgar Reitz’s epic film series Heimat (1981-1984) and Martin Walser’s awardwinning auto-biographical novel, A Leaping Spring (1998) (Ein springender Brunnen).
From distinct political perspectives, these works model a collective national reclaiming of
narratives of the Third Reich from outsiders as well as a move to privatize the past in a
way that isolates personal experience from practices of state genocide.
The 1990s were defined both by Germany’s reunification and by a fresh outbreak
of racist violence against immigrants and refugees. Even as reunification raised the
possibility that Germany could once again be a “normal” nation in Europe, fatal fire
bombings and riots broke out in the early 1990s, raising the specter of the racisms of
Germany’s past. The 1990s also brought new revelations about the involvement of
Wehrmacht soldiers and everyday Germans in the Holocaust (Caplan, Frei, Geyer, Nolan,
& Stargardt, 2006). At the same time, frustration was building with the growing
memorial culture and official efforts at “coming to terms with the past”
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(Vergangenheitsbewältigung) (Assmann, 2003). However, despite complaints that the
past casts a consistent and oppressive shadow over Germany, the breadth and depth of
discussions and efforts at self-reflection and coming to terms with the past have been
highly contested (Kansteiner, 2006b). To be clear, not only have the meaning of the past
and the relevance of the past for the present been contested, the meaning and extent of
that process of public self-reflection is itself a complex and contested issue. While the
specter of the question of guilt and responsibility (the Schuldfrage) never fully left the
collective consciousness, Dan Diner writes that over time the question has been
“paradoxically most present in terms of denial” (2000, p. 221). While the crimes of the
Nazi past would periodically break onto the scene, in the form of high-profile trials such
as the Eichmann trial, as well as in controversial commemorations and debates,
discussions of the Holocaust only gained broad traction in the 1980s9 (Caplan et al.,
2006; Confino, 2004; Giesen, 2004; Maier, 1997). The myth of the good and chivalrous
German Wehrmacht soldier, as opposed to the vicious Nazi, had been undermined in
scholarship as early as the 1970s, but survived among the general public until the late
1990s (Kansteiner, 2006b). The history of public debate about the meaning of the Nazi
past, its relevance for the present, and the role of everyday Germans in enabling and
perpetrating atrocities, is complex and uneven. Regardless of the inconsistent and often
limited nature of these discussions during much of postwar history, the claim that the past

9

See Wulf Kansteiner (2006b) for a detailed discussion of the various phases and protagonists of the
struggles over memory culture from 1945 through the 1990s.
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has been constantly used to create a “guilt complex” (Schuldkomplex) among Germans is
widely accepted as valid. As this section will show, this guilt complex has been situated
as a major stumbling block inhibiting the “normal” development of Germany as a strong,
proud, and effective nation today.
As was discussed above, Heimat provided a refuge from the most troubled parts
of the collective memory of Nazi crimes, starting with the escapism of the popular
postwar Heimat films. With a few very powerful exceptions, in the first decades after the
war, “West Germans emphasized their own suffering and largely ignored the suffering
they had inflicted on others” (Kansteiner, 2006b, p. 111). Even when representations of
the Nazi genocide began to appear with more frequency on television in the 1970s,
stories were focused on a particular subset of victims—usually successful survivors—and
good Germans who aided them, erasing perpetrators and bystanders or reducing them to
elite leaders or to caricature (Kansteiner, 2006a). One turning point in media
representation and public discussion was the 1979 telecast of the American television
mini-series Holocaust (1978) in West Germany. The series, which attracted 20 million
West German viewers or roughly half of the population, followed two families during the
Third Reich, a family of German Jews and an ambitious couple that ascended the ranks of
the SS. The entertaining and emotionally powerful series included both victims and
perpetrators as complex subjects and brought the Nazi genocide into the center of the
public sphere with unprecedented success. However, the success of Holocaust frustrated
some on the German left, who saw the production as a hypocritical capitalist project,
meant to profit from the pain of Nazi crimes (Herf, 1980).
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Edgar Reitz explicitly framed his popular television series, Heimat (1984), as a
German answer to the successful American mini-series, Holocaust (Confino, 1998). The
epic, fifteen-hour film tells the story of a family in a small town near the Rhine from
1919 to 1982. As Alon Confino explains, beginning in the 1970s, the New Left embraced
the Heimat idea as a symbol of "local roots and authentic German ways of life", and,
thus, as the antithesis to nationalism, Americanization, and consumerism (1998, p. 193).
This was at the heart of a new movement among German historians promoting oral
history and the history of everyday life. Taking up this approach in television fiction,
with Heimat Reitz aimed to portray genuine German relationships and experiences, as
opposed to the supposedly kitschy and stereotypical Hollywood representations of
Holocaust. Reitz unequivocally supported the commonly held view that Heimat cannot
be scaled up to the nation or state, claiming in a 1984 article in Die Zeit, that "Heimat and
nation... are contradictory terms" (quoted in Confino, 1998, p. 190). The nation is
associated with conflict, abstraction, and diversity; Heimat is personal, embodied,
harmonious and close-knit. As Confino summarizes, “the local meaning of the Heimat
idea enables Reitz to disavow the notion of national history, and to fragment the larger
processes of German history into numerous histories of local Heimats" (1998, p. 190).
Reitz’s statements about Heimat reveal a slippage between the intimate personal
experiences he foregrounds in the film, on the one hand, and on the other, a national
consciousness constructed on collective but private ownership over the past.
This foregrounding of the legitimacy of local experiences also has implications
for determining who has the right to narrate the past. In reaction to Holocaust, Reitz
wrote that “the most profound expropriation that exists is the expropriation of people
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from their own history” (quoted in Confino, 1998, p. 194). Reitz’s film is a reaction
against expropriation both by foreign storytellers and by historians who attempt to, in his
words, “generalize, to order events, to disclose cause and effect” (E. Reitz, 1988, p. 137).
Although he positions himself against national history, Reitz proposes a nationalist
version of history that equates embodied “German experience” with authenticity,
excluding both those who do not have a personal connection to the German past and
those who undertake a broader analysis of the past and situate the personal in relation to
political events. This view gives authority to speak based only on the personal, assuming,
of course, one is also a member of the nation.
This argument was taken even further by Martin Walser in his 1998 speech
accepting the Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchandels (Peace Prize of the German
Books Trade) for his autobiographical novel, Ein springender Brunnen (1998). The
award is one of Germany’s most prestigious, and the annual award ceremony is
nationally televised and attended by the cultural, political, and intellectual elite. Walser’s
novel depicts an idyllic childhood in southern Germany during the Nazi period, and of
the loss of a father and brother during the war. As in Reitz’s film, National Socialism is
presented unreflectively and its crimes are not presented at all. In Walser’s acceptance
speech, which will be examined in more detail below, he spoke out against the
"instrumentalization of Auschwitz" and the making of remembrance into a ritual (1998).
He framed his critiques to provide plausible deniability against possible claims that he
was promoting the forgetting of the past in that he purported to only be speaking for
himself and his own experience. However, the language of the speech constantly slipped
seamlessly between the personal “I” and the German “we”, belying this claim.
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The speech received a near unanimous standing ovation from the exalted
audience. Two days later Ignaz Bubis, the chair of the Zentralrats der Juden in
Deutschland (Central Council of Jews in Germany) criticized the speech as intellectual
arson (geistige Brandstiftung). Bubis repeated and elaborated his criticism a month later
on the 60th anniversary of Kristallnacht, which unleashed a heated debate. Opinions
expressed in the media generally sided with Walser, and cast Bubis’s concerns as a
“failure to understand” Walser’s literary and artistic style in the speech (Assmann, 2003;
Eshel, 2000). The debate ended up reinforcing Walser’s position and casting doubt on
both the ability and the motives of “Others” who would speak out against closing off the
past.
Walser shares a suspicion of abstraction and symbolism with the early architects
of the notion of Heimat. He also shares their blind acceptance of the nation as a natural
community. “Germany” as a collective of German individuals is utterly natural, to the
extent that it supersedes the political—and therefore abstract—state. Walser demonstrates
this by reiterating his long-standing opposition to the division of Germany. Contrary to
the typical West German stance, Walser denied not only the legitimacy of the GDR, but
also of the Federal Republic in its divided form. Walser compares the stance he took in
1977 to his current project. “Trembling as [he was] then" Walser insists that "Auschwitz
is not suited to becoming a routine threat, a means of intimidation or a moral cudgel to be
mobilized at any time, or simply a required practice. What comes to pass through
ritualization has the character of lip service”v (Walser, 1998). Here, the threat Auschwitz
poses is not that it reveals humanity’s latent capacity for unspeakable brutality but rather,
that it can be used for the “permanent presentation of our shame.” Walser’s deep
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identification as a German above all means that he interprets any presentation of German
crimes as a process of external shaming imposed by self-hating Germans and various
outsiders.
Walser’s rejection of the representation of German crimes is not limited to the
crimes of the National Socialist past, however. He feels the same suspicion in response to
discussions of contemporary hate crimes. He presents a quotation from an unnamed
“intellectual” (Habermas) about the festive atmosphere during the racist riots of the early
1990s. Framing his question as self-critical, Walser asks why he is “not galvanized by the
same outrage” as this intellectual who writes of the “sympathetic population [that] sets up
sausage stands in front of burning refugee hostels.” Here, Walser references an article
that Habermas wrote for Die Zeit in 1992 criticizing the public reaction to the xenophobic
violence. Habermas argues against the single-minded concern with the political
implications of the violence for Germany’s international image. After quoting a number
of top politicians who identified “the actual crime” as the harm to Germany’s
international image, Habermas writes, “Neither the victims or the barbarization of our
society rate as the first worries, rather it is the image of seat-of-industry Germany”vi
(1992). Walser goes even further, by categorically refusing to believe the worst details of
the riots themselves.
Walser sees the injustice of the supposed guilt complex (Schuldkomplex) as
singular: in the past quarter century, there is “no other people (Volk), population, society”
that could be so addressed. Although the unnamed intellectual refers to a specific and
contemporary event, Walser rejects the presentation of racist violence that recalls
Germany's “eternal shame.” He blames the media’s “routine of accusation” for pushing
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him to look away when faced with German “shame:” “when I am presented every day
with this past in the media, I notice that something in me defends itself against the
permanent presentation of our shame….I start to look away.”vii But lest the audience
think that Walser is concerned about the ethics of this tendency, he reveals that in
analyzing it he is “almost happy” to realize his reaction is not against remembrance itself,
but against the “instrumentalization of our shame for present purposes.”viii Walser
suspects that the media and self-hating German intellectuals have ulterior motives for
representing the past in public. He suspects that it makes German critics feel closer to
victims, relieving themselves of their burden by heaping it higher onto their compatriots.
Walser, however, claims that he cannot shake the feeling of always standing on the side
of the “accused.”
This section of Walser's speech raises several important issues. First, it shows
how the over-identification with the national (German) converts all representations of
crimes committed by group members into an accusation against the nation, and thus
against all members. This identification is so strong that it holds together crimes past and
present under the same agenda of shaming. Any use of the past as a tool for analysis is
tantamount to “instrumentalization,” which, regardless of its purpose, is suspect and is a
misuse of Auschwitz. Second, it reflects once again the structure of 19th century Heimat
discourse, which defends the sovereignty of the individual and expresses suspicion of
politics, abstraction, and symbolism. Under cover of this disavowal of politics, it
reaffirms the unquestioned natural community of the people (Volk). This is a politics of
the private nation, which holds the personal experience as primary and truly authentic.
This nation is unaffected by the historical unfolding of the politics and actions of the
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state. Finally, it draws a strong line between “we” Germans who are the target of hurtful
representations and those who marshal those representations. Walser’s binary divides the
world into victims and perpetrators, accusers and accused. The strength of Walser’s
national identification makes a shared practice of remembrance impossible. Those who
publically discuss German crimes are thus outsiders. The common experience of being
constantly accused, threatened with the constant mobilization of Auschwitz as "a means
of intimidation or moral cudgel" (Walser, 1998) unites Germans. The positive reception
reflected in the standing ovation Walser received was carried over into the mediated
debate that followed from Bubis’s critique. While a number of other prominent figures—
most of them also Jews—shared Bubis’s reading of Walser’s speech, the responses
published in the media largely supported Walser and dismissed the critique as an inability
to understand Walser’s literary style (Eshel, 2001). The lightly veiled anti-Semitism
underlying the claim that German Jewish critics were incapable of understanding literary
German was expressed in a more extreme form when, at the height of the debate, a pig
painted with a Star of David and labeled BUBIS was driven onto Berlin’s Alexanderplatz
(Roll, 1998). The mostly positive reaction to Walser’s and against Bubis’s criticism of it
shows that speaking out against the continued public analysis of Germany’s past to
establish the “normality” of reunified Germany serves to unify and consolidate the idea
of the German nation against domestic and international outsiders.

New Germans and the German Past
This national consolidation around the past has consequences for immigrants and
new Germans, whose familial past does not include a connection to the perpetrator
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generations of the Third Reich. This is not only a problem of the right, as represented by
Walser. While many have called for an inclusive practice of memory since early in the
postwar period, many of the critical leftist proponents of Vergangenheitsbewältigung
(coming to terms with the past) have relied heavily on a genealogical connection to
National Socialism to justify the depth of German responsibility to be critically selfreflective. For example, Habermas’s idea of “constitutional patriotism” is based on
political attachment and the commitment to the norms, values and procedures of a liberal
democratic constitution, relying also on “supplements of particularity” to become an
effective form of political attachment (J.-W. Müller, 2008, p. 11); in the German case this
meant the self-critical memory of the Nazi past.
Habermas and other leftist intellectuals proposed constitutional patriotism in
reaction to the move by conservative historians to relativize the National Socialist past
during the 1980s (see Chapter 3). However, in seeking to reaffirm the singularity of Nazi
crimes, the national emphasis of early concepts of constitutional patriotism effectively
excluded immigrants and new Germans from a key site of national community formation
(J.-W. Müller, 2008, pp. 37–39; Rothberg & Yildiz, 2011, p. 38). Nevertheless, as JanWerner Müller argues, this ethnic-national emphasis is not critical to—or even
sustainable within—the practice of constitutional patriotism (2008, p. 42). Although it
may have been an expedient way to counter conservative drives for normalization, the
construction of an exclusive form of memory culture is not necessary to preserve active
engagement with the past. In fact, it is counterproductive. As Rothberg and Yildiz (2011)
show in their excellent ethnographic work with immigrants and their descendants who
engage with and explore Germany’s past and its lessons for politics and society across
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time and space, there is no a priori reason that immigrants cannot access the collective
memory of the receiving country. Taking on the question of whether the immigrating to
Germany doesn't also mean immigrating into Germany's recent past (Senocak & Tulay,
2000), Rothberg and Yildiz discuss the example of a group of immigrant “activist
citizens” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). This group of Turkish immigrant women are engaging
with and exploring Germany’s past and its lessons for politics and society across time and
space, using the example of Nazi genocide to think through the Turkish history of
Armenian genocide. Rothberg and Yildiz counter the assumption that immigrants are
necessarily cut off from the collective memory of the receiving country. They expose the
ways that the leftist politics of contrition, in the ways outlined above, have led to
cordoning off immigrant citizens and minorities, supporting ethnicist notions of
Germanness.
In the 1980s and 1990s, both sides of the polarized debate between conservative
and critical leftist approaches to defining the place of the National Socialist past in the
country’s contemporary self-conception depended on a descent-based definition of the
national community. For conservatives like Walser, only Germans could understand the
emotional and psychological toll of being faced with a ceaseless “routine of accusation”
domestically and internationally. In contrast, pushing back against conservative attempts
to relativize the past led many critical intellectuals to overemphasize the particularly
German responsibility for remembering National Socialist crimes (Rothberg & Yildiz,
2011). However, after reunification, the self-reflexive critical form of identification
called for by “constitutional patriotism” fell out of favor. Reunification ushered in a new
wave of nationalist enthusiasm. With the “anomaly” of the national division gone, many
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intellectuals from across the political spectrum thought that Germans could now form a
“normal” national consciousness (J.-W. Müller, 2008, p. 44). In addition, after fiercely
but vainly resisting citizenship law changes introducing limited birth right to citizenship
around the turn of the millennium, conservative politicians gradually discovered the
pedagogical power of immigrant patriots in the cause of establishing a “normalized”
national consciousness (see Chapter 5). The enthusiasm of immigrant patriots for their
new homeland serves as an example to Germans whose relationship to the nation is
portrayed as neurotic and tense (verkrampft). In contrast, critical intellectuals from
Adorno to Habermas see this tension as part of a productive community-building process
of reflection on uncomfortable pasts (Jürgen Habermas, 1997, p. 17). From this
perspective, engaging with this tension that conservatives view as pathological serves as
a tool of empowerment and as the key to the formation of an ethical and active national
community (Assmann, 2003; J.-W. Müller, 2008).
However, this rational and complex discursive version of national affiliation runs
precisely contrary to the pre-political, affective, and harmonious notion of Heimat.
Heimat discourse accepts the contributions that immigrants and transnational citizens can
make in freeing German national sentiment from the friction and complexity of the past.
Their participation is also rhetorically useful as evidence of the inclusiveness of new
nationalism. However, since Heimat thinking is also incompatible with the complexity
and rationality of plural and transnational affiliations, it also maintains a boundary
between immigrant patriots and normative nationals. German “memory culture” (Esmer,
2014) thus stands as both a challenge and an opportunity for new Germans seeking to
claim their place within national culture.
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While those with identifiable immigrant heritage may continue to be frustrated in
their attempts to claim their Heimat in Germany, their presumed lack of a German past
gives them a privileged position in defining a new Germany free from the burdens of the
National Socialist past. This is evident in minority cultural production from hip-hop to
journalism (see for example Harris, 2010a; Samy Deluxe, 2009). In their 2012 book Wir
neuen Deutschen (We New Germans), Polish-born Alice Bota, Turkish-German Topçu
Özlem, and Vietnamese-German Khue Pham intertwine narratives from their personal
lives as first and second generation immigrants from three distinct cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds with broader analysis and critique of identity and exclusion in
contemporary Germany. They use their biographies and their experience as journalists on
the editorial staff of the prestigious weekly newspaper, Die Zeit, to analyze the logics and
functions of limited notions of Germanness and to argue for the benefits of inclusiveness
to the whole population of Germany. Throughout their work they criticize the
hierarchical differentiation of “Germans” from “foreigners.” Germanness is defined first
by the lack of foreign traces in language, religion, appearance, and name. However, they
observe that Germanness may be attained (at least provisionally) despite these foreign
traces based on a person’s level of achievement in society.
Although Bota et al. provide a nuanced and comprehensive critique of the
differential valuation of the “foreign” and the “German,” they also uncritically accept
several common assumptions relating to Heimat and the German past. The third chapter
of their book, Meine Heimat, keine Heimat (My Heimat, No Heimat), addresses the
question of where one comes from, delving into the affect of belonging. Bota et al.
observe that those who ask this question of others can usually answer it easily for
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themselves, but are not satisfied with a simple answer. For those whose origins are
multiple this question is a trap, forcing them to declare loyalties to one at the expense of
others. They write that Heimat is an extremely emotional and complicated concept, one
that evokes the sacrifices their parents made by emigrating, and the desire for the security
their German friends seem to derive from it. “Heimat,” they write, “is the origin of body
and soul; it is the middle point of one’s own world” ix (2012, p. 50). The authors’
internalized conception of Heimat underscores their assimilation of German notions of
self, even as it marks them as permanently alienated from it.
Even as they perceive that Germans enjoy security and harmony from inhabiting
their own homeland, echoing Walser’s position, they see Germans as tormented by shame
for the Nazi past. They write that, “being German still means: having to bear Nazi jokes
abroad, keeping your head bowed, and only bringing out the flag during the World Cup”x
(2012, p. 53). They argue that the burden of the past has prevented Germans from having
a robust national identity. Somehow, the authors do not interpret long persistence of
exclusively descent-based citizenship, the primacy of singular notions of Heimat, and the
resistance to accepting people of color as German as indications of a strong national
identity. Despite the abundant evidence Bota et al. present of the resilient positive
associations with Germanness, the authors still accept the Walserian notion that a
persistent “guilt complex” makes positive German identity impossible. Bota et al. go so
far as to borrow the axiom that “to love others, one must first love themselves” (2012, p.
53) to argue that German self-loathing is actually the root of xenophobia. They offer little
justification for this claim, which appears to be based on the commonsensical idea that
bullies—here xenophobes—only lash out at others out of a lack of self-confidence,
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caused in this case by shame about the Nazi past. The authors consider themselves as
absolved from this shame, since others do not see the German past as belonging to them.
In this, they find an opportunity: by encouraging Germans to accept their immigrant and
minority compatriots as part of the nation, they can build a new identity free from the
fetters of past nationalist atrocities. In their acceptance of the view that the past has a
pathological impact on the German national psyche, they view the incorporation of the
transnational in Germany as a route to freedom from the past.
Bota et al.’s book musters a powerful critique of the cultural politics of
contemporary social inequality, but it also demonstrates the taboo surrounding the
concept of racism in Germany. The authors repeatedly address issues of appearance,
religious stigma, and religious and cultural othering, but the words “race” and “racism”
only appear on two pages in the book. Beyond that, it shows the even stronger taboo
around examining continuities with National Socialist past. The only role the German
past plays in the book is as a source of shame that prevents a relaxed and healthy
contemporary German identity. Taking a different approach, Turkish-German journalist
Mustafa Esmer (2014) rejects the ways the past is used by normative Germans in a
commentary written for the online magazine, Migazin, which covers issues related to
migration in Germany. Esmer uses stories from his life to demonstrate how the burden of
the past functions to delegitimize criticism of racism by minorities in contemporary
Germany. Esmer points to a pattern evident in episodes ranging from memories of his
parents' attempts to criticize discriminatory treatment in the search for housing to
contemporary discussions about his experiences of everyday racism with "bio-German"
friends. Whenever his parents or Esmer spoke up against racialized inequality, they were
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met with the defensive dismissal, “Yeah, yeah, we are all Nazis” (Esmer, 2014). He then
asks,
Why, even though I have lived in Germany since my birth, I grew up here and I
actively follow politics, am I not allowed to criticize the injustices that govern my
life? Very simple: I am missing a crucial marker of bio-German identity, namely,
the German original sin—the Holocaust. The exclusivity of the German original
sin is the problem that leads to the lack of recognition of new Germans by the
majority society.xi (Esmer, 2014)
Esmer sympathetically observes the same “guilt complex” that Bota et al. blame for
German self-hatred and, paradoxically, xenophobia, but comes to a different conclusion.
Instead of seeing the inclusion of minorities as a means of breaking the curse of guilt,
Esmer calls for an initiative involving representatives of the German population in all its
diversity to devise a new, active, and inclusive approach to German memory culture.
Esmer’s account shows that, even among his liberal German friends, the past is not
functioning as a tool to understand the logics and the significance of everyday forms of
racism. On the contrary, it has been used to create an environment of what Robin
DiAngelo (2011) in the United States has called “white fragility,” or the expectation
among majority populations of being insulated from racial stress, leading to the inability
to tolerate challenges to the hegemonic racial equilibrium.
This resistance among majority German society to a national “guilt complex” and
its prevention of “normal” national sentiments reaches back to the early postwar years.
Already in 1959, Adorno criticized pervasive complaints of a “guilt complex,” suggesting
that this term portrays burdening of oneself with the past as pathological, “whereas the
healthy and realistic person is fully absorbed in the present and its practical goals” (2012,
p. 91). This quote reflects the extent to which biopolitical concepts of health and the
productive, future-oriented population were already well-established and functioning to
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construct national ideals less than 15 years after the war ended. Indeed, Adorno saw
much behavior that is neurotic in relation to the past, including “defensive postures where
one is not attacked, intense affects where they are hardly warranted by the situation, an
absence of affect in the face of the gravest matters, not seldom simply a repression of
what is known or half-known” (2012, p. 90), examples of all of which are readily
apparent in Walser’s 1998 speech. Adorno was skeptical that this neurosis was the result
of a collectively felt guilt, but rather suggests it was a defensive reaction against it. A key
part of this defense is the denial of continuities from the Third Reich to postwar
Germany—in particular as regards national identity and racism. Establishing a new
national normality after the Third Reich has depended heavily on the intimate features of
Heimat thinking, while denying its political functions in establishing the abstract nationstate and maintaining the notion of internal strangers.

Conclusion
By privileging an imaginary stability, simplicity, and harmony, Heimat excludes
populations whose experiences of moving across cultures and switching cultural codes
makes them acutely aware of the ambiguities and complexities of national cultures.
Because new Germans must learn diverse sets of cultural codes, they can never forget
that cultural assumptions are not simply natural, but are socially constructed. Heimat
crystallizes this desire for continuity between the personal and the social, between local
experience and the political abstraction. Although visible minorities are excluded from
this German norm of Heimat, their perceived lack of a German past positions them to
support another desired form of normality: a present- and future-oriented German nation
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that is free from the burdens of the past. Whereas this chapter has focused on an affective
concept that distinguishes indigenous Germans from integrant strangers, the next chapter
examines rational, biopolitical conceptions of the social body that mobilize immigrants
and minorities in integration projects that aim to build a new Germany suited to the
challenges of a global economy.

i

So wird es en Deutschland gemacht
Wie schön! Sie fahren zurück in die Heimat.
iii
Deutscher im Sinne dieses Grundgesetzes ist vorbehaltlich anderweitiger gesetzlicher Regelung, wer die
deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt oder als Flüchtling oder Vertriebener deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit
oder als dessen Ehegatte oder Abkömmling in dem Gebiete des Deutschen Reiches nach dem Stande vom
31. Dezember 1937 Aufnahme gefunden hat. (GG Art. 116 (1))
iv
Aufnahmebewerber aus anderen Staaten (einschließlich Estland, Lettland oder Litauen) als der ehemaligen Sowjetunion müssen zusätzlich nachweisen, dass sie auf Grund ihrer deutschen Volkszugehörigkeit
Benachteiligungen oder Nachwirkungen früherer Benachteiligungen unterlagen.
v
Das fällt mir ein, weil ich jetzt wieder vor Kühnheit zittere, wenn ich sage: Auschwitz eignet sich nicht,
dafür Drohroutine zu werden, jederzeit einsetzbares Einschüchterungsmittel oder Moralkeule oder auch
nur Pflichtübung
vi
Nicht den Opfern und der Entzivilisierung unserer Gesellschaft gilt die erste Sorge, sondern dem
Ansehen des Industriestandortes Deutschland.
vii
Wenn mir aber jeden Tag in den Medien diese Vergangenheit vorgehalten wird, merke ich, daß sich in
mir etwas gegen diese Dauerpräsentation unserer Schande wehrt. Anstatt dankbar zu sein für die
unaufhörliche Präsentation unserer Schande, fange ich an wegzuschauen.
viii
Wenn ich merke, daß sich in mir etwas dagegen wehrt, versuche ich, die Vorhaltung unserer Schande
auf Motive hin abzuhören und bin fast froh, wenn ich glaube, entdecken zu können, daß öfter nicht mehr
das Gedenken, das Nichtvergessendürfen das Motiv ist, sondern die Instrumentalisierung unserer
Schande zu gegenwärtigen Zwecken.
ix
Heimat ist der Ursprung von Körper und Seele, es ist der Mittelpunkt der eigenen Welt.
x
Deutschsein heißt immer noch: im Ausland Naziwitze ertragen, den Kopf gesenkt halten, die Fahne nur
zur WM rausholen.
xi
Warum darf ich trotz der Tatsache, dass ich seit Geburt in Deutschland lebe, hier aufgewachsen bin und
die Politik aktiv verfolge, die Missstände, die meinen Alltag bestimmen, nicht kritisieren? Ganz einfach:
Mir fehlt ein wesentliches Merkmal biodeutscher Identität, nämlich die deutsche Erbsünde—der
Holocaust. Die Exklusivität der deutschen Erbschuld ist das Problem, das zu der fehlenden Anerkennung
Neudeutscher vonseiten der Mehrheitsgesellschaft führt.
ii
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CHAPTER 2 – SPORTS INTEGRATION IN THE NEW GERMANY

In the early 2000s, after the introduction of territorial birthright to citizenship (jus
solis), Germany quickly transformed itself from a paradigm of “segregationist”
approaches to immigration into a strong supporter of new “integrationist” approaches
(see Süssmuth 2001). German migration policy shifted from exclusion and repatriation to
focus on management and socialization. Chapter 1 discussed the German notion of
Heimat, or homeland, which is generally conceived as a paradigmatic example of
particularism. Heimat evokes a personal, private and individual imagination of the place
of true belonging outside the realm of politics. However, as Chapter 1 argued, it is
precisely this sense of intimacy that made Heimat such an effective tool for the
generalization of identity to formulate Germany as a national community in the modern
sense. Heimat maintains its particularist and primordial underpinnings but, by conceiving
of itself as an individualist concept, resists political analysis. However, as this chapter
will argue, contemporary notions of national belonging and citizenship in Germany have
also evolved to include universalizing imperatives under the paradigm of civic
integration. As a complement to the past temporal orientation of Heimat, contemporary
integration projects work to cultivate collective forms of subjectivity that aim to improve
the future life of the population. Sports have emerged as one of the most prominent forms
taken by these projects. This chapter looks at the prominent place of sports, and
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particularly soccer, in integration policy to parse the logics underpinning the development
of new techniques for managing diversity in German society.
Several of the earliest national institutions to initiate integration projects were the
German Olympic Sports Confederation and the German Football Association (DFB,
Deutscher Fußball Bund), which fields the national soccer team. Despite the long
relationship of sports to war (Mangan, 2004; Pritchard, 2009), today sports are
conceptualized as the ideal model for transcultural social cohesion and international
cooperation. This chapter opens with an analysis of a 2014 cover story from Der Spiegel,
which shows the extent to which sports facilitate discourses of national self-construction.
To further investigate the conceptualization of the relationship between sports and
integration, this chapter examines the place of sports in the National Integration Plan of
2006 and in the integration programs of the German Football Association and the
German Olympic Sports Confederation. The corpus for this chapter is as follows:
•

German Football Association (DFB) and Mercedes Benz
o Integration Prize
• Brochures (2008-2015)

•

German Football Association (DFB)
•
Integration Starts with Me! Practical Handbook (2011)

•

German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB)
o Integration through Sports Program
• 20 Years of Integration Brochure (2009)
• Integration through Sport: An Introduction (2012)
• Basic Framework Document (2014)

•

The Federal Government (Die Bundesregierung)
o National Integration Plan
• Plan Introduction and Sections Related to Sports (2007)
• National Integration Plan Brochure (2007)
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I analyze the social policies and rhetoric around the participation of minority Germans in
elite and amateur soccer, and in particular, the claim of DFB leaders—echoed by
politicians—that “sport is the primary engine of integration in Germany,” and that elite
athletes of color represent “lived integration” (gelebte Integration). As this chapter
shows, discourses of sporting integration follow a biopolitical mode of governance aimed
at managing diversity and cultivating it into a form that is beneficial for the German
population. In doing so, those discourses strengthen the normative foundations of
majority German society and justify the socio-economic inequality of those who choose
not to or fail to meet those normative standards.
The chapter ends with an analysis of the seams of this sporting integration, the
disjunctures where the easy transition from celebration to skepticism and condemnation
reveal the dual nature of biopolitics: the power to “make live” involves deciding which
life should be encouraged to thrive and which should not. The logics dictating that
resources and energies be poured into disciplining non-normative bodies to transform
them into valuable members of the population also dictate that those provisional members
be surveilled for evidence of errancy. In particular, I examine a debate about requiring
players to sing the national anthem that cropped up after the national team performed
below expectations at the Euro Cup in 2012. This chapter asks, what connection do
discourses of sports integration illustrate between life and integration? How does
promoting “integration” through sports discipline unruly bodies and turn them into
productive citizens? How are the minority affiliations of these athletes conceptualized as
contributing to their ability and to the ability of the German national team, or in the case
of amateur sports, to the German population at large? The central role of sports in
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German policy on the socialization and management of those newly entitled to
citizenship has emerged in concordance with economic theories of national life
developed in Germany after World War II and, more recently, as part of the spread of a
new form of integration discourse across Europe around the turn of the millennium. In
both cases, economic logics have gained ascendance in the definition of deserving
citizens.
Although it is still common to distinguish European policies on immigrant
reception into national typologies defining them on a range between multiculturalist and
assimilationist, as Christian Joppke (2007) has shown, policy across European states is
converging around the ideal of “civic integration.” Typologies of nationalism often
categorize nationalisms according to their relative reliance on ethnic or civic traits in
defining the population (Canovan 2000, Yack 1996). “Mature,” “modern” and “Western”
forms of nationalism—with all of the problematic superiority implied in these terms—are
typically associated with civic nationalist conceptions that accommodate and incorporate
diversity in the very idea of the nation (Canovan, 2000). This form contrasts with
“exclusive” forms that depend on primordial and particularistic conceptions of the
national population. The latter, “segregationist” form is often associated with Germany
(Koopmans 2005), most dramatically expressed in the period of National Socialist rule.
Even after National Socialism, Germany’s maintenance of a decent-based form of
citizenship (jus sanguinis, or “blood right”) made it, until recently, “the pariah among
immigrant-receiving states in the West” (Joppke, 2007, p. 2). In contrast, the Netherlands
and France are held up as exemplars of two different forms of civic nationalism (Joppke,
2007). The Dutch version is characterized as a strong pluralist model of multiculturalism
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built on the traditional Dutch model of pillarization, which affirmed the right to selforganization in the interests of maintaining religious communities (Prins & Saharso,
2010). On the other hand, the French model of civic nationalism is often referenced as a
paradigm of universalist or assimilationist models of incorporating cultural difference
(Simon & Sala Pala, 2010). However, closer examination of the policy and discourse of
these paradigmatic examples shows that they have actually converged in recent decades,
moving towards new discourses of “integration,” while condemning the supposed
“balkanization” of multiculturalism (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). At the same time,
assimilation is no longer considered a realistic or ethical approach. Even France
condemned the idea of assimilation as early as the 1980s, calling for the utilization of
“differences within a common project and not, like assimilation, their abolition”
(quotation from the French High Council for Integration cited in Simon & Sala Pala,
2010, p. 93). Despite their many differences, recent scholarship has shown that clean
typological distinctions among models of citizenship and belonging in Western
immigrant-receiving countries are untenable.
Instead, Europe has broadly turned to “integration” as a supposed alternative to
assimilation and multiculturalism, outlined in a policy document released by the Council
of the European Union in 2004. This document reflected and advanced a convergence of
policy on immigrant reception and incorporation. The Council outlined goals for the
monitoring and evaluation of integration processes, as well as factors such as education,
employment, language skills and majority society contact that they argued contribute to
successful integration (Council of the European Union, 2004). While also including a
point clarifying the need to pursue anti-discrimination policy, the document primarily
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outlines immigrant obligations to become productive and autonomous. State and civil
society measures are aimed at creating the conditions for immigrant self-reliance.
Christian Joppke (2007) traces the development of the EU policy to the Netherlands,
which took a strong turn away from multicultural policy over the course of the 1990s.
The Dutch went from being pioneers of multiculturalism to become leaders in what Prins
and Saharso (2010) call “new realism,” a social conservative discourse condemning the
supposed hegemony of the “liberal elite” and its oppressive norms of “political
correctness.” While the language of the 2004 policy document maintains broad language
of inclusivity, Joppke shows that the implementation of “civic integration” policy across
Europe demonstrates an increasingly obligatory tendency and has become a new tool for
immigration restriction, particularly for the family members of low-skilled immigrants
seeking reunification.
European states have moved to adopt a dualistic policy of immigration, which
rolls out “a red carpet of relaxed entry and residence requirements” for highly skilled
immigrants while “fending off” low-skilled immigrants with pre-entry integration
requirements and other restrictions (Joppke, 2007, p. 8). After long denying the
permanence of postwar labor migration and the settlement of asylum seekers, Germany
followed the implementation of changes to citizenship law in 2000 with the enactment of
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its first explicit policy on immigrant inclusion with the Immigration Act in 2004. 10 This
law introduced, in highly contradictory terms, the “entitlement” and the “obligation” of
immigrants to attend integration courses. Without defining it, the law includes the term
“integration” 61 times. The law requires integration education for long-term permanent
residents who are deemed to have “special integration needs” and those who receive
public benefits. This law grants broad discretion to authorities to determine the level and
meaning of integration. The meaning of integration, however, has remained flexible,
defined informally in public discourse and indirectly through the specific government
measures to pursue it. While later chapters, and particularly Chapter 6, analyze the
repressive side of integration discourse, this chapter analyzes the attractive and
productive aspects of biopolitical mechanisms embodied in sporting integration.

Being Somebody Again: National Self-Reflection and Optimization Through Sports
After Germany’s 2014 victory during the men’s FIFA World Cup, Der Spiegel
published an issue with a cover that asked Wir sind wieder… wer? (We are who…
again?). This title used punctuation to convert the famous idiom Wir sind wieder wer (We
are somebody again), which emerged from the jubilant collective response to West
Germany’s 1954 World Cup victory, commonly known as the Miracle of Bern (“„Wir
sind wieder wer“,” 1996). That event has taken on mythological proportions in national

10

Act to Control and Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens
and Foreigners (Immigration Act) of 30 June, 2004.
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narration, with prominent politicians and historians referring to it as “the true birthday of
the Federal Republic” (Joel & Schütt, 2008, p. 8). In a spontaneous display of national
exuberance—one that provoked anxiety among many international observers—the
audience in Bern broke into the original national anthem, complete with the excised
section proclaiming “Deutschland über alles” (Germany above all). By referencing the
return of collective public pride in 1954, Spiegel ties the current victory back to that
postwar moment of “becoming someone.” At the same time, the ellipses and interrogative
transform the statement into its opposite: a statement of doubt and anxiety about the
makeup of the population and its meaning for national collectivity.
The issue was released with six different cover images of people draped in the
German flag, who, according to the editor’s introduction, represent six German
Archetypes, including a man in sandals and white socks with a German shepherd, a
woman in business attire with a child on her hip, and a man pushing a shopping cart filled
with reclaimed bottles and cans. These people represent six possible answers to the
question of who represents the national “we”. The figures, the top halves of their bodies
covered by the flag, are identifiable by their stances and clothing. On the cover for the
digital edition (figure 1), Angela Merkel is suggested by her typical dress (black slacks
and pink blazer) and her characteristic stance: straight-backed with feet placed close
together, arms bent with her hands meeting in front of her torso, fingers lightly touching.
To each side, you can see part of two other figures, suggesting that the series of covers
forms a circle. These two figures are identifiable as a national soccer team member and a
Muslim woman, fully veiled in black. Ironically, in order to show that the woman is
veiled, she is the only figure whose face is not completely covered by the German flag.
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The cover image suggests that the nation, embodied by its top politician, stands between
two possibilities competing to define its future. The soccer player represents national
unity and the glory of success on a global stage.

107

Figure 1: The cover of Der Spiegel for the first issue published after Germany’s 2014 World Cup win. The
figures represent various archetypes in German society. Here, the central figure evokes Chancellor Angela
Merkel. She is flanked on the one side by a national hero in the form of a German soccer team member and
on the other by a figure of national anxiety: a presumably Muslim woman in modest dress.

This is the Germany of lightness and positive national sentiment. The figure of the
woman, on the other hand, represents the threat of a “parallel society” within Germany,
defined by “traditional” Muslim values and gender norms. The veiled woman is both a
figure of both pity and anxiety, symbolizing the supposed repression of women among a
segment of the “we” in Germany that does not wish to adopt “Western” norms. As Joan
Scott (2007) observed, in Western Europe the veil or the headscarf has taken on a
disproportionate meaning, standing in for the threat posed to liberal democracy by
Muslim minorities and symbolizing a “clash of cultures” between the West and the
Muslim world. This cover image is Orientalist in Said’s (1979) most basic sense: it poses
Western Europe’s quintessential image of Oriental difference beside the figure
representing the liberal democratic state and asks whether these things are reconcilable.
Although there are many other visible cues that could signify Muslim difference, the
headscarf or veil is the primary focus of attention in European cultural politics (J. W.
Scott, 2007). By choosing a fully covered figure meant to represent the maximum
possible difference, the cover’s designers set up an irreconcilable tension between Islam
and key German institutions.
This symbol of illiberal traditionalism stands in contrast to, and as such defines,
the liberal democratic values embodied by Chancellor Merkel. But this image also
includes a third figure: the national soccer team player. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate,
the unprecedented diversity of the German national team beginning in the 2000s
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contributed to a new national imaginary that uses minority players and patriotic fans to
authorize and “teach” the German public to be proud of their country. In public
discussions about the changing German population, sports and sporting celebrity
repeatedly emerge as a means of managing cultural difference and reasserting normative
German values under the banner of integration. Sports not only provide a forum for
national self-reflection, they have been mobilized as a technology for transforming
immigrants and their descendants into valuable citizens.
The quintessential German values identified in these discussions are imbued with
the kind of universalism that Wallerstein (1990) identifies in his analysis of the key
relationship between universalism and racism-sexism. This symbiotic pair contains the
contradictions of the world system under capitalism, explaining persistent inequalities in
the face of capitalist promises of rising prosperity for all. Wallerstein’s idea of the
universal and the racist-sexist tracks closely with the rationalities behind Foucault’s
theories of biopolitics. Both identify a political economy of life that seeks to optimize the
life of the population, while always also reproducing the division between life that is
worthy and life that is unworthy, and thus a threat to the population. The population must
be optimized for better life, which means that it must also be fragmented—a hierarchical
mechanism that Foucault uses to define racism (2003, p. 255). This involves a constant
process of self-definition, and identification of traits of universal value with the
hegemonic or normative population. Wallerstein defines this form of universalism as
“European universalism,” which holds that Western civilizations are superior because
they are the only ones that have come to be based on universal values and truths.
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The title article in the 2014 Der Spiegel issue is a wide-ranging rumination on
who “we” are, defining the components of a national population and touching on pieces
of the German past and present, from the Nazi past to Germany’s emergence and bright
future as a global economic powerhouse and moral authority. The theme of the article is
the trajectory away from “self-imposed gloominess” (Selbstverdüsterung) and shame
over the past towards attaining “lightness” interpreted as the primary component of a new
“Germany feeling” (Deutschlandgefühl). The article claims that “it is also German virtues
that have led to the German lightness. Since prosperity makes life light and elevates the
mood. As a consequence of diligence, discipline, and obedience this prosperity is
currently growing”i (Kurbjuweit et al., 2014, p. 61). These culturally defined traits are
used to explain the prosperity of Germany, which, as the authors note, was enjoying
something like a “small economic miracle” amidst the European economic crisis. They
attribute this prosperity both to “German virtues” and to the economic reforms made in
the early 2000s to “bring society and the economy into conformity.” This statement
legitimates Germany’s economic gains at a time when its Southern European neighbors
were mired in economic turmoil. The virtues claimed as culturally German serve to
explain Germany’s success on the playing field as well as in the global economy.
Returning to the cover image of the three figures described above, German liberal
democracy stands between its projection of illiberal traditionalism on the one side and on
the other a national soccer team that has come to signify the possible benefits of a
transnational and multiethnic society. This forked pathway of “benefits” and “challenges”
has driven the underlying narrative in the battle for Germany’s future, encapsulated in
integration discourse and its projects. It should not be surprising, then, that sports
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emerged as a major focus of the earliest national projects for integration. One of the first
institutions to take up the project of integration was the German Olympic Sports
Confederation (DOSB). The DOSB conceptualized a program called “Sport for
everyone—Sports with Aussiedlern” in 1989 that allocated federal funding to provide
recreational sports activities to newly arrived ethnic German immigrants from the Soviet
Union and Eastern bloc countries (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of Aussiedler). In its
first iteration, only immigrants with German citizenship were included. The decision not
to include refugees was harshly critiqued by some politicians, but it was justified by
arguments that ethnic German Aussiedler were permanent immigrants and that they had a
“greater willingness for integration” than other groups (Giebenhain, 1995, p. 172). In
2002, as part of a national shift sparked by the liberalization of German citizenship law,
“Sports with Aussiedler” was renamed “Integration through Sports,” reflecting a new
recognition of immigrants and their children as part of German society. However, this
move towards new inclusiveness was accompanied by increasing majority anxieties about
some groups’ “cultural compatibility” and “willingness to integrate,” or lack thereof.
The National Integration Plan of 2006 and the integration programs of Germany’s
two most important sporting organizations reflect attempts by the State, in Gramsci’s
generous sense of the term (1971, p. 244), to manage cultural and social difference by
cultivating “docile bodies” (Foucault, 1978) at the individual level. At the level of the
population, these programs contribute to discourses that normalize values that are
portrayed as both inherent in German culture and universal in their utility for cultivating
an economically independent and rational citizenry under global capitalism.
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Germany’s Economic Rebirth: Foundations of Sovereignty in Economic Liberty and
Enterprise
The concepts of neoliberal citizenship at the heart of integration discourse are not
unique to Germany, but they have played a particularly important role in the Federal
Republic since its establishment in 1949. Foucault uses the example of Germany’s
reconstruction in his lectures from 1978-1979, collectively titled The Birth of Biopolitics
(2008), to trace the emergence of one of the most influential strains of the neoliberal
politics in globalized political economy. In the aftermath of Germany’s defeat in World
War II and its subsequent occupation by Allied powers, German politicians faced an
existential crisis of national legitimacy and national sovereignty. Under the guidance of
prominent neoliberal economist, Ludwig Erhard, the state’s role was framed as the
establishment of “economic freedom” and “responsibility” of its citizens (Foucault, 2008,
p. 81). The purpose of this framing was not simply to establish good economic
management for the purposes of universal prosperity; more importantly, “the economy
produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor... this economic institution…
produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as agents within these
economic processes” (2008, p. 84). As Foucault puts it, “history had said no to the
German state, but now the economy will allow it to assert itself” (2008, p. 86). This
allowed Germany to establish “a new dimension of temporality” based not on the
memory of a “malfunctioning history,” but rather on continuous economic growth. While
this form of political economy subsequently spread across the globe, it played a
foundational role in mitigating the memory of the past to reestablish a self-confident
West German state.
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In establishing the tenants of this new political-economic regime, German
politicians drew on the tenants of the German and Austrian ordoliberal school of
economics, which had been active since the 1930s. Their theories would also become the
basis of American neoliberalism. Against the tenants of welfare economic theories,
according to the ordoliberals, social policy should not aim to equalize economic
differences restricting the access of consumer goods. Instead, inequality plays a vital role
in maintaining the “price mechanism,” which is the basis of economic rationality: it can
only produce regulatory effects if the fluctuations that are part of mechanisms of
competition are allowed to function (Foucault, 2008, p. 142). The mechanism of this
“social policy” must be privatization. Finally, economic growth is the only true and
acceptable form of social policy; growth should not be followed by increased
redistribution, which, according to neoliberal theory, would hinder further growth. As a
liberal regime, the neoliberal government cannot intervene in the effects of the market, or
correct its harmful effects on society. Instead, it is left to intervene on society itself.
The architects of the social and economic policy in the first decades of the Federal
Republic called for a politics of society (Gesellschaftspolitik) that sees “society as the
target and objective of governmental practice” (Foucault, 2008, p. 148), or what one key
policymaker called “a politics of life” (Vitalpolitik). This involved generalizing economic
rationality and the ideal of the citizen as entrepreneur and producer throughout the social
body. At the same time, German neoliberals in the postwar period recognized that the
economization of the entire social field, which prioritized competition as a principle order
of life, would put stress on the social fabric of society. Vitalpolitik and what was also
called the “social market economy” (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), maintained strong welfare
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provisions and other measures to protect the population from the harshest impacts of a
generalized economistic approach to politics and life. To compensate for the “cold”
features of competition in society, the state must maintain a political and moral
framework that would ensure “a community which is not fragmented,” and foster
cooperation amongst people who are "naturally rooted and socially integrated" (Foucault,
2008, p. 243). Thus, the German form of neoliberalism also included social protections to
compensate for the ethical problems of neoliberalism, while also depending on a
homogeneous conception of society to justify this protection. This framing also
foreshadows a response to migration and cultural diversity as a threat to the viability of
the protections offered by the social market economy approach. However, this provision
of protection for a “naturally rooted” population divided German neoliberal policy
against itself by maintaining protections that worked against the conditions it held as
necessary for the full functioning of the regulatory mechanisms of the market.
While Germany was liberalizing its citizenship policy around the turn of the
millennium, German government and the business sector were also implementing
fundamental changes to liberalize Germany’s economy and eventually to severely reduce
its social safety net (see Chapter 4). As the Spiegel article cited above proudly stated,
Germans made changes aiming to “bring society and the economy into conformity,”
including massive cuts to its welfare provisions. These changes moved to do away with
the ambiguities of German neoliberalism as it had been implemented, bringing it closer to
the pure form imagined by the ordoliberals in the 1930s, a form which had been more
fully implemented in the United States. The liberalization of citizenship law at this time
also created the imperative to include immigrants and minority Germans in this political
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and economic regime. This was an opportunity fully in line with many of the economic
imperatives of neoliberalism. Critical Marxist theorists have long critiqued the logic of
global capitalism as one of standardization, from Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944) work
on cultural industries through Herb Schiller’s (1976) theory of cultural imperialism and
critics of globalization in the 1990s. However, Foucault argues that these theories have
little to do with neoliberal governmental policy. On the contrary, the current art of
government involves “obtaining a society that is not oriented towards the commodity and
the uniformity of the commodity, but towards the multiplicity and differentiation of
enterprises” (2008, p. 149). This explains why integration discourse so easily to praises
social and cultural difference as enriching, as sources of potential growth for the
population at large.
On the other hand, when candidates for integration reject this order, it stands as a
threat to the population. In his lectures from 1977-1978, titled Security, Territory, and
Population, Foucault clarifies the distinction between the politically relevant population
and its Others: “The people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the
system” (2009, p. 44). Agamben also observes this division in Western politics, arguing
that
It is as if what we call “people” were in reality not a unitary subject but a
dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the set of the
People as a whole political body, and on the other, the subset of the people as a
fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies. (1998, p. 178)
For both Agamben and Foucault, this fracturing is only possible within a group that can
be conceived in some way as a people or a population. Thus, when foreigners become a
part of the citizenry in Germany, when they are finally included within the population,
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they also become subject in a new way to processes of biopolitical fracture. It must
always remain to be seen whether they will join the population as entrepreneurial
members whose young bodies and “cultural difference” might even benefit the economic
growth of the social body, or whether they will refuse the terms of engagement and
become a threat to the system. This permanent ambiguity is heightened around
immigrants and apparent minorities, representing in the starkest terms the biopolitical
fracture that is an always active potential in the population: “it is what cannot be included
in the whole of which it is a part and what cannot belong to the set in which it is always
already included” (Agamben, 1998, p. 179). It is only when they became a potential part
of the politically relevant population that immigrants and their children became the
targets of integration.

To Support and Demand: The 2007 National Integration Plan
In 2007, the German Government released a National Integration Plan, in
cooperation with representatives from the sectors of research, business, civil society, and
the media. Before going into more depth on the parts of the plan dealing with sports, this
section examines the broader conception of integration outlined in the introduction to the
plan. In the introduction, then secretary of the Federal Ministry for Migration, Refugees,
and Integration Maria Böhmer sketches Germany’s postwar migration history in a few
short paragraphs. Starting in the 1950s, foreign guest workers were invited to work in
Germany. “They wanted to stay—and should have only stayed—temporarily; then many
of them chose a life in Germany”ii (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 9). Then “people came for
other reasons to Germany, and were often also allowed to stay,”iii she writes, referring
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obliquely to the rise in asylum seekers in Germany in the late 1970s and 1980s. Finally,
with the fall of the Iron Curtain, “many Germans returned to the land of their ancestors.”iv
The legitimacy gap between the refugees and guest workers who overstayed their
welcome and the “Germans returning to the fatherland” is hardly veiled in Böhmer’s
statement. The statement goes on to propose a new historiography of Germany, saying
that although the postwar immigration has changed Germany, migration and cultural
exchange has traditionally characterized Germany as a European “Kulturnation” (cultural
nation). Böhmer addresses the long-delayed acceptance of “foreign” migration (as
opposed to the “returned German” Aussiedler) as: “A reality, that opens up many
opportunities but also contains the danger of social tension.”v Thus, only an active and
comprehensive policy to pursue integration of “people with a migration background” can
contain the risk they pose and convert them into a benefit for the Population.
In the following sections, I used descriptive coding (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) to
identify the themes and discursive patterns that emerged in the documents from national
sporting integration programs. I began with the introduction to the Federal Government’s
2007 National Integration Plan and the section of the plan dedicated to sports. I examined
the brochures celebrating the winners of the annual “Integration Prize” awarded since
2007 by the German Football Association (DFB) and its corporate sponsor, Mercedes
Benz. As of the time of writing, it is the most highly remunerated social prize in
Germany. Winners earn money as well as vehicles from Mercedes Benz. The prize
honors amateur sports programs in a variety of different institutions, including soccer
teams, schools, and sports clubs. Soccer is their primary focus, although they also honor
other sports programs. From the DFB, I also examined the 2013 “Practical Handbook”
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for developing integration programs in amateur sports. In addition, I analyzed the
German
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Confederation’s

(DOSB)

2014

“basic

paper”

(Grundlagenpapier) on the program “Integration through Sports.” The DOSB is the
umbrella organization for local German sports clubs (Sportvereine) and claims to be the
largest “citizens’ movement in Germany,” with over 27 million members in about 90,000
sports clubs across the country (Der Deutsche Olympische Sportbund, n.d.). Sports clubs
in Germany are primarily financed through membership fees and depend heavily on
volunteers for management and programming (Hovemann, Horch, & Schubert, 2006). In
terms of membership numbers and cultural influence, the DFB and DOSB are two of the
most important civic institutions in Germany. The materials examined here depict
approaches to integration as a concept and a social agenda by key organizations from
government, business, and civic sectors.
The first of the two most important guidelines proposed to optimize this risk-tobenefit ratio is that “Integration must be lived. It cannot be prescribed.” Secondly, it
requires the practical and concrete engagement of institutions and individuals at all levels
of the state and society. It is a universal social project within the nation that reinforces
and protects national norms by managing potential dangers posed by immigrant
difference. In setting the foundations for integration, the National Integration Plan
emphasizes the importance of a strong conception of the particularity of German culture
and normative values as well European universalist norms that form the basis of German
constitutional law:
Integration is a task with national significance. The foundation is, besides our
values and our cultural self-conception, the free and democratic order, as it has
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developed from German and European history and which has its legal expression
in the basic law.vi (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007)
This statement sets the terms for the discussion on integration: it is a discussion that will
be framed in terms of national interests. It also binds together, in no uncertain terms, the
establishment of the German constitution with the presumably monolithic values and
cultural self-conception of the hegemonic German “we.” To further emphasize the
primordial underpinnings of the community claiming to set the foundations, the statement
emphasizes the organic and historical development of the community and its norms.
Throughout the National Integration Plan, the possessive language of the first-person
plural underscores the stability of the normative German national category into which
immigrants are to be integrated.
The Integration Plan and its accompanying brochures and press releases
frequently reiterate that integration is a project and requires “effort” (Anstrengung) from
everyone: state, society, and immigrants. It is generally listed in this order, in an apparent
attempt to dispel the concern that demands are being made on the immigrant alone. The
directionality of these efforts, however, is not equal. As the statement above confirms, the
process is built on the normative foundations of a historically defined culture and nation.
The state and society has the responsibility to make efforts to educate and employ
immigrants, while immigrants must make themselves employable, culturally acceptable,
and intelligible by majority society through the German language. Change may be
demanded of all, but the immigrant is required to change themselves whereas the
majority society is only required to make changes to enable the immigrants’
transformation. Under the rubric of “support and demand” (fördern und fordern), the plan
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sets out the obligations to be placed on those I call integrants or candidates for
integration:
Integration cannot be prescribed. It requires effort from everyone, from the state
and society. Crucial, for a start, is the willingness of the immigrant to be open to a
life within our society, to accept unconditionally our basic law and our whole
legal system and, especially, to make a visible sign of their belonging to Germany
by learning the German language. On the side of the receiving society,
acceptance, tolerance, civil society engagement and the willingness to honestly
welcome people who legitimately live with us are indispensable: Integration—an
opportunity for our country!vii (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007)
The receiving society here, once again hailed in the flyer through the first-person plural,
is required to be tolerant and accepting, at least of those whose residence is deemed
legitimate. However, the since the flyer stipulates from the outset that “Germany is an
open-minded country,”viii this does not require those in the majority society to make any
fundamental changes. They need only act according to their tolerant and open nature.
On the other hand, very concrete demands are made of immigrants. The
immigrant is asked to be open to a life within German society and to follow its rules.
They are expected to accept these laws and the whole legal order “unconditionally,”
which is to say, they have no right to challenge or question existing laws and norms. It is
difficult to understand how a democratic system can also proscribe its people from
challenging existing legal norms, unless those people are considered non-citizens.
Finally, immigrants are assigned the burden of proving their affiliation and dedication to
Germany by learning the standardized form of the German language. As this is something
that immigrants must prove, normative German society does not have to presume
belonging until it is visibly signified. The use of the modifier “visible” (sichtbar), which
figuratively translates here to obvious or apparent, is curious for a capacity or trait that is
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auditory, not visible. However, the first mode of determining whether immigrants must
demonstrate their belonging as candidates for integration, or whether they are presumed
already to belong to “society,” is inevitably somatic difference.
The expectations placed on German institutions and normative society generally
focus on encouraging them to more effectively include, educate, and build the capacity of
immigrants and their descendants. They are encouraged to see “diversity as an
occupational resource” (Beschäftigungsressource). In terms of fighting discrimination
against immigrants and minorities, the report does not go into detail. An analysis of the
terms hate, racism, prejudice, xenophobia, stereotypes, and discrimination11 as they are
used in the report shows that these issues arise only rarely. Where they do appear, it is
often in the context of concerns about interethnic tension between immigrants. Concerns
with discrimination are often related back to their harmful effect on creating a productive
workspace or on Germany’s image, and thus its international competitiveness. For
example, in a section dedicated to increasing Germany’s attractiveness to highly qualified
researchers and workers, the plan states that “the prejudice of ‘xenophobia’ in Germany
can give international researchers the impression that they will not be welcome”ix
(“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 190). To be clear, the “prejudice” that is of
concern in this statement is not bias against foreigners, but rather the preconception held
by outsiders that xenophobia is a problem in Germany. It then goes on to affirm that

11

Hass, Rassismus, Vorurteile, Ausländerfeindlichkeit, Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Stereotypen,
Diskriminierung
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studies have shown that only a tiny number of foreign researchers experience xenophobia
in Germany during their stay, dismissing it as a real concern. Only the “prejudices” or
preconceptions of xenophobia are a concern, not its actual existence. Throughout the
report, racism and discrimination among the majority society is addressed only in the
vaguest of terms, and is often paired with a renewed declaration of the responsibilities of
immigrants to be open to normative Germans. For example, “among the native (German)
population prejudices and xenophobia must be dismantled. At the same time immigrants
must also be willing to be open to society” (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 140). Although
the plan claims that integration is “a two-way process,” normative society’s role is to
educate and train immigrants in majority norms while the immigrant’s role is to accept
established norms and to contribute to optimizing the life of the social body.

Sports as “Lived Integration”: Cultivating Responsible Citizens and Managing Risk
In the 2007 Integration Plan, sports are institutional arenas that receive special
attention. The plan points out that as a “motor of integration,” sports provide a wide
range of possibilities for integration, from cultural and social exchange to involving
immigrants in the “everyday politics” of running and supporting sporting clubs and
teams. The “positive effects of sports involvement” are accepted as common knowledge:
Sports provide very diverse offerings and stand open to all people, regardless of
their personalities or their cultural or financial situations. Fair play and equal
opportunity are supported in every form of sports through worldwide standards of
rules. Sports satisfy the human need for comparison and serves development of a
movement- and body-oriented personality. In particular, the practice of team
sports leads to a team spirit that does not emerge on its own in daily life. x
(Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 139)
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Despite these common-sense claims of the open, egalitarian, and socially constructive
nature of sports, scholars have contested the basic claim that amateur sports inevitably
lead to the kind of cooperative, intercultural solidarities described above (Giebenhain,
1995) as well as the claim that sports participation is equally available to all (Breuer,
Hallmann, & Wicker, 2011). Halm (2006) even provides evidence indicating that, in
general, amateur sports in Germany have contributed to social division between majority
society and Turkish-German youth. However, this chapter is not concerned with the
effectiveness of sporting integration in achieving its stated goals, but rather what sports
integration reveals about the biopolitical foundations of cultural politics around
nationalism and migration in Germany. My critical analysis here focuses on how major
sporting institutions, the government, and business sponsors discuss and frame the
integration projects they support.
The National Integration Plan, along with the integration programs of the DOSB
and the DFB, represent an ambitious project to use the symbolism of elite national sports
and the practical framework of amateur sports to discipline young “integrant” bodies and
to normalize values that are portrayed both as universal and as already typically German.
These values mirror ideals of economic citizenship and the imperative to cultivate human
capital. While the programs all play lip service to the ideal of integration as a two-way
process, the targets of integration programs show this process to be highly uneven. The
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role of sports in communication and language learning is a clear example of the
enforcement of German norms within a practice that is lauded as universal and egalitarian
(presuming, of course, that one has the physical capacity to participate). Language is one
of the most salient themes in the corpus.12 Sports are seen as ideally suited to bridge
communication gaps because of their universal rules and the prioritization of physical
communication over verbal forms. At the same time, sports are taken as an opportunity to
enforce norms of monolingual communication in the national language.
Among their six fundamental rules, the DFB’s Handbook for sports integration
lists the need to establish German as the sole “field language” (Platzsprache). The rule of
monolingualism is justified in terms of the need for fairness and equality. They write that
“communication only functions in the language that all participants understand. It is a
fault of respect and unfair to speak to someone in a language that he does not obviously
understand. This leads to rejection and aggression” (Hink, 2011, p. 28). This statement
contradicts the many statements lauding the value of sports in its transcendence of
language. This statement goes so far as to legitimate German speakers who reject and
react aggressively towards those who speak anything but the universal language. It shows
that despite celebrations of diversity in the universalist framework of sports, sports are a
means of entry to organize diversity and subordinate it to hegemonic norms. The unequal

12

See Chapter 7 for further discussion of language norms within integration discourse.
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flow of these expectations of norm acquisition is even clearer in this statement
advocating sports in the National Integration Plan:
Cultural integration is accomplished by the transmission of cultural techniques
like, for example, language acquisition as well as the acquisition of culturally
coded social “normative models” like behavioral models for everyday situations.
Sports clubs offer not only places to play sports; they are also spaces of everyday
communication that open access to two-way intercultural learning.xi (“Nationaler
Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 140)
The final nod to two-way processes of learning is belied by the fact that the norms and
techniques to be acquired in the first part of the statement are German, starting with
language. Encouraging bilingualism or the majority acquisition of minority languages is
not promoted anywhere in the corpus. Programs are oriented towards attracting,
accommodating and/or reforming people “with a migration background.” Majority
Germans are involved as planners or, incidentally, as teammates and peers, but are not
framed as targets. Majority norms are the foundation of the process tying together the
social body. As the National Integration Plan puts it, the goal is “to tie more people with
a migration background into established structures, and thereby improve understanding
between people of different cultures” (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 142). The
guidelines and narratives presented in the corpus call for changes at the institutional level
to more effectively reach and reform minorities at the individual level.
If sports are—as is repeatedly claimed in the corpus—the ideal tool for
integration, it is because sports serve the dual purposes underlying biopolitics: discipline
and regulation. As I argue throughout this dissertation, biopolitics are the logical and
technical modus operandi of integration. As Foucault shows, the modern era has been
characterized by a turn away from negative, repressive forms of constraint and towards a
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generalized system of discipline and surveillance that operates through desire (Foucault,
1977, 1978, 2009). Sports integration depends on the broad appeal of sports to attract
young minorities and, once physically and affectively engaged, to recruit them into a
system of liberal political and economic values. As I will demonstrate, the stories of
successful integration selected for the DFB and Mercedes Benz Integration Prize
characterize soccer as a technology for transforming dysfunctional multi-ethnic
communities and spaces into optimized cosmopolitan communities. They do so by
affirming the legitimacy of values and norms that are framed as German, and more
broadly Western, as optimal for collective life while simultaneously celebrating
beneficial and consumable forms of difference.
The Integration Prize highlights two kinds of contexts for this community
transformation. One type of transformation exemplifies the disciplinary side of sports
integration through the conversion of dangerous multiethnic neighborhoods into safe
spaces by attracting and educating unruly young men. The other commonly featured
narrative illustrates the regulatory side of sports integration, celebrating clubs that have
managed to turn demographic shifts that could have posed existential threats into new
sources of growth. The award honors clubs that lost membership due to the strong
localized growth of immigrant communities, but which managed to turn this threat of
demise into a productive new opportunity by attracting new immigrant members. They
also promote the accommodation of a selection of divergent norms around consumption
and modesty, by promoting respect for alcohol and food restrictions and affirming
different practices around showering and nudity.
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The disciplinary side of sports integration projects focuses on using the affective
and playful character of sport to attract and teach minority youth values and norms such
as punctuality, discipline, responsibility, and hard work. Coaches, educators, and program
coordinators explain that soccer motivates young people, spurring them to discipline
themselves:
That soccer plays a primary role in integration, is obvious to Heinz Bunzer: “We
have it so much easier, since we are a playful community.”xii (2010
Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 9)
In our opinion, endless prohibitions and reprimands don't go anywhere. We set
ourselves the goal to do things from the inside out in a positive way and through
that to reach different cultures.xiii (Hink, 2011, p. 8)
I think that the boys and girls on a team notice quite quickly how much fun it is to
pursue goals and to celebrate victories together—and everyone happily pitches in
for that.xiv (Hink, 2011, p. 48)
Once engaged in sport, young people are primed to incorporate other forms of behavior
that elevate their human capital. Their performance in sport is secondary to other
pedagogical goals. The body is a medium, a conduit for socialization:
Social capacity, a self-confident performance, team spirit—that is more important
than lactic acid values and shooting techniques. “With soccer young people are
intrinsically motivated, so they learn with greater motivation and in a playful way,
to stick to the rules,” says Konermann. “The goal is to get as many of them to get
a foothold in the job market as quickly as possible.”xv (2013 Integrationspreis,
2014, p. 19)
"Soccer is a good means to realize positive developments, both for individual
students, as a class and, also, for our entire school," says Jürgen Kuhlmann.
Because the ball can do a lot—playing soccer teaches the Gelsenkirchen youth
important values and strengthens their character. "Not to give up so easily when
facing difficulties, to address conflicts but not to allow them to escalate, soccer
facilitates this," reports the physical education teacher from his experiences in
past years.xvi (2010 Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 10)
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In this schema, sports provide a point of entry to engage the individual in selfimprovement for the good of the class, school, and beyond to the population at large. The
logic of sports integration tracks closely with the techniques and aims of discipline,
turning “confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of
individual elements” (Foucault, 1977, p. 170) whose forces are coordinated and made
productive. The chaos of untrained bodies emerges particularly clearly in one prize
narrative. Businessman Thomas Stoll decided to start a soccer program after had
attending “a seminar on the transmission of values in Austria.”
Then I came home and picked up my son from school. The children were out of
control; they were simply running across the street and were hurling around the
wildest profanity. That was my key moment. It was clear that I had to do
something.xvii (2010 Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 14)
The ethnic background of the children is not specified in the narrative of the program, but
its status as an “integration” program communicates the minority status of its targets.
Soccer, with its requirements of order, cellular dispersion and control of bodies also
includes processes of “hierarchical observation” and “normalizing judgment” (Foucault,
1977, p. 170). Integration as a system of managing difference aims to normalize
immigrants and their descendants and render them useful. At the same time, as it operates
in service of liberalism, it must avoid the appearance of illiberal coercion. Sports are
hailed as a “motor of integration” because they attract young, able-bodied people,
enlisting them in their own normalization.

Targets of Discipline and Normalization: Unruly Boys and Oppressed Girls
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Sports integration programs overwhelmingly focus on young people and their
families. Since sports integration is heavily invested in sports as a pedagogical tool,
families are targeted as the first locus of social reproduction. The targets of these
programs are approached within a highly-gendered framework. While the pedagogy
applied to girls and boys share some of the same goals—foremost among them, the
cultivation of individual empowerment, confidence, and “good values”—they diverge on
key points. Remedies proposed by sports integration programs point to perceived deficits
in immigrant communities. In the corpus, young minority males are singled out for
reform of deviant behaviors like violence and criminality, whereas women and girls are
targeted to remedy gender inequality that is presumed to be a generalized problem in
“traditional” minority communities. In both cases, integration projects are largely
oriented towards problems located within immigrant communities. This deficitorientation is particularly prominent in the narratives of the DFB and Mercedes Benz
Integration Prize.
In the stories publicized by the Integration Prize, young men are often normalized
by neglecting to mention gender as a focus when discussing boys’ teams, or stigmatized
by making them the focus of programs targeting social deviance and neighborhoods
classified as “social combustion points.” The celebrated Midnight Sports program in
Berlin is a paradigmatic example of this type of gendering, targeting people characterized
as potential delinquents and normalized as male. As the 2013 Integration Prize brochure
avers, Midnight Sports organizers were invited to confer with Chancellor Merkel on the
topic of integration and were awarded with the Bambi—Germany’s oldest and most
important media prize (see Chapter 7)—for the category Integration. The project
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mobilized the celebrity and symbolic power of its sponsor, the Ghanaian-German
national soccer team member Jérôme Boateng, in a narrative of reforming urban minority
youth through sports to “defend a Berlin neighborhood teetering on the brink.” The
program’s founder Ismail Öner, a trained social pedagogue of Turkish heritage, described
his motivation for starting the project,
The police designated the Heer Street in North Spandau a "criminally burdened
place." A group of about 30 young people, mostly with a migration background,
had practically crippled the neighborhood. For me it was clear: something had to
change now. Midnight Sports was the result of a discussion I organized between
the police and the young people. On December 8, 2007, we opened the gym for
the first time. The effect was stupendous. The categorization of "criminally
burdened place" place could soon be lifted.xviii (2013 Integrationspreis, 2014, p.
22)
This story epitomizes transformative narrative of sports, which by transforming
dangerous young people, defends and restores the social body to health. The category of a
“criminally burdened place” is a local legal classification of space that the police may
assign, which lowers the requirement of reasonable suspicion to justify police
intervention. Cities and states across Germany have similar policies classifying
“dangerous zones” to justify increased surveillance and police intervention. Local police
have broad authority to designate of these spaces of exception, and the limited research
available on these policies suggests that designation is based as much or more on
demographic features of a space than on actual risk of violence (Belina & Wehrheim,
2011; Ullrich & Tullney, 2012). Öner draws on this category to justify the claim that
these mostly minority youths represented a serious threat to life in the neighborhood and
to link his intervention to the neutralization of that threat.
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Midnight Sports uses the attraction of organized sports to transform threatening
young men into useful individuals through a variety of disciplinary techniques that
coincide with the requirements of sport. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977)
outlines a modern technology aimed at increasing the usefulness of individuals in the
most efficient possible manner. Discipline seeks to produce “subjected and practiced”
bodies, increasing the forces of the body in terms of utility while decreasing the political
force of the body through obedience (1977, p. 138). This involves processes of enclosure
and partitioning, which in this case is the removal of young men from the public spaces
of the streets to the controlled space of the gym and the indoor soccer field where each
player knows his place and his function within that space. By its very definition as a
practice, sport produces “docile bodies,” which is Foucault’s term for the disciplined
body that represents maximal utility and minimal cost. Beyond the direct practices of the
game, however, sports open the possibility for further interventions, as the leader of
Midnight Sports explains.
DFB Interviewer: And the baseball bats had to be left outside the gym?
Ismail Öner: Let's not exaggerate, it wasn't so bad. We created encounters. At our
first tournament, the police played against the kids. They had previously only
encountered each other during incidents. The young people come to the gym and
they bring all their works and needs along. Then the social pedagogy work begins.
We create networks with schools, families, soccer clubs, child welfare offices,
and other people and institutions around the kids. There is often trouble. They are
in danger of failing, they are under threat of expulsion, a young man can't find an
internship, another has a court order. Sometimes it's just lovesickness.xix (2013
Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 22)
Here, the DFB interviewer picks up on the description of delinquency that Öner
introduced in his previous statement by suggesting, half in jest, that these young men
needed to be disarmed before participating. Öner initially pushes back against what he
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classifies as an overstatement of their deviance. He then continues to outline the depth
and breadth of interventions necessary to reform these young men and make them
productive. Foucault writes that disciplinary space aims to “establish presences and
absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications,
to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual,
to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits” (2009, p. 143). The practice of
soccer in itself fulfills these aims, but Öner’s statement shows that, above all, it generates
the enticement to enter a disciplinary space that to acts as the nexus in a network of other
disciplinary spaces. The statement above concludes with an inventory of transgressions
against the standards and norms of schools, the job market, and the legal system. Öner
mitigates this description of deviance by adding an example of the “normal” travails of
youth learning to navigate amorous relationships.
There is a tension in the DFB literature between the masculine normativity of
soccer and the special gendered imperatives of integration discourse demanding the
inclusion and empowerment of women. While the above interview emphasizes that
Midnight Sports welcomes all national backgrounds, “including Germans,” Öner
expresses discomfort with female participants, explaining that he is unable to relate to the
problems of girls:
If they come into the gym they are permitted to play. But I know what I can do
and what I can’t. Pedagogy plays a major role. I don’t have the ability to
empathize in order to understand the problems of 14-year-old girls. Other female
colleagues (Kolleginnen) will have to take that on.xx (2013 Integrationspreis,
2014, p. 23)
Before this question, the last of the interview, the neutral term “young people”
(Jugendliche) is generally used for the participants. Once Öner refers to “our boys”
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(unsere Jungs), but until the last question gender otherwise unspecified, and
consequently, presumed to be male.
Soccer in Germany and in most of Europe is deeply associated with masculinity
(Pfister, 2003; Pfister, Fasting, Scraton, & Vázquez, 2002). While the men’s soccer was
becoming a keystone of postwar national mythology, German women were barred from
organized soccer by the German Football Association until 1970. In the development of
recreational and professional soccer across most of Europe during the 20th century, soccer
was coded as fundamentally masculine and women were long barred or discouraged from
playing organized soccer.13 Although women’s soccer programs in Europe have become
increasingly competitive at the elite level, amateur participation rates are heavily skewed
in favor of men. In 2016, women’s teams made up only 7.7% of soccer teams in
Germany (Deutscher Fussball-Bund, 2016). The drastic gender disparity in soccer
participation nationwide does not rate as a central concern on the DFB website. It
receives only passing mention and the lack of female players is described as a technical
problem to be negotiated with, for example, an online team exchange where female teams
can post openings for players or with “test training” sessions (Schnuppertraining) where
girls can check out the game. In contrast, in the context of sports integration, girls’
participation is framed as a central problem with broader social implications, both as a

13

In contrast, in the U.S. participation rates across genders are approximately equal, and soccer has
traditionally been considered a sport that is equally appropriate for males and females (Knoppers &
Anthonissen, 2003; Markovits & Hellerman, 2003).
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reflection of and as a means to change the presumed patriarchal norms of minority
communities.
Girls and women receive special attention in the DFB Integration Prize, although
their interest in soccer is sometimes observed with considerable surprise. As one prize
winner stated, “we noticed—with total astonishment—that the girls also liked to play
soccer during recess, and were good at it”xxi (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 8). This
statement underscores the strength of the male coding of soccer in majority German
society. However, this realization of girls’ interest in soccer in the context of integration
programs does not lead to reflection on the problematic gendered assumptions about
soccer held by majority society. Instead, participation is viewed within the framework of
assumptions about gender inequalities in minority communities. As program organizer
Hans-Jürgen Daum stated,
I was very skeptical at the beginning. Girls from Moroccan or Turkish families
playing soccer? I couldn’t really imagine that. Today I see the enthusiasm of
fathers cheering on their daughters. Soccer has contributed to a convergence of
cultures.xxii (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 19)
The failure of imagination described in this statement relates to the intersection of
gendered and religiously coded national categories. While there is much left unsaid in
this statement, it only makes sense in relation to an underlying presumption of, on the one
hand, a patriarchal traditionalism among Muslim minority families and, on the other, a
normative culture that supports gender equality in sports participation. This statement is
best understood by beginning at the end. Daum’s inability to imagine Muslim girls
playing soccer was tied to the assumption that their fathers—who turned out to be
enthusiastic fans—would prohibit their daughters’ participation in soccer. When he was
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proven wrong, however, he does not question his initial assumptions about these
(Muslim) families, but instead credits soccer with causing a change in their culture,
causing them to converge with implicitly German norms. This proposed effect of soccer
in transforming patriarchal norms is even clearer in another statement by the founder of
the project, Social Integration of Girls through Soccer, which has been replicated
nationwide. Founder, Dr. Ulf Gebken claimed that, “soccer can be a lever of
emancipation. The older brother or father see the sister or daughter in a completely
different milieu. It changes the role behavior”xxiii (2011 Integrationspreis, 2012, p. 18). In
hegemonic sports culture, soccer is seen as a fundamentally masculine pastime, while in
the context of sports integration it is as a means of empowering minority girls and
combatting the particular gender inequalities in minority families. The concern with
gender in integration discourse separates the actual and perceived gender inequalities in
immigrant communities from those of the majority society.
Along with sports’ ability to teach rules and norms, targeting women and girls is
one of the most frequently appearing themes across the corpus. Following the gendered
focus of the National Integration Plan, minority women in sports integration programs are
defined as a special target for integration. Using the female body as a symbolic site, these
programs strongly target immigrant and minority girls and women to contest the gender
inequalities presumed to be endemic in minority communities and to encourage women
to transmit the values and norms of integration in their role as mothers. As the National
Integration Plan states,
In their role as mothers, female migrants have a key place in the integration of the
next generation. Many girls with migration backgrounds achieve good results in
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school and dominate the German language. Nevertheless, they often lack the
opportunity to put their potential to profitable use. (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 18)
The Integration Plan and in the sports integration programs portray women as a crucial
source of unutilized human capital. This focus on women as mothers also reflects the
drive of biopolitics to push into every domain of human life. Integration programs focus
heavily on empowering girls, in part to recover female productivity lost to traditional
family structures and in part to prepare them to pass integrated values down to their
future children. The reason for this loss of female human capital, implicit in the statement
above, is sketched out in more detail through the examples of the problems to be solved,
including need to protect immigrant women from domestic violence, forced marriage,
and the impingement of their human rights. By framing these problems as particular to
immigrant communities, this discourse characterizes immigrant communities as illiberal.
Their illiberalism poses a threat to the ability of immigrant women to contribute to
Germany’s future prosperity. In this way, the presumption of patriarchal dominance calls
for disciplinary solutions to change the behavior of men and boys and regulatory
solutions to change the norms that prevent women and girls from reaching their full
economic capacity.

Regulation: Immigrants and the Nation’s Future
There is considerable overlap in the discourses driving sports integration
programs examined in this chapter. They all include the goal of improving the inclusion
and socialization of immigrants and minorities for the benefit of society at large. They
also proclaim the ability of sport to reform or socialize the individual and impart the
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idealized Western/universal values of equality, liberty, and individualism. The programs
in this chapter operate at the micro-level of practice, but also draw on the national level
symbolism of elite athletics, quoting national team members who explain how soccer or
their Olympic careers have allowed them to integrate into normative society and
convinced them of the equality of opportunity for immigrants and minorities in
Germany.xxiv One quote that encapsulates the sports integration-meritocracy narrative is
from women’s national soccer team member Cecilia Okoyino da Mbabi, who states,
“Soccer helped me to easily integrate myself into German society, so that today I can
study and play for the national soccer team. I learned through sports that there are
opportunities in Germany, even for children with a migration background” (Hink, 2011,
p. 12). Programs proclaim sports’ ability to create community through the shared
experience of self-actualization around a common task with universal rules. These values
and behaviors are framed as a stepping stone to success on the job market. These sports
integration programs also share a lack of concern with structural inequality, racism, and
social exclusion. Although sports can just as easily exacerbate stereotypes and racism
(see Stuart Hall, 1997b; Hoberman, 1997), the idea of sports—both at the level of
individual practice and the level of mediated representation—as a natural mechanism for
positive transcultural exchange is persistent throughout the discourse on sports
integration.
Although they share key foundations, the discourses of the DFB and DOSB can
be distinguished in terms of emphasis and tone. The DFB literature has a more
disciplinary and remedial emphasis, whereas the DOSB places a greater emphasis on
creating interventions to achieve equal participation. In their 2014 paper, the DOSB
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writes that “whereas before remedial integration was consistently the focus, today it is
primarily about the equal participation of people with and without a migration
background in all areas of life”xxv (DOSB, 2014, p. 4). Subtle forms of othering persist in
the DOSB’s integration discourse. However, recent publications by the DOSB also
critically interrogate the classification of “having a migration background” and insist on
the category’s fluid meaning. Furthermore, they define those with a migration
background as an inextricable part of the German population. While both the DFBMercedes Benz and the DOSB programs use disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms, the
DOSB discourse emphasizes the regulatory elements by conceptualizing integration
primarily in terms of the population. The regulatory elements of sports integration center
on the “social body,” which is to say, on the population as an aggregate. As opposed to
the deficit-orientation of disciplinary discourse, regulatory discourse is oriented towards
the potential benefits of immigration and cultural diversity for the future. This involves
the quantification and projection of changing demographics that underscore the need to
recruit immigrants and their children into the national project. In this mode, politicians,
industrial elites, and sporting functionaries speak enthusiastically about the opportunities
offered by candidates for integration.
Regulatory aspects of projects identify key target populations and optimize
interventions for the greatest possible benefit to the broader population. This targeting
focuses on families, the young, and the able-bodied based on their importance for
sustaining national growth in the future. Integration projects all begin with the division of
the population into normative nationals and candidates for integration, defined by the
possession of a “migration background.” The DOSB project is no exception, but while it
138

accepts this basic premise of division, it seeks to mitigate the harm caused by this
division by promoting an anti-essentialist definition of the category of “people with
migration background” and challenging those who equate it with “foreigners.” Instead,
they argue that this diverse category is an increasingly important part of the nation’s
future:
The total number of new immigrants grew last year by 43,000 or 0.1%. According
to projections, this tendency will continue at least until 2030, but not because that
many new people will immigrate, but primarily because people of non-German
heritage are younger on average than the majority population, and are therefore
more often at an age to establish families.xxvi (German Olympic Sports
Confederation, 2012, p. 6)
Using statistical projections, the DOSB justifies the importance of interventions to
increase the productivity of those with a migration background, who, they note in the
following paragraph, are twice as likely to be unemployed as their normative German
peers. This comment opens the door to discussions about structural inequality, but the
solutions offered by sports integration programs invariably return to interventions
targeting individual behavior and interpersonal contact.
Although the framing and top-level conceptualization of the DOSB program
emphasizes the benefits of diverse populations, the programs featured often involve the
same pedagogical and disciplinary approaches as those honored by the DFB and
Mercedes Benz Integration Prize. Like the DFB, the DOSB uses sport as a gateway other
pedagogical interventions, including language programs, social counseling, and school or
job search assistance, an approach they call “Sports plus x” (German Olympic Sports
Confederation, 2012, p. 30). The DOSB shares the commitment of the National
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Integration Plan and the DFB framework to mobilizing sport as part of a comprehensive
and interventionist program aimed at imparting idealized normative values and behaviors.
While the disciplinary mode includes more-or-less implicit threats posed by
individual immigrants and immigrant communities, the regulatory mode focuses entirely
on the potential benefits of managing the present population for future gains. The
emphasis on the benefits represented by diversity fits into an economic system of value
that sees difference as a potential source of innovation. In the words of Mercedes Benz’s
Director of Global Diversity,
Diversity, whether in sports or in business, always broadens one's own
perspective.…diversity enriches our culture and thereby our lives. It is, therefore,
the foundation for the future of enterprise and for the future of society.xxvii (2013
Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 3)
To achieve this benefit, however, integration must be carefully managed and “rehearsed”
(geübt) through coordinated interventions from top level policies down to individual
communities. In the 2009 Integration Prize brochure, the same Mercedes Benz
representative underscores the importance of active interventions in order to make
diversity beneficial, emphasizing that “integration must be fostered and supported in
order to be really effective and lasting, and so that diversity of people and cultures will be
an enrichment for everyone”xxviii (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 3). Ideally, programs
should form a network. As the DOSB puts it, “integration work can start on islands. But
sooner or later these islands must be connected, so that each one can reach its full
effectiveness”xxix (German Olympic Sports Confederation, 2012, p. 32). To illustrate
effective networking, they present the example of a “colorful Berlin network” that
organizes “prevention weeks” for school children. This program involves schools, police,
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the judiciary, and sports clubs to teach children the difference between “fighting and
competition” (Kampf und Wettkampf). After lessons on drug abuse and weapon laws
from German authorities, students can try a variety of new sports. In this combination of
fun activities and stern lessons, sports are not simply a reward for disciplined attention; it
demonstrates the continuity of these projects. This program perfectly blends the
disciplinary imperatives to impart bodily control and knowledge of certain punishment
for potential transgressions. It does so according to a biopolitical philosophy promoting
preventative measures to manage the risk and increase the stability, health, and economic
viability of the population. Even with the attempts at progressive reframing by the
DOSB, their highlighted integration projects target immigrant and minority children as
risks in need of management.
Although the regulatory mode enthusiastically proclaims the benefits of diversity,
the implicit threat does not disappear, but rather shifts up to a higher scale: to the level of
the population. The potential benefits are contingent on the successful management of
difference through “integration work.” In a typical articulation of the task, Maria Böhmer
states,
The integration of people from immigrant families is an enormous challenge.
Let's make it into an opportunity for our country! Because here we are deciding,
above all, the question of the future viability of our society—both on the national
and the European level. (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007)
Here, “our society” is both national and European, implicating all European nations in the
project of integrating non-European populations. This quote emphasizes the integration
of minorities as a path to a better national and European future. However, by framing the
stakes of integration projects as nothing less than “the future viability of our society,” the
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threat posed by the supposed refusal to integrate operates at a greater order of magnitude.
The threat of failure is framed as existential, making each unruly body symbolize the
death of German and European society.

Cracks in the Veneer of Sports Integration
Integration as a conceptual framework guides interventions attempting to bring
immigrants and their children into the biopolitical order that Foucault calls the
“normalizing society.” These interventions reflect their transition to being recognized as a
permanent part of the population, a change which began with the implementation of a
limited form of jus soli citizenship rights in 2000. This increased inclusion has been
accompanied by new interventions from the state level reaching down to local
communities and even into the family sphere, seeking to discipline and regulate new
Germans through their status as permanent candidates for integration. Power under a
regime of biopolitics operates through the cultivation of life. Yet, biopolitics also
involves a constant process of distinguishing between life that must be cultivated, and life
that poses a threat to the People and must be weeded out. The discourses and programs of
integration do not categorize all immigrant and minority people as unworthy life. Instead,
they categorize these groups as carriers of both risks and benefits. The extraction of
benefits calls for coordinated and comprehensive interventions and surveillance to assess
progress. This process includes celebration, care, and attention with the goal of
developing candidates for integration into enthusiastic supporters of the German national
project. In this regard, sports are seen as an ideal and natural nexus connecting individual
bodies to the life of the normative population.
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This process of assessment and distinction of integration successes from failures
is open-ended. Candidates for integration may be celebrated as exemplars of success one
day, only to have their integration status questioned at the next opportunity. Elite athletes
are repeatedly caught up in this process. As embodiments of the nation, the minority
athletes of the men’s German national soccer team are a key focal point of this process of
assessment, celebration, and criticism. This process is by no means confined to Germany.
When the French men’s soccer team won its first World Cup title in 1998, the ethnic
composition of its team reflected France’s history of empire. The diversity of the French
team was hailed as a source of its success and as a sign of a new post-colonial era of
racial equality and harmony (Dubois, 2010). Despite the team’s successes, any lackluster
performance has consistently raised complaints from the right that the team might be “too
black.” In the Netherlands, there has been a similar development as the number of
national team players of color increased in the 1990s. While a number of minority players
have achieved the status of national heroes, audience studies and studies of media
coverage of the national team have shown familiar racialized patterns that distinguish
(autochthonous) white players from their (foreign) teammates of color (Hermes, 2005;
Floris Müller, Zoonen, & Roode, 2007; Sterkenburg, 2013). Historical legacies of
colonialism and increasingly mobile transnational populations are reflected in the
demographics of national sports teams, and media coverage frequently draws on
difference as an explanatory tool for the successes and failures of national teams.
International competition turns athletes into embodied national symbols, and the
carefully choreographed cameras and running commentary of mediated international
sports reproduce common tropes and narratives of differentiation (Wenner, 2002). In the
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German case, the vaunted “multikulti” team of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa came
to symbolize the strength of a new inclusive Germany (see Chapters 5 and 7). The
Turkish-German midfielder Mesut Özil became a breakout national star. Özil, along with
his German-born national teammates Jerome Boateng, Sami Khedira, have been widely
lauded as “examples of successful integration.” The Polish-born Miroslav Klose and
Lukas Podolski are sometimes also added to the list of the “successfully integrated.” But
while the national team was being celebrated for its unprecedented diversity in 2010, a
new debate emerged reflecting the surveillance and assessment that has accompanied
minorities’ entrance into the symbolic national core. Before the 2010 tournament, former
national team member, trainer and DFB vice president, Franz Beckenbauer criticized the
national players who chose not to sing along with the national anthem before games.
Beckenbauer faced a temporary ban from FIFA in 2014 and is currently under
investigation for corruption related to the successful bid to host the 2006 World Cup, but
remains one of the most popular figures in German soccer. The popular tabloid, the Bild,
stoked the debate by publishing Beckenbauer’s statement that all players should be
required to sing along (Stevens, 2010). After the team exited the 2012 European
Championship, the debate was kicked up again with new enthusiasm. Politicians and
leaders in the DFB proposed a “singing requirement” (Singpflicht) for all national team
players, while the team’s coach defended the free choices of this players (“Diskussion
ums Halbfinal-Aus bei der EM,” 2012). These discussions were renewed again in
anticipation of the World Cup in 2014 and the European Championship in 2016.
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Figure 1: The caption for this photograph reads, “The silent and the singers: The German players with a
migration background listen to the national anthem with closed lips, the rest sing along ardently.”xxx
(Spoerr, 2014)

Winning “Integration Prizes” and even the World Cup in 2014 has not protected
minority athletes from perpetual policing. In a country where nationalist celebrations
around sports have, until recently, been relatively restrained (see Chapter 3), the scrutiny
and critique of athletes who choose not to sing has been highly charged. Karen Spoerr, a
commentator in the national newspaper Die Welt, addressed the players in an open letter.
It is worth quoting substantial excerpts from the letter, since it provides a striking
example of racialized and gendered discourses in soccer and narrates how the mediated
experience of sports feeds expectations for affective satisfaction.
Dear Mesut Özil, Sami Khedira, Jerome Boateng,
I don’t understand much about soccer, but I understand a little…. I must say, the
business of playing together works well on the German team. Something else
does not work so well. You already know what I am talking about, right, about the
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national anthem. All the players sing the national anthem—only you three don’t.
You stay silent…. I have to ask myself: What are you telling us with your silence?
… I really like you three, because you look so good, because you can run so fast,
and because you want to shoot goals so that the Germany can become the best
soccer team in the world.
But then I see you standing there silently. The camera films the singing mouths.
The singing players, the singing trainer, the singing reserve bench. Only you three
pinch your lips together14 like teenagers who want to punish their parents for not
being cool enough. You stand there and shun the millions of enthusiastic
countrymen in front of their televisions, who are yearning nothing more deeply in
that moment than to get goosebumps. Who wish to be allowed to melt into a
singing German community of destiny, even people like me, who can’t tell the
difference between a penalty and a free kick.
[…] You three stand there speechless and destroy the beautiful idea that by
singing the national anthem we can become a whole. Or could it be that this is just
a misunderstanding?
Dear Mesut, Sami, Jerome, every time that I see you stay silent, I ask myself what
you must be thinking while Germany sings. I think I know: You aren’t thinking
about Turkey, Tunisia and Ghana. You aren’t thinking about your national
identity. You think: Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit für das deutsche Vaterland
(unity and justice and freedom for the German fatherland). Right? How about
next time you think it you just open your mouths?15 (Spoerr, 2014)
This commentary arguing that all national players should be expected to sing is followed
by a counterpoint by a (male) colleague arguing that performance on the field matters
most and that not singing does not mean that the players are not patriotic. He also points
out that during the 1974 final no one, not even Beckenbauer, sang along. In contrast to
the female author of the first position who proclaims three times her ignorance of the

The originally used term kneifen means “to pinch,” but is also used in phrases indicating the shirking of
duties or fleeing in cowardice.
15
For the original text, visit http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article129454350/Sollten-alledeutschen-Spieler-die-Hymne-singen.html
14
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sport and disinterest in anything but national team soccer, the second author is concerned
with results, with substance over symbolism. This reinforces the expectation that women
have little understanding of soccer and are only interested in the pageantry and emotion
of international games, whereas men have a deeper, more technical interest. The World
Cup is framed as an exceptional event, where “even women” become soccer fans and
patriotic displays are increasingly not only safe and normal, they are almost obligatory.
Spoerr drives this point home, writing, “The national anthem is just as interesting to me
as soccer, which is to say normally not at all. But during the World Cup I am interested in
both, soccer and the anthem.”xxxi Chapter 3 will examine the beginnings of this new
national sports orthodoxy in 2006. By 2014, Spoerr expresses her entitlement to demand
that players satisfy her desire for the affective satisfaction of uncomplicated “collective
effervescence,” to reference Durkheim’s (1995) classic theory.
Spoerr is angry that these three players of color have “destroyed the beautiful
idea” of perfect national unity. Possibly recognizing a problem with explicitly singling
out three minority players for rebuke, she attempts to show that she is not prejudiced
against them personally, by complimenting their physical appearance, speed, and
effectiveness in raising Germany to the top of the global (sports) hierarchy. This
comment falls squarely in the terrain of positively framed racism that flourishes in sports,
where minority athletes are valued for their almost preternatural physical prowess, and
appreciated for their physicality rather than their tactical or intellectual abilities (see
Hoberman, 1997). After sexually objectifying these players, the author further demeans
Özil, Boateng, and Khedira by infantilizing them and accusing them of petulance and
spite against their “uncool parents,” presumably here embodied by white German society.
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To avoid accusing them of secret disloyalty by thinking instead of their fathers’
homelands (Boateng and Khedira have white German mothers) she presumes to fill their
silence with her own wishful interpretation that they must be mentally singing along.
Spoerr concludes with the demand that they should “just open their mouths” next time.
Özil, Boateng and Khedira had already been scrutinized and critiqued for their
failure to properly perform patriotism in 2010 and 2012, and had already publicly
accounted for and defended their actions during the anthem, explaining that they use that
moment to focus and/or pray. In defense of his legitimate place as a national player,
Khedira argued
It is a good sign when one sings the national anthem, but that doesn’t make you a
good German. You become a good German when you speak the language well
and you live the values. And that is the case with all of us.xxxii (“Debatte um
Nationalhymne „überflüssig“,” 2012)
Khedira accepts not only the positive value of performing patriotism, but also the basic
notion that belonging as German is defined by speaking “good German” and adopting
normative values (see Chapter 7 for and examination of the role of language in defining
legitimate citizenship). Spoerr not only erases minority players’ speech on this specific
topic, she takes the liberty of defining their thoughts and demanding they act according to
her expectations. Spoerr’s commentary perfectly blends sexist and racist frameworks
around soccer. Although her column is an extreme example in that it illustrates so many
tropes in such an unvarnished manner, the assumptions and expectations underlying it run
throughout the cases analyzed in this dissertation.

Conclusion
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Elite sports, particularly at the national level, reflect and reconstruct national
politics of culture, race, and citizenship. They symbolize the optimism of national
communities and also reveal the fragility of support for celebrated figures of integration.
This chapter examined the politics of sports integration as it has been conceptualized by
stakeholders in the government, business, and civic sectors and implemented at the level
of communities. These programs demonstrate how the idea of integration operates
through intertwined processes of discipline and biopolitical reason, seeking to improve
the life of the population by disciplining bodies that represent a particular risk to that
population. The celebratory and optimistic tone of sports integration discourse and
practice, which emphasizes the benefits of properly disciplined diversity for the national
future, implies the existential threat represented by the “failure” of integration.
Immigrants and their children will either be the source of Germany’s future growth or the
cause of its demise.
The rise of integration discourse cannot be separated from the rise of renewed
forms of symbolic nationalism. This is the case not only in Germany but throughout
Europe as the unity of the European Union has faltered in the face of nationalist
commitments to regulating the population through controls on migration. Germany
provides a particularly valuable case, however, because its history of atrocities committed
in the name of the nation makes symbolic nationalism a contentious topic, which is
subject to considerable public debate. The following chapters in this dissertation analyze
a number of these public debates and “critical incidents” (Zelizer, 1992). These mediated
incidents mobilize celebrity athletes and entertainers as examples for celebration or
scrutiny for their roles in the project of constructing the new “colorful” German nation.
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The next three chapters analyze and contextualize press discourses legitimating
patriotism beginning with the 2006 World Cup. Chapter 3 analyzes media coverage to
trace the emergence of the idea of “soccer patriotism.” Chapter 4 examines the political
economy and representational politics of a media campaign that paved the way for the
successful normalization of soccer patriotism in 2006. Chapter 5 investigates the
mobilization of immigrants as pedagogical figures in the case of a dispute between
immigrant patriots and German anti-nationalists.

i

Es sind auch deutsche Tugenden, die zur deutschen Leichtigkeit beitragen. Denn Wohlstand macht das
Leben leicht und hebt die Laune. Als Folge von Fleiß, Disziplin und Folgsamkeit wächst dieser Wohlstand
gerade.
ii
Sie wollten und sollten auf Zeit bleiben, dann entschieden sich viele von ihnen für ein Leben in
Deutschland.
iii
In den späteren Jahrzehnten veränderte sich die Zuwanderung. Nun kamen Menschen aus anderen
Gründen nach Deutschland – und konnten häufig auch bleiben.
iv
Mit den politischen Veränderungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa kamen viele Deutsche in das Land ihrer
Vorfahren zurück.
v
Dennoch hat es lange gedauert, bis diese Entwicklung als das verstanden wurde, was sie ist: Eine
Wirklichkeit, die viele Chancen eröffnet, aber auch die Gefahr gesellschaftlicher Spannungen birgt.
vi
Integration ist eine Aufgabe von nationaler Bedeutung. Grundlage ist neben unseren Wertvorstellungen
und unserem kulturellen Selbstverständnis die freiheitliche und demokratische Ordnung, wie sie sich aus
der deutschen und europäischen Geschichte entwickelt hat und im Grundgesetz ihre verfassungsrechtliche
Ausprägung findet.
vii
Integration kann nicht verordnet werden. Sie erfordert Anstrengungen von allen, vom Staat und der
Gesellschaft. Maßgebend ist zum einen die Bereitschaft der Zuwande-rer, sich auf ein Leben in unserer
Gesellschaft einzulassen, unser Grundgesetz und unsere gesamte Rechtsordnung vorbehaltlos zu
akzeptieren und insbesondere durch das Erlernen der deutschen Sprache ein sichtbares Zeichen der
Zugehörigkeit zu Deutschland zu setzen. Auf Seiten der Aufnahmegesellschaft sind Akzeptanz, Toleranz,
zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement und die Bereitschaft unverzichtbar, Menschen, die rechtmäßig bei uns
leben, ehrlich willkommen zu heißen: Integration—eine Chance für unser Land!
viii
Deutschland ist ein weltoffenes Land.
ix
Das Vorurteil der „Ausländerfeindlichkeit“ in Deutschland kann dazu führen, dass Forscher aus dem
Ausland den Eindruck gewinnen, nicht immer willkommen zu sein.
x
Der Sport bietet sehr vielseitige Angebote und steht allen Menschen—unabhängig von ihrer persönlichen,
kulturellen oder finanziellen Situation—offen. Fairplay und Chancengleichheit werden in jeder Sportart
durch weltweit einheitliche Regeln gefördert. Sport befriedigt das menschliche Bedürfnis nach Vergleich
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und dient der bewegungs- und körperorientierten Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit. Insbesondere die
Ausübung von Mannschaftssport führt zu Teamgeist, der im Alltag nicht von selbst entsteht.
xi
Kulturelle Integration erfolgt durch die Vermittlung von Kulturtechniken wie z. B. den Spracherwerb
sowie den Erwerb kulturell eingefärbter sozialer „Normalitätsmuster“ wie Verhaltensmuster in
Alltagssituationen. Sportvereine bieten nicht nur Orte des Sporttreibens, sondern sind auch Orte der
Alltagskommunikation, die Anlass zu wechselseitigem interkulturellem Lernen bieten.
xii
Dass der Fußball eine Vorreiterrolle bei der Integration spielt, liegt für Heinz Bunzer auf der Hand „Wir
haben es soviel leichter, denn wir sind eine spielerische Gemeinschaft.“
xiii
Unserer Auffassung nach führen ewige Verbote und Maßregelungen zu nichts. Wir haben uns zum Ziel
gesetzt, solche Dinge von innen heraus positiv zu gestalten und damit die unterschiedlichen Kulturen zu
erreichen.
xiv
Ich denke die Jungs und Mädels in einer Mannschaft merken selbst ziemlich schnell, wie viel Spaß es
macht, gemeinsam Ziele zu verfolgen und Siege zu feiern – und dafür packt auch jeder gerne mit an.
xv
Soziale Fähigkeiten, ein selbstbewusster Auftritt, Teamfähigkeit das ist wichtiger als Laktatwert und
Torschusstechnik. „Jugendliche beim Fußball sind intrinsisch motiviert, sie lernen also mit hoher
Motivation und auf spielerische Weise, sich an Regeln zu halten“, sagt Konermann, „Das Ziel ist es, dass
möglichst viele, möglichst rasch auf dem Arbeitsmarkt Fuß fassen.“
xvi
„Der Fußball ist einfach ein sehr gutes Mittel, um sowohl beim einzelnen Schüler, im Klassenverband
aber auch für unsere gesamte Schule positive Entwicklungen auf den Weg zu bringen“, sagt Jürgen
Kuhlmann. Denn der Ball kann viel - Fußball spielen lehrt den Gelsenkirchener Jugendlichen wichtige
Werte und stärkt den Charakter. „Bei Schwierigkeiten nicht so schnell aufzustecken, Konflikte
anzusprechen aber nicht eskalieren zu lassen, das leistet der Fußball“, berichtet der Sportlehrer aus den
Erfahrungen der vergangenen Jahre.
xvii
Ein Seminar über Wertevermittlung in Österreich. Dann kam ich nachhause und holte meinen Sohn von
der Schule ab. Die Kinder waren außer Rand und Band, rannten einfach über die Straße, hatten die
wüstesten Beschimpfungen drauf. Das war mein Schlüsselerlebnis. Mir war klar, dass ich etwas
unternehmen muss.
xviii
Die Polizei deklarierte die Heerstraße Nord in Spandau 2007 als kriminalitätsbelasteten Ort. Eine
Gruppe von etwa 30 Jugendlichen, die meisten mit einem Migrationshintergrund, legten praktisch den
Stadtteil lahm. Für mich stand fest: Jetzt muss etwas passieren. Der Mitternachtssport war das Ergebnis
eines von mir organisierten Gesprächs zwischen Polizei und Jugendlichen. Am 8. Dezember 2007 haben
wir dann die Halle das erste Mal aufgeschlossen. Der Effekt war umwerfend. Die Kategorisierung als
kriminalitätsbelasteter Ort konnte bald aufgehoben werden.
xix
DFB: Und die Baseballschläger mussten vor der Halle abgegeben werden? Ismail Öner: Man sollte nicht
übertreiben, so schlimm war es auch nicht. Wir haben Begegnung geschaffen. Beim ersten Turnier
spielten Polizisten gegen Jugendliche, die sich sonst nur bei Einsätzen begegnet sind. Die Jugendlichen
kommen zu uns in die Halle und bringen alle ihre Sorgen und Nöte mit. Dann beginnt die
sozialpädagogische Arbeit. Wir schaffen Netzwerke aus Schule, Elternhaus, Fußballverein, Jugendamt
und anderen Personen und Institutionen rund um den Jugendlichen. Oft sind es Schieflagen. Die
Versetzung ist gefährdet, es droht ein Schulverweis, ein Junge findet keinen Praktikumsplatz, der andere
hat eine richterliche Weisung. Manchmal ist’s auch einfach Liebeskummer.
xx
Wenn Mädchen in die Halle kommen, dürfen sie mitspielen. Aber ich weiß auch, was ich kann und was
nicht. Pädagogik spielt eine große Rolle. Und mir fehlt die Fähigkeit und das Einfühlungsvermögen, die
Probleme von 14-jährigen Mädchen zu verstehen. Da müssen andere Kolleginnen ran.
xxi
„Wir haben—durchaus mit Erstaunen—bemerkt, dass in den Pausenhöfen auch die Mädchen gern und
gut Fußball spielen“, berichtet Städtler.
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xxii

Ich war sehr skeptisch am Anfang. Mädchen aus marokkanischen oder türkischen Familien und Fußball
spielen? Das konnte ich mir nicht so richtig vorstellen. Heute erlebe ich bei Turnieren den Enthusiasmus,
mit dem die Väter ihre Töchter anfeuern. Der Fußball hat dazu beigetragen, dass sich die Kulturen
annähern.
xxiii
Fußball kann ein Hebel der Emanzipation sein. Der ältere Bruder oder der Vater sehen die Schwester
oder Tochter in einem ganz anderen Umfeld. Das Rollenverhalten verändert sich.
xxiv
Der Fußball hat mir sehr dabei geholfen, mich problemlos in die deutsche Gesellschaft zu integrieren,
so dass ich heute studieren und für die deutsche Nationalmannschaft spielen kann. Ich habe durch den
Sport gelernt, dass es auch für Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland Chancengleichheit gibt.
xxv
Wo vorher stets eine nachholende Integration im Blickpunkt stand, geht es heute um die
gleichberechtigte Teilhabe und Teilnahme von Menschen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund in allen
Lebensbereichen im Sinne einer interkulturellen Öffnung.
xxvi
Die Gesamtzahl der Zugewanderten ist im Vorjahr gewachsen, um 43.000 Menschen beziehungsweise
0,1 Prozentpunkte. Prognosen zufolge wird sich die steigende Tendenz bis mindestens 2030 fortsetzen.
Aber nicht weil so viele Personen immigrieren würden, sondern vor allem weil Menschen nichtdeutschen
Ursprungs im Durchschnitt viel jünger sind als die Mehrheitsbevölkerung. Und damit häufiger in einem
Alter, in dem Familien gegründet werden.
xxvii
Vielfalt, ganz egal ob im Sport oder im Unternehmen, ist immer eine Erweiterung der eigenen
Perspektive und will geübt sein. Vielfalt bereichert unsere Kultur und damit unser Leben. Dadurch ist sie
das Fundament für unternehmerische Zukunft und für die Zukunft der Gesellschaft.
xxviii
Aber Integration muss gefördert und unterstützt werden, um wirklich erfolgreich und nachhaltig zu
sein, und damit die Vielfalt der Menschen und Kulturen eine Bereicherung für alle wird.
xxix
Integrationsarbeit kann auf Inseln beginnen. Früher oder später aber müssen diese Inseln verbunden
werden, damit jede einzelne voll zur Wirkung kommt.
xxx
Schweiger und Sänger: Die deutschen Spieler mit Migrationshintergrund lauschen der Nationalhymne
mit geschlossenen Lippen, der Rest singt inbrünstig mit
xxxi
Die Nationalhymne interessiert mich ungefähr genauso wie der Fußball, nämlich normalerweise gar
nicht. Aber wenn Fußballweltmeisterschaft ist, dann interessiert mich beides, der Fußball und die Hymne.
xxxii
Es ist ein gutes Zeichen, wenn man die Nationalhymne singt. Aber man wird dadurch kein guter
Deutscher. Ein guter Deutscher wird man, wenn man die Sprache gut spricht und die Werte lebt. Und das
ist bei uns allen der Fall.
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PART II: INTEGRANTS AND THE NEW GERMANY
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CHAPTER 3 – CONSTRUCTING PATRIOTISM ABOVE REPROACH: THE
REHABILITATION OF GERMAN NATIONAL PRIDE IN THE 2006 WORLD
CUP
Integration discourse is an exercise in national self-construction, focusing as
much on defining and propping up the normativity and the positive value of the national
category as on defining those whose candidature for belonging must be assessed. As the
case studies in this dissertation show, discussions about integration are deeply interwoven
with reflections on German identity—in relation both to the troubled national past and to
its possible futures. However, in their construction of the categories of integrant and
national, these discussions not only define through opposition, more importantly they
depoliticize and naturalize these categories. This requires the minimization of conflicts
and controversy around them, requiring both categorizations to appear necessary, benign,
and even positive. In the German case, however, the positive value of the national
category has been contested since Germany’s defeat in the World War II was followed on
the global stage by the atrocities that may follow from nationalism being taken to its
logical conclusion. Germany’s defeat and the demand for a public reckoning for atrocities
committed in the name of the nation complicated public nationalism, even though the
defeat had little impact on the continuity of banal forms of nationalism, in that, borrowing
Billig’s framing (1995), Germans never forgot or doubted that they were German.
Although postwar nationalism continued to thrive in the collective intimacy of Heimat
(see Chapter 1), the spectacular and celebratory practices of nationalism favored by
National Socialists became points of contention. The media prescribed immersion in
national colors during the 2006 World Cup to alleviate this contentiousness, proclaiming
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the tournament as “the best group therapy for Germans, who are tormented by identity
complexes, even though they are the world leaders in exports and have a generous social
welfare system” (“Deutschland in Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006). In this Spiegel article, this
quote from a Portuguese newspaper commentary was gathered along with quotes from
five other international periodicals to affirm the value of uncontested national identity.
This chapter analyzes the process by which the media in Germany constructed
new narratives of national identity and patriotism around the 2006 World Cup. While
Chapter 2 outlines the function of sport in the biopolitical system of values that defines
the conditions for the substantive citizenship of minorities, this chapter returns to the
category of the normative national and its narrative association with a harmonious and
happy population. To understand the discursive field in which the press coverage of the
tournament operates, I first outline the history of debates over nationalism in Germany. In
2006, the return of symbolic nationalism was celebrated by the German media and
approved by international observers. Discourses of soccer patriotism construct the
positive value of the national category, affirming the necessity of national affiliation for
the health and wellbeing of the population and removing it from the realm of political
contention.
During the 2006 World Cup, soccer was proposed as an ideal model for national
engagement. This case study analyzes how the features and expectations of this event
were marshalled to legitimate a change in German practices of symbolic nationalism. The
first section examines the history of the debates over remembering National Socialism,
which was introduced in Chapter 1, to explain the tension that the coverage of celebration
of “soccer patriotism” in 2006 sought to defuse. The second discusses the nature of
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sporting nationalism to clarify the role of sport spectacles in the formation and
legitimation of the category of the national. Finally, I look at the media coverage of the
2006 World Cup to examine how the German media constructed new narratives of
salutary national identity and patriotism by using the event to create a break from the
past.
Articles were gathered using the search terms Fußball (soccer) AND Patriotismus
(patriotism) in two different newspaper archives. Because of the volume of coverage
related to soccer patriotism is so large, I limited my search to one influential national
periodical and one regional periodical. For the national periodical I chose Der Spiegel
including its online sibling Spiegel Online, which are by far the most frequently cited
quality periodicals in Germany (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). A Spiegel search for the
above terms yielded 46 articles (14 in print and 33 online) written in 2006. To understand
the circulation of discourses of soccer patriotism in regional public spheres, I examined
the archive of the Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (MZ), which holds a near monopoly on regional
coverage in the south of Saxony-Anhalt. The MZ archives returned 26 results for the
above search terms in 2006. The regional daily newspaper is not known for holding a
strong ideological position. Of these results, I selected and examined articles that focused
primarily on patriotism and national sentiments in the context of the World Cup. This
yielded a total of 49 articles across the three sources (see table 2).
Table 2: Search Results for Fußball AND Patriotismus, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2006
Source

All Results

Selected
(Commentary)

Der Spiegel

14

6
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Spiegel Online (SPON)

33

19

Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (MZ)

26

24

Total

73
49
Using discourse theory and analysis, I examined the themes and narratives used in

the German press to construct the event and define its meaning for the nation. In the
process, media coverage created a break from the past by simultaneously omitting or
dismissing critical discourse about the role of nationalism in Germany’s fascist past and
creating collective narratives of a new, unimpeachable “soccer patriotism.” As one astute
commentator observed regarding the difficulty in taking a logical or critical stance
towards the flag issue, “the secret of the little flags is: any resistance immediately comes
off as uptight, whereas now we are in such a super laid-back mood”i (K. Schmidt, 2006).
The return of celebratory nationalism hinges on a binary between tension and
relaxation—any discussion or reflection on it uncovers or raises tension. The object under
scrutiny (the flag and national colors) is defined as fun itself, establishing a “chain of
equivalence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) between national symbolism, the popular “parsed
flag” (Marvin & Ingle, 1999, p. 216), and happiness, unity, and the alleviation of identitybased tension. Politics and critique are situated as the opposite of this, and, thus, quickly
become unsustainable. National symbols are situated in a narrative of transformation in
which the nation, previously alienated from itself, celebrates a glorious reconciliation.
Current narratives framing national soccer as the foremost site of national
symbolism focus on the World Cup tournament hosted by Germany in 2006. Merely
mentioning “the summer fairytale” (Sommermärchen), as it came to be called, is enough
to evoke images of exuberant, flag-waving crowds of Germans “finally” taking their
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place among the “normal” nations. The strength of this association continues unabated, as
was evident in media reports in late 2015, which revealed that Germany’s successful bid
to host the 2006 World Cup was not won on its own merit, but was bought away from the
front-runner, South Africa. Spiegel’s title story revealing the results of their investigation
declares that,
The soccer World Cup in summer 2006 was a turning point in German history.
The country of the Holocaust had already made other steps towards rehabilitation;
it had matured into a stable democracy; it had peacefully reunited. But then
German also became likeable. (Feldenkirchen, 2015)
The author then outlines Germany’s concurrent rise to become one of the world’s most
admired countries, as global leaders acting against climate change and for a capitalist
economy that is both robust and socially responsible. The 2006 World Cup, according to
this article, was the point that marked Germany’s change in global position from
repentant perpetrator to moral role model.
However, as the article points out, the possibility of high-level corruption behind
the symbolically crucial 2006 tournament in Germany threatens to tarnish Germany’s
reputation and self-conception as a moral beacon. Nevertheless, the Spiegel journalist
concludes that this has led to a more realistic image of a nation that is no better and no
worse than any other: “There is no cause for German arrogance, no reason for feelings of
superiority, which in these days are again showing themselves in their most primitive
form: hatred of foreigners” (Feldenkirchen, 2015). This quote reflects a recognition of the
link between identitarian forms of self-love and suspicion and hatred of those perceived
as exogenous. As this chapter shows, this kind of reflection had no place within press
narratives that asserted the unmitigated social and psychological benefits of the flag158

draped sporting spectacle of 2006. Although the World Cup, and in particular the 2006
tournament hosted by Germany, has emerged as possibly the most visible platform for
national self-reflection and nation branding, it has received remarkably little scholarly
attention. This chapter examines the process by which hosting this sporting spectacle
transformed the nation’s relationship to its national symbols, freeing them from their
long-troubled relationship to the atrocities of National Socialism while cultivating new
collective memories to define German national identity. The contentiousness of the
German case, as well as the efforts to neutralize that contention, provide a particularly
stark example of the often-unnoticed processes of national narration that are part of all
global sporting spectacles.

The History of Remembering: Conflicting Postwar Narratives
German memory of National Socialist atrocities followed a tortuous path,
bifurcating in divided Germany with each nation following its own pattern of
remembrance and amnesia. In her piece Between Memory and Oblivion, Claudia Koonz
traced these paths, arguing that beginning with the post-war “Zero Hour” (Stunde Null),
“Germans constructed a new identity based on a fresh start or a clean break from the
past” (1996, p. 262). East and West Germans differed, however, in their strategies for
creating the break. East Germans railed against Nazi crimes, using them as an
opportunity to celebrate Communist resistance to fascism and to proclaim that “German
monopoly capital—they gave orders for murder… while in the West, memory was sealed
off in post-traumatic oblivion” (Koonz, 1996, p. 265). What was forgotten on both sides,
however, was the racial genocide and the complicity of everyday Germans in Nazism.
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Not until the late 1960s did memory of the genocide return to public consciousness, albeit
in very different ways in the East and West. In this period, East Germany began
preserving and memorializing the concentration camps, continuing the state-organized
project of focusing on the heroism of “anti-fascist resisters”, minimizing or omitting the
central racial element of the genocide. In the West, the flood of commemoration begun
by the student movements in the late 1960s—including the push to recognize the Jewish
victims of genocide—was less uniform, and more loudly contested. This contestation
reached a climax in the bitter 1985-86 “historians’ dispute” (Historikerstreit) between
historians, philosophers, and intellectuals over the appropriate historical interpretation of
the genocide.
This debate arose from a quest by conservative intellectuals to distance Germany
from the fascist past and establish “a new, proud, ‘normal’ national identity” (Nolan,
1988, p. 62). The public battle began with an article by Ernst Nolte published in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung entitled, “The past that won’t go away” (Nolte, 1986). In
arguing that many aspects of the Third Reich and the Holocaust were not unique, Nolte
and other conservative historians sought to normalize National Socialism. As Mary Nolan
(1988) argued, the Historikerstreit was one of a series of controversies sparked by actions
from Germany’s political right throughout the 1980s that reflected the growing desire of
conservatives for a “usable past.” In order to accomplish this, the political right needed to
“emancipate nationalism from its discrediting by fascism. A reinterpretation of
history…above all of the Third Reich, is integral to this construction of a conservative
national identity” (Nolan, 1988, p. 62). Leftist intellectuals, led by Jürgen Habermas,
fought back against this attempt to whitewash the German past and, in particular, the
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Holocaust. Nolan argued that “whereas the right wants a uniform and emotionally felt
national identity, [the left strives] for a calm and reasoned acceptance of constitutional
democracy, built on a critical understanding of Germany's recent past” (1988, p. 65).
Although they did begin to chip away at the “mourning work” (Trauerarbeit) that was
gaining momentum in the 1980s, the right was not entirely successful in overcoming the
pervasive hold of the past on German identity in West Germany at the time of
reunification in 1990.
The gap in Eastern and Western conceptions of the past were a significant
stumbling block to the establishment of a shared national identity after unification. As
Koonz observes,
Like a common currency and culture, the public memory of historical events
structures a sense of civil society across generations, classes, and regions… While
tensions and out-right hostility repolarized East and West Germans, the public
memory of their shared Nazi past also became a site of dispute. (1996, p. 269)
While East Germans had constructed narratives around the continuity of German fascism
in the capitalist West, West Germany had nurtured an opposing position, likening the
authoritarian GDR to the totalitarian Nazi state. Not surprisingly, East Germans balked at
accepting the West German brand of mourning work, which included both implicit and
explicit disparagement of the GDR and did not properly reflect East German experiences.
In particular, residents of the towns near the concentration camps in the former East
resisted the re-branding of the camps from heroic anti-fascist memorials into monuments
of admonishment.
In fact, even in the West where they had originated, the official chastisements of
mourning work, which inspired respect abroad and among liberal Germans, had not
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caught on among the public at large. Koonz writes that “even before unification, the
depiction of Nazism in West German television specials, best-sellers, and films
contradicted political leaders’ rhetoric of mourning (1996, p. 274).” Many of them
focused on the lives of average Germans during the Nazi time, omitting or sanitizing the
unpleasant or morally challenging aspects (see also Chapter 1). Beginning with the
Historikerstreit, conservative intellectuals sought to exploit the gap between popular
memory and official invocations of the genocide. After unification, their message also
found an attentive audience among East Germans irritated by Wessie forms of memory.
Indeed, the desire to cast off the fetters of the past complicating the public
expression of national pride was one of the few sentiments that had popular appeal across
the newly reunited nation. The process of reunification facilitated this goal on two fronts.
First, reunification provided a functional justification for patriotism and the cultivation of
a united German identity. And second, it marked the end of a historical period.
“Sometime between November 9, 1989, and October 3, 1990, twentieth-century Germany
became history” (Confino 2004, 389). The dissolution of the post-war divide created a
new distance from the World War II—a “symbolic rupture” (Nora, 1998, p. 503) —
paving the way for a new German generation even further removed from the troubling
past.
Although the symbolic potential of the break with the past offered by
reunification held great potential for the foundation of a new national narrative, this
potential was mired in the conflicting Eastern and Western conceptions of that past. As
Michael Geisler (2005) argues in his work on German national symbols and public
memory after 1989, the process of forming a consensus around the meaning of past
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events is a necessary—and in the German case, extraordinarily difficult—part of
establishing the symbols of national identity. The significance of this failed consensus is
illustrated by Ernest Renan’s famous claim that a nation is defined by its collective
memory, by the fact that it shares, “in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets.” It is thus
A large scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices one has made
in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a
past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent,
the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if
you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite. (Renan, 1990, p. 19)
Although Germany’s national symbols are arguably effective at accomplishing the
official tasks of representing and identifying the state, Geisler argues that they have failed
at their ideological tasks of “sustaining the collective identity of the nation, bookmarking
public memory, and integrating diverse subgroups” (2005, p. 64). This results from that
fact that large segments of the population—mostly among liberal Germans—feel
discomforted by the symbols that are meant to inspire feeling of affiliation. However, it
is important to note that while national symbols remained a point of contention, official
forms of nationalism remained deeply rooted, for example, in German citizenship laws
and immigration and asylum policies of the 1980s and 1990s (see Göktürk, Gramling, &
Kaes, 2007). Despite the focus among both public observers and scholars of nationalism
on public celebrations of nationalism, Michael Billig (1995) rightly points out that a more
profound accomplishment of nationalism is its pervasiveness and durability in everyday
life, even—and especially—as it disappears from notice.

Sporting Nationalism
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Global sports spectacles are uniquely positioned to facilitate the renewal of
nationalism under the pretext of a cooperative international event. Since their foundation,
the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup were steeped in the idealist rhetoric of global
peace and harmony. Tomlinson and Young (2006) traced these origins in the statements
of the founding fathers of these events, Baron Pierre de Coubertin and FIFA president
Jules Rimet. For de Coubertin, “the Olympic project had philosophical, historical, and
educational dimensions and goals,” and he insisted that “internationalism was a bulwark
against ignorance, chauvinism, and war” (A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006, p. 4). Rimet’s
goals for the World Cup were no less lofty.
Seeing in sport a means of building good character, Christian and patriotic, his
love of God and France was combined in his passion for football. He believed in
the universality of the church and saw in football the chance to create a worldwide
‘football family’ welded to Christian principles (A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006, p.
5).
This conception of international sporting events as a source of healthy pleasure and fun
and as promoting global friendship across social, racial, and cultural difference has
endured as the justification for these events, even as particularistic elements of religion
and nation thrive under the surface.
As this case study shows, the idealist rationale for the World Cup inoculated it
against concerns about the nationalistic displays it encourages. After all, the logic goes,
how can celebrations associated with an event explicitly designed to encourage universal
peace be conduits of national chauvinism? But this is not so contradictory after all. As
Gellner demonstrated,
The nationalist principle can be asserted in an ethical, ‘universalistic’ spirit. There
could be, and on occasion there have been, nationalists-in-the-abstract, unbiased
in favour of any special nationality of their own, and generously preaching the
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doctrine for all nations alike: let all nations have their own political roofs, and let
all of them also refrain from including non-nationals under it (2006, p. 2).
In this way, nationalism and universalism need not be mutually exclusive. The World
Cup celebrates a universalized form of particularism regulated by nation-states. Even as
international sports spectacles unite the people of the world under the banner of universal
peace, they provide the opportunity to cement more “united” and fixed conceptions of
national identity. And at the same time, the pervasive acceptance of these events as
fundamentally benign makes any critique of the activities associated with them very
difficult to sustain publicly.
The connections between global sports events and nationalism have been well
documented (Bairner, 2001; A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006). One of the key tools of this
connection is the ability to abolish the divisions between the national and the private
through sports and the media. As Eric Hobsbawm writes, for the standardization,
homogenization and transfer of popular ideologies, “deliberate propaganda was almost
certainly less significant than the ability of the mass media to make what were in effect
national symbols part of the life of every individual” (1992, p. 142). Sports as a mass
media spectacle are a potent force for bridging the gap between private and public
worlds. Hobsbawm continues to argue that
What has made sport so uniquely effective a medium for inculcating national
feelings, is the ease with which even the least political or public individuals can
identify with the nation as symbolized by young persons excelling at what
practically every man wants, or at one time in life has wanted, to be good at. The
imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named
people. The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of his
nation himself. (1992, p. 143)
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Thus, sports are a key locus for transference of national identity to the individual through
the shared pleasure of admiring the physical abilities of the nation’s most talented
athletes. The process of the individual becoming the symbol of the nation is so seamless
that it is easily naturalized, and therefore tends to remain unquestioned and difficult to
interrogate.
For the nation hosting the event this process is intensified, since, as the nation
becomes the host, the burden of hosting must be met by all those identified as belonging
to the nation. This is an opportunity for national leaders to mobilize citizens for a united
and idealistic cause. Acting as good hosts through enthusiastic support “is presented as a
patriotic duty, whereby internal differences need to be set aside, if only for the duration,
in the greater national interest. In this sense, host Olympic discourse resembles the
galvanizing rhetoric of war” (Rowe & Stevenson, 2006, p. 199). With the enormous
international media attention focused on the event, global sporting spectacles provide
unparalleled opportunities for accruing symbolic capital if the event is well executed. The
success or failure of the event is seen as a direct reflection of the capabilities of the host
nation.
This is true even when unforeseeable events intervene, as was the case in the 1972
Munich Olympics, when the Black September terrorist group kidnapped and murdered
eleven Israeli athletes from the Olympic Village. Like the 2006 World Cup, the Munich
Olympics were seen as an opportunity for (West) Germany to “showcase its rehabilitation
as a peace-loving, democratic state where the past was a foreign country” (C. Young,
2006, p. 118). Referring to the massacre in his memoirs, then Chancellor Willy Brandt
wrote:
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My disappointment at the time was intense, first because the Olympics on which
we had expended so much loving care would not go down in history as a happy
occasion—indeed, I was afraid that our international reputation would be blighted
for many years—and secondly because our counter-measures had proved so
abortive. (C. Young, 2006, p. 118)
As Young notes, this statement is striking due both to the order in which Brandt’s lists his
regrets—the self is placed before others and the harm to the nation is prioritized over the
suffering of the individual—and to the list of key words he employs: history,
international reputation, loving care, and happiness. This emphasis on positive emotions,
affective connections, and historical and international significance endures in the
conception of the role of hosting that Germany brought to the 2006 World Cup.

Reclaiming a Collective Identity: Establishing and Redressing the Lack
As outlined earlier in this chapter, since reunification and even before, there has
been a strong popular and conservative intellectual desire to reclaim German national
pride from the clutches of the past. Despite the enduring “wall of the mind” (Mauer im
Kopf) separating former citizens of East and West Germany, citizens of the newly united
Germany shared a longing for a “normal” national identity. In the context of the modern
nation-state, John Gillis writes that
Individuals, subgroups, and nations all demand identity as if it were a necessity of
life itself. Identity has taken on the status of the sacred object, an “ultimate
concern,” worth fighting and even dying for. To those who believe they do not
have it, identity appears even more scarce and precious” (1994, p. 4).
Popular German sentiment after unification arose from this sense of identity lost through
occupation and national division. At the same time, it is important to note that Gillis
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discusses not the empirical existence of identity, but rather the collective belief in the
possession of identity and the ability to ritually celebrate it.
This also raises the question, with the contemporary proliferation of forms of
identity, whether the national form still matters, and if so, why. Even as globalization
makes borders increasingly porous, the nation-state still stands as the primary arbiter of
legitimacy holding the power to determine what Hannah Arendt calls, “the right to have
rights” (1973, p. 296). The physical capacity to cross borders may be more generalized
than ever, but one’s ability to be fully human is still tied to the accident of birth that
determines belonging to a nation-(state). This belonging to a political community is
legally established by rules of citizenship, but it also requires social and affective
scaffolding to perpetuate its legitimacy. Addressing the affective realm, Carolyn Marvin
and David Ingle (1999) argue that the ability to govern is built on the willingness of
citizens to sacrifice themselves and their children. One area that Marvin and Ingle do not
address is the determination of whose death may act as a group-constituting sacrifice, an
ability that Giorgio Agamben (1998) has recognized as a key function in modern politics.
This distinction between life that has political value and can thus be sacrificed and life
that may be killed but not sacrificed is the biopolitical basis of both modern democracy
and modern totalitarianism. It is the foundation of integration discourse and reveals the
continuities between past and present forms of exclusion. In modern democracies, the
civic religion of nationalism is the only domain of identity that inspires this scale of
collective devotion. This willingness to sacrifice is not only necessary in a straightforward military sense of national security and conquest. It is the sacrifice of group
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members that creates the group, creating a form of unity that trumps—though never
completely or without contestation—other affiliative domains.
Marvin and Ingle argue that only the process of the willing sacrifice of group
members is powerful enough to forge the affective bonds holding a group together. For
this reason, they define the nation as “the memory of the last sacrifice” (1999, p. 5).
However, the idea that sacrificial violence is the source of national cohesion is contrary
to the values of modern nation-states, which hold violence to be immoral or barbaric, a
failure of politics rather than its necessary precursor. “To protect themselves from
recognizing the source of group unity, citizens render totem violence and its symbols
sacred” (Marvin & Ingle, 1999, p. 12) which is to say taboo, unknowable and
unspeakable.
But what happens when the last great sacrifice revealed the totem secret before
the whole world? Germans felt unable to construct their identity out of shared past not
tainted by shameful revelation of the bloodthirsty foundations of nationalism. The
revelation of the bloodthirsty nationalism of the Third Reich before the international
community inhibited the proper function of the taboo against acknowledging that violent
sacrifice generates the sentimental power of national cohesion. This broken taboo
manifested in discomfort with the totemic symbols of national identity (flags, colors,
anthems, etc.). In the late 1980s, the Historikerstreit began the movement to revive
explicit symbolic nationalism, and reunification provided the sense of a legitimate need
for active displays of patriotism, but official ambivalence around direct appeals to
national pride still endured. To chip away at this lingering ambivalence, an event was
needed that would strengthen national affect and symbolism while offering an illusion of
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separation from explicit national pride. To create distance between the violence of past
nationalism and current forms, nationalism had to be retrieved from the realm of
contention and restored as a neutral given. Hosting the World Cup provided the perfect
opportunity to create a uniform and emotionally felt national identity, while also
dismissing the pursuit of a critical discourse on Germany's past.

Mediatized Plebiscite: Fan Fests and Renewed National Narratives
The soccer patriotism narratives of 2006 typically begin with descriptions of cities
being taken over by a “sea of flags” (Fahnenmeer). These accounts revolve around a key
new feature of the sporting spectacle; organizers introduced public viewings, or Fan
Fests, throughout the country in the 2006 tournament. This element has become standard
practice for World Cups ever since, taking place not only in the host country but also
internationally. These viewings provided places for people to gather together and
celebrate, and consequently they also provided an excellent opportunity to capture the
revelry in the media and broadcast it to the world. This offered unprecedented
opportunities for multiplying the impact of the celebrations. Not only could Germans
across the nation participate in the experience of watching the event as a group regardless
of whether they had tickets to the matches or even lived near the stadiums, but their
celebration became the object of media attention, conferring an even greater status on
their participation.
The most famous of these viewings was the Berlin “Fan Mile,” which stretched
between the between two significant memorials of German identity and history: the
nearly 70-meter-high Victory Column (Siegessäule) and the Brandenburg Gate. An
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official city website publicizing the revival of the Fan Fast for the 2010 World Cup
proclaimed that
With the Fan Fest during the 2006 FIFA World Cup Berlin created a worldwide
acknowledged wave of enthusiasm, furor and friendliness for the German capital
and for Germany. The incomparable pictures taken of the Fan Fest 2006 stood and
stand for enthusiasm for sport, hospitality and the new found confidence of the
Berliners and Germans. (“International FIFA Fan Fest Berlin,” 2010)
The website celebrates the “breathtaking atmosphere” created by the over one million
people that came every day during the 2006 tournament. This shows the value of the
public viewings both for the mass sharing of positive sentiments and for simultaneously
memorializing the unique experience by capturing and circulating it in images. It is also
significant that this website, written in English and targeted towards visitors of Berlin,
emphasized the newfound confidence of Berliners and Germans. This event allowed
Germans to reclaim their nationalism from its shameful past not only for themselves, but
to proudly affirm this fact in front of the whole world. With the 2006 World Cup
Germans declared to the world their national pride, and through the success of the event
they were validated by nearly universal international praise.
The German organizers of the World Cup recognized the value of the lived
experience of the event. Although the media are a key component of constructing
“imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006), there is still a power implicit in an embodied
experience that gets lost in the mediated experience of an event. Paul Connerton explains
that
There is a world of difference between typography as a rhetoric that is known
about, and topography as a rhetoric that is known… For there is a type of
experience recognizable only to those who have walked through a particular
building or street or district. Only they have lived it. To ‘live’ an artifact is to
appropriate it, to make it one’s own. (2009, p. 32)
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Experiencing the World Cup on television from the comfort of one’s home is thus
qualitatively different from the experience of the public viewing, which mimics more
closely the scale and sensations of the experience of viewing the game from the stadium.
In their literature publicizing the benefits of hosting a “Fan Fest”, FIFA wrote that in
2006, the official Fan Fests in twelve cities attracted approximately 18 million viewers,
allowing six times as many people as were accommodated in the stadiums to experience
the “unique FIFA World Cup feeling” (FIFA, 2010). Although the mediated experience
of the events provides a sense of simultaneity to viewers, the experience pales in
comparison to the power of physically experiencing the events in the same time and
space. Together with the media, the public viewings created a feedback loop in which
audiences enjoyed the embodied experience of collective emotions of fandom and the
media wrote about those experiences, legitimating them and making them meaningful.
Indeed, the World Cup offers this experience of simultaneity on a level unlike any
other event, even the Olympics, in which the simultaneity of different events divides the
attention of spectators. In contrast, the World Cup offers only one event at a time,
concentrating spectator attention at the global scale. There are reminders of the
simultaneous spectator experience everywhere soccer is appreciated, from the quiet
streets to the outbursts of sound that unite a city in celebration (or mourning). The public
viewing experience heightens this experience even further, allowing spectators to
participate bodily in a multi-sensory experience orchestrated by the action of the sporting
event. The media captures and disseminates this experience, creating a virtuous circle
further multiplying the impact, through photos and allusions to jubilant flag bedecked
crowds.
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Figure 2 The caption to this photo reads, “Flag sea: Celebrating a goal at North Germany’s biggest fan
party in Hamburg.ii (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006)

Figure 3 The caption reads, “Black-Red-Gold: Fan party at the “Field of the Holy Spirit” in Hamburg iii
(“Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006)

As the FIFA literature affirmed, the public viewings were “very important platforms,”
providing “80 percent of the non-action related stories” in the media about the World Cup
(FIFA, 2010). The 2006 World Cup combined the nationally-oriented, mediated
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experience of watching on television with the massive embodied experience of the public
viewings, all of which resonated and was amplified by the media coverage of the
spectatorship.

Rescuing the Flag from the Past: Young, Safe, Healthy
Scholarship on journalism has challenged the common assumption that
journalism’s role in presenting the news means that in terms of memory work it is only
involved in writing “the first draft of history” and not the last (Edy, 1999; Lang & Lang,
1989; Zelizer, 2008). In fact, a great deal of journalism’s work consists of looking back,
even—and perhaps especially—when reporting on the newest breaking stories. As is
shown below, in covering the 2006 World Cup, the German media worked on making the
new soccer patriotism the definitive end of Germany’s long struggle with its identity.
Subsequent public reflections, particularly around the World Cup tournaments in 2010
and 2014, demonstrate the success of this narrative. To achieve this, media coverage
employed a combination of memory and amnesia, of the present and the past. Stories
emphasized the bounded and idealistic features of sports spectacles, creating a safe space
for patriotism. Within this safe space, the media rehabilitated national symbols by
portraying them in association with the positive and universal experience of the sporting
event, reaffirming their interpretations through the expert opinion of German cultural
elites. These narratives—thus established and remaining uncontested—were then used as
symbols to recall and create nostalgia for the event over the following months and years,
establishing in collective memory a basis for “soccer patriotism” as a new normal mode
of German national identity.
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One of the methods they used to accomplish this was to focus on the bounded
nature of “soccer patriotism,” which, the argument goes, is bound to sports and not to
politics and more dangerous forms of nationalism. The fact that people are swathing
themselves in the national colors is ascribed solely to the desire to support the national
team, which happens to be represented by those colors.
There’s no need to worry about soccer enthusiasm playing into the hands of rightwing extremists. On the contrary: carnival costumed soccer fans send the message
to the world: “Look here, we invite you to the international soccer festival.”
Tricolored wigs instead of Nazi skinheads” (Biallas, 2006).
“Not every flag-waver is directly made into a patriot or nationalist,” says Klaus
Boehnke, Sociologist at the International University of Bremen. The masses do
not reflect at all on the historical meaning of national symbols. Above all, they are
carried by momentary euphoria.iv (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut,” 2006)
We remember: It was the soccer World Cup and Germany transformed itself for a
few weeks into a euphoric nation.v (Hoch & Main, 2006)
Journalists and the experts they cite also assure readers that there is no need to be
concerned about the long-term effects of soccer patriotism since it is tied to this singular
event in which Germans are the hosts. Germany will not be able to host again for at least
25 years. This perspective ignores, however, the fact that these temporary experiences of
what Durkheim (1995) calls “collective effervescence” serve to transfer these
transformative emotions to the symbols around which the event evolves. While the event
is temporary, its impact continues in the revitalization of the normalized significance of
national membership. In this way, the World Cup provides the aura of neutrality even
while exercising distinctly partisan behavior.
The central tool of this quasi-religious connection between the individual and
national identity is the ubiquitous reference to national symbols, above all “black-red175

gold,” which achieves the status of fixed phrase. As Geisler writes, “a symbol reduces the
enormous complexity of communication by using a concrete sign as a kind of shorthand
for—in our case—a complex of interrelated concepts, ideals, and value systems”
(Geisler, 2005, p. xxvii). As shown above, the media invoked national symbols in
conjunction with hyperbolic, quasi-religious ecstasy. In Durkheim’s words, “it is, in fact,
a well-known law that the feelings a thing arouses in us are spontaneously transmitted to
the symbol that represents it” (2003, p. 112). Through the experience of participating as a
spectator in the World Cup—particularly at mass public viewings—the intense positive
emotions of the experience are fused to the symbols representing the national team being
supported. The experience of Germans soccer fans temporarily losing their individual
selves in the totality of the nation through interaction with national symbols was
described in the German media in hyperbolic terms like “euphoria”, “exultation” or
“jubilance.”
Although black-red-gold was never sullied in history, Germans have had a hard
time with national symbols in the past decades. Now the whole country has been
baptized in German colors. (“WM-Euphorie,” 2006)
In a civic religious experience, the German people were said to have been restored, made
whole again through their embrace of the national colors. The whole nation is portrayed
as participating in the ritual of renewal and rebirth into a shared national identity, all-thewhile being reassured that these symbols have nothing to do with the shameful past. After
the fact, the media provided Germans with the shared experience of imagining reliving
the event, solidifying these symbolic associations and erasing any troubling links to the
past they might have previously evoked.
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The World Cup is delimited in time and space, and its patriotic displays are
characterized as temporary. Journalists affirm that, “like a holiday”, after its passing the
decorations will disappear back into the closet (Bock, 2006b). This characterization
resonates with the idea that, in established nations, when nationalism “does irrupt in fever
pitch, it is often seen as being confined to special occasions, the irruption soon dies
down; the temperature passes; the flags are rolled up; and, then, it is business as usual"
(Billig, 1995, p. 5) This language is repeatedly mirrored in World Cup coverage to prove
that this display of nationalism is contained and is, therefore, safe.
For the Bielefeld historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the newly discovered selfawareness of the German fans is no sign of burgeoning nationalism. Rather, sports
call forth an “Ersatz nationalism… since it operates with national colors and a
national team.” For Wehler, the rediscovery of the German flag is an
“extraordinarily ephemeral phenomenon,” a dangerous nationalism will not be
called forth by it.vi (Todt, 2006).
Using expert voices, journalists draw stark boundaries around “soccer patriotism,”
protecting it from the critique it might attract if taken seriously as an issue of cultural and
social politics. However, the same articles that emphasize the temporary nature of soccer
patriotism, often characterize it as a fundamental social transformation. Just before
providing reassurances of its ephemerality, the above article states that “on the streets and
in the stadiums, the inhibiting shame in dealing with national symbols has apparently
given way to a relaxed relationship.”vii The reassurances of boundedness are belied by
articles praising and exhorting the spread of the new national sentiments to other areas of
life. This spread is repeatedly characterized as evidence of a normal and relaxed
relationship to national symbols.

177

This event is made particularly exceptional by the duty of Germans as hosts,
which implies the expectation of creating an appropriate atmosphere through shows of
enthusiasm. To begin with, citizens are called upon to participate as a matter of their
patriotic duty to represent the hospitality and enthusiasm of the nation (see also Chapter
4). Participating in the act of supporting one’s national team provides a site of large-scale
solidarity, accentuated by the extra expectations of the role of host country. This
expectation—evident in the association of flagged celebration with the liveliness and fun
expected of a party’s host—was emphasized repeatedly in the German media to justify
and legitimate nationalistic displays, seeking to eliminate the contentiousness of public
symbolic nationalism in Germany.
“All of Germany rejoices black-red-gold—and friends from the whole world
celebrate cheerfully along,” writes [Green Party Faction leader Renate] Künast in
a guest column for the Bild am Sonntag. The soccer World Cup is a “festival of
colors, of nations, of people, and black-red-gold is our ID card as guests: come
here, we’ll show you, how beautiful Germany can be.”viii (“Deutschland in
Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006)
The World Cup hysteria is undiminished. And patriotism appears just as strongly
pronounced in these weeks. Above all, the Germans as hosts of the soccer
spectacle are showing their flags.ix (Pfeifer, 2006)
[Young Germans] are already globalized party-goers, and now they are the hosts.
In this role, they don’t want to be grumpy. During a World Cup, globalization
also means: the battle of merriment cultures. The Germans are participating in
force.x (Kurbjuweit et al., 2006, p. 76)
Many journalists enthusiastically declared that the 2006 World Cup finally broke the
taboo on nationalist celebration. In fact, it may be more accurate to say that, borrowing
from Marvin and Ingle (1999), hosts used the simulated violence of global sporting
spectacle to finally restore the taboo obscuring the real violence that constitutes the totem
secret.
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The national narrative that developed around the 2006 World Cup began from the
premise that Germans have long been suffering under the burdens of the national past.
This burden, the narrative goes, has led to collective self-doubt and a tense relationship
between citizens and their national identity.
In Germany, there is always a big “but” when it has to do with Germany. Isn’t
there too much black-red-gold in the seats and on the screens? Is one allowed to
sing the German national anthem from the heart?xi (Kurbjuweit et al., 2006, p. 70)
Citizens of the Federal Republic have always had a hard time with flag waving,
with painted faces, with singing.xii (Schnibben, 2006, p. 84)
In the discussions of “soccer patriotism” in 2006, journalists frequently hint at a
generalized feeling of disconnectedness and discontent that was alleviated by the
tournament, suggesting that Germans had been denied something essential to their
existence. Most often, the previous lack is indicated by claiming the newness of the
“relaxed” mobilization of national symbols. Other examples are more explicit:
International studies confirm that in comparison to other countries, Germans still
have a poor sense of self-esteem…. A big event like the World Cup, however,
stokes up community sentiments and is a chance, particularly for young people, to
identify with the country.xiii (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut,” 2006)
I find the ease new and highly pleasant… you notice how tensely you’ve been
seeing things for such a long time.xiv (Reif & Drecker, 2006)
Patriotism is not a luxury, but rather a necessity for survival.xv (Matussek, 2006)
German identity and German pride are described as being laden with contention and
discontinuity. At the same time, strength of national identification is equated with good
self-esteem, and—echoing Arendt’s and Agamben’s observations about the equivalence
between affiliation with a political community and one’s right to life—is even construed
as vital for existence.
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Discussions of the German nation in the corpus are frequently ambivalent,
oscillating between concrete description of national characteristics or patriotic displays
and the denial of their coherence or significance. One article, in particular, demonstrates
the simultaneous claim and denial of national coherence. Describing one of the many
museum exhibits examining the meaning of German nationhood that appeared around the
time of the World Cup, this Spiegel feature article lists several national exemplars
featured in one exhibit:
There are the German thinkers and poets, the German forest, the German
Gemütlichkeit (atmosphere of comfort, good cheer), German efficiency, the
German longing for Italy, and there is Winnetou.xvi (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)
Referencing a beloved German character from Karl May’s eighteenth century Western
novels, the “Apache” Winnetou is a perfect example of the Noble Savage trope—a
product of the distant European imagination of a prelapsarian human uncorrupted by
civilization. The figure of Winnetou usurps an idea of Nativeness as a canvas on which to
project German ideals.
Winnetou is hands-down the Federal German hero, a paragon of virtue, a nature
freak, a Romantic, a pacifist in his heart but in a bellicose world, the best warrior,
agile, trenchantly accurate. Eleven Winnetous, and we would be world champions
on July 9th.xvii (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)
Appropriating the figure of the Noble Savage as a vessel, the author delivers notions of
self-evident and unimpeachable German ideals. If each member of the team could live up
to the German ideals embodied in the figure of Winnetou, no nation could defeat them.
Yet, after declaring these identity concepts, he denies the possibility of a coherent
German identity. Citing an irresolvable tension, endemic to Germanness, the author
asserts the necessity of continuous efforts of self-construction:
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Identity and Germany are contradictory terms. After all, what Germanness meant
was too long flush with unclear or constantly changing borders and populations.
After all, the Holocaust is too unwieldy. With [the Holocaust] one cannot
construct an identity, and without it even less…. in truth, the search is the goal.
To search for the self, without being able to find oneself—that is German, that is
also a German form of amusement.xviii (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)
The uncertainty about the nature of German national affiliation is an invitation to
perpetual reflection on the meaning of the nation—a practice that occurs throughout the
soccer patriotism archive. These examples show how national redefinition discourse
proceeds by 1) claiming that there is (and perhaps always has been) a crisis of
identification, 2) defining the national/citizen, and 3) denying the boundaries created by
the previous redefinition and, thus, defending against critiques of exclusion. Definition
must take place, just as that definition must be denied to impede the introduction of
agonistic politics. Its ambiguity maintains the nation at the center of attention. Departing
from the claim of Germany’s particularly tense relationship to national identity,
journalists affirm that the soccer patriotism of the World Cup nullifies these tensions—at
least temporarily. At the same time, they argue that the exceptional nature of the event
ensures that this release of tension will not turn into a politically dangerous form of
national excess.

Stigmatizing Critique
Although the coherence, unity, and true patriotism of the soccer revelry were
often questioned, the normative value of the World Cup and its nationally oriented
performativity was framed as irreproachable. After all, commentators argued, gloomy
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and serious deliberations have no obvious place in a sporting event, and thus critical
discussions were rejected outright as knee-jerk, pessimistic, and generally absurd:
To reframe the dance in black-red-gold as an expression of the return of
strengthened national feeling is absurd.xix (Biallas, 2006)
Professionals consider the critique to be knee-jerk and typical German defeatism.
“I don’t take it seriously” says Heinz Grüne, executive at Reingold (Cologne), an
institute for market and media analysis.xx (Bock, 2006a)
There will not be threatening national pride in Germany anymore, said
[Bundestag President] Lammert. As such, he rejected criticism of the World Cup
Euphoria: “The attempt, to declare such healthy patriotism as objectionable
encourages the activities of deranged rightwing extremists.”xxi (“WM-Euphorie,”
2006)
One has long asked himself: “Are we allowed to do this?” Of course, we are
allowed. We have asked ourselves questions that should not be asked, since this is
all without question normal. It is really good. Furthermore, the external perception
is much more relaxed than our own. This all doesn’t mean that now Germany is
marching again. Whoever interprets what is happening that way is crazy. xxii (Reif
& Drecker, 2006)
These last two comments, in particular, reveal the strength of associations of nationalism
with normality and critique with political extremism of the right and left. The logic of this
argument claims that by complicating symbolic nationalism, critics alienate “normal”
citizens and drive them into the arms of the extreme right. Instead, it holds that positive
feelings of uncomplicated national belonging should be generated at the center of society.
Nearly half of the selected articles refer to the existence of a “debate” around
national identity and soccer patriotism, although few of them present actual criticsisms of
soccer patriotism. After alluding to debates, journalists and their sources condemn “bad”
forms of nationalism sometimes alluding to the need to remember the Nazi past, while
building up arguments of the positive value of soccer patriotism. Some commentators
accept the inevitable presence of the national past, without engaging with the historical
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connections between sporting spectacle and the symbolic politics of nationalism. In
discussing concerns about possible xenophobic violence against World Cup visitors, one
commentator reflects that for the potential victims
It may not matter whether their health is threatened by a German or by someone
else, but for Germans the shame and disgrace is incomparable. In this history has,
and must have, a lasting effect. It need not ruin one’s cheerfulness, but in this
country one cannot completely get away without consciousness of the Nazi years.
(Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)
Recalling Brandt’s characterization of the tragedy of the Munich Olympics, the harm to
the reputation and self-esteem of the national population is more significant than the
impact on the individual. This journalist recognizes the injustice of this, but cannot quite
bring himself to dig into its more problematic implications for the value of life and death.
One kind of death has symbolic significance, in that it can harm the national reputation,
whereas the other would have the same result for the victim but no relevance for the
national population. The Nazi years, here, stand as a constant threat to the national
population’s legitimacy and happiness. They are less important for the lessons they offer,
than for the shadow they cast on the nationally defined realm of politically significant
life.
The one clear example of the active vestiges of the leftist political critique from
the era of the Historikerstreit emerged when leaders of Germany’s largest teachers’
union, the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW), republished an excerpt
from Benjamin Ortmeyer’s 1991 critical analysis of the history of Germany’s national
anthem. This action was mentioned as evidence of resistance in five articles in the
archive. Their stated goal was to emphasize the continued “need for a deep discussion of
the history and present of nationalism in Germany” in order to avoid “whitewashing the
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ever increasing social cleavages in this country and conflating integration with
assimilation”

xxiii

(Ortmeyer, 2006). According to the one article in the corpus that

specifically examined the state of leftwing criticism in the context of the World Cup, the
public backlash against the excerpt’s circulation was so harsh that the GEW was forced to
apologize, stating that the “GEW did not want to spoil the World Cup for fans,” and
acquiescing that “when young soccer fans sing the national anthem today, they do so out
of joie de vivre and to support the German team”xxiv (Bilger, Langenau, & Stolzenberg,
2006). Although the GEW framed their action not as outright condemnation but simply as
a call to keep discussion of nationalist symbolism alive, the threat it posed to fans’ “joy”
was cast as egregious. In this schema of biopolitical values, the agonism promoted by
leftist critique threatens the pleasure of frictionless unity, and must therefore be
delegitimized. As one journalist observed with bemused approval, even among the
cultural elite there was hardly a critic left to be found:
Suddenly, even late returnees (Spätheimkehrer) to patriotism in culture and
politics discovered their hearts converted to the nation and fought loudly and with
full physical strength against all forms of politically correct German selfhatred.xxv (Mohr, 2006)
The original term used for these converted critics is Spätheimkehrer, which refers to
German late returnees from prisoner of war camps after the World War II. The use of this
term, underscores that critics are prisoners of the past and characterizes their turn to
embracing symbolic nationalism as finally coming home to a normal relationship with the
nation. The discussion surrounding the World Cup not only excluded critical leftist
perspectives on the past and present of nationalism, it offered the opportunity to exile
them to the political margins.
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The Integrated: Immigrants in the Sea of Flags
In 2006, the version of the German nation that was established primarily focused
on the unity, health, and happiness of normative Germans, which is to say, those without
apparent foreign heritage. In the corpus examined in this chapter, transnational Germans
were given little explicit consideration within the schema of this “new German feeling.”
While the 2006 national team already included several first- and second-generation
German players, the increasing diversity of the team only became a focus of broader
attention in 2010 (see Chapter 5). Most often in these commentaries, immigrants appear
as taxi drivers or merchants who tell journalists that they proudly wave the German flag
next to their other national flag and express their approval of the new German pride.
Writing of a conversation about game day preparations with his taxi driver from Ghana,
one journalist relays,
His worst fear for this day: that he wouldn’t be able to get a hold of a German flag
for the big party that evening. He wants to put it up on the roof next to the
Ghanaian flag.xxvi (Mohr, 2006)
In another article, the journalist talks to an immigrant flag salesman about his feelings on
regarding the flag-draped celebrations:
Salim Hadij stands before a stall on the Fan Mile and takes a flag out of its holder.
He is happy that the relationship of Germans to national symbols is becoming less
uptight. With his praise, the German-Algerian is not entirely disinterested. He
runs a wholesale business in Charlottenburg with fan items and is pleased with
torrential sales. “Germans want to be proud of their country too,” says Hadij, “as
they must be.”xxvii (Todt, 2006)
Transnational and non-normative Germans’ approval of World Cup flag celebrations
supports the idea that soccer patriotism is universally acceptable and not exclusionary.
This universal approval removes the nation and its symbolism from the realm of politics
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and recasts it as a source of happiness and unity—temporarily transforming even
integrant strangers who worship the flag into unambiguous friends, to use Baumann’s
terms (1990).
It was a festival of youth—without a heavy ideological superstructure. Germany
had the world as its guest and the Germans recognized that they were far more
multicultural and international than they and others realized. That’s why it was so
easy to hang a German flag from the balcony: for the first time in the history of
the Federal Republic black-red-gold did not represent any political claims—like it
still did in 1989—rather it was the national symbolic colors of good humor. If
there is going to be patriotism, then let it be this kind! And if the German flag is
being hung all over the country in Turkish and Arab shops and businesses, then
integration is perhaps not in such bad shape, as many politicians wanted us to
believe before the World Cup.xxviii (Malzahn, 2006)
Even temporarily, this transformation of stranger into member threatens more radical
nationalists who hold more explicitly racist criteria for belonging. This fact also serves to
bolster the credentials of soccer patriotism as a force for good. The irritation of the farright National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD: Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands) with the soccer patriotism and the participation of non-white players on
the national team was raised as proof that the World Cup nationalism runs contrary to
exclusionary and violent forms.
The NPD ideologue Gansel, deeply disappointed with his people, concludes in a
disgustingly racist but otherwise exactly correct way:
“Soccer patriotism integrates, in fact, everyone whose knowledge of German
makes him capable of acquiring black-red-gold cloth from some migrant
merchant. What the parade of blacks in the white [jerseys] of the national eleven
demonstrates, works equally on the dancing streets. Here even negroes become
German patriots.”
We have come so far. Nazis hate a cheerful, cosmopolitan patriotism like the
devil hates holy water.xxix (Mohr, 2006)
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German patriotism, which is equated in the last quote to a Christian sacrament, is
portrayed as acceptable to and accepting of difference, unlike xenophobic right-wing
nationalism that despises party patriotism because of its inclusivity. Although immigrants
and minorities play a smaller part in 2006 than they come to play in 2010 and beyond,
they appear already here at the constitutive margins of German soccer patriotism.
The conditionality of the kinds of belonging granted by soccer patriotism is erased
through comparison with the staunch ethnic nationalism of the NPD and the far-right
generally. However, the provisional nature of belonging appears amid the multicultural
national celebration as well. One Spiegel feature article, titled “The Integrated” (Die
Integrierten) (Supp, 2006), that was published mid-way through the tournament, assesses
the progress of Muslim Germans towards integration (figure 5). The appraisal situates
itself in the context of immigrant participation in soccer patriotism, observing that—
“Berlin Turks in Black-Red-Gold, Germany flags on migrant cars—after five decades of
immigration the gaze focuses on those new citizens who have found a Heimat in this
country and who have not remained foreignersxxx (Supp, 2006, p. 58). Although the
article claims to examine those who have “successfully integrated,” it is at least as much
about providing examples of those who had the possibility to integrate, but chose not to.
The article also presents the postwar history of migration and the myth, shared by
Germans and Turkish guest workers alike, that the invited workers would someday return
“home.”
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Figure 4: This photo is placed above the article’s title, juxtaposing women wearing headscarves—a symbol
of Muslim difference fetishized in the German public sphere—with the unifying symbolism of the German
flag, implicitly asking whether these two symbols may function coherently together. (Supp, 2006)

The stories of four immigrants of different generations are interwoven with the
history of German migration policy. Two of those featured made their living
portraying the dysfunction of Turkish-German society. The Turkish-born author
Saliha Scheinhardt,
Wrote about things that were true; she knew about the tradition of violence, the
archaic-patriarchal power structures in parts of immigrant society; she knew about
forced marriage, domestic violence, about the oppression of Turkish women. She
was one of the first to tell about it.xxxi (Supp, 2006, p. 60)
The article holds up Scheinhardt as an example of “integration” through her choice to
leave the violence of the anti-modern Turkish society behind to embrace, in
Scheinhardt’s words, the “freedom” of the “heavenly” German society. Similarly, Oktay
Özdemir, an actor who debuted in the role of violent young gangster in the 2006 film,
“Tough Enough” (Knallhart), affirms that “there is too little integration” among Turkish188

German youth. He tells of his own difficult childhood on the streets. The article claims
that this is not the exception, but normality.
The adolescents, who experience violence as normality, at home in the gang. The
13-year-old with drugs in his pocket, who looks for his role models in the tough
scene, and naturally these role models exist in the neighborhood. Ghetto-German,
that is their language. Ghetto-pride—that is the attitude on the street, at school.
(Supp, 2006, p. 62).
In this article, Turkishness is defined as violent, patriarchal, and anti-modern. This
statement casts the values and even the speech of these internal Others as fundamentally
different, incomprehensible and antithetical to German social norms. As anthropologist
Ghassan Hage observes (Hage, 2003), in a post-9/11 world, sociological explanations of
problems ranging from criminality to terrorism have been displaced by the demand for
unqualified condemnation. This is particularly true when the transgressions are
considered endemic to non-Western or minoritized groups. In this “war-mentality” the
ambiguous, humanized subject that emerges from a grounded and rigorous attempt to
understand the Other presents a constant threat to order.
Here, Turkish-Germans have a choice to either condemn this litany of antimodern traits and “choose the way into German society” or they can choose “another
way,” as the final example of (refused) integration shows. The last example is Hülya
Kandemir, who “was a musician with dreadlocks and a guitar and led a Western life, but
[her brother] Mesut admonished her and she listened” (Supp, 2006, p. 62). She gave up
her dreadlocks, which here stand as a sign of her adoption of a Western youth culture that
borrows freely from other global counter-cultures, and chose the illiberal subservience of
the headscarf and marriage to a strictly religious man. This parable illustrates the German
fear of social disintegration through multiculturalism. It also affirms the impermanence of
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integration. Integration is not the freedom to choose, with full knowledge and experience
of one’s options, between different styles of life, but is instead the choice of the correct
liberal German values. This article, which is not about the World Cup or soccer
nationalism, appears in the middle of the tournament and is introduced by the implicit
question of what it means when “Turks” wave German flags. It fits within the project of
national narration that ran through coverage of the 2006 World Cup, affirming the
boundaries of Germanness while entertaining the possibility of transnational difference
within it. The role of transnational citizens in legitimating symbolic nationalism is hinted
at in 2006, as the media campaign examined in Chapter 4 shows. However, as the case
study in Chapter 5 demonstrates, by 2010 this role took center stage.

Conclusion
Of the articles in the “soccer patriotism” corpus, one stands out as encapsulating
the process of constructing patriotism above reproach, not because of its distinctiveness,
but instead by its use of so many of the techniques and arguments leveraged throughout
the corpus for this chapter. “Man, Woman, and Child Wear Black-Red-Gold” (Bock &
Reuther, 2006) opens by enumerating some of the many consumer items that have been
branded by the national colors: from bratwurst packages to thong underwear. The
German national colors are ubiquitous like never before as “the national hosts display
their flags.” How could a symbol attached to things as ridiculous as skimpy underwear
and sausages pose any sort of threat? The article continues by listing examples from the
many books being published to “teach Germans somewhat more self-love,” suggesting
that lack of patriotism is a disorder that calls for an intervention.
190

In case the reader is wary of national symbols and their connection to the past, the
authors explain the history of the national colors dating back to the supposed colors of
uniforms of the Prussian Free Corps that fought the French in 1813. This story reminds
readers of the liberal origins of the colors and of their freedom from implication in the
“Nazi reign of terror.” The implication of this historical account is that since today’s
German colors were not involved in past nationalist crimes, they should no longer be
subject to critical interrogation based on the memory of nationalist excesses. The article
evokes a memory of the past centered on the expulsion of the hereditary enemy and the
desire for the union of the nation expressed in the failed 1948 revolution. Finally, it
evokes the continuation of the legacy of shared German history reflected in the common
characteristic of Prussian virtue. The article concludes with a tongue-in-cheek assurance
for those who wonder, “in the style of Wilhelmenic obedience,” if it is even permitted to
hang a flag from one’s balcony, that it is fine so long as it is not so large as to obstruct the
view of others.
Just as pointed as the article’s words, the images accompanying the piece drive
home the message of the positive impacts of the public expression of national pride. The
photographs are powerfully affective: a heterosexual couple clothed in the national colors
kissing beneath a flag unfurling in the breeze (figure 6), a sleeping baby with a tiny flag
on her tiny shirt (figure 7), and a young man asleep on a bench with a large flag clutched
loosely in his hand—he is all tuckered out since, as the caption explains, “national pride
can be tiring” (Bock & Reuther, 2006).
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Figure 5: Representing the reproductive power of the national flag. The caption reads: “one German flag,
two bottles of beer—and then the man comes closer to the womanxxxii (Bock & Reuther, 2006)

The images represent the paradigm of peaceful normality, all courtesy of the comfort of a
“natural” relationship to national pride. This article provides a historical trajectory for the
flag that is free from tension while establishing the roots of present day Germany in a
shared past. It also centers the flag within the reproduction of Germany, in this case quite
literally. The flag provides cover and the affective spark for the couple’s intercourse and
adorns the baby that results from its successful completion.
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Figure 6: This German Press Agency (DPA) image was used in multiple articles in this chapter’s corpus.

The World Cup provided journalists with the opportunity to craft new narratives
around national symbols. Through repetitive language and imagery, journalists created
collective memory of the World Cup even as they reported on the events as they
unfolded. By the end of the World Cup, journalists had firmly established a recognizable
narrative signified by terms like “soccer patriotism” that are invoked to recall the
“Summer Fairytale” (Sommermärchen)16 that was the 2006 World Cup. The World Cup
offered the ultimate public plebiscite on a massive level, affirming the desire of the

16

This term, heavily used by journalists, was coined as the title of a documentary film portraying the
German national team’s preparations for the World Cup and following them through to their third-place
finish and the following celebrations. The title, Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen refers to Heinrich
Heine’s work Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen, a satirical and critical piece that also includes naturalized
patriotic elements.
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nation to unite as a collective. Two features are important here: the event created the
opportunity to collect a vast public archive—visual, textual, and auditory—of public
consent through media coverage, photos, and even a documentary film. In addition, the
commitment to the new practices of national pride are built around a reoccurring event;
the World Cup every four years, interspersed with the smaller scale Euro Cup, offers a
new opportunity every two years to remember the 2006 tournament and keep the new
traditions alive. During the 2006 World Cup, the media re-wrote German national
identity around the practices of “soccer patriotism,” using it to restore the collective
amnesia that obscures the brutality at the foundations of national cohesion.
The forms of public nationalism embraced in Germany during the 2006 World
Cup are by no means unique to Germany. As was repeatedly noted in the articles I
examined, the practice of banal nationalism is widespread and generally unquestioned
outside of Germany. Furthermore, the individual interpretation of the experience of
joining in the collective practice of acting as a fan of one’s national team may diverge
sharply from the most common mediated interpretations. This is illustrated by one
Spiegel Online article published following Germany’s 2014 World Cup win. It featured
the responses of ten young people to a popular question in the German media: “are you
proud to be German?” (“Deutschland ist Weltmeister,” 2014). The responses varied
greatly, from those who identified fully with the national team and felt personal
ownership for the German win to those who supported the team but disavowed
generalized national pride. Unlike many of the articles in the 2006 corpus, this article
does not build up skepticism of generalized national pride as a straw man or as
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depressive, self-loathing. Skeptical respondents push back against external interpretations
of the excitement and jubilation of fans. Of the World Cup, one fan responded,
I joined in the fever too, watched every game, sweated, screamed, laughed. But I
do that at concerts too. I’m not proud there either, I don’t feel responsible there
either if a band’s album lands at the top of the charts.xxxiii (“Deutschland ist
Weltmeister,” 2014)
This analogy uses two collective events that inspire similar actions and feelings among
fans to caution outside observers who seek to interpret the national meaning of World
Cup celebration. At the same time, this response points to the fallacy of nationalist
interpretations that extend the successes of exceptional individuals to the entire national
population. For other respondents, this symbolic extension was meaningful, and they felt
varying degrees of personal ownership over the German team’s victory. Contrary to the
media framing that suggests that skepticism or ambivalence around nationalism emerges
from oppressive guilt over the past, Germany’s national past does not appear as a factor
in these responses. Instead, responses emerge from distinct political positions on the
constitution and symbolism defining a national collective, positions that echo those
proposed in the Historikerstreit, only without specific reference to the past. For some, the
investment in symbolic nationalism is a meaningful and positive form of collective
engagement; for others, collectivity emerges from specific institutions and forms of
engagement. This unusual article suggests that the politics of fandom are far more
complicated than the media portrayal generally suggests. The next chapter addresses the
investment of the German media in the symbolic nationalism of the World Cup, and asks
what kind of Germany it sought to produce.
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In 2006, journalists argued for the right to establish a public form of patriotism
unburdened by reflexivity as is practiced in other established nation-states. As can be
seen in the United States, however, in elevating the celebration of national symbols, the
work of democracy can fall by the wayside. In the United States, Lauren Berlant argued
that “the national knowledge industry has produced a specific modality of paramnesia, an
incitement to forgetting that leaves simply the patriotic trace, for real and metaphorically
infantilized citizens, that confirms that the nation exists and we are in it” (1997, p. 50).
This substitution of the symbol (national colors) for the thing (democratic processes)
inhibits critical processes. During the 2006 World Cup, Germans could relegate to a
distant past the lessons of the Berlin Olympics, which show how no patriotism, and
certainly not sports patriotism should be exempt from scrutiny.
Soccer patriotism and other forms of banal nationalism are a normalized part of
contemporary life in countries worldwide. However, to explicitly deny the connection
between sports and nationalism requires Germans to forget the symbolic significance of
the 1936 Olympics as the international coming out party of National Socialism.
Awareness of this memory is sometimes evident in traces of defensive discomfort in the
coverage of the 2006 World Cup, but substantive engagement with the traumatizing past
is explicitly avoided. This amnesia indicates the demise of the collective memory of the
Berlin Olympics, and a relegation of the event into the annals of a history lived by
“others.” The 2006 World Cup allowed Germans to reorient the collective memory of
public displays of national enthusiasm away from the displays of the traumatic past and
to build them instead around the purportedly apolitical, inclusive, and heroic global
sporting spectacle. As the media made clear, “our” German patriotism has nothing to do
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with “their” German nationalism. During the 2006 World Cup, the past “went away,”
emancipating national symbols and placing patriotism in Germany above reproach. The
next chapter analyzes efforts by politicians and the media industry to lay the groundwork
for the patriotic revival of the 2006 tournament. It examines a massive marketing
campaign organized by the major players in the German media industry with the stated
goal of improving the national mood and stimulating a new national feeling in advance of
the 2006 World Cup.

i

Das Geheimnis des Fänchenerfolgs ist: Jede Gegenwehr wirkte schnell unentspannt, wo wir jetzt so super
locker drauf sind.
ii
Fahnenmeer: Torjubel auf Norddeutschlands größter Fanparty in Hamburg
iii
Schwartz-Rot-Gold: Fanparty auf dem "Heiligengeistfeld" in Hamburg
iv
«Nicht jeder Fahnenschwenker wird gleich zum Patrioten oder Nationalisten», sagt Klaus Boehnke,
Sozialwissenschaftler an der International University Bremen. Die große Masse mache sich über die
historische Bedeutung der nationalen Symbole gar keine Gedanken. Sie werde vor allem durch
momentane Euphorie getragen.
v
Wir erinnern uns: Es war Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft und Deutschland verwandelte sich für ein paar
Wochen in eine euphorische Nation.
vi
Für den Bielefelder Historiker Hans-Ulrich Wehler ist das neuentdeckt Selbstbewusstsein der deutschen
Fans kein Zeichen für aufkeimenden Nationalismus. Der Sport rufe vielmehr einen
"Ersatznationalismus" hervor, "weil er mit Nationalfarben und einer Nationalmannschaft operiert." Für
Wehler ist die Wiederentdeckung der deutschlandflagge ein "außerordentlich flüchtiges Phänomen", ein
gefährlicher Nationalismus werde dadurch nicht hervorgerufen.
vii
Auf der Straße und in den Stadien ist die verdruckste Scham im Umgang mit nationalen Symbolen
offenbar einem unverkrampften Verhältnis gewichen.
viii
„Ganz Deutschland jubelt schwarzrotgold—und Freunde aus aller Welt feiern fröhlich mit“, schreibt
[Grünen Fraktionschefin Renate] Künast in einem Gastbeitrag für „Bild am Sonntag“. Die Fußball-WM
sei ein „Fest der Farben, der Nationen, der Menschen, und Schwarzrotgold ist unser Ausweis als
Gastgeber: Kommt her, wir zeigen euch, wie schön Deutschland sein kann“.
ix
Die WM-Hysterie ist ungebrochen. Und ebenso stark scheint in diesen Wochen der Patriotismus
ausgeprägt. Vor allem die Deutschen als Gastgeber des Fußball-Spektakels zeigen Flagge.
x
[Junge deutschen] sind längst globalisierte Partygänger, und jetzt sind sie die Gastgeber. Da wollen sie
nicht griesgrämig sein. Während einer WM heißt Globalisierung auch: Wettstreit der Heiterkeitskulturen.
Die Deutschen machen kräftig mit.
xi
In Deutschland gibt es immer ein großes „aber“, wenn es um Deutschland geht. Ist das nicht schon zu viel
Schwarzrotgold auf den Plätzen und Bildschirmen? Darf man das Deutschlandlied inbrünstigsingen?
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xii

Die Bundesdeutschen haben sich immer schwergetan mit dem Fahnenschwenken, mit dem Schminken,
mit dem Singen.
xiii
Internationale Studien bescheinigen den Deutschen im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern immer noch ein
schlechtes Selbstwertgefühl…. Ein Großereignis wie die Weltmeisterschaft schüre aber das
Gemeinschaftsgefühl und sei gerade für junge Menschen eine Chance, sich mit dem Land zu
identifizieren.
xiv
Die Unverkrampftheit finde ich neu und höchst erfreulich…. Man merkt, wie verkrampft man selber die
Dinge lange Zeit gesehen hat.
xv
Patriotismus ist kein Luxus, sondern eine Überlebens-Notwendigkeit.
xvi
Da gibt es die deutschen Dichter und Denker, den deutschen Wald, die deutsche Gemütlichkeit, die
deutsche Effizienz, die deutsche Sehnsucht nach Italien, und es gibt Winnetou.
xvii
Winnetou ist der bundesdeutsche Held schlechthin, ein Tugendbold, ein Naturfreak, ein Romantiker, ein
Pazifist im Herzen, aber in einer kriegerischen Welt der beste Krieger, flink, stark treffsicher. Elf
Winnetous, und wir würden am 9. Juli Weltmeister.
xviii
Identität und Deutschland sind Widersprüche. Dafür war das, was Deutsch hieß, zu lange Reich mit
unbestimmten oder ständig veränderten Grenzen und Bevölkerungen. Dafür ist der Holocaust zu sperrig.
Man kann sich mit ihm nicht in einer Identität einrichten, schon gar nicht ohne ihn.... In Wahrheit ist die
Suche das Ziel. Sich suchen, ohne sich finden zu können—das ist deutsch, das ist auch ein deutsches
Vergnügen.
xix
Von dem Reigen in Schwarz-Rot-Gold den Ausdruck eines wieder erstarkten Nationalgefühls
abzuleiten, ist absurd.
xx
Fachleute halten die Kritik für typisch deutsche Miesmacherei und reflexhaft. «Das nehme ich nicht
ernst», sagt beispielsweise Heinz Grüne, Geschäftsführer von Rheingold (Köln), einem Institut für
Markt- und Medienanalysen.
xxi
Dröhnenden Nationalstolz werde es in Deutschland nicht mehr geben, sagte Lammert. Deshalb wies er
Kritik an der WM-Euphorie zurück: «Der Versuch, einen solchen gesunden Patriotismus für anstößig zu
erklären, begünstigt die Aktivitäten der rechtsextrem Verwirrten».
xxii
Lange hat man sich gefragt: "Dürfen wir das?" Natürlich dürfen wir. Wir haben uns Fragen gestellt, die
nicht zu stellen sind. Nun ist das alles fraglos normal. Das ist richtig gut. Zudem ist die
Außenwahrnehmung sehr viel entspannter als unsere eigene. Das alles bedeutet ja nicht: Jetzt marschiert
Deutschland wieder. Wer das, was geschieht, dennoch so empfindet, der hat einen Vogel.
xxiii
“Die Notwendigkeit einer tiefgehenden Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte und Gegenwart des
Nationalismus in Deutschland.… Nationalismus, der die immer größer werdende soziale Kluft in diesem
Land übertünchen soll und Integration mit Assimilation verwechselt.”
xxiv
Die GEW wolle nicht „den Fans die Fußball-WM vermiesen… Wenn heute junge Fußballfans die
Nationalhymne singen, tun sie das aus Lebensfreude und zur Unterstützung der deutschen Mannschaft.“
xxv
Plötzlich entdecken auch patriotische Spätheimkehrer aus Kultur und Politik ihr Konvertitenherz für die
Nation und kämpfen lautstark und mit vollem Körpereinsatz gegen jede Spielart des politisch korrekten
deutschen Selbsthasses.
xxvi
Seine schlimmste Befürchtung für diesen Tag: Dass er für die große Party heute Abend keine
Deutschland-Fahne mehr auftreiben kann. Die will er sich neben der von Ghana ans Dach stecken.
xxvii
Salim Hadij steht vor einem Verkaufsstand auf der Fanmeile und nimmt eine Fahne aus der Halterung.
Er freut sich darüber, dass das Verhältnis der Deutschen zu nationalen Symbolen unverkrampfter wird.
Der Deutsch-Algerier ist mit seinem Lob allerdings nicht ganz uneigennützig. Er betreibt in
Charlottenburg einen Großhandel mit Fanartikeln und freut sich überreißende Absätze. "Auch die
Deutschen wollen stolz sein auf ihr Land", so Hadij, "das muss doch auch so sein."
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xxviii

Es war ein Festival der Jugend—ohne bleiernen ideologischen Überbau. Deutschland hatte die Welt zu
Gast und die Deutschen erkannten, dass sie selbst längst viel multikultureller und internationaler sind, als
sie von sich und andere über sie annahmen. Deswegen fiel es so leicht, eine deutsche Flagge am Balkon
zu hissen: Schwarz-rot-gold repräsentierte zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik keinen
politischen Anspruch—wie auch noch 1989—sondern war das nationale Farbensymbol guter Stimmung.
Wenn schon Patriotismus, dann diesen! Und wenn die deutsche Flagge inzwischen auch landauf landab
in türkischen und arabischen Lokalen und Geschäften gehisst wird, dann kann es um die Integration
vielleicht doch nicht so schlecht bestellt sein, wie so manche Politiker vor der WM noch glauben machen
wollten.
xxix
Der von seinem Volk zutiefst enttäuschte NPD-Ideologe Gansel schlussfolgert ekelhaft rassistisch, aber
sonst ganz richtig: "Der Fußball-Patriotismus integriert in der Tat jeden, dessen Deutschkenntnisse ihn
dazu befähigen, bei irgendeinem Migranten ein schwarzrotgoldenes Tuch zu erwerben. Was mit der
Schwarzenparade im Weiß der Nationalelf vorexerziert wird, klappt auf der tanzenden Straße sowieso.
Hier werden selbst Neger zu deutschen Patrioten." So weit also haben wir es gebracht. Nazis hassen
einen fröhlichen weltoffenen Patriotismus wie der Teufel das Weihwasser.
xxx
Berliner Türken in Schwarz-Rot-Gold, an Autos von Migranten Deutschland-Fähnchen—nach fünf
Jahrzehnten Einwanderung richtet sich der Blick auf diejenigen Neubürger, die in diesem Land eine
Heimat gefunden haben und nicht Fremde geblieben sind.
xxxi
Schrieb über Dinge, die Wirklichkeit waren, sie wusste um die Gewalttradition, die archaischpatriarchalischen Machtstrukturen in Teilen der Einwanderergesellschaft, wusste um Zwangsehen,
Familiengewalt, um die Unterdrückung türkischer Frauen.
xxxii
Eine Deutsche Fahne, zwei Flaschen Bier—und schon kommt Mann der Frau näher.
xxxiii
Auch ich habe mitgefiebert, jedes Spiel geschaut, geschwitzt, geschrien, gelacht. Aber das mache ich
auch auf Konzerten. Da bin ich auch nicht stolz, da fühle ich mich auch nicht verantwortlich, wenn eine
Band mit ihrem Album auf Platz eins der Charts landet.
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CHAPTER 4 – SELLING THE NATION ON ITSELF: THE MEDIA, SYMBOLIC
POWER, AND GLOBAL SPORTS SPECTACLE

If you were watching television in Germany on the evening of Tuesday,
September 26, 2005 you most likely saw, nearly simultaneously with 17 million others, a
two-minute commercial featuring in quick succession over 30 prominent Germans
interspersed with “everyday citizens.” The uncommonly long ad is a whirlwind of faces,
places and phrases, moving at a brisk pace. The message of the ad is that “You Are
Germany” (Du bist Deutschland). Breaking the third wall, this ad crossed into the private
sphere and invited citizens into the collective fold via an empowering narrative of
national identification. The campaign juxtaposes the grandiose with the infinitesimal, the
obviously significant with the seemingly insignificant, the celebrity with the unnamed
citizen, Germany with “you.” It collapses the categories of individual and society,
arguing that although no one knows who “you” are, you are equally responsible for the
success of the nation as its most prominent members. This, the campaign claims, will cut
through the pessimism that is preventing Germany from reaching its fullest potential as a
nation and motivate citizens to “take their foot off the break” and fuel the nation’s
growth. The campaign confirms that with this identity comes the responsibility to be a
productive part of the national economy. Serving as the keystone of the effort to prepare
Germany and Germans to host the men’s 2006 FIFA World Cup, this campaign reveals
essential aspects of the assemblage of political and economic interests mobilized by
global sports spectacles.

It serves, thus, as a locus through which to examine the

dialectical relationship between the nation-making and global-marketing capacity of sport
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as well as broader developments in political and economic approaches to national
identification.
Building on the analysis of the new forms of nationalist practice outlined in
Chapter 3, this chapter investigates the investment of media industries in promoting an
affectively charged and uniform nationalism. To do so, it traces the form and function of
the unprecedented social marketing and nation branding campaigns leading up to the
2006 World Cup in Germany. The examples in this chapter further elucidate the
connections between the personal and affective politics outlined in Chapter 1 and the
pragmatic and utilitarian metrics of social citizenship outlined in Chapter 2. The social
marketing campaigns that began in 2005 demonstrate a new approach to nation building
that accommodates and even promotes visible forms of difference within the population
while constructing new qualifications for citizenship according to the individual’s
contribution to the wellbeing and life of the national population. Specifically, this chapter
focuses on the Du bist Deutschland (DbD) campaign, the centerpiece of the marketing
effort, which had the stated goal of empowering and lifting the moods of Germans. The
investment of media institutions in these marketing campaigns cannot be explained in
terms of the usual quid pro quo relationship cultivated by the promoter of a product and
the consumer. Even in the realm of social marketing campaigns, which focus on raising
awareness of and support for issues such as environmental protection and public health,
the “mood-boosting” German campaign is an outlier. Although the campaign raised
lively discussions in the German press, with a few exceptions it garnered remarkably
little attention from scholars, generally receiving little more than anecdotal treatment.
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This chapter examines how political and industrial stakeholders leveraged the
liminality of the mega sports event to normalize banal nationalism and promote a new
form of national identity more suited to a globalized economy. Understanding the
purpose and function of the campaign requires an examination of the political, social and
historical framework within which it operates. After outlining the historical context, the
second section consists of a textual and critical discourse analysis of the two-minute
advertisement that formed the core of the first iteration of the campaign in 2005. The
campaign denounces a critical stance towards public affairs and towards the nation.
Instead, it promotes national membership based on the productivity of citizens and their
willingness to support the nation. This allows for the inclusion of migrants and Germans
of color so long as they are productive members of society. At the same time, by making
belonging a result of personal engagement, the campaign suppresses questions of
hierarchies and power relations between different groups, both cultural and socioeconomic. In addition to the campaign’s advertisements, this chapter concludes with an
analysis of press articles written on the campaign in the top national periodicals (see
Introduction).17 A search for the terms “Du bist Deutschland” AND “Kampagne”
(campaign) returned 124 relevant results. After examining these articles, I noticed that a
distinct subsection of articles focused on the campaign creators and stakeholders, clearly

17

This corpus does not include articles from the Bild, which does not maintain comprehensive electronic
archives. The archive search on the Bild website did not return any relevant results for the search terms
used in this chapter.
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articulating their public explanation of the campaign’s intended purpose and meaning.
These carefully crafted messages convey a distinct ethic and set of ideals for German
society. To focus more deeply on this perspective, I selected the articles that focused on
the campaign’s creators and industry supporters. The resulting corpus of 29 articles
includes media industry analysis and interviews with campaign creators to provide
insight into the campaign’s stated goals as well as a range of journalistic perspectives on
the campaign’s political and social implications. I coded these articles using grounded
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) to determine the predominant themes and their
relationships.
Table 3: Search Results from “Du bist Deutschland” AND Kampagne
All Results

Selected
(Stakeholder- Focused)

Focus

7

0

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

9

5

Der Spiegel

13

3

Spiegel Online (SPON)

13

0

Die Süddeutsche Zeitung

18

6

Stern

5

1

Die Tageszeitung

18

4

Die Welt

19

6

Die Zeit

23

4

Total

124

29

Sources
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This analysis focuses on the advertisements themselves as the primary texts, and
considers the paratextual role of journalistic coverage. This campaign reveals the strategy
and motivations that undergird the media industry’s investment in national pride and its
role in the economics of global sports spectacles.

“World Champions of the Heart”18: Branding the Host
In the fall of 2005, the Du bist Deutschland campaign seemed to come out of
nowhere; its development and the actors who created it were largely unknown (Speth,
2006). The partnership that produced the campaign included nearly all major German
media companies, and yet there was very little advanced discussion of the campaign in
the press. In the larger corpus of 124 articles, only 6 were written before the campaign’s
debut. These and subsequent articles and provide very little insight into the material
motivations of the campaign’s creators and stakeholders. Instead, they cite the affective
goal of improving the national “mood” (Stimmung). Understanding the strategies that
motivated the campaign requires looking back to broader political and economic
developments in Germany around the turn of the millennium. During a period of
economic deregulation and labor market liberalization, social marketing campaigns like

18

This slogan appeared in 2004, but it gained traction in the media and among the public during the
tournament, both to celebrate the goodwill generated by the successful tournament and to cushion the
disappointment of not taking home the World Cup trophy. It is still referenced today.
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DbD communicated a new social vision for Germany that values self-reliance and an
optimistic and agreeable stance toward the nation-state.
Although the postwar German economy has traditionally been regarded as a
paradigm of socially conscious and constrained capitalism based on the idea of the social
market economy (sozialer Marktwirtschaft), since reunification in the 1990s, the German
economy has become increasingly liberal (Menz, 2010). The most radical of recent
liberal reforms, collectively called Agenda 2010, were implemented under the leadership
of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democrats beginning in 2003. These
reforms were enacted to address the period of slow economic growth and rising
unemployment that followed German reunification in the 1990s. In the first two years
after reunification, the GDP in the Eastern states collapsed by a third (Hunt, 2006, p. 2).
Restructuring and incorporating the “new states” from the former GDR involved the
largest transfer of wealth in economic history (Streeck, 1997). In order to finance the
costs of reunification, the government raised taxes in the 1990s and, even with new tax
income, debt increased from 41.8% of GDP in 1989 to 64.2% in 2003 (Hunt, 2006, p. 9).
Even before reunification, the high-wage West German economy had been suffering from
growing unemployment and concerns about the capacity of German industry to develop
innovation and maintain control in the high-end markets (Streeck, 1997). By the early
2000s Germany’s financial outlook was grim enough that the liberal periodical The
Economist dubbed it “the sick man of Europe” (Minton Beddoes, 2013). Strong
protections for workers, high wages, and generous welfare provisions made the German
labor market more expensive than in neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. Slow
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growth and rising unemployment supported arguments by industry leaders to enact
reforms to lessen the labor market protections of the social market economy approach.
As part of the effort to convince political leaders to enact reforms to liberalize
Germany’s economy, industrial groups began to develop new communicative approaches
to influence policy and public discourse. Rudolf Speth (2004, 2006) followed the
development of these new lobbying strategies during the Schröder government, tying
them to a fundamental shift in the German political and industrial organization. Whereas
West German industry had long been characterized by high levels of coordinated
“organization, concentration, and centralization,” with the government playing an active
role in making sure the markets addressed social imperatives (Zysman, 1983, p. 252), the
established means of coordination and communication between government and industry
began to shift in the 1990s. While traditional trade unions weakened, businesses became
more independent. At the same time, the public relations sector was also becoming more
professionalized (Speth, 2006). Public relations agencies saw opportunities in working
with industry groups to influence public and political communication using modern
marketing techniques to establish “discursive sovereignty using economic research
expertise in conjunction with the media” (Speth, 2006, p. 9). Speth shows that campaigns
and initiatives developed by industry groups proliferated in the first years of the new
millennium, successfully winning political advocates for economic reform. However, the
abandonment of the social contract that had long governed German capitalism was not
popular among the public.
Halfway through his second term as chancellor, Schröder’s attempts at
implementing reforms through consensus between business and labor interests had
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yielded paltry results (Camerra-Rowe, 2004). As unemployment spiked and their
electoral advantage began to slip away in 2002, political leaders of the ruling Social
Democrats came under increasing pressure to implement reforms to address the longterm economic slump and to sell those reforms to an economically distressed population.
In 2003, Schröder announced the Agenda 2010 reforms as well as plans to initiate an
“innovation offensive” the following year (“Sick man walking,” 2003). In January 2004,
Chancellor Schröder convened an “Innovation Conference,” bringing together leaders of
industry and research to forge a plan to promote German industry and research
(“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004). At the January meeting, Schröder announced his intention to
form a “Partnership for Innovation” between leaders in the private and public sectors
(“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004, “Innovationsgipfel,” 2004). Six months after this initial
meeting, the “Partners for Innovation” agreed upon a mission statement committing to
“work together for a new culture of innovation in Germany” (“Partner für Innovation Mission,” n.d.). The initiative included industrial giants such as BASF, Deutsche
Telekom, and Siemens as well as think tanks and lobbying groups such as the German
Industry Association (BDI: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) and the German
Trade Union Federation (DGB: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). At the same time,
another government-supported initiative involving many of the same industry partners
formed under the campaign that eventually became known by the slogan, “Germany—
Land of Ideas.” This first campaign, which debuted under the soccer-club-inspired name
“FC Deutschland 2006,” garnered bad press due to its poor organization. It also provoked
the ire of the leading opposition party, the center-right Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) for using public money as well as industry donations to fund what they
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characterized as a campaign for the Social Democrats for the 2006 elections
(Hammerstein et al., 2004). The Land of Ideas campaign was plagued by suspicions of
political motivations, drawing unwanted attention to the campaign’s founders and
eroding trust in its message.
While the Land of Ideas campaign was publicly struggling, a more abstract social
marketing campaign was quietly in development to fuse the individual and the nation
under the slogan, Du bist Deutschland. Media reports on the DbD campaign traced it to
the Partners for Innovation initiative, but the campaign emphasized its independence
from other groups and, above all, from the government and politics (von Petersdorff,
2005). According to one of the initiators of the DbD campaign, Bernd Bauer, the projects
of the Partners for Innovation had been successful as a collaboration to create a reform
friendly atmosphere in Germany; however, “the problem with the project was, that we
did indeed reach the opinion leaders… We had the feeling, though, [that] now is the time
to address all Germans. To motivate them to surprise themselves”i (Moring, 2005).
Among the Partners for Innovation was the Bertelsmann AG, Germany’s largest media
corporation and one of the top five media corporations in the world. Under Bertelsmann’s
leadership, the social marketing campaign was developed independently from the
Partners initiative, and assembled the country’s biggest media players from television and
publishing to cinemas all participating pro bono. The strong division between the
government- and the industry-led projects created a bulwark for the DbD campaign
against the accusations of political propaganda that plagued the Land of Ideas initiative.
Although this safeguard was not impervious to critique, it worked as part of a strategy to
diffuse suspicion and enervate criticism, enhancing the plausibility of the claim of purely
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philanthropic motivation. Altruistic claims aside, an analysis of the mechanisms of this
nation branding effort—and particularly the role of the domestically focused
component—reveals the strong economic logic driving this instance of corporate
philanthropy.

The Economics of Global Sport Spectacle and the Corporate Value of National Identity
The wilting German economy and the unpopular reforms developed to
“modernize” it provided one major impetus for the emergence of several new high-profile
promotional campaigns. The other push came from hosting the 2006 World Cup, which
was seen as both an opportunity and a justification for these new campaigns
(Hammerstein et al., 2004). During the World Cup, the eyes of the world would be
focused on Germany. In general, despite the highly visible economic activity spurred by
hosting a global sporting spectacle, the activities directly related to the event have little
economic value to host communities. The benefits of hosting, from the political and
industrial perspective, have everything to do with their ability to create audiences or
publics. As Wolfgang Maenning and Andrew Zimbalist’s comprehensive collection,
International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events (2012) demonstrates,
the direct economic benefit to nations and cities of hosting sports mega-events are
minimal at best. In fact, events usually result in a legacy of increased tax burden on
citizens and superfluous “white elephant” facilities not suited to local use (Feddersen,
Grötzinger, & Maennig, 2009; Maennig & Feddersen, 2010; Zimbalist & Maennig,
2012). In the case of less developed countries the economic impact can be particularly
dismal. The hosts of the 2006 World Cup in Germany were at a significant advantage
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compared to less developed countries. Germany’s infrastructure as well as its
professional sports infrastructure, was already strong. The German Football Association
(DFB) worked with private stakeholders to arrange for the costs of stadium development
to be predominantly borne by soccer clubs and other forms of private investment.
Even under these auspicious conditions, the regional economic benefit from the
World Cup to regional hosts was difficult to discern (Feddersen et al., 2009). Although it
is well-known that sports mega events almost always result in a public deficit,
competition to host these events is growing (Dowse, 2011). Scholars writing on sports
economics agree that the motivation of national leadership to host sports mega-events
cannot be explained by aspirations of direct economic benefit to the country. Instead,
motivations are driven by a complex political economy consisting of a range of actors
with set agendas, including transnational corporations, domestic sport associations and
politicians and policymakers from different levels of governance. As Scarlett Cornelissen
points out, “the manner in which the interests of these actors overlap or diverge
determines the processes by which tournaments take shape, and the longer-term
consequences such events bear for the wider host society” (2007, p. 248). Each
tournament emerges from a different and contextually dependent set of interests.
In the case of the 2006 World Cup, a point of consensus between domestic
corporate and political stakeholders was the priority of the promotion of the nation, the
remaking of brand Germany. Consistently generating audiences unparalleled by other
types of media events, global sports spectacles offer ideal opportunities to exploit focused
attention to shape narratives of the nation for domestic and international purposes. Since
the first expos and world fairs of the nineteenth century, global spectacle has played this
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role as both a product of and a contributor to modern nationalism (E. Hobsbawm &
Ranger, 1992; Roche, 2000). Maurice Roche observes that from their advent,
international and supernational cultural events helped to create a fragile space,
something of an “international public culture,” in which “official” versions of
collective identities, particularly but not exclusively national identities, were
asserted and recognised in a (usually, at best, hierarchic and exclusionary; at
worst hate-filled and warring) international “world of nations.” (2000, p. 22)
These events created an international consciousness at a global level, and gave
governments a tool for creating and assigning meaning to collective national
consciousness. Although these functions of global spectacle have a long history, they
have recently undergone a subtle but important transformation that is reflected in the rise
of the theory and practices of “nation branding.”
Nation branding, or “competitive identity,” as one of its major proponents, Simon
Anholt has come to call it, essentially refers to approaching the nation as a product.
Anholt, an independent policy advisor, argues that “governments now find themselves
competing in ways that they are scarcely prepared to deal with, and inhabiting a world of
global competition and mobile consumers where few of their traditional approaches
work” (2007, p. 16). However, managing this type of competition is what businesses
have perfected. According to Nadia Kaneva’s review of the literature, nation branding
supporters share the assumptions that “nation-states operate in a global competitive
context” and that “by managing their reputations strategically, nations can advance their
interests in the international arena,” whether political or economic (2011, p. 125). This
blending of economic and market rationalities into political communication distinguishes
nation branding from traditional forms of strategic messaging and propaganda.
Proponents of nation branding generally see it as the natural development of these earlier
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forms to respond to the new demands of governance from a globalized economy
(Kaneva, 2011). The market fundamentalism that underlies much of the work on nation
branding sees it as more peaceful form of collective identity than traditional nationalism.
Anholt concisely expresses this view that
the market-based view of the world, on which the theory of place branding is
largely predicated, is an inherently peaceful and humanistic model for the
relationships between nations. It is based on competition, consumer choice and
consumer power; and these concepts are intimately linked to the freedom and
power of the individual. For this reason, it seems far more likely to result in
lasting world peace than a statecraft based on territory, economic power,
ideologies, politics or religion. (Anholt, 2006, p. 2; quoted in Kaneva, 2011, p.
126)
This view is based on a politics and morality that uses market metaphors and extends
them beyond the realm of material exchange into all realms of life. In this way, even
something as intangible as happiness can be “registered” and “recognized” as “having
negotiable value” (Anholt, 2006, p. 2).
The significance of the role of cultural identity in economic competition is only
recently starting to become clear. Less than three decades ago, corporations
enthusiastically embraced Theodore Levitt’s prediction of the disappearance of cultural
difference in the face of the proliferation of “global corporation” (1983, p. 3). However,
local cultures were not as easily penetrated as Levitt imagined. Levitt’s global
corporations faced unexpected resistance in the form of local competition and backlash
against the overexposure of global brands (Silk, Andrews, & Cole, 2005, p. 1).
Corporations were forced to reformulate global strategies to take local cultural difference
into account.
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The value of negotiating identity for corporations seeking to capture broader
markets is clear. But as globalization has involved national governments in new
unaccustomed forms of competition, nation-states have taken a new look at the value of
the symbolic capital of the “national brand.” The increasing mobility of capital has
undermined many of the traditional prerogatives which nation-states were founded to
maintain. “The modern nation-state emerged as a cohesive political, economic, and
cultural entity designed to consolidate and regulate capital accumulation within the
boundaries of a specific geographic location” (Silk et al., 2005, p. 2). As the boundaries
dividing national and global markets have largely dissolved, the globalized conditions of
late capitalism have undermined traditional national sovereignty in crucial ways. The
conditions that have unsettled the traditional jurisdiction of the nation-state are the same
that have given rise to global corporatism. Silk et al. argue that “while human civilization
is being increasingly corporatized, the nation and national culture have become principal
accomplices within this process, as global capitalism seeks to—quite literally—capitalize
upon the nation as a source of collective identification and differentiation” (2005, p. 7).
Rather than making the nation obsolete, under advanced globalization the nation-state
and global corporations have grown together, sharing an interest in the symbolic capital
and affective power of “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006) as well as of imagined
Others.
In the case of the 2006 World Cup, this opportunity came with a particular set of
political and historical challenges. As was discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, even though the
call for generalized national pride gained strength through reunification, resistance
against abstract symbolic national pride persisted among segments of the leftist political
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and intellectual establishment. However, a comprehensive marketing approach to the
nation requires the cultivation of an abstract form of nationalism. According to Anholt,
“the first and most important component of any national C[ompetitive] I[dentity] strategy
is creating a spirit of benign nationalism amongst the populace, notwithstanding its
cultural, social, ethnic, linguistic, economic, political, territorial and historical divisions”
(2007, p. 16). The perception of the national brand among the internal population, Anholt
argues, is a driver of the external perception of the brand. However, Anholt sees this as a
long-term, comprehensive project. In an article in Die Zeit about Germany’s major preWorld Cup campaigns, Anholt expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the DbD
campaign, calling it an “absolutely laudable effort that, I am certain will do absolutely
nothing”ii (Hoff, 2005). From Anholt’s perspective, much longer term and more targeted
programs are necessary to create appreciable change in a Nation Brand. However, while
the concrete impact of such campaigns may be hard to measure and may even be
indiscernible despite campaign creators’ references to survey data showing that ten
million people were “motivated to take things on” by the campaign (Bauchmüller, 2006),
they are significant for what they reveal about industrial and political concepts of society.

The Power to Define Reality: The Media and the National Symbolic
Recognizing the symbolic potential of the World Cup, German politicians,
industry and the media sought to harness its full potential by creating a broad-ranging
marketing strategy including campaigns to initiate the German people in their upcoming
role as national hosts. These “social marketing” campaigns were facilitated and justified
by the upcoming World Cup, but their symbolic utility was not limited to this event.
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While other campaigns, like the Land of Ideas, made soccer a central point of reference,
DbD was more general, utilizing sports, and above all national-level soccer, as one point
of reference among many nationally charged symbolic scenes. Under the auspices of
benign corporate citizenship, the domestically-focused DbD campaign proposed a new
relationship between Germans and the nation-state characterized by American-style
meritocracy and patriotism. In her classic work Decoding Advertisements, Judith
Williamson outlines the construction of systems of meaning through advertising. She
writes that “advertisements are selling us something else besides consumer goods: in
providing us with a structure in which we, and those goods are interchangeable, they are
selling us ourselves” (Williamson, 1978, p. 13). In a very literal application, when the
nation is the good being sold, advertising is thus selling the unification of nation and self,
the you becomes Germany.
Although most my analysis deals with the 2005 television spot, the print branch of
the first campaign merits consideration as well. This branch consisted of print
advertisements featuring a variety of famous Germans from the past and present. These
ads appropriated the prestige of successful individuals such as Ferdinand Porsche and
Albert Einstein and bestowed it on the audience, promising that if they try hard enough,
they too can become as important as these figures. The mode of transference is through
the nation. Germany is the connection between the aspirant and the prominent person. It
is thereby implied that as the national culture cultivated past success, by your association
with it you too will be successful. However, in their choice of figures the campaign was
again caught up in a historical trap that opened it to critiques of callous opportunism. As
one critic pointed out, in his lifetime Albert Einstein was emphatically told, “Du bist
215

nicht Deutschland!” (you are not Germany) (Böss, 2009) Another critic pointed out that
the campaign proved Einstein right when he said, “If my theory of relativity is proven
successful, Germany will claim me as a German and France will declare that I am a
citizen of the world. Should my theory prove untrue, France will say that I am a German
and Germany will declare that I am a Jew.” The choice of Ferdinand Porsche similarly
inspired critique over the role Porsche played in the war effort during the Second World
War. The unsuccessful dehistoricization of historical figures in the print ads also made
them popular fodder for internet satirization and critique.
The television spot stayed on safer ground by largely maintaining a present and
future orientation. The opening shot, fading in from black, is of the sun peeking through
the foliage of the trees lining a field. The quality of the light and the misty air suggests
the sunrise. The sky deepens toward the edge of the frame to a clear blue. The camera
tracks to the left and the sound of birds chirping accompanies opening notes of Alan
Silvestri’s theme for the film Forrest Gump. In the choice of theme music, the campaign
evokes the values promoted in the American film, which—according to Lauren Berlant’s
reading—is “one of the most popular vehicles celebrating citizenship’s extraction from
public life…which uses spectacles of the nation in crisis to express a nostalgic desire for
official national culture” (1997, p. 180). Forrest is incapable of being corrupted by
national crisis because of his limited ability to conceptualize. Even being the namesake of
the founder of the Ku Klux Klan cannot besmirch his innocence. “He encounters history
without becoming historical” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 180). In this way, the connection
with the film expresses a desire to be liberated from personal association with history,
like Forrest. In its condemnation of the political movements of the 1960s, the film also
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mirrors the attacks by conservative Germans on the value of the debates forced upon the
public sphere by the protests of the postwar generation that famously turned a critical eye
to their parents’ activities under Nazi rule.
By moving from darkness to the dawn, the viewer is reborn in the opening shot.
The shot divorces what will follow from that which came before. As in Berlant’s allegory
of infantile citizenship, the nation is conflated with the natural. “The nation’s priceless
essence is located in what transcends the world of practical citizenship, with its history of
nationally sanctioned racial, sexual, and economic exploitation” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p.
40). Although Berlant is writing about the United States, the fact that her theories
correspond with many of the key points of the campaign reflects the desire to adopt forms
of privatized citizenship like those being promoted in the US. This form of citizenship is
built on the normalization of the national symbolic. In becoming normal, “hardly anyone
asks critical questions about its representativeness” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 36). Although
the symbolic body of the national flag was not yet “normal” enough to be utilized without
raising critical questions, the ad’s creators accessed the symbolic national body in the
form of nature.
The second shot reveals a beautiful older woman with flaxen hair standing with
her back to a tree and the sun illuminating her face. Like a loving grandmother, she
smiles into the camera ad she says, “you are the miracle of Germany.” As she pronounces
the final word, the camera pulls back to a medium long shot, emphasizing the move from
the particular to the general. Her statement refers to the unexpected 1954 World Cup
victory of the West German team, commonly known as “the miracle of Bern” (Das
Wunder von Bern). Here, the “miracle” also evokes Germany’s rapid postwar economic
217

recovery, commonly called the “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder). Immediately,
the audience is immersed the system of meaning of the sporting spectacle, and more
specifically, the meanings and sensations of victorious competition. The particular
victory referenced was also the spiritual rebirth of the nation from the ashes of the World
War II. The reference to this victory also prepares viewers to associate the campaign
slogan with the slogan “Wir sind Weltmeister” (we are world champions), which is the
chant that corresponds to the celebration of World Cup victory. This associate did not
escape notice in the press (see Corinth, 2005).
Germans would have made these connections with ease, especially with the debut
of the film “The Miracle of Bern” in 2003. The film tells the fictional story of a prisoner
of war returning to his family from internment in Siberia. It chronicles the difficult
reunion of the family shattered by war. Ultimately, the victory of the national team finally
succeeds in reuniting the estranged father and son. The allegory is brought full circle, as
it is the son’s special relationship with one of the national players that inspires the player
to score the winning goal in the final game. Thus, the “infantile citizen” delivers the
national victory that unites his family and his nation. By reframing the memory of the
war around the suffering of the postwar period and the intimate relationships intertwined
with the symbolic national victory, the traumatic past is contained and the present is freed
from its burdens.
After the ad’s symbolically laden first three shots, the next shot is a simple closeup of a woman resting her face on her right hand. The background is out of focus, but
appears to be a cobbled street which is again lit by the angled light of a bright morning
sun. Referencing a popular interpretation of the mathematical chaos theory, she informs
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us that “a butterfly can unleash a typhoon.” The next shot presents a young woman,
frame left, in a yellow shirt cradling a baby swaddled in blue. The swaddling reflects the
color of the sky. On the right side of the frame the Berlin TV tower stands tall. The
woman, who appears to be of East-Asian descent, looks up from her baby and continues
that “the gust produced by its wings may uproot trees kilometers away.” In the middle of
the pronouncement the shot cuts to a winged stage performer creating a translucent arch
with a bubble blown with a wand.
The next shot is a tracking shot from an extremely low angle that shows young
people peeling off and dropping yellow flyers from what is appears to be a balcony in an
official building. The man speaking is one of the protestors and as the shot moves to him,
a fragment of a protest sign becomes visible behind him. The next shot is from below
shooting directly upwards. The illuminated dome is visible above as fliers flutter down
toward the camera. The next shot is a long shot from a low angle in which the protestors
are visible on the balcony of the rotunda. It is now clear that the signs contain crossed out
swastikas. The anti-Nazi association of this scene is driven home by the shot of the
falling fliers, which mirrors almost exactly a shot from the 2005 film Sophie Scholl: The
Final Days, which chronicles the interrogation and execution of White Rose activists
Sophie and Hans Scholl when they were found guilty of high treason after being caught
distributing anti-war leaflets. Closer inspection reveals that the scene is shot in the atrium
of Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, the location of the Scholl siblings’
apprehension in real life and in the film. This scene associates the messages promoted by
the campaign with heroic activism and thereby positions the patriotism promoted in the
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campaign in opposition to past nationalisms. In fact, this scene suggests that it is through
a strong identification with the nation that nationalism is best resisted.
All of this has been presented in the first 17 seconds of the two-minute spot. In
total, the ad is composed of 66 shots, none of them longer than three seconds long, most
of them less than two. These shots feature 43 different speakers, over 30 of them
celebrities of differing calibers. The themes expressed in the campaign’s text—which
creators dubbed a “manifesto”—emphasize the power of the seemingly insignificant (the
individual citizen) and the obligation of the individual to the collective embodied in the
nation. Individuals are not positioned as important in themselves, but rather in their
relation to the national symbolic. “Why do you wave flags while [Michael] Schumacher
makes his rounds?” asks a man standing by the side of a pool as a swim team practices.
“You know the answer,” suggests a man emerging from between the grey pillars of
Berlin’s Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. “Unrealistic, you say? Then why do
you cheer on your team if your voice is so unimportant?” The many (individually
insignificant) all contribute to support the national symbolic, embodied in its most
successful members.
Another prominent theme is the need for self-sufficiency. In a reformulated
version of JFK’s famous speech, a male surgeon instructs the audience to “ask not what
others can do for you.” German national team member Gerald Asamoah picks up this
point, saying “You are the others. You are Germany.” To drive this point home, the ad
features people in humble positions, including a bathroom cleaning lady, sitting alone in
a bathroom with a plate for tips on a table beside her, or an impeccably dressed and
coiffed—yet presumably homeless—man selling copies of BISS, a street magazine
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designed to “help the homeless help themselves.”19 Two harbor workers in the familiar
overalls of manual laborers emphasize that “it doesn’t matter where you work, or what
position you hold. You keep the store running.” A waitress in a Japanese restaurant says
in accented German, “You are the store.” Tied up with these themes is an injunction
against criticizing or demanding anything from the government, as in the line “treat your
nation like a good friend. Don’t complain about him, offer him your help.” The alignment
of these values with those of neo-liberalism was not lost on critics (see for example
Jessen, 2005; Wulf, 2005).
Although the liberal economic philosophy of the “manifesto” was decoded and
soundly critiqued by a handful of journalists and commentators in the German public
sphere, the politics of its images and characters received less attention. In particular, what
is the connection with the demographic characteristics of the figures and the roles in
which they are cast? One fact stands out in this analysis: white men are the norm. The ad
carefully includes individuals representing other demographics—a fact that rarely
escaped explicit mention in the press. Ghanaian-born German national team member
Gerald Asamoah’s inclusion sparked particular interest. Other visible minorities include a
man with Down Syndrome, the waitress of East-Asian heritage, as well as R&B singer
Xavier Naido and Vietnamese-German television moderator and actress Minh-Khai

19

BISS—Bürger in sozialen Schwierigkeiten (Citizens in Social Difficulties)—is a Munich-based monthly
street magazine published by a non-profit group to offer homeless people a means to support themselves
through its sale. Different versions of this program can be found in major cities across Germany.
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Phan-Thi. Although commentators are right to celebrate the inclusion of disabled and
non-white individuals in the campaign’s construction of the German nation, it is not clear
that these representations challenge the expected roles of Germans of color, and
particularly those recognizable as Turkish- or Muslim Germans. Turkish-Germans are
represented by rapper Kool Savas, who is shown with his characteristically urban style
and distinctive style of German common among transnational urban youth. An interior
shot of a group of five dark-haired young men riding in a car and flashing hand-signals
also suggests a typical conception of “urban” Turkish or Arab young men.
The portrayal of gender in the campaign is even more starkly normative. Of the
41 adult speakers, only 13 of them are women. This disparity is masked by the
positioning of more women at the beginning and end of the advertisement. The ratio
among prominent figures portrayed is even worse, with three times more famous men
than women. Only four of the women are portrayed in the context of a non-domestic
profession. Two of those professions are bathroom attendant and waitress. Another,
fashion designer Gabriele Strehle, is accompanied in her studio by her industrialist
husband. Only champion cyclist Judith Arndt is portrayed actively participating in a nontraditional profession. Of the women not portrayed in active roles, three of them are
portrayed inside the home, while not even one of the men appears in a private setting.
The men, on the other hand, are portrayed in a wide variety of settings and professional
roles, from academic and symphony conductor to mechanic.
Finally, one of the most salient features of the campaign is the prominence of the
media itself. Twelve of the featured celebrities are either journalists or actors or both. In
the content and the structure of the campaign, media’s authority to represent the nation is
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repeatedly reinforced. The resonance of this impact was increased through the media
coverage of the campaign. A campaign press release cited a study showing that in its
five-month duration, the campaign had reached 98% of the population in Germany, with
every German over age 16 having been exposed on average 21 times. Despite lively
criticism on the web, 54% of respondents liked the campaign and 41% felt personally
invested in the topic (Diel, 2006). According to the same press release, the campaign was
mentioned in more than 2,500 press articles. As will be discussed in the remainder of this
chapter, this not only increased exposure for the campaign itself but also provided the
opportunity for campaign leadership to build narratives around the creation of the
campaign emphasizing the charitable intentions that drove it. Even the criticism of the
campaign by some journalists was spun by campaign leaders to prove that the power of
media institutions does not undermine the diversity of journalistic opinions and the free
press. DbD served to legitimate the media as the framer of national reality by reinforcing
the importance of media personalities. The juxtaposition of known and unknown persons
suggests that it is through the media—and the national symbolic as expressed in the
media—that unknown citizens become connected to the mythical national center.

Intimacy, Politics, and National Reproduction
Multiple “social marketing” campaigns that emerged in advance of the 2006
World Cup targeted ambitious goals of renewing Germany’s image and generating
excitement about Germany both domestically and abroad. DbD is distinguished by its
primary focus on abstract idea of “mood” (Stimmung). While the concurrent Land of
Ideas campaign also targeted sentiments of excitement and fun using enthusiasm for
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World Cup soccer, it was more pragmatically legible, promoting specific German
industries and knowledge sectors and encouraging specific actions like inviting
international investment (see figure 9). In contrast, the original DbD campaign addressed
abstract sentiments and values. Even the more specific second incarnation of the
campaign in 2007, which focused on encouraging “child-friendliness,” maintained a
carefully broad message, skirting clear exhortations while promoting the adoption of a
generalized public disposition. In the second campaign “you” refers to children, and the
narrator speaks as a parent. The audience watches the children on screen from the
position of parents while the soothing female voice claims that “there is no bad time to
have you.”iii The creators’ statements to the press show that Du bist Deutschland is not
only a project to evoke emotional reactions in audiences; it is a much more ambitious
project to cultivate a system of values prioritizing a neoliberal politics of private
responsibility and biopolitical values of production and reproduction.

Figure 7: After over a year of negative press coverage of internal disputes and flagging support, the Land
of Ideas campaign had its first major public success with internationally-placed ads that invited (male)
investors to couple with Germany as embodied by supermodel, Claudia Schiffer, promising full satisfaction
including “breakfast in the morning.”

This final section draws on the text and images of the 2005 and 2007 DbD
campaigns along with media coverage of their creators to identify three overlapping
aspects of this political project. First, the campaigns promote an intimate and affective
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form of citizenship that prioritizes the cultivation of an optimistic predisposition and casts
it as the precursor to economic well-being. The definition and function of affect is a
matter of significant discussion among theorists. One point of tension is its distinction
from and relationship to emotion. Both affect and emotion related to aspects of feeling.
Lawrence Grossberg proposes that "emotion is the articulation of affect and ideology"
(2010, p. 316). Affect can be understood as feeling before its articulation in a particular
instance, as the feelings and associations that circulate in public and "stick" - in Sara
Ahmed's words - to reproduce the associations between "ideas, values, and objects"
(2010, p. 29). As with the concept of Heimat discussed in Chapter 1, affect is both a
public form of feeling and the basis of apparently intimate lives, giving "circuits and
flows the forms of a life" (Stewart, 2007, p. 2). In this case, I connect the emotions
expressed in this case to the affective politics of the economic vision of life they support.
Instead of seeing happiness as resulting from material security, the first DbD
campaign proposes that a positive attitude is the necessary precursor to economic growth.
The second DbD campaign in 2007 ties happiness to literal—not just symbolic or
economic—reproduction. This affective orientation also extends to politics and the
relation to the nation. The next and closely related aspect of this project is a new framing
of the responsibility of individuals to the nation. Instead of viewing the nation-state as
responsible for creating the conditions enabling citizens to be productive, this framing
removes the state and makes the individual responsible for creating the nation with their
productive action and positive disposition. Once this relationship was established in the
first campaign, the second DbD campaign’s apparent leap to encouraging literal
reproduction as a national project is revealed instead to be a seamless continuation.
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Finally, DbD campaign proposes a new identitarian schema for Germany that deemphasizes ethnic and cultural forms of identification in favor of citizenship based on
individual, private (re)productivity. This is accomplished through a narrative of a colorblind and classless society, in which the self-conscious placement of a handful of visible
minorities among normative citizens smoothes over economic and racial inequalities.
DbD promotes an explicitly nationalist framework, but does so—and perhaps is only able
to do so—by altering the vision of the nation, moving away from the explicitly culturalist
and genealogical definitions of the German people. Instead, it offers a new cosmopolitan
meritocracy that fiercely promotes the nation even as it alters the qualifications for
national citizenship. This alteration is, in one sense, a broadening in that it offers equality
to all regardless of race or class. However, as observers of American fantasies of
meritocracy well know, by privatizing risk this apparent opening also introduces new
forms of precarious citizenship.
These campaigns may be best understood through comparison with another
national context: the cultural politics of right-wing America. Although the social or
“coordinated market economy” of postwar Germany and the liberal anarcho-capitalism of
the United States are often considered as oppositional varieties of capitalism (Crouch &
Streeck, 1997; Menz, 2010), their theoretical origins are actually the same. Foucault
argues that the foundation of this form of government or governmentality is the idea that
the only acceptable form of social policy is economic growth. In order to achieve this
growth, government must intervene to create the conditions for optimal functioning of the
market, so that competitive mechanisms can play their proper regulatory role in all areas
of life (Foucault, 2008, p. 144). They key difference between the German “social market
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economy” and American neoliberalism is the belief among German theorists that the
market mechanisms are so fragile that they must be carefully managed by a socially
interventionist policy (Foucault, 2008, p. 323). In this sense, the “enterprise society
imagined by [German] ordoliberals is… a society for the market and a society against the
market” (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). The American version eliminates this ambiguity,
generalizing the economic form of the market “throughout the social body and including
the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary
exchanges" (Foucault, 2008, p. 243). However, the Du bist Deutschland campaign and
the concurrent economic reforms passed by the German government suggest an erosion
of this ambivalent stance in favor of a purer commitment to the generalization of market
mechanisms, proposing a fundamental change in the role of the state in mediating
between markets and the population. This shift is also accompanied by a more expansive
role for industry in social affairs. In responding to the question of what constitutes the
campaign’s deeper message, advertising executive and DbD creator Fischer-Appelt
summarized it as an affirmation “that the industry is ready to take over responsibility for
this country”iv (Ax, 2005). In place of state support, industry aspires to assume social
responsibility by propagating the personal embrace of market rationalities.
Lauren Berlant’s (1997, 2011) work on American cultural politics demonstrates
the consequences of this generalization of market rationality, which reached new levels
through what she calls the “Reagan revolution” beginning in the 1980s. Central to this
process is the simultaneous expansion of the nation idea and contraction of the idea of the
state. The state’s role is to support the generalization of market logics rather than to
provide public services. In this increasingly “intimate” public sphere, private values and
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practices are the basis of citizenship. Here, citizenship practice is, above all, oriented
towards or emerging from the family sphere. “No longer valuing personhood as
something directed toward public life, contemporary nationalist ideology recognizes a
public good only in a particularly constricted nation of simultaneously lived private
worlds” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 5). In this privatized, intimate national sphere, the
“public” in the traditional modernist sense of deliberative democracy ceases to be the
central ideal of the body politic. Central aspects of this public life, from the protests of
social movements—at least those not concerned with family politics—to the professional
practice of politicians have “been made to seem ridiculous and even dangerous to the
nation” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 5). Instead of looking to the public sphere to formulate
political solutions to problems, responsibility is placed on the individual and risk is
shifted to the personal sphere.
Berlant’s concept of intimate publics is complex and varied. Introducing a
discussion with Berlant, Jay Prosser proposed that intimate publics “are both the
strangers formed into communities by affective ties; and the assumptions of shared
emotions and worldviews that precede, create, and then often render anxious and
ambivalent such publics” (L. Berlant & Prosser, 2011, p. 180). Intimate publics can
function at the small scale of specialized communities of interest on the internet or at the
large scale of national or transnational communities. They are both actual people bound
by shared experiences or concerns and assemblages of norms that organize, mobilize, and
interpret collective sentiments. What makes them so effective is their ability to connect
with people through a sense of “authenticity.” Their relationship to politics is also
complex. In the same discussion, Berlant clarifies that
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Intimate publics usually flourish to one side of politics, referring to historical
subordinations without mobilizing a fundamental activism with respect to them
….in times of crisis, though, such as the present, their relation can become newly
fraught and dynamic. Political publics in struggle often take on the logics of
intimate ones, deploying sentimental models of affective recognition to establish
political grounds for imagining survival according to their own interest. Indeed,
they often try to co-opt or affiliate with existing intimate publics, for good or ill,
as when they claim that their own politics is really about realizing a world for
affective community, and not about power as such. (2011, p. 184)
This is the function of intimate publics that most clearly applies to the campaigns
analyzed in this chapter. As with the dramatic appearance of the intimate public that
Berlant observes at the heart of the new conservatism of the late twentieth century, the
campaigns of the coalition of German industries and politicians in the Partners for
Innovation and the Land of Ideas initiatives address the nation as an affective community
to support specific political and economic agendas. While the American form focused
primarily on social conservatism and rigid norms of reproductive bodies, the German
version focuses less on regulating the particulars of sex—although it is at least as
concerned with reproduction, as is abundantly clear in the second DbD campaign and the
Sarrazin debate (see Chapter 6). The German form concentrates more on economic
liberalism and personal responsibility for creating what Berlant calls “the good life”
(2011). In both contexts, the abstract sentimental nation takes center stage. The first DbD
campaign centers on deploying sentimental images and ideas to create the idea of a better
life through affective national bonds.

Affective Economy
“You are Germany. So how about you celebrate yourself again?”v—Du bist
Deutschland Manifesto
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The most important motivation cited by campaign creators in the press was the
desire to change and brighten the national “mood” (Stimmung). From the first discussions
at Chancellor Schröder’s “Innovation Conference” in January 2004, a link emerged
between the “right” disposition and the continuation of the good life in Germany.
Schröder criticized cautious and conservative approaches in German business and
research and exhorted the assembled industrial, political, and academic elite to “speak
first about opportunities and only then about risks” (“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004, “Schröder
zu Innovation,” 2004). The chancellor framed this as an existential matter for the nation,
arguing that Germany’s prosperity depends on its ability to outcompete its rivals in global
markets. To do so, Schröder emphasized again the importance of attitude: “The goal is to
strengthen renewal in Germany, to deconstruct barriers and to awaken new confidence in
the productive capacity of this country”vi (“Schröder zu Innovation,” 2004). Besides
committing the government to increasing funding for research universities, the
Innovation Conference had few clear goals beyond uniting important national players to
clarify shared interests and underscore the need for attitudinal change. As was outlined at
the start of this chapter, this meeting lead to the foundation of the Partners for Innovation
who went on to create the DbD campaign. As the story was narrated in the press, leaders
of one of the world’s top media conglomerates, Bertelsmann, were inspired to attack the
disordered national affect that had developed from the economic malaise:
Germany in autumn. Gray skies, veil of mist, bad humor. Many people have
resigned themselves to unemployment, bankrupt companies, lost prosperity. As
trees lose their leaves in the autumn, they lose their courage, cast off
responsibility. In Germany in autumn 2004, Bertelsmann CEO Gunther Thielen
and his friend Bernd Bauer refused to come to terms with it. Optimism and
responsibility were needed, not self-pity. Everyone should know this. The idea: 82
million people identify again with Germany.vii (Moring, 2005)
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In this narrative, the campaign came from the spontaneous inspiration of titans of
industry who had become frustrated with the passivity of the economically depressed
population. The use of the seasonal metaphor sets up a curious relationship between the
economy and individuals. Changing seasons usually indicate that which is outside of
individual control or social influence. The dropping of leaves in autumn is not something
that a tree could be expected to change or take responsibility for. However, even this
extreme example of a situation governed by inexorable structure does not justify
complaint or the abdication of individual responsibility. The prospect of economic winter
demands “optimism and responsibility, not self-pity.” Yet, it is telling that the metaphor
for the economy is a force of nature. The message is not that people should mobilize to
find political solutions to change economic conditions. It would be foolish to try to
prevent seasons from changing. To weather harsh economic conditions, individuals must
muster their own reserves and take care of themselves. The source of affective fortitude,
stated as if it were self-evident, is the collective identification with the nation.
The primary target of the DbD campaign, in both its 2005 and 2007 iterations,
was to alter the sentimental climate of Germany. One of the most common words to
appear in the corpus of stakeholder-focused articles is Stimmung, which translates to
collective mood, sentiment, or morale. In the press corpus for this chapter, coded
segments related to emotions outnumbered all other themes. More specifically, campaign
creators claim that Germany’s most pressing problem is a collective bad attitude:
The aspirations with which organizers have set out are not exactly modest: they
want to fight whiners, defeatists, and self-doubters. No longer should every other
German have to report that he is afraid of the future. “We want to reach an
awakening in Germany” says campaign leader, Bernd Bauer.viii (A. Kaiser, 2005)
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This framing of Germany’s problems as primarily attitudinal goes back at least as far as
the first campaign proposed by Chancellor Schröder, FC Deutschland, which became the
Land of Ideas. This early campaign was described in a Spiegel article from 2004:
Enough with despondency, self-doubt, and fear of the future, so speaks a
melodious voice to the audience. We can do it. We are somebody. We are, above
all, a great community, capable of getting fired up.ix (Hammerstein et al., 2004, p.
23)
The authors of this article observe that this kind of emotional politics represents a stark
departure from the traditional position of the Social Democratic Party:
Officially, it is about a brightened mood in the country organized by the modern
advertising industry. Schröder wants to impart a new we-feeling to Germans
tormented by fear of social decline. Highly emotional PR has thus arrived among
those who had always fought against such efforts to smooth over reality. They
once wanted to be “the voices of critique” or even to organize a “counter public;”
they no longer recoil from targeted mass influence.x (Hammerstein et al., 2004, p.
22)
These campaign ideas indicate the rightward shift of the center-left Social Democrats,
moving from an agonistic politics of deliberation to an emotional, intimate politics more
commonly associated with the political right. Although FC Deutschland never took off in
the specific form proposed in 2004, the political and economic rationality of the Schröder
government was readily adopted in the media industry’s DbD campaign. In a reversal of
the philosophy of the German social market economy, here the emotional life of the
population is not to be supported by the markets guaranteed by the state, instead the
markets are to be supported by the appropriately buoyant emotions of the population. The
people must be optimistic, because it is what the market/nation requires.

The Productive Citizen
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The purpose of cultivating a positive disposition is to improve the individual
potential for productivity and to stimulate “courage” to take personal responsibility for
the prosperity of the nation. You are Germany when you have a positive attitude and you
use your energies for entrepreneurial and productive purposes. In interviews and press
statements, campaign creators emphasize the goal of catalyzing individual action,
framing passivity as a core contributor to German economic problems:
“That is the goal: to finally drag Germans out of a standstill, to give the starting
shot so that they want to get moving,” says [campaign] initiator Bernd Bauer. xi
(Moring, 2005)
The [campaign] initiators hope that many citizens become active. “Do
something,” they want to call out: “Make something, you can do it” xii (“Wir in
Deutschland,” 2005).
The [slogan] fits, because we want to tell people: it depends on you, what happens
in Germany. It has to do with you! … We wanted to seize people. So that every
person does what they can. That is why we have the passage: “Germany has
enough hands, to reach out to each other and grab hold. We are 82 million.”xiii
(Oliver Voss quoted in A. Kaiser, 2005)
This national inertia is framed as a result the failure of personal responsibility or, framed
euphemistically, the failure to believe in oneself. As advertising executive Holger Jung
stated in an interview,
We concentrated on a characteristic tendency that is currently obvious in this
country: to push the responsibility for all the problems of this world away from
oneself and to say, “It’s not my fault, it is theirs.” The intelligentsia finds this
[formulation] too simple for a problem that is certainly very complexly
interwoven. But a campaign can’t solve that; it has to concentrate on a key
problem that lies with every individual.xiv (Grimberg, 2006)
Jung’s statement acknowledges the complexity of social and economic problems, but
absolves his branch from the responsibility to do justice to this complexity, citing the
inherent limitations of the format of advertising. It is portrayed simply as a matter of
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expedience that they have chosen to focus on individual responsibility and to ignore
complex, structural causes.
The creators acknowledge, however, that it would not be effective to show a
completely positive picture. They make a concession to reality by admitting the difficulty
of the task they propose, as in the 2005 DbD “manifesto” with the line “our time does not
taste like cotton candy. No one wants to claim that it does. It may be that you have your
back to the wall….Yet once we tore a wall down together”xv (“Das Manifest: ‘Du bist
Deutschland’ im Wortlaut,” 2005). By including low-wage workers and even a
presumably homeless—albeit well-dressed—man, campaign creators lend plausibility to
their claim to represent a reasonable assessment of the contemporary situation in
Germany. As the creator of the campaign slogan, Oliver Voss, puts it, “if we had just
shown happy people, that would have been a lie. Through the direct address, in which we
pointed a finger out through the television, people are almost forced to react” xvi (A.
Kaiser, 2005). But the purpose of this concession is not to focus attention on
understanding the problems themselves, but to acknowledge them so that they can be put
aside to make way for the call to action.
The statements of campaign creators underscore a contradictory stance towards
politics, conflating productive activity with civic or political action. When confronted
with the question of what authorizes industry to take on “such a massive political
initiative” (Ax, 2005), Michael Trautmann, one of the advertising executives engaged in
the campaign, affirmed first the formal right of any interested party to engage in building
political will and shaping public opinion. At the same time, Trautmann emphatically
denied that the campaign has any political content:
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This advertisement is not propaganda….it does not aim to convince anyone of a
political opinion. It only aims to remind every citizen of his responsibility and to
push him to take part in the political debate. There can be no doubt that this goal
is legitimate.xvii (Ax, 2005)
This statement is a poor fit with the content of the campaign, which directly discourages
critical politics through its exhortation to “treat your nation like a friend,” and to stop
complaining and take responsibility for yourself. In the campaign, responsibility does not
refer to political engagement, unless all productive activity is equated with civic or
political engagement. Trautmann’s denial of a political agenda cloaks the campaign’s
promotion of a politics of the apolitical, a politics of personal productivity and collective
identification with the nation. This statement is even more disingenuous when paired
with the acknowledgement by campaign co-founder Bernd Bauer, quoted above, that the
motivation for the campaign was to extend support for economic reform policies beyond
the political elite to the general population (Moring, 2005). As one cultural critic writing
in the typically reform- and campaign-friendly Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
summarized,
Economic problems appear in this perspective as psychosomatic suffering,
unemployment is seen as a consequence of a nationwide depression and no longer
as the result of decisions that have created particular structural conditions.
Because they have apparently given up on believing in the ability to change them,
they logically seize on a rhetoric of revitalization, which reduces the nebulous
realm of struggle to the question of solely personal commitments: “You are
Germany. Your will is like fire under your behind. You hold the store together.
You are the store. You are Germany.”xviii (Reents, 2006)
In short, the campaign seeks to reshape the field of public engagement, locating it in the
terrain of the “intimate public” and foreclosing a systemic or structural approach to
solving political problems.
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The biopolitical logics of productivity underlying these qualifications for fully
“being Germany,” which is to say, for being a full citizen took on an even stronger role in
the second part of the DbD campaign that debuted in 2007. The second iteration
replicated the format of the first and boasted an even bigger budget, saturating Germany’s
media-sphere. In the first campaign the addressee is the potentially productive person
who is exhorted to be Germany by taking productive action, through some form of labor
or philanthropy. The speaker is the national collectivity embodied in celebrities and
media personalities and unknown Germans including visible minorities. In the second
iteration, the addressee is a child—all children—and the speaker is the parent figure. The
ad reflects long-standing anxieties about Germany’s aging and insufficiently fertile
population (T. Kaiser, 2007). In interviews, campaign creators frame Germany’s
demographic decline—its failure to achieve optimal reproduction—once again as an
affective problem. They seek to create an atmosphere of child-friendliness, which they
carefully distinguish from directly arguing that people have more children (Iken &
Gerlach, 2008). Again, the ad’s “manifesto” addresses the difficult and unpleasant parts
of parenting, providing dramatic tension that is overcome by the full wash of emotions,
love and purpose that children represent. “You make us crazy” the warm female voice
says, pausing before adding, “with happiness.” The adult, in reproducing, has reproduced
the nation in its ideal, infantile form, still unsullied by history and existing as pure
potentiality.

Integration and the Equal Inequality of Neoliberal Citizenship
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For DbD, full German citizens must be productive, optimistic, and independent in
the face of adversity. One requirement that the campaign sets aside, however, had until
recently been a formal requirement under the law: decent from German parents. Among
the dozens of children pictured in the second DbD television advertisement, a handful of
non-white children appear. While white children clearly represent the norm, as in the first
iteration, this version consciously includes children of color as well as several children
with Down Syndrome to show that the nation it invokes is not defined in the ethnic
primordialist sense.
The campaign creators position themselves against old ways of defining
Germanness. In fact, when a historical photograph surfaced showing the slogan “Denn
Du bist Deutschland” (Because you are Germany) on a large banner at a Nazi
demonstration in the mid-1930s, campaign leaders dismissed any connection between the
campaign and past nationalism as absurd. According to ad executive Holger Jung, the
revelation of the photo caused a serious internal discussion among the creators, but when
they determined that it was a call to join a local event, and was “in no way a Nazi slogan
at the level of Arbeit macht frei,20 or the like, [they] were relieved” (Grimberg, 2006).
When historians confirmed the insignificance of the slogan for National Socialist
messaging, they felt they could “move forward with the slogan in good conscience.” xix
Jung then pointed to the content of the campaign as clear evidence disproving nationalist

“Work sets you free.” This slogan was famously displayed over the entrance to Auschwitz and other Nazi
concentration camps.
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goals: “Just look at the campaign and the advertisement: the very last thing that we want
is to slip off into a nationalist direction. That would be practically exactly the opposite of
the campaign”xx (Grimberg, 2006). Holger’s statement here, and the relative ease with
which campaign creators and historians (see for example Meyer-Gatermann, 2005)
dismissed any meaningful parallel in the historical example, reveal a very narrow
conception of nationalism. Nationalism is never defined but is understood to be negative,
chauvinistic, and archaic. Cultivating a “national feeling” or an identification with the
nation is frequently cited by the media and creators as a principal goal of the campaign,
yet this is somehow unquestionably distinct from, or even contrary to, nationalism.
The supposedly stark distinction between the desired national feeling and
identification and chauvinist nationalism is so self-evident that they do not elaborate on
it. Holger’s statement implies that one only need look at the campaign’s inclusion of
visible minorities to see the inclusiveness of the campaign’s vision of Germany. What
this narrow conception of nationalism fails to consider, however, is that nationalism’s
categories of belonging may change, but it always fundamentally involves decisions
about who qualifies as a member and who does not. The parallel in the slogans old and
new is defined not by the specific qualifications it makes, but rather by the fact that it
serves as a system of qualification. Furthermore, nationalist systems of affiliation
function at multiple levels, from formal juridical qualifications to cultural, moral and
substantive forms. The value of this parallel then, is not to show that DbD shares
National Socialism’s brand of exclusion, but rather to draw attention to the importance of
interrogating every nationalist discursive framework to understand its logics of inclusion
and exclusion.
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While DbD includes visible minorities within its schema of Germanness, it does
so alongside new qualifications, namely, that all may “be Germany” who 1) embrace a
positive disposition towards growth and reproduction, 2) do not complain or protest, and
3) who contribute to national prosperity. The fairness of these dictates is built on the
presumption of equality—of equal opportunity in a fair and unbiased system. The
campaign accepts the existence of economic inequality by featuring menial workers and a
newspaper-selling homeless person along with Germany’s wealthy industrialists and
celebrities. It argues that these differences do not matter, because, as Michael Trautmann
put it, “anyone who does something is a role model, like Einstein or Ludwig Erhard”xxi
(Moring, 2005). Trautmann erases the differences between Germany’s most famous and
successful citizens and its humblest by elevating productive action to the status of moral
virtue. The campaign’s choice of Ludwig Erhard is particularly meaningful (see figure
10). Erhard served as the first Minister of Economics after the war and is widely credited
for West Germany’s postwar economic boom, known as the Wirtschaftswunder
(economic miracle). As Foucault observes, he was also instrumental in establishing
economic freedom and prosperity as a basis of the legitimacy of the new Federal
Republic of Germany, which had lost its legitimacy through the Nazi defeat and foreign
occupation. Erhard helped establish a framework in which “economic development and
economic growth produces sovereignty….the economy produces legitimacy for the state
that is its guarantor” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84). The state guarantees free economic activity
and,
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Figure 8: This 2005 print advertisement depicting a woman with an unusually large cabbage refers to
former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard who was one of the principle architects of postwar economic policy, and
is widely credited for Germany’s “Economic Miracle.” The text reads in part, “Do you believe that a
miracle is the result of hard work? Then you have something in common with Ludwig Erhard…. You too
can work for your miracle. You decide whether you reach your goal. Not fate.” xxii

consequently, those who participate in that activity legitimate the state through their
participation. This
Produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as agents within
these economic processes, as investors, workers, employers, and trade unions. All
these economic partners produce a consensus, which is a political consensus,
inasmuch as they accept this economic game of freedom. (Foucault, 2008, p. 84)
This economic philosophy that legitimizes the state is easily extended to legitimize the
citizenship of minorities who appear as agents within economic processes. All those who
participate in economic activity contribute to the legitimate sovereignty of the state. As
Chapter 6 shows, however, this act of inclusion does not inhibit racialized forms of
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exclusion. In fact, when some groups are conceived as congenitally deficient economic
actors, it becomes very easy to condemn the group while denying racism with the claim
that any economically contributing individual, regardless of race, is a valid citizen.
Furthermore, the focus on the relatively high rates of reproduction among minority
groups defined as undesirable shows that not all children or “child-friendly” communities
“are Germany.” Instead, they may be defined as the source of Germany’s eminent
demise.

Conclusion
The social marketing campaigns inspired by hosting the 2006 World Cup
attempted to create consensus around increasingly neoliberal economic and political
policies. To do so, they mobilized an intimate version of the public, which is tied together
as an affective community through affiliation with an abstract, imagined Nation.
Although the direct appeal to mass emotion used in this campaign was a significant
departure from postwar political communication in West Germany, the idea of economic
activity as a force constituting national legitimacy, as “a circuit going from the economic
institution to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84) goes back to the foundation of the Federal
Republic. In Ludwig Erhard’s deceptively simple words, “only a state that establishes
both the freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately speak in the name of
the people” (quoted in Foucault, 2008, p. 81). As Foucault shows, freedom here refers
primarily to economic freedom, to the ability to act as an agent in economic processes.
Responsibility refers to the state’s obligation to create the proper conditions for market
rationalities, or incentives, to function. In this way, the discourse of DbD is connected to
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a well-established German political economy. At the same time, its expansion into
intimate and affective realms and the reduction of the role of the state signals a move
toward more all-encompassing forms of neoliberalism. As the state’s direct social role is
diminished, the idea of the nation moves to the fore.
DbD also marks an important change in the place of visible minorities in the
German identitarian schema. Their inclusion can be seen in pragmatic terms as a means
of diffusing critiques that the campaign represents a “bad” kind of nationalism. Yet, this
move also signals something more profound. It signals the introduction of colorblind
norms of citizenship that propose to unite the population under a moral framework of
economic “freedom and responsibility.” This is a fundamental aspect of integration
discourse, which holds that the path to full citizenship is equally available to all who
formally qualify. The advertisement proposes that in today’s Germany, all who follow
this moral framework belong to the nation. Those who fail, do so of their own choosing.
However, as we will see in the final three chapters, the question of visible minorities’
qualifications is never fully settled. Instead, integration discourse holds integrant
candidates in a separate space of evaluation, where they may be celebrated as a success
and a credit to the nation or classified as threatening to its continued existence. The next
chapter examines the case of an immigrant family whose defense of an oversized German
flag against anti-nationalist attacks during the 2010 World Cup attracted the attention of
the media and the praise of experts and politicians. As in the DbD campaign, the
patriotism of these “new Germans” serves as a pedagogical example for normative
Germans, authorizing and even demanding the generalized practice of public patriotism.
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i

Das Problem bei dem Projekt war, daß wir zwar die Meinungsführer erreicht haben… Wir hatten aber das
Gefühl: Jetzt ist die Zeit, alle Deutschen anzusprechen. Sie zu animieren, von sich selbst wieder
überrascht zu sein.

Hier soll wohl „Du bist Deutschland“ Abhilfe schaffen—„Ein löbliches Unterfangen“, meint Anholt,
„das, da bin ich sicher, absolut nichts bewirken wird.“
iii
Du zeigst uns, dass es nie den falschen, sondern eigentlich nur den richtigen Zeitpunkt gibt dich zu
bekommen.
iv
Daß die Wirtschaft bereit ist, gesellschaftliche Verantwortung für dieses Land zu übernehmen"
v
Du bist Deutschland. Also, wie wäre es wenn du dich mal wieder selbst anfeuerst?
vi
Ziel ist es, die Erneuerung in Deutschland zu stärken, Hemmnisse abzubauen und neues Vertrauen in die
Leistungsfähigkeit des Landes zu wecken.
vii
Deutschland im Herbst. Grauer Himmel, Nebelschleier, schlechte Stimmung. Viele Menschen haben sich
längst abgefunden mit Arbeitslosigkeit, Unternehmenspleiten, Wohlstandsverlusten. Wie die Bäume im
Herbst die Blätter verlieren sie den Mut, werfen die Verantwortung ab. In Deutschland im Herbst 2004
wollten sich Bertelsmann- Vorstandschef Gunther Thielen und sein Freund Bernd Bauer damit nicht
abfinden
viii
Der Anspruch, mit dem die Organisatoren daherkommen, ist nicht gerade bescheiden: Sie wollen gegen
Nörgler, Schlechtredner und Selbstzweifler angehen. Nicht mehr lange soll jeder zweite Deutsche
bekunden müssen, er habe Angst vor der Zukunft. „Wir wollen einen Aufbruch in Deutschland erreichen“,
sagt der Leiter der Kampagne, Bernd Bauer.
ix
Schluss mit Verzagtheit, Selbstzweifel und Zukunftsangst, so spricht da eine wohlklingende Stimme auf
den Zuhörer ein. Wir können was. Wir sind wer. Wir sind vor allem eine große Gemeinschaft, die sich zu
begeistern vermag.
x
Offiziell geht es um eine mit den Methoden moderner Werbewirtschaft organisierte Stimmungsaufhellung
im Lande. Den von Abstiegsängsten gepeinigten Deutschen will Schröder ein neues Wir-Gefühl
vermitteln. Die hoch emotionale PR ist damit auch bei denen angekommen, die derartige
Realitätsglättungen stets bekämpft haben. Wollten sie einst "die Stimme der Kritik" sein oder gar
"Gegenöffentlichkeit" organisieren, schrecken sie nun vor gezielter Massenbeeinflussung nicht mehr
zurück.
xi
"Das ist das Ziel: Die Deutschen endlich aus dem Stillstand zu holen, den Startschuß zu geben, damit sie
sich bewegen wollen", sagt Initiator Bernd Bauer.
xii
Die Initiatoren hoffen, daß so viele Bürger aktiv werden. „Tu was“, wollen sie ihnen zurufen: „Mach
was, Du kannst das“.
xiii
Der Satz paßt, weil wir den Leuten damit sagen: Es hängt an Dir, was in Deutschland passiert. Es geht
um Dich! … Wir wollten die Leute packen. Damit jeder tut, was er kann. Deshalb die Passage:
"Deutschland hat genug Hände, um sie einander zu reichen und anzupacken. Wir sind 82 Millionen."
xiv
Worauf wir uns konzentriert haben, ist eine Eigenart, die hierzulande derzeit ganz offensichtlich ist: Bei
allen Problemen dieser Welt die Verantwortung von sich wegzuschieben und zu sagen: "Ich bin nicht
schuld, das sind ja die anderen." Das findet die Intelligenzija dann zu eindimensional für ein Problem, das
sicherlich hochkomplex verstrickt ist. Aber das kann eine Kampagne nicht lösen, sie muss sich auf ein
Schlüsselproblem konzentrieren, das bei jedem Einzelnen liegt.
xv
Unsere Zeit schmeckt nicht nach Zuckerwatte. Das will auch niemand behaupten. Mag sein, du stehst mit
dem Rücken zur Wand, oder dem Gesicht vor einer Mauer. Doch einmal haben wir schon gemeinsam eine
Mauer niedergerissen.
ii
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xvi

Wenn wir nur glückliche Leute gezeigt hätten, wäre das doch verlogen gewesen. Durch die direkte
Ansprache, indem ein Finger aus dem Fernseher hinauszeigt, ist man zum Reagieren geradezu
gezwungen.
xvii
Diese Werbung ist ja keine Propaganda.… Sie will niemanden von einer bestimmten politischen
Meinung überzeugen. Sie will nur jeden Bürger an seine Verantwortung erinnern und ihn anregen, sich an
der politischen Debatte zu beteiligen. Es kann keinen Zweifel daran geben, daß diese Absicht legitim ist
xviii
Ökonomische Probleme erscheinen in dieser Perspektive als psychosomatisches Leiden,
Arbeitslosigkeit wird als Folge einer landesweiten Depression betrachtet und nicht mehr als Ergebnis
bestimmter, sich aus Entscheidungen ergebender Rahmenbedingungen. Weil man es offenbar aufgegeben
hat, an deren Veränderbarkeit zu glauben, greift man, höchst konsequent, zu einer Erweckungsrhetorik,
welche die vage im Raum stehenden Schwierigkeiten auf die Frage ganz persönlichen Engagements
reduziert: „Du bist Deutschland. Dein Wille ist wie Feuer unterm Hintern. Du hältst den Laden
zusammen. Du bist der Laden. Du bist Deutschland. “
xix
Als wir dann herausbekamen, dass es sich lediglich um einen lokalen Aufruf für einen kleinen lokalen
Aufmarsch in Ludwigshafen handelte und keineswegs um einen Nazi-Slogan auf dem Level "Arbeit
macht frei" oder Ähnliches, waren wir erleichtert. Zumal uns das Historiker bestätigt haben. Da konnten
wir guten Gewissens mit dem Slogan weitermachen.
xx
Denn sehen Sie sich die Kampagne und den Spot an: Das Allerletzte, was wir wollen, ist, in eine
nationalistische Richtung abzugleiten. Das wäre praktisch genau das Gegenteil der Kampagne.
xxi
Denn jeder, der etwas tut, ist ein Vorbild, wie Einstein oder Ludwig Erhard.
xxii
Du glaubst, dass ein Wunder das Ergebnis harter Arbeit ist? Dann hast du etwas mit Ludwig Erhard
gemeinsam…. Auch du kannst dir dein Wunder erarbeiten. Ob du dein Ziel erreichst, entscheidest du.
Nicht das Schicksal.
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CHAPTER 5 – IMMIGRANT PATRIOTISM: TEACHING GERMANS TO
CHEER

After the 2006 FIFA men’s World Cup hosted by Germany re-established the
practice of public celebrations of national affiliation there, flag-waving became an almost
obligatory national sports tradition in the 2008 Euro Cup and again in the 2010 World
Cup. As commentators in the media enthused, the multi-ethnic German national team of
the 2010 World Cup inspired minority Germans and immigrants to join in the patriotic
displays in greater numbers. Even second and third generation migrants who inhabit the
physical space of the German nation have only recently been allowed to lay claim to the
metaphysical, abstract space of national citizenship. In this context, performances of
patriotism including the marking of physical space controlled by immigrants with
German national symbols can serve as a challenge to exclusionary ethnic ideas of
national identity. At the same time, the promotion of civic forms of national identification
as a challenge to ethnic nationalism reinforces the legitimacy of the nation-state as the
paramount form of social identification. In Germany, ethnic norms of citizenship
continue to operate alongside new conceptions of citizenship that emphasize liberal
democratic norms of economic and social citizenship; these norms of equality, human
rights, and freedom are framed as universal in their validity, but also endemic to
Germany and “the West” (see Introduction and Chapter 2). Thus, while to be German
without qualification still depends on apparent German descent, affective civic nationalist
performances have emerged as a new route for visible minorities to claim citizenship as a
“new German.” By moving between the arguments and rhetorical frames within the
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media coverage and the political and social contexts they are in conversation with, this
chapter aims to untangle these tensions as well as the political strategies and stakes of
immigrant patriotism in Germany.
To understand these dynamics, this chapter examines the media spectacle
generated by a flag fight between German flag hoisting immigrants and left-wing antinationalists in the Berlin neighborhood of Neukölln during the 2010 World Cup. As
Youssef Bassal, a protagonist of the flag fight, argued, “we belong here, no matter if the
leftists or extreme right does not like us. In the end we're even going to teach the
Germans how to cheer for Germany again” (Grieshaber, 2010). In this conception,
marking space in an immigrant neighborhood with the national flag of the adopted nation
allows non-ethnic Germans to claim full access to both abstract and physical national
space through civic national displays. In exchange for the right to identify with the
national core, immigrants provide a model of “infantile citizenship” (L. G. Berlant,
1997). Unsullied by associations with nationalist crimes of the past, immigrant patriotism
authorizes and invites ethnic Germans to participate in quotidian forms of nationalist
expression. The harmless depictions of the Bassals and their neighbors celebrating in
over-the-top costumes bearing the national colors infantilizes the immigrant patriots and
attests to the benign nature of symbolic celebration (figure 11). At the same time, it
serves as a pedagogical performance aimed at teaching the diverse constituencies of the
German nation-state how to practice civic nationalism.
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Figure 9: Ibrahim Bassal poses with his German flags and novelty items. (Anker, 2010a)

The coverage of the case examined here demonstrates how global sporting
spectacles provide an apparently apolitical space of mediated national self-reflection.
These popular events are focal points of national attention and frequently provide the
stage on which debates of national significance play out. At the same time, as Maurice
Roche observes, sports mega events reveal connections between the cultural, the political
and the economic in modern societies and the contemporary world order (2000, p. xi).
Moreover, the (trans)national appeal of these events invokes a powerful articulation of
popular communication: it embodies at once the structural forces of transnational capital,
cultural globalization, and the political dynamics at the juncture of local histories,
representations and nationalisms in globalized contexts. Studying these dynamics, as
occasioned by the incidents and discourses under discussion in this chapter, reveals the
powerful structural, affective, and textual articulations of popular communication.
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The relatively small scale of the incident required a broader search methodology
than was used in other chapters. I used the surname of the family, Bassal, in an expanded
Google Custom search set to search 234 German periodicals. I also searched international
coverage of the incident using LexisNexis and the terms Bassal AND Germany. These
searches returned 66 unique articles (table 2). Sources included regional papers from
across Germany but mostly concentrated in Berlin, national prestige publications, as well
as several international sources including the Wall Street Journal (US) and The
Independent (UK). To contextualize this case, this paper builds on the discourses
analyzed within the press coverage of the 2006 World Cup in Chapter 3. These sources
represent a broad cross-section of the German media-scape in terms of geographical scale
and political orientation. The national and international reach of the coverage indicates
the broad scope of the story’s media appeal.
Table 4: Combined Search Results for Bassal (German Periodicals) and Bassal AND Germany
(LexisNexis)
Periodical Type

Total

International

12

National

27

Local/Regional

27

Total

66

This case illustrates the attempt by some immigrants to contest their exclusion
from the German citizenry from the peripheral space of a frequently-maligned immigrant
neighborhood. Through the case we can also see glimpses of how the recent broadening
of Germany’s legal definition of citizenship is already beginning to impact the inclusion
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of immigrants and new Germans in German national life and in the abstract space of
national identity. At the same time, the case shows how the opening of national
identification on civic lines may coexist with the continued privileging of ethnic norms.
Furthermore, the discourse of civic nationalism in the flag battle also posits the necessity
of normalized displays of nationalism, discrediting critiques of casual forms of
nationalism.
The tension between the boundaries of the state and the ethnic categories of the
people included and excluded by those boundaries is a hallmark of the modern nationstate. Under Gellner’s famous definition, “nationalism is primarily a political principle,
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (2006, p. 1). To
legitimate the claim of sovereignty, the liberal democratic state must foster the belief in,
and dedication to a common culture defined in some combination of ethnic, religious,
linguistic, philosophical or juridical terms. This form of common identification is
essential in liberal democracy since, as Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle write, “only
nationalism motivates the sacrificial devotion of citizens without which there can be no
effective governance” (1996, p. 10). The affective requirements of modern nationalism
are thus a far more important part of the function of the modern state than the rational
Enlightenment values of liberal democracy would acknowledge.
George de Vos offers three basic temporal orientations for group identification:
“past-oriented (familial-cultural), present-oriented (functional), and future-oriented
(ideological)” (1995, p. 27). The first category correlates with ethnic nationalism and is
rooted in the perceived common territorial origins of a social group. The second category,
which correlates with civic nationalism, focuses on the space of experience and
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emphasizes present participation (de Vos, 1995, p. 26). The final orientation emerges out
of dissatisfaction with past- and present-oriented forms of national identification.
Although some forms of this movement- or cause-orientated identity may seek to operate
within the nation-state system, I will refer to this form as post-nationalist. In reaction to
the nationalist atrocities of the past, post-nationalism in Germany can be seen in the
traditional—though currently faltering—support for the supranational political project of
the European Union as well as in the far-left politics of antifascist groups. As de Vos
notes, these categories are by no means mutually exclusive. Still, they provide a useful
framework for analyzing the priorities and strategies of a nation-state in defining the
requisites for belonging to the dominant social category. They can also be used to
understand the struggles of the members of subordinated groups to access a more
favorable standing in society.
These struggles can be observed in neighborhoods of multicultural cities that
exemplify the dynamism and complexity of spaces of identity not easily accounted for by
the homogenizing category of national citizenship. In particular, immigrant
neighborhoods represent the permeable boundaries between the hegemonic identities of
the majority and the competing and complementing identities of immigrant minorities. In
nations that impose civic nationalism as the norm, de Vos writes that “some members of
subordinate groups may seek to change their assigned or ascribed lower-status positions
to more congenial past or future designations of self and group” (1995, p. 28). This form
of resistance can be seen among some transnational Americans who use the flag of the
ancestral homeland to protest American structural inequality, which often hides behind
the symbolic equality of universal national allegiance to the stars and stripes (Flores250

Gonzalez, 2001, p. 14). In other cases, groups marginalized by ethno-nationalist norms
may seek to claim access to national identity through civic nationalism.

Territory, Ethnicity and Citizenship in the Modern German Nation-State
In Germany, the union of nation and state has been particularly strong. Although
old regional identities—along with their differentiated languages and customs—remain,
the conception of Germany as a territory occupied by and ruled by and for Germans (in
Geller’s national sense) remained strong even through the cataclysmic changes of the last
century. Although at the time of Germany’s foundation as a modern nation in 1871 it
adopted a territory-based rule of citizenship (jus soli), “blood” (jus sanguinis) has been a
key concept in German citizenship since 1895 after a rightward populist turn of German
conservatives that eventually led to the fully descent-based citizenship laws of 1913.21
These rules remained in effect, with the addition and later removal of Nazi
policies of exclusion and racial expulsion, through the end of the millennium. Despite the
rapid growth of the foreigner population, until 2000 a child acquired German citizenship
only by descent from a German parent. Although naturalization was contemplated in law,
even for highly qualified candidates, the process was ambiguous, arbitrary and
prohibitive (Göktürk et al., 2007, p. 151). When the revision of the Nationality Act22 was
enacted establishing jus soli citizenship in 2000, there were approximately 7.5 million

21
22

1913 Reichs- und Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG
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foreign nationals living in Germany, which represented nearly 10 percent of the country’s
population. Nearly 1.5 million of these “foreigners” were born in Germany. In fact, onethird of all foreigners had been in Germany for over twenty years (Abraham, 2008, p.
149). The new citizenship laws opened membership to German society to millions of
residents, at least legally.
The introduction of jus soli citizenship rights through the revision of the
Nationality Act in the late 1990s was highly contentious (Göktürk et al., 2007). It was
passed with varying degrees of resignation, even among many leaders in the governing
coalition of the center-left Social Democratic (SPD) and the center-right Free Democratic
parties (FDP) that proposed the reforms (Nathans, 2004, p. 252). This is clear in the
remarks of then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who introduced and concluded the section
of his speech to the Bundestag addressing the law by focusing on the need to face what
he called “reality,” that is, that recent immigrants were unlikely to leave. The lack of
enthusiasm for the changes is even clearer in the statements of one of the Social
Democratic Party experts on citizenship law, Dieter Wiefelspütz, who said in a 1997
debate that “we aren’t going to be rid of the people here now” (quoted in Nathans, 2004,
p. 255). Territorial rights to citizenship introduced new forms of uncertainty into the
definition of society and the population.

Under the sole rule of “blood” rights to

citizenship, the biopolitical metaphor of the social body functioned with seeming
transparency. The blood connection limited the types of birth that were relevant in
biopolitical terms. Territorial birthright introduced new concerns about disparate fertility
rates among various groups for the national future (see also Chapter 6). With the
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expansion of the definition of the population to include territorial rights, the increased
complexity of defining the population has spurred new forms of surveillance and control.
This expansion of access to citizenship has been accompanied by new restrictions
on immigration. Liberalizing the laws governing citizenship was easier when the
government seemed better able to control who might come to live in the country
(Nathans, 2004, p. 252). Before 2000, restrictions on immigrants from European
countries and on ethnic German Spätaussiedler23 were much looser than on immigrants
from countries perceived as less “culturally compatible.” In practice, this cultural
incompatibility was primarily ascribed to Turks and immigrants from other
predominantly Muslim countries. This process has continued in the 2000s with the new
immigration act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), that, as Markus Schmitz writes, “unmistakably
opted for the Europeanization of the national immigrant labour market and for centralized
control over non-EU immigrants” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 262). This law includes new
requirements for residency that “specifically [regulate] the national (re-) socialization of
immigrants from non-European countries who are required to attend so-called
‘integration courses’”. These laws are applicable to new immigrants as well as those who
already reside in the country but are determined to be “in particular need of integration
measures.”

In 1993, the ‘Right of Return’ was extended to individuals of German ethnicity living in the former
communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
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Integration and Redemption: A Civic Alliance for New Nationalism
In Germany, where the connection of ethnic nationalism to the crimes of the Nazi
period lingers despite efforts to relativize and historicize it, the persistence of ethnic
conceptions of Germanness have made celebrating national pride contentious. Leftist
anti-fascist (Antifa) and anarchist groups attempt to maintain the awareness of this
connection through attacks on banal nationalist discourse and symbolism. However, in
the battle between critical and celebratory approaches to national symbolism, the latter
have made significant gains in recent years. The “soccer patriotism” of men’s World
Cup soccer has opened a new path in Germany for mitigating the negative associations of
ethnic nationalism without following the post-nationalists in abandoning nationalism all
together (see Chapter 3). That the 2006 World Cup provided the setting for the renewal of
German nationalism concords with scholarship on mega-events and the symbolic
cultivation of the modern nation-state. According to Maurice Roche, since their invention
in the late 19th century, modern states have used international and supranational cultural
events to create a space of transitory uniqueness. They offer concrete, if transitory,
versions of symbolic and participatory community (2000, p. 7). Since the establishment
of broadcast media, sporting spectacles have consistently provided the largest audiences
ever assembled (Wenner, 2002). The symbolic power of these events is amplified by the
fact that more than any other popular genre, sports has demonstrated the capacity to
assemble publics that approach the totality of the public. The pretext of hosting an
international sporting event gave the German public license to worship national symbols
while still maintaining that the celebration had nothing to do with the nation, but was
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merely an expression of enthusiasm for the game. Given their role as hosts, many in the
media even portrayed patriotic displays as the duty of the host nation.
As we saw in Chapter 3, during the 2006 World Cup, the German press heralded
the birth of a new civic religion. The language in the press characterized new patriotism
in religious terms. The experience of thus losing the individual self in the totality of the
whole, through communication with the national symbolic is described in the media as a
hyperbolic experience of “euphoria”, “exultation” or “jubilance”. To use the terminology
of Marvin and Ingle, through devotion to the “totem god” made tangible in the vernacular
flag (1996), the German people are said to have been restored, made whole again. In
2010, immigrants and minority Germans joined ethnic Germans in civic nationalist
displays in unprecedented numbers, according to the German and international media.
Cheering for the national team was made more attractive by the teams unprecedented
diversity. In fact, 11 of the 23 national players in 2010 had a transnational background. A
significant proportion of the team would not have legally qualified to wear the German
jersey just 10 years prior. The black, red, and gold-draped celebrations of soccer fans
including many immigrants, and the backlash they provoked among left-wing postnationalists, provided an opportunity to establish a new nationalist pedagogy designed to
reorient German national identity. In the Neukölln flag fight in particular, the media used
the immigrant example to “teach the Germans how to cheer for Germany again.”

Broadcasting New Nationalism
In the immigrant neighborhood of Neukölln, which, as journalists emphasized, is
home to 300,000 in habitants from more than 160 nations, owners of a small family-run
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electronics shop on the Sonnenallee gained national attention for the struggle surrounding
their enormous German flag. The family—alternately described as “Arab”, “Lebanese”,
“Lebanese living in Germany,” “German-Lebanese,” “Lebanese-German”, “German of
Lebanese descent,” “German of Lebanese background,” “German,” “shopkeepers with
Arab roots”—ordered a German flag measuring 22 meters tall and 5 meters wide
specially made to cover the façade of their five-story building at a cost of 500 EU. They
had hung small German flags outside for years without incident. The cousins, Youssef
and Ibrahim Bassal, and Badr Mohammed told journalists that immediately upon hanging
their flag they were approached by leftist individuals who criticized them, demanded they
take the flag down, and accused them of nationalism. The encounters escalated and the
flag was attacked, set on fire, and cut down by an unidentified party that accessed it by
climbing onto the roof. According to an article published on June 25, one cousin, Badr
Mohammed, stated that if the flag antagonists were successful in destroying the flag, they
would not order a second one due to the prohibitive cost (Anker, 2010a). Despite
organizing a neighborhood watch the flag was successfully damaged or stolen on three
occasions (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 2010). But, as the coverage asserts, the attacks
only steeled the family’s resolve to display their national devotion to Germany, leading
them to purchase two more identical replacement flags.
Their explanations for their devotion to German symbols emphasize their right,
based on their affective devotion and their lived experience, to identify with their adopted
nation. The Bassals shared pieces of their migration narratives to illustrate their process
of becoming German.
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“When I came to Berlin in the middle of the 1980s, I couldn’t speak a word of
German. It annoyed me so much that I couldn’t understand anything, that I
wanted to learn the language quickly. Today Berlin is my home; I am German,
have a German passport, my kids were born here. I live and work here, pay taxes.
Why shouldn’t I also support the German soccer team,” asks Ibrahim.i
(Nachtsheim, 2010)
This narrative begins with learning the German language as the first point of entry into
German society. Language learning, and the supposed inability and unwillingness of
immigrants and their children to learn German, is one of the primary objects of scrutiny
in German debates on integration (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2010; Gramling, 2009; Wiese,
2015; see also Chapter 7). I. Bassal starts with his journey to linguistic competence and
then lists a series of other qualifications, from the official state sanctioning of the
passport and contributions to government coffers, to the lived experiences of raising
children and working. Bassal shows that he is a fully active and competent citizen. In
other articles the cousins mention their relatives in the police and the army, emphasizing
the ultimate sacrifice they, as a community, are willing to make for the nation.
[I. Bassal] has spent most of his life here. His family as truly arrived in Germany.
His nephews serve in the military, and one is now even training with the Berlin
police, in the “higher levels of the civil service,” as Ibrahim stresses. ii (Klatt,
2010)
Ibrahim Bassal: “I say: We feel like Germans. I was born here. My two children
were born here, and one of my friends fights with the army in Afghanistan. We
identify with Germany and, naturally, with the German flag.”iii (Schupelius, 2010)
This last statement, which was repeated in several articles, claims territorial birthright to
citizenship, whereas in most of the statements the Bassal cousins state that they
immigrated decades earlier. In other articles, the cousins’ claim to German belonging—
and to self-determination generally—is even more assertive, almost a provocation.
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“We won’t let anyone tell us, that we can’t hang the flag.” And furthermore: “We
live here, we have our existence here, and also our roots—little by little.”iv
(Grabitz, 2010)
“‘I am a German,’ he declared in between customers, many of whom he spoke
with in Arabic. ‘It’s that simple’” (Angelos, 2010).
Moving between German and Arabic, while claiming the legitimacy of his citizenship
affirms that pluralism and transnationalism should now be considered part of what
defines the German population. Other quotes from non-ethnic German Neuköllners
echoed these sentiments (see “Trommeln für Deutschland,” 2006). The family’s claims to
legitimate citizenship using the evidence of their devotion to national symbols were
celebrated in the press, presented as a model for minorities and immigrants as well as for
normative nationals.

Nationalism as Normality
This case reveals a persistent tension in the German relationship to the flag and
nationalist celebration. Even while there is a belief that Germans are prevented from
celebrating freely because of past nationalist excesses, press discourse in this case affirms
that nationalist celebration is normal, natural, and salutary. Frustration with this tension is
revealed in the ascription of normality and abnormality to the actions of the event’s
players. To alleviate the tension and situate national celebration as normal and good,
moral reservations about it need to be discredited and inhibitions dismissed as illegitimate
or abnormal. The first assumption of normality that the articles affirm is that citizens
should venerate their national symbols. As Butler writes about the instantiation of the
sexed position, through the assumption of the national position and its appropriate
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performances in this instance, the media creates the fiction of the preexisting positions
and behaviors it assumes (2011, p. 71). Journalists (re)iterate the assumption that national
subjects should naturally venerate the national flag. The actions of the white German flag
antagonists violate this assumption.
So [Badr Mohammed] fights against Germans and for the German flag.
Sonnenallee 36 stands for the contradictory relationship of many Germans to their
country.v (Stawski, 2010)
The leftist scene in Berlin has started a campaign against German flags. The juicy
part: most German flags hang from the apartments of foreigners—they don’t
understand the world anymore.vi (“Linksradikale reißen Deutschlandflaggen ab,”
2010)
In Neukölln the world stands on its head. Turks and Arabs hoist the German
flag—on their cars, their shops, their houses and apartments. They rejoice over
our national eleven. At night radical German leftists come [and] tear the flags
down or light them on fire.vii (Schupelius, 2010)
While the coverage assumes that normative Germans should celebrate the flag, the
articles frequently frame it as counterintuitive that immigrants would venerate the flag of
their adopted nation, assuming, at the very least, that they should be less ardent devotees
than autochthonous Germans.
The flag fight, which is described as “bizarre” and “grotesque,” transgresses this
expectation by emphasizing the sacrifices of the immigrant protagonists and their
neighbors, their flag devotion descripted as “a minor miracle” (Scally, 2010). The flagdefending cousins are frequently quoted emphasizing this transgression of normality.
The two [cousins] cannot comprehend that Neuköllners of Arab heritage [have to]
defend the German flag against those of German heritage.viii (“Linke bekämpfen
vermeintlich zu deutsche Araber,” 2010)
Almost bemused, they state that the Neuköllners of Arab heritage from the
Sonnenallee are defending the German flag against those of German heritage.
Upside-down world, they find.ix (Anker, 2010a)
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[Bassal] simply cannot understand that the protest is coming from the German
side.x (Hagen, 2010a)
Bassal is baffled. He finds it strange—and also irritating—that Germans want to
forbid a Lebanese from hanging up a black-red-gold flag.xi (“Fahnen-Streit,”
2010)
Why are Germans tearing down their flag, while people of all nations celebrate
the black-red-gold?xii (Nachtsheim, 2010)
The cousins’ statements are used to affirm that not only is it natural for normative
citizens to celebrate the flag, the fact that immigrants and foreign-nationals would do so
proves that it cannot involve the taint of exclusionary forms of German nationalism. In
this case, the blurring of the boundaries of the national subject to include immigrant
patriotism reconciles nationalist norms with liberal democratic expectations of tolerance
and, thus, secures the foundations of contemporary German nationalism. The last
question posed above, by a German commentator, characterizes the flag fight as a
transgression of the benign order of a German patriotism in the naturalized world of
nations. This rhetorical question set the grounds for the reaffirmation of patriotic practice
as distinct from, and opposed to, chauvinism in order to invalidate the post-nationalist
critique of symbolic nationalism.

Invalidating the post-nationalist critique

“Flag fighters mistake patriotism for nationalism”
The corollary of the immigrant’s unexpected German patriotism is the aberrant
anti-nationalism of the German activists. Their rejection of the flag is characterized as
unnatural but not entirely unexpected. It is framed as evidence of a pathology in German
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national self-conception that results in the misconception of all national symbolism and
sentiment as tantamount to Nazism. The flag thieves’ critique of nationalism as a political
system was simplified to the point of absurdity, characterized as illogical and incoherent.
A question posed by the flag protagonists across the body of articles is, “Why
shouldn’t we cheer for Germany?” The articles identify and invalidate two possible
answers to this question. The first possible answer is that the brutality of past crimes of
German nationalism is so exceptional as to make German national celebration immoral in
perpetuity. As one 58 year-old woman is quoted as saying, "Germany did too many
horrible things during the Third Reich to be able to cheer out loud for this country"
(Grieshaber, 2010). The press coverage of this case shows almost universal skepticism of
this view. To this point, Youssef Bassal is quoted as saying, "It's not like there is still a
swastika on Germany's flag" (Grieshaber, 2010). Because immigrants are not implicated
in the Nazi atrocities, they are taken as having the authority to absolve the present
generation for past German crimes. This portrayal characterizes anti-fascist flag fighters
as foolish and their critique as preposterous.
The flag is not hanging there “because of the Second World War, but rather for
the German team: because the German team is no longer really German; it’s
multi-kulti and we belong to that” explains Bassal.xiii (“„Wir werden die deutsche
Fahne verteidigen”,” 2010)
Here they have made a point of destroying and removing Germany flags hanging
outside shops and vehicles because they believe the proud patriotism hearkens
back to the ugly nationalism of the Third Reich. (“Leftists Harass Immigrants for
Supporting Germany,” 2010)
As soon as [Bassal hung the flag], young people aggressively came into his store
and accused him of supporting nationalism and waking Nazi feelings in the
German population once again.xiv (T. Reitz, 2010)
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In Berlin-Neukölln, the multi-kulti neighborhood par excellence… above all
German-Turks and German-Arabs adorn their shops in black-red-gold. The
“Autonomous” scene from the black block— “Never again Germany!”—naturally
cannot tolerate this. The antifascist fight knows no mercy, and even the
shopkeeper from Lebanon can be a menacing flag-Nazi”xv (Mohr, 2010)
To associate immigrants waving the German flag with National Socialism is intuitively
ludicrous. Pointing this out invalidates critiques of “event-dependent nationalism,” as one
anti-fascist group called it, and places it above accusations of chauvinism. In addition, it
invalidates any argument that seeks to make comparisons between present and past forms
of nationalism, enshrining the Nazi past as exceptional and aberrant. As one article puts
it, “the Bassal cousins say their patriotism has nothing to do with the evils that transpired
long before they immigrated to Germany. Rather, they say, the flag is an expression of
the good life they've built here” (Angelos, 2010). This narrative emphasizes a presentand future-oriented nationalism—or “patriotism” as it is invariably called—based on the
economic prosperity of post-war Germany, while marginalizing arguments referencing
the Nazi past.
The flag fight narrative naturalizes and solidifies the distinction between the
“good” patriotism of the immigrant flag protagonists and the “bad” nationalism of the
National Socialist past and the xenophobic racism of the present. Today’s German flag is
characterized as anathema to nationalism, which belongs to despotism. As one editorial
put it, “Not for nothing was the flag of German Democracy forbidden during the Third
Reich”xvi (“Schwarz-rot-bunt,” 2010). As in the coverage of the “soccer patriotism” of
the 2006 World Cup (see Chapter 3), the disapproval of the openly xenophobic far-right
is used to show the morality of the object under discussion. It is as if the democratic
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pedigree of the national colors prevents them from falling in the realm of nationalism,
which is presumed to be anti-democratic.
However, as Michael Billig’s work on banal nationalism shows, even on the farright, nationalists rarely characterize themselves as such. Instead, in-groups tend to
describe their motivations as patriotic (Billig, 1995, p. 57). Popular and scholarly claims
of an obvious distinction between aggressive nationalism and defensive patriotism fall
apart under examination. To illustrate, Billig references writings on nationalism from the
Nazi period observing that “fascists will protest that they are defenders, not attackers,
only taking against foreigners when the latter are a danger to the beloved homeland”
(1995, p. 57). Even the most ardent nationalists conceptualize their actions as
domestically oriented, defensive and motivated by the love of the homeland and its
people. While the specific projects carried out following nationalist assumptions may
vary radically, encompassing projects of solidarity and of violent exclusion,
distinguishing negative and positive form as distinct psychological phenomena does not
hold up to scrutiny. In deconstructing this distinction, Billig is not making a normative
argument demonizing patriotism; instead he strips away the normative distinction that
uses the nationalism of “others” to place “our” patriotism above reproach, naturalizing
the world of nations with its “universal code of particularity” (1995, pp. 72–72). Billig
argues for critically examining the construction of the globalized “habitus” (Bourdieu,
1994) of nationalism, a phenomenon that has been so successful that it is rarely noticed
and very difficult to imagine elsewise. Billig examines the relationship between the
waved and the unwaved, forgettable flag. Both modes of flagging make up banal
nationalism, although Billig’s primary intervention is focusing attention on the ignored
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unwaved form. Billig proposes that in the stable nation-state, the unnoticed form
overtakes the actively symbolic and communicative form of flagging that accompanies
disputes over territory and national identity. In the German case, the desire to erase
contention around the flag played out most strongly in the 2006 World Cup (see Chapter
3). While the 2010 flag fight was a contentious episode, the press used it to discredit the
flag antagonists and establish the propriety of banal nationalism, which includes both
unnoticed everyday flagging and organized, sanctioned episodes of exuberant flag
waving.
The media’s characterization of normality in the flag fight suggests that despite
the friction that regularly manifests around nationalism in Germany, assumptions of the
proper behavior of nationals—that they should celebrate and defend the national flag—
were already well established in the mediated public sphere at the time. The participation
of the immigrant protagonists is posed as proof of the inclusive, democratic nature of
contemporary German nationalism. The flag’s defense by immigrant patriots nullifies any
association with nationalism, as with Y. Bassal’s rhetorical question “What, pray tell,
have I got to do with the Nazis?”xvii (Lau, 2010). Both the flag skeptics and enthusiasts of
national celebrations share the assumption that the Nazi past is exceptional, and therefore
incomparable. For the skeptics of nationalism, this means that Germans have an
exceptional moral obligation to abstain from the nationalist celebration that is a global
norm. For national celebrants, the exceptionalism of the Nazi past means that any
reference to it as a comparative tool is illegitimate. Furthermore, national celebrants
consider the moral obligations advocated by the skeptics to be unfair and discriminatory.
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However, if we do not accept the exceptionalism of the discourses of nationalism
from the Nazi period, both of these positions are destabilized. This is not to deny the
importance of ethical and normative discussions examining the extent of the evils of the
period. Instead, it clears the ground for important discussions about the extent to which
banal nationalism may provide a basis of continuity that has made it possible to maintain
the idea of a coherent nation through successive transformations of the state. It also
enables the crucial consideration of the continuities in conceptions of “the people” and
the ways threats to the population are conceptualized. After all, the most valuable
understandings to be gained from the Nazi period are not simply the recognition of the
human capacity for brutality but rather how, as Agamben puts it, a nation can transition
so easily from modern parliamentary democracy to totalitarianism and back to democracy
(1998, p. 122). Agamben argues that the ease of this transition points to the extent to
which politics has become biopolitics. The banality of nationalism—with its assumptions
about citizenship and about which life has political value—is deeply implicated in this
process. This question has relevance far beyond German borders. Events like the flag
fight provide opportunities to modify and affirm consensus around these assumptions and
to discuss nationalist norms in order to forget them (Billig, 1995).
In waging war against what the anti-fascist representatives on the internet called
“event-dependent nationalism,” flag antagonists sought to underscore the repressive and
racist authority of the nation-state. In a statement made on the internet calling for a
national World Cup flag battle, a person identified as Ines Müller wrote, "It seems as
though the Germans are yearning for a basis for their identity that would allow them to
push the German state and its past in the background, but neither the present nor the past
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can be repressed" (Angelos, 2010). Post-nationalist statements regarding the flag fight
raise reasoned arguments linking soccer nationalism to everyday discourses delineating
and excluding “those who do not fit the image of the ‘good German’” (Autonome
Neuköllner Antifa, 2010). More fundamentally, they raised objections to the hegemony
of nationalism as a mode of governmentality. In a statement regarding the media
interpretations of the flag fight, one Neukölln-based antifascist group, which did not
claim to participate in flag-stealing activities, characterized the nation as “an obligatory
collective in which societal contradictions—such as the permanent competitive
relationship between individuals—must be obscured and individual happiness must defer
to the supposedly superior interests of the national collective” (Autonome Neuköllner
Antifa, 2010). In choosing to wage their battle against the private property of individuals,
however, the broader post-nationalist political agenda was ignored or villainized in the
press. Instead, the illegal anti-fascist actions are used to portray the flag-wavers as
courageous heroes (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). The clear immorality of the attack on
personal property bestows moral authority on the victim who resists the attackers.

“Flag fighters are anti-immigrant”
Once the activist critique of nationalism is ruled unreasonable, the remaining
answer proposed in the articles to the question of why the Bassal’s flag was targeted is
that activists must believe immigrants do not have the right to affiliate themselves with
the German nation. In several statements, the cousins recognize the distinction between
the xenophobia that motivates right-wing extremists and the motivations of the leftists. A
typical example of this reads, “For the fascists we are foreigners, and for the anarchists…
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actually, I have no idea what we are to them”xviii (Hagen, 2010a, 2010b). However, in
most of the coverage, about the nature of the identitarian politics motivating leftists’
actions gives way to statements that directly conflate leftist positions with xenophobia
and hatred.
From their perspective, we are migrants. They don’t understand Germans who
defend Germany who are not of German descent. (I. Bassal quoted in Anker,
2010a)
Youssef Bassal doesn’t understand the world anymore: “We have relatives who
serve in the military and with the police. Germany took us in when we had to flee
war in Lebanon. We know how much we owe to our new Heimat. And this
hatred…xix (“Deutschland-Hasser terrorisieren Fußball-Fans,” 2010)
In this way, the leftists’ actions are attributed to ethno-nationalist rather than postnationalist ideologies. Left-wing radical groups may practice their own forms of ethnic
essentialization (see Chapter 3 for discussion of the leftist form of German
exceptionalism). In fact, the statement about the fear of waking “Nazi feelings” in
normative Germans attributed to flag-critics in the article by Reitz quoted above shows a
kind of exceptionalism regarding Germans’ relation to nationalism. If this second-hand
repetition is accurate, this statement implies that Germans are particularly susceptible to
dangerous forms of nationalism. While this form of essentialism merits critical
deconstruction, the articles in the archive tended to skirt this more complex question,
simply characterizing the flag-thieves as anti-immigrant and their anti-nationalist politics
as facile and absurd.
For German post-nationalists, the cultivation of a national identity at the state
level is necessarily dependent on the definition of Others, which leads to racism and
group-based hatred. In a photograph taken during the flag fight, the masked members of
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the group Anti-Racist Alliance Neukölln (Antirassistische Bündnis Neukölln) stand over a
mound of flags with a banner that reads, “German flags can’t help against racism” (see
figure 13). The picture, which was posted on the website Indymedia linksunten, was
accompanied by a letter claiming responsibility for the theft of 5,000 flags, including
“one of the internationally known giant Sonnenallee flags” (AntiraBündnis44, 2010).
Post-nationalists do not believe in a benign, egalitarian form of nationalism. The flag
thieves position themselves against all forms of flag celebration, whether by immigrants
or by established Germans, stating, “We oppose the media discourse that accuses us of
making our neighbors into ‘foreigners.’ The debate around the ‘Neukölln flag fight’ only
serves one thing: the image of a ‘cosmopolitan’ German nation!”xx This goal of
promoting Germany as cosmopolitan, or open to the world (weltoffen), using national
symbolism runs contrary to the post-nationalist conviction that flags are necessarily tools
that divide populations.
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Figure 10: This was published on the website linksunten.indymedia.org along with a letter claiming
responsibility for the theft of 5000 flags. The banner reads: “German flags can’t help against racism! Attack
nationalism! Stop deportations!” (AntiraBündnis44, 2010)

The flag thieves argue that integration is an idea that is used to dictate that
immigrants undertake one-sided adaptation even while they are denied full societal
participation (AntiraBündnis44, 2010). However, as they protested in their statement, the
narrative that developed in the press framed the anti-flag campaign as an anti-immigrant
action, suggesting that they took particular issue with immigrant patriotism. In all the
articles examined for this chapter, only one, from the progressive independent Die
Tageszeitung, challenged this narrative, pointing out that it makes more sense to see the
attacks on immigrants’ German flags as evidence that the leftists see anyone waving a
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(German) flag as an equal antagonist; “They do not pay attention to origins, for them
every flag waver is a nationalist and, therefore, the enemy” xxi (Alke, 2010). Without
necessarily agreeing with their politics, this journalist was the only one to question the
logic of framing the flag vandals’ actions as anti-immigrant.

Teaching civic nationalism

Then a small boy enters the store. He reaches for one of the small flags meant for
mounting on cars.
"What sort of flag do you have there?" Bassal asks the child.
"Germany," the child, who also appears to be of immigrant descent, replies
quickly.
"And what do you love?" Bassal asks.
"Germany," the child calls out.
Bassal smiles, satisfied. (Hagen, 2010b)
After resolving the question of the legitimacy of German patriotic displays by
minority Germans and immigrants, the media turn to the task of broadcasting the Bassal
cousins’ lessons on civic nationalist comportment. Media coverage of the flag fight
portrays immigrants as natural teachers, “leading the way in teaching Germans how to
feel good about themselves” (Grieshaber, 2010). Journalists observed that in 2010 the
immigrant neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln seemed to be even more heavily
bedecked with the German flags than the “traditionally German” neighborhoods in Berlin
(Stollowsky, 2010b). “Former immigrants” are showing “bio-Germans,” with their
inhibited relationship with the flag, how to be more relaxed showing the flag (Anker,
2010b). The use of the term “bio-German” here reinforces the normativity of ethnic or
blood-based citizenship. The use of “former” as a qualifier for immigrants suggests that,
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although the family members had undertaken immigration, in this context they have
overcome their immigrant status.
Journalists describe the Bassal’s electronics shop as the center of World Cup
activity in Neukölln. The oversized flag outside the store calls to wayward patriots, and
invites them to enter the church of civic religion. “Now the little shop is almost full of
people,” states one article, “all curious to hear the story of the giant flag” (Hagen, 2010b).
The flag even draws pilgrims, as another article shows: “an older woman enters the store.
She isn’t interested in a cell phone card or a TV cable, instead she says, ‘I’ve come all the
way from Wilmersdorf. I absolutely had to see the flag.’”xxii (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,”
2010). Ibrahim Bassal, who jokes that he has a dry tongue from so much storytelling, is
always willing to tell the story one more time, and so are journalists.
According to Bassal family statements, what started as an idea to do “a little
something extra” in celebrating the World Cup that year became something more. The
conflict and the public attention it generated solidified their defense of the flag into a
mission to promote patriotic performance. Articles show that hanging the flag was
carefully orchestrated to make a statement and teach a lesson to fellow immigrants and
ethnic Germans alike, breaking through the boundaries of the “parallel society”
(Parallelgesellschaft) supposedly exemplified by the neighborhood.
It is often said of the Germans, that their relationship to their own flag is
sometimes tense. But as during the Summer Fairytale four years ago or the
European Championship two years ago, former immigrants showed the “bioGermans,” according to [Green Party politician Özcan] Mutlut [sic], how to be
more relaxed with showing the flag.xxiii (Anker, 2010b)
The flag represented a conscious effort to demonstrate and claim belonging, and to reach
out to ethnic Germans. Ibrahim Bassal went so far as to say that the five-story flag was “a
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small gift to this country.” In explaining their decision to order the flag, Badr Mohammed
was quoted as saying, “we considered amongst ourselves what we could do to show
everyone: ‘we belong together’”xxiv (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). Mohammed is a politician in
the ruling center-right Christian Democratic Party, and is consequently well versed in the
perceptions and interpretations of immigrant actions (“Flagge zeigen,” 2010). After 18
years with the center-left Social Democrats, Mohammed switched to the Christian
Democrats in 2009 after dissatisfaction with the social democratic approach to the
politics of integration. In a statement made at the time of his decision, Mohammed
emphasized the need to “build the unity of Germans of diverse backgrounds and
religions”xxv (Schulz, 2009). Mohammed emphasized the need for immigrants to be
productive and loyal German citizens, a position which he said was not sufficiently
supported by the center-left party. The statements of the flag defending family selfconsciously wield their particular patriotic authority to position themselves at the center
of the new diverse Germany they are seeking to promote. This immigrant patriotism
resonates with the desire of German conservatives to popularize a new form of banal
nationalism that cannot be associated with past nationalist atrocities (Geisler, 2005; see
also Chapters 1 and 3). Aware of the political implications of the flag spectacle, the
cousins’ enactment of multicultural patriotism must be read as a political and pedagogical
act directed at both ethnic Germans and new Germans.
The news stories show that the lesson was enthusiastically received by German
politicians as well as by the wo/man on the street. “Integration expert” Burkard Dregger,
also of the center-right Christian Democratic Party, is quoted opining that the flag was
exemplary in showing that those who hung it were ready to “identify with our nation.
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Many long-time Berliners could take a lesson from them”xxvi (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010).
Ethnic Germans quoted on the scene all approve of the flag and its owners’ fight to
defend it. Still, the divisions separating the categories of native and migrant run deep.
Although the ethnic Germans quoted are enthusiastic about the family’s message of
unity, their statements maintain the normative notion of Germanness, constructing
“integration” as unidirectional process. “We have to get away from calling these people
foreigners,” 19-year-old customer, Manuel Hornauer, is quoted as saying. “It is super
when they are so integrated” (Hagen, 2010b). Similarly, an elderly woman in the
company of two friends who made the pilgrimage to see the flag commented, “When the
Turks feel like Germans, I find that beautiful,” wrongly assuming the cousins to be
Turks. “It’s good that they feel like us” (Angelos, 2010). Others have even more trouble
internalizing the pluralist identifications possible under civic nationalism. On another
occasion a woman stopped by the store to ask why the Bassals didn’t put up a Palestinian
flag (Angelos, 2010). The flag fight revealed the normative ethnic nationalist
assumptions of majority Germans, while providing an opportunity to supplement them
through the affirmation of a broader form of civic nationalism.

Soccer Patriotism and Sports Integration
The flag fight was widely hailed in the media as a “sign of integration” (Anker,
2010a). The term “integration,” along with its adjective and verb forms, appears 93 times
in the corpus in 40 different articles. The patriotic performance of the Bassal family from
the heart of one of Germany’s most stigmatized neighborhoods is so powerful and
unexpected that many journalists claim it has made them reconsider common portrayals
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of the neighborhood. Neukölln is described as a foreign space and its enthusiasm for
German national symbols is, therefore, portrayed as unexpected.
This alone is remarkable: an Arab family has rolled out likely one of the biggest
German flags in the country here of all places, in Neukölln where every fifth
person is a foreigner.xxvii (Stawski, 2010)
Terms used to describe Neukölln include “social problem area” (Bein, 2010), “problem
neighborhood” (Grabitz, 2010; Zehrt, 2010), and “social combustion point” (Anker,
2010b). It is described as being “like an oriental bazar” (Stollowsky, 2010a) boasting
“the busiest police station,” “the largest unemployment office in Germany” and “at least
one suspicious mosque” (Keseling, 2006).24 The “Sonnenallee is a man’s street”
(Keseling, 2006) in a neighborhood that is plagued by “language deficits,” “criminality
and poverty” (Anker, 2010a) that also “brings many children into the world” (Keseling,
2006). Journalists exoticize the neighborhood, emphasizing its difference in classically
Orientalist terms and associating that difference with social deficits. It is masculine,
dangerous, and highly fertile. One article lists a litany of commonly known critiques of
the neighborhood, claiming that the flag fight does not fit with this picture.
Neukölln has for years earned a rather ignominious fame as a social combustion
point. Unemployment, low level of education, high percentage of foreigners,
criminality, and poverty are more pronounced here than in other neighborhoods.
More than 300,000 inhabitants from more than 160 nations live in Neukölln…
The flag fight does not fit in this image of Neukölln.xxviii (Anker, 2010a)

24

This article, which appeared four years before the flag fight, was a feature piece on Neukölln that
included a short portrait of Youssef Bassal. Although it predates the flag fight, it sheds light on longstanding perceptions of the neighborhood. Since it also includes one of the central flag fight protagonists, I
decided to include it in the corpus.
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More neutral characterizations of the neighborhood refer to it as “multi-kulti,” but most
often its diversity is associated with other social deficits. English language articles
describe the neighborhood in less negative terms, such as “working-class district”
(Hagen, 2010b) and “multicultural neighborhood” (Scally, 2010). Journalists repeated
familiar tropes of the neighborhood’s marginality, foreignness, and deficiency, and then
proposed that the patriotic performance of the flag fight could be cause to reconsider this
image.
Throughout the corpus, the patriotic performance of the Bassal family is directly
equated with integration. The fierceness of their loyalty to Germany was increasingly
emphasized as the flag battle progressed, as evidenced by the financial and even physical
sacrifices made to the flag. The willingness to sacrifice to the national totem (Marvin &
Ingle, 1999) provides proof of their integration. As discussed above, the Bassals provide
other arguments and evidence supporting the legitimacy of their claim to German
citizenship, but, in the end, the flag and its defense provide the key evidence.
A few streets away is the notorious Rollberg quarter, where gangs of youth,
mostly Lebanese multiple offenders, make trouble…. Failed integration? The
Bassal cousins have their own perspective on things. They defend the German
flag.xxix (Grabitz, 2010)
With three plush soccer balls atop his oversized Germany hat, Ibrahim Bassal
does not exactly look fearsome, but he is very serious. “We will defend our flag
even with our blood. No one will tear it down again,” says the 39-year-old
[Bassal] full of passion, pointing with his index finger to the giant black-redgolden flag above his electronics shop… “From now on we will keep watch
around the clock”xxx (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 2010)
Youssef Bassal’s face color has turned somewhat grey-green. He has not slept
much in the recent days—since “these strange Germans” turned up at his shop
wanting to tear down his flag. He smiles, tired but satisfied like someone who is
fighting the good fight. Bassal is fighting for the honor of the German flag: “I will
defend this flag—[even] if I don’t get to sleep at all!”xxxi (Lau, 2010)
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“We sit here every night with two or three men and keep night watch,” [I.] Bassal
explains. “The flag will be defended until the last breath.”xxxii (Zehrt, 2010)
Kahled Hossen, who fastened the flag to the roof, risked his life to do so. Even if
autonomists keep tearing and igniting it: “We will keep on repairing it.”xxxiii
(“Flagge zeigen,” 2010)
The militaristic language and sacrificial zeal of these statements belie the apolitical
harmlessness projected by the plush soccer ball hat. The coverage glorifies the sacrificial
offerings for the “honor” of the flag. Offering their blood, breath, and lives for the
protection of the symbol points to the transformation of bodies into worthy lives through
their association with the national (Agamben, 1998).
If integration is equated here with displays of loyalty to national symbols, then to
criticize or question the legitimacy of national symbols is to actively block integration.
Bassal and the journalists covering this story impugned Germans who are not holding up
their end of the integration bargain. For immigrants to “integrate,” they must be allowed
to belong as full members of the nation. These proponents of civic nationalism argued
that minority integration and essentialist conceptions of national identity are mutually
exclusive. Instead, this essentialist ideology was ascribed to the post-national flag
opponents, letting ethno-nationalists off the hook and placing blame for the inability of
visible minorities to achieve equal status in German society onto post-nationalists. After
sharing quotes from international newspapers praising Germany’s diverse national team
as evidence of Germany’s success in embracing its multi-ethnic society, one article uses
the flag fight as evidence that there are still “problems with the co-existence of
demographic groups in Germany” (“Fans froh,” 2010). The flag vandals are cast as
antagonists against the immigrants as such rather than against the hegemony of
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nationalism in Germany and beyond. Here, post-nationalist politics, rather than structural
and everyday forms of social exclusion, are identified as the cause of social conflicts.
Statements by politicians go even further in situating post-nationalist ideology as a threat
to an inclusive Germany:
For Green [Party politician] Özcan Mutlu, the bizarre fight represents an “upsidedown world.” “It is expected that immigrants integrate, but when the identify with
the colors of democracy, they are attacked,” said Mutlu.xxxiv (Anker, 2010b).
In this statement, the Turkish-born Mutlu supports the normality of nationalist celebration
and conflates national symbolism with politics itself. The actions of the integrants in
protecting the flag proves their commitment to democracy. In attacking the flag, the
activist vandals are not merely transgressing the law, they are attacking democracy itself.
Mutlu’s statement creates a complex “chain of equivalence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001),
equating nationalist with democratic performance and using nationalist celebration as the
anchoring point to define integration.
The dependence on self-contemplation through examination of the margin is
demonstrated by some articles that even suggest that the lack of German national pride
has contributed to Germany’s inability to integrate immigrants. An article quoting
sociologist Klaus Bade, the head of Germany's Expert Council of Foundations for
Integration and Migration (SVR) suggests that the causes of two of the key problems
Germany faces, low standards of education in immigrant communities and the growth of
an ethnically defined underclass,
stem from Germany's difficult history and a resulting lack of national pride, after
the atrocities of two world wars. Unlike France or the US, Bade said, Germany
lacked a sense of confidence and greatness for immigrants to identify with and
aspire to. In contrast, he pointed out that Germany's large Turkish population
respected and honoured the "great country and tradition" of their homeland.
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"We're proud of being Turkish, are you proud of being German? No, you're
somehow embarrassed to be German," Bade paraphrased their attitude. (Maguire,
2010)
Although Bade’s concerns with the impact of persistent discrimination are briefly
mentioned later, this quote promotes the idea that that the lack of civic national pride on
the German side discourages immigrants from claiming German identity as their own.
This argument assumes that German identity is freely available for the taking by nonethnic Germans. On the contrary, the history of German debates on citizenship and
immigration shows that the norms of Germanness still exclude non-white and Muslim
Germans. Even with legal liberalization, those who claim belonging but who do not meet
the ethnic criteria can still expect to be met with incredulity.
Still, the protagonists of the Neukölln flag fight frame their actions in part as a
model of empowerment for fellow immigrants and minority Germans. In this arena, at
least, it is the immigrants who have access to a lesson that Germans desire to learn: how
to openly demonstrate pride in one’s country. The Bassal family sees this knowledge as a
gift they can bestow—demonstrating an uninhibited and unburdened relationship to
national symbols, free from the past. As Youssef Bassal was quoted as saying, “we can
teach the Germans a little national pride, regardless of history” xxxv (“Fans froh,” 2010).
Unfortunately, however, although the lesson of the moral authority of civic religion was
easily assimilated, their effort to dismantle the boundaries reproducing the idea of a
“parallel society” of dangerous internal others did not have such an enduring impact.
Understanding the importance of boundary maintenance for the stability of
dominant identities reveals the precariousness of societal integration through soccer
patriotism: while minority patriotism offers a potent tool for strengthened nationalist
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discourses, truly acknowledging the permeability of boundaries separating the national
majority from the foreign subaltern would require relinquishing a fundamental tool for
majority self-conception. The Bassal cousins were seeking to open the abstract space of
German identity to include those with experiential and affective ties to German national
space. In doing so, they aligned themselves with the symbolic nationalist politics of the
German center-right.
While this might theoretically pose a threat to conservative ideology, the centrist
conservative politics that dominate German governance recognizes the pedagogical value
of this parable of civic nationalism. Furthermore, enshrining the example of the Bassal
family’s loyalty to Germany does not necessarily preclude politicians from reverting to
the condemnation of the supposed “parallel societies” as soon as the Bassals’ lesson has
served its purpose. Thus, diversity can be acknowledged, and even celebrated within the
context of the unifying force of broader civic national identity. While this national
allegiance remains unchallenged, the majority can feel free to emphasize the diversity of
those united under the flag. This can even serve to underscore the power of the totem: the
greater the diversity of its worshipers, the greater its unifying power must be.
Indeed, the news coverage shows that the media and politicians capitalized on the
story to push for more open nationalism and use this case to impugn the morality of those
who critique nationalism. They also used it to showcase the “good” migrant who is
playing by the rules, thereby conflating nationalist expression with socially desirable
integration. In this vein, Dregger was quoted as saying, “Burning and tearing our flag is
abhorrent enough. But to reproach well integrated immigrants for their integration is
downright perfidious” (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). Chancellor Angela Merkel, also a
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Christian Democrat, is cited numerous times in the articles championing Germany’s
“international team” (Maguire, 2010) and celebrating displays of patriotic enthusiasm in
immigrant neighborhoods “as a sign of long-awaited positive integration” (Paterson,
2010). The precariousness of this support for pluralism was demonstrated only three
months later when Merkel again declared “the absolute failure” (“Der Tag, als Multikulti
für tot erklärt wurde,” 2010) of the multicultural society in the wake of the runaway
success of Thilo Sarrazin’s statistical condemnation of “undesirable” immigrants (see
Chapter 6).

Legible Space and Ethnic Discrimination
As the debates and legislation on immigration suggest, despite the opening of
ethnic citizenship laws in Germany since the 2000, the ethnic idea of national affiliation
in Germany continues as the norm. This has been most evident in the backlash against
multiculturalism and in the efforts of conservative politicians to legally enshrine the
hegemony of the German Leitkultur. As a proposal released by the ruling Christian
Democratic leadership several months after the flag fight states, “our cultural values,
formed through a Judeo-Christian tradition to which the Christian Democratic Party feels
particularly bound, and historical experiences are the basis for the societal cohesion that
constitutes our Leitkultur. We expect those who come to us to respect this” (Wittrock,
2010). This proposal assumes a clear delineation of German (Judeo-Christian) culture
from the culture of unassimilated (Muslim) Others. It also establishes the hierarchy of
this binary within German territory.
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These religious and cultural Others are at their most dangerous when they are
perceived as being organized into a “Muslim parallel society” (muslimische
Parallelgesellchaft) (Schmitz, 2011). These parallel societies are epitomized by the
Berlin neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln, as was evident in the coverage of the
World Cup flag fight. The availability of low-cost housing in these formerly neglected
West-Berlin neighborhoods made them essentially obligatory destinations for guest
workers in the post-war reconstruction period. Workers’ hostels offered substandard
housing for migrant workers who were eventually able to afford lodgings of their own in
the inexpensive neighborhoods. These communities grew in the following decades and
remain well-established today.
A key technique for maintaining state control in complex and heterogeneous
systems, is the narrowing of vision and simplification (J. C. Scott, 1999). One of the most
successful simplification strategies is the state-administered gathering of census
information. By increasing the legibility of the nation’s population, the census provides
important tools for the state’s power to define demographics and spaces as valuable or as
liabilities. In Germany, local police precincts administer a comprehensive population
registration system. According to the law, all residents of Germany must report to a local
police precinct within a week of changing their domicile. Registration is difficult to avoid
since it is necessary to open bank accounts and for a wide array of official business. As
part of this registration, demographic information is gathered. This information is
processed by regional statistical offices that produce regular demographic reports. The
series of biannual registered population reports produced by the Berlin Brandenburg
statistical office focuses primarily on two metrics: ethnicity and age—two metrics that
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are at the root of anxieties about the future of the aging and dwindling German nation
(Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011).
Despite the new citizenship rules, the statistical reports of the state maintain the
German/migrant binary by dividing the population into the categories of those with or
without a “migration background”—a category introduced by the State and Federal
Statistical Offices in 2005 to describe any person who has at least one parent who
immigrated to Germany after 1949 (Statistisches Bundesamt, n.d.)—before breaking it
down by citizenship status. In Berlin, these reports are broken down by neighborhood.
They thus render the spaces of ethnic minorities visible and legible. Focusing on the
ethno-nationality of residents and their ages in the reports suggests that these are the most
meaningful metrics for interpreting the social space of the city. Whether because the
reports suggest this, or because the writers share the basic anxieties of the state, writers
critiquing German social space focus heavily on ethno-nationality and fertility in their
assessments, raising fears that the least culturally “fit” among the population will
outbreed the country’s more “intelligent” and successful members (see Chapter 6). These
treatments use statistics and pseudoscience to reify the boundaries separating ethnic
Germans from immigrants and their progeny. The most well-known of this genre is Thilo
Sarrazin’s popular Deutschland schafft sich ab (“Germany Does Away with Itself”) (see
also Heisig, 2010; Hug, 2010; Ulfkotte, 2010), which debuted just two months after the
peak of the multicultural “party patriotism” of the 2010 World Cup.
Sarrazin’s work, which will be the subject of Chapter 6, uses suggestive statistics
to draw boundaries creating the internal Other to stabilize and promote a stronger sense
of Germanness tied to ethnicity. Sarrazin does not reject immigration out of hand, but
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rather argues that “good” immigration from “culturally compatible” nations needs to be
encouraged and undesirable immigration curbed. Above all, Sarrazin distinguishes the
bad immigrants from the good by their Muslim background. Sarrazin portrays Muslim
immigrants as an existential threat to European society. Mehdi Semati defines
Islamophobia as “a cultural-ideological outlook that seeks to explain ills of the (global)
social order by attributing them to Islam” (2010, p. 266). The extraordinary success of
Sarrazin’s book brought Islamophobia into the open in the center of society. In Sarrazin’s
book and others like it, the dangers of “Muslim parallel societies” are embodied within
immigrant neighborhoods. Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin, as the quintessential
national exemplar, are the focus of intense scrutiny (see for example Buschkowsky,
2012).
Portrayals of the area are characterized by the “ambivalent interplay between
celebrating and stigmatizing cultural difference” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 269). These
neighborhoods are alternately characterized as dangerous, poor, and culturally desolate or
as edgy, hip, and shabby-chic. Drawing on the work of Edward Said (1979), Schmitz
writes that the idea of the parallel society functions as a spatial reference for the
Muslim’s refusal to integrate; “at the same time, it represents all that is not compatible
with Germany’s imagined cultural homogeneity” (2011, p. 269). In the context of
supposedly parallel societies, the display of allegiance to German national symbols (not
the least of which is the national soccer team) by minority Germans and immigrants
defied the expectations of the normative population.

Conclusion: Persistent hierarchy
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The compelling characters of the Neukölln flag fight were mobilized by
the German media to 1) sever the link with the past using the de-historicized, presentfocused nationalism of the immigrant and to discredit those who would maintain the link
between nationalism and racism, to 2) spread the gospel of the new civic religion, again,
by using the example of devout immigrants who demonstrate the proper relationship
between worshippers and its most powerful symbol: the national flag, and 3) to secure the
morality of the new nationalism by emphasizing its egalitarianism and tolerance of
difference. This serves to allay fears of the bloodthirsty, violent nature of the new
nationalism (Marvin & Ingle, 1999) by substituting purportedly peaceful international
sporting competitions for war. This benefits the media and the political elite by restoring
nationalism to the toolkit for governance and national narration. The desire of immigrants
to wave the flag is a powerful ally in the battle to bolster and legitimate the power of the
totem. Because the immigrant chooses their new flag rather than simply accepting its
assignation by birth, immigrant patriotism demonstrates the desirability of identification
with Germany. Furthermore, the immigrant’s love of their host nation is present-based
and untainted by the stain of past abuses of national power. At the same time, the
immigrant and new German protagonists of the Neukölln flag fight used the event to
claim their place in the nation and to challenge their exclusion from the privileged space
of national belonging.
In the flag fight, the Bassal cousins used civic nationalist norms to attack the
cultural differentialism that closes German citizenship to Muslim immigrants, in
particular. In doing so, however, the Bassals and the German media strengthened the
hegemony of nationalism in Germany, bringing it one step closer to achieving unnoticed
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banality. In contrast, in their fight against nationalist symbols, German anti-fascists
proclaimed the inevitable racializing functions of nationalism as a system for managing
difference. However, their attacks on the flag in Neukölln ended up providing a
compelling narrative on which to base a powerful civic nationalist pedagogy affirming
the moral superiority of civic nationalism. Anti-fascist forms of post-nationalism, then,
became the nationalist’s straw man. The coverage of the flag fight was a useful space for
the re-negotiation of national identity, but a surface reading of that coverage and of the
event can miss underlying problems that such a conception of identity glosses over. The
celebration of immigrant patriotism shores up the universalist and egalitarian credentials
of the nation (see also Chapter 2), but, as the following chapter shows their contribution
to the legitimacy of civic nationalist celebration does not necessarily undermine the
particularism that disrupts the inclusion of immigrants and minorities as part of the
national category.
The next chapter examines the consequences of this persistent particularism in an
event that occurred several months after the flag fight: the debate that followed the
publication of a book that predicted the destruction of the German people through the
dual threat of proliferating Muslim immigrants and declining birthrates among educated
white Germans. This case also demonstrates the difficulties in discussing race and racism
in the German context. Intolerance stoked by cultural, religious, and linguistic difference
is more easily portrayed as benign and justifiable than racial intolerance. Perhaps this is
because, as Stuart Hall (2000) notes, the biological referent of ethnic differentiation is
less direct. In conceptions of ethnicity, the biological articulation of difference is present
but is indirect, operating through kinship. As civic nationalism establishes itself as a new
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norm in Germany, its relative inclusivity should not be allowed to render it invisible and,
thus, above critique. As the book debate shows, civic nationalism does not necessarily
mitigate pseudo-scientifically legitimated models of social and cultural deficiency that
plague representations of immigrants. Although it opens new possibilities for legitimating
minority identification with the nation, it also supports a binary of the “successfully
integrated” versus the “unassimilable and intractable” immigrant.

„Als ich Mitte der 80er-Jahre nach Berlin kam, konnte ich kein Wort Deutsch. Es hat mich so genervt,
dass ich nichts verstanden habe, dass ich so schnell die Sprache lernen wollte. Heute ist Berlin mein
Zuhause, ich bin Deutscher, habe einen deutschen Pass, meine Kinder wurden hier geboren. Ich lebe und
arbeite hier, zahle Steuern. Wieso soll ich also nicht auch für die deutsche Fußballnationalmannschaft
sein“, fragt Ibrahim.
ii
Die meiste Zeit seines Lebens hat er hier verbracht. Die Familie sei in Deutschland angekommen. Die
Neffen dienten bei der Bundeswehr, einer mache jetzt sogar eine Ausbildung bei der Berliner Polizei,
»gehobener Dienst«, wie Ibrahim betont.
iii
Ibrahim Bassal : "Ich sage: Wir fühlen uns als Deutsche. Ich wurde hier geboren, meine zwei Kinder
wurden hier geboren, und einer meiner Freunde kämpft mit der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Wir
identifizieren uns mit Deutschland und natürlich mit der deutschen Fahne."
iv
"Wir lassen uns nicht sagen, dass man die Fahne nicht aufhängen darf." Und weiter: "Wir leben hier, wir
haben unsere Existenz hier, auch unsere Wurzeln - schon langsam."
v
[Badr Mohammed] kämpft also gegen Deutsche und für die deutsche Fahne. Die Sonnenallee 36 steht
längst für das widersprüchliche Verhältnis vieler Deutscher zu ihrem Land.
vi
Die linke Szene in Berlin hat eine Aktion gegen Deutschlandflaggen gestartet. Pikant: Die meisten
deutschen Flaggen hängen an Wohnungen von Ausländern - die verstehen die Welt nicht mehr.
vii
In Neukölln steht seit Tagen die Welt Kopf. Türken und Araber hissen die deutsche Fahne. An ihren
Autos, ihren Läden, ihren Häusern und Wohnungen. Sie freuen sich über den Erfolg unserer Nationalelf.
Nachts kommen deutsche Linksradikale, reißen die Fahnen herunter oder zünden sie an.
viii
Die beiden können gar nicht fassen, dass die arabischstämmigen Neuköllner die Deutschlandfahne gegen
die Deutschstämmigen verteidigen.
ix
Fast belustigt stellen sie fest, dass die arabischstämmigen Neuköllner aus der Sonnenallee die
Deutschlandfahne gegen die Deutschstämmigen verteidigen. Verdrehte Welt, finden sie.
x
Dass die Proteste gerade von deutscher Seite kommen, kann er einfach nicht verstehen.
xi
Bassal ist verständnislos. Dass Deutsche einem Libanesen verbieten wollen, eine schwarz-rot-goldene
Fahne aufzuhängen, findet er „komisch“. Und ärgerlich auch.
xii
Warum reißen Deutsche ihre Fahne herunter, während Menschen aller Nationen Schwarz-Rot-Gold
feiern?
xiii
Die Flagge hänge dort „nicht wegen des Zweiten Weltkriegs, sondern wegen der deutschen Mannschaft:
Weil die deutsche Mannschaft ja nicht mehr richtig deutsch ist; das ist ja Multikulti, wir gehören dazu”,
erläuterte Bassal gegenüber der JF.
i
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xiv

Kaum geschehen, seien junge Leute aggressiv in seinen Laden gekommen und hätten ihm vorgeworfen,
er fördere den Nationalismus und wecke wieder Nazigefühle in den Deutschen
xv
In Berlin-Neukölln, dem Multikulti-Kiez par excellence. Vor allem Deutschtürken und Deutscharaber
staffieren ihre Läden schwarzrotgold aus. Das konnten die Szene-"Autonomen" vom schwarzen Block "Nie wieder Deutschland!" - natürlich nicht dulden. Der antifaschistische Kampf kennt keine Gnade, und
auch ein Kleinhändler aus dem Libanon kann ein gemeingefährlicher Flaggen-Nazi sein.
xvi
Nicht umsonst war im Dritten Reich die Fahne der deutschen Demokratie verboten.
xvii
Was habe ich denn bitte mit den Nazis zu tun?
xviii
"Für die Faschisten sind wir Ausländer und für die Autonomen…" - Bassal hält inne und denkt nach "keene Ahnung watt". (In this statement, the journalist transcribed Bassal’s switch to the Berlin dialect in
the second part of the sentence. This shows Bassal to be both fluent in standard German, but also in the
regional dialects of his German hometown.)
xix
Youssuf Bassal versteht die Welt nicht mehr: "Wir haben Verwandte, die dienen bei der Bundeswehr
und bei der Polizei. Deutschland hat uns aufgenommen, als wir aus dem Krieg im Libanon flüchten
mussten. Wir wissen, was wir unserer neuen Heimat zu verdanken haben. Und dann dieser Hass ..."
xx
Wir wenden uns gegen den medialen Diskurs, der uns beschuldigt, unsere Nachbar_innen zu
"Ausländern" zu machen. Nur einem dient die Debatte um den "Neuköllner Fahnenstreit": Dem Image
einer "weltoffenen" deutschen Nation!
xxi
Sie achten nicht auf Herkunft. Ihnen ist jeder Fahnenträger Nationalist und damit Feind.
xxii
Eine ältere Frau betritt den Elektroladen. Sie interessiert sich nicht wirklich für eine Handykarte oder ein
Fernsehkabel, sondern sie sagt: „Ich komme extra aus Wilmersdorf und wollte unbedingt diese Fahne
sehen.
xxiii
Den Deutschen werde oft nachgesagt, ihr Verhältnis zur eigenen Flagge sei mitunter verkrampft. Aber
wie schon beim Sommermärchen vor vier Jahren oder bei der Europameisterschaft vor zwei Jahren
hätten ehemalige Zuwanderer den "Bio-Deutschen", so Mutlut, gezeigt, wie man das Flaggezeigen
lockerer sehen könne. "Das Zeigen der Farben der deutschen Demokratie bei öffentlichen Anlässen wie
einer WM muss nicht unbedingt mit dumpfem Nationalismus zu tun haben", sagt der Grünen-Politiker.
xxiv
„Wir haben uns überlegt, was man machen könnte, um allen zu zeigen: ‚Wir gehören zusammen’“
xxv
Meine Position ist die, dass die Einheit der Deutschen verschiedener Herkunft und Religion hergestellt
werden muss.
xxvi
Die Fahne beweise „vorbildlich“, dass diejenigen, die sie aufgehängt hätten, bereit seien, „sich mit
unserem Land zu identifizieren“. „Daran könnten sich viele alteingesessene Berliner ein Beispiel
nehmen“, findet Dregger
xxvii
Allein das ist bemerkenswert: Eine arabische Familie hat ausgerechnet hier, in Neukölln, wo jeder
Fünfte ein Ausländer ist, wohl eine der größten Deutschlandfahnen im Land ausgerollt.
xxviii
Neukölln hat seit Jahren eine eher unrühmliche Bekanntheit als sozialer Brennpunkt erlangt. Die
Arbeitslosigkeit, ein geringer Bildungsgrad, ein hoher Ausländeranteil, Kriminalität und Armut sind hier
ausgeprägter als in anderen Bezirken. Es leben mehr als 300.000 Einwohner aus mehr als 160 Nationen
in Neukölln…. Der Fahnenstreit in der Sonnenallee passt nicht in dieses Neuköllnbild.
xxix
Wenige Straßen weiter liegt das berüchtigte Rollbergviertel, wo Gangs von jugendlichen, meist
libanesischen Intensivtätern ihr Unwesen treiben.... Die Bassal-Cousins haben ihre eigene Sicht der
Dinge. Sie verteidigen die deutsche Fahne.
xxx
Mit den drei Plüsch-Fußbällen auf dem viel zu großen Deutschland-Hut wirkt Ibrahim Bassal nicht
wirklich furchteinflößend, doch er meint es ernst. `„Wir werden unsere Fahne bis aufs Blut verteidigen,
die reißt uns keiner mehr runter“, sagt der 39-Jährige voller Pathos und deutet mit dem Zeigefinger auf

287

die scharz-rot-goldene Riesenfahne über seinem Elektroladen in der Sonnenallee des Berliner Bezirks
Neukölln: „Ab jetzt halten wir rund um die Uhr Wache.“
xxxi
Youssef Bassals Gesichtsfarbe changiert schon ein wenig ins Graugrünliche. Er hat nicht viel
geschlafen in den vergangenen Tagen—seit »diese komischen Deutschen« nachts vor seinem Laden in
Berlin-Neukölln aufkreuzen und ihm seine Fahne herunterreißen wollen. Er lächelt müde, aber zufrieden
wie einer, der einen gerechten Kampf ausficht. Bassal kämpft für die Ehre der deutschen Flagge: »Ich
werde diese Fahne verteidigen—und wenn ich überhaupt nicht mehr zum Schlafen komme!«
xxxii
"Wir sitzen hier jeden Abend mit zwei, drei Mann und schieben Nachtwache", erklärt [I.] Bassal. "Die
Fahne wird verteidigt bis zum letzten Atemzug."
xxxiii
Kahled Hossen, der die Flagge auf dem Dach befestigte, hat dafür sein Leben riskiert. Auch wenn
Autonome immer wieder an der Fahne zerren oder zündeln: "Wir werden sie auch immer wieder
reparieren."
xxxiv
Für den Grünen-Bildungspolitiker Özcan Mutlu stellt der bizarre Streit eine "verkehrte Welt" dar. "Es
wird erwartet, dass sich die Zuwanderer integrieren, aber wenn sie sich zu den Farben der Demokratie
bekennen, werden sie angegriffen", sagt Mutlu.
xxxv
Cousin Yussuf will helfen: «Wir können den Deutschen ein wenig Nationalstolz beibringen, Geschichte
hin oder her.»
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PART III: “FAILURES” OF INTEGRATION
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CHAPTER 6 – DESTRUCTIVE PRODUCTIVITY: THE SARRAZIN DEBATE
AND THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATING NON-CITIZENS

Just weeks after the national celebration of Germany’s immigrant patriots and
multi-ethnic national team emerged as a major theme of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the
release of politician and Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin’s book positing the
demographic demise of Germany triggered a nationwide debate on racism, immigration,
political correctness, and the effectiveness of German social policy. In the media sphere,
Sarrazin’s polemical book incited impassioned denunciations, cautious interest, and the
heralding of a brave harbinger of inconvenient truths even before its publication. The
firestorm of public responses peaked national interest and contributed to the book selling
out on the first day of its public release (Stein, 2012, p. 1). Over the following six weeks
of intensive public debate, the “Sarrazin debate” quickly morphed into an “integration
debate.” What began as a debate about the problematic nature of Sarrazin’s racially
charged arguments developed into a debate about migration policy and the integration
status of Muslim populations. The book, and the public debate it triggered, constituted a
contentious public event through which the boundaries and values of the nation were
discussed and consolidated. Whereas previous chapters focus on the celebration of
immigrants and “new Germans” in social marketing campaigns, sports integration
programs, and sporting nationalism, this chapter examines one of the most visible public
debates of the past decade in Germany to analyze the exclusionary side of integration
discourse. But while the emphasis in this chapter’s case shifts from celebration to
condemnation, both modes of integration discourse depend on the same theories defining
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the ideal political and economic conditions to secure the future of the German national
population.
This chapter critically examines patterns and themes of public discourse on
culture and integration and its role in constructing the normative national core and
managing difference. In particular, it analyzes the construction and fortification of
divisions between normative citizens and racialized groups including immigrants and
Muslim Germans—between integration failures and successes. The Sarrazin debate
demonstrates how divisions made using biopolitical logics fracture the population so that
the power to “make live” (Foucault, 2003) can be optimized by confining social ills to
particular segments of the population. To determine which rhetorical structures resonated
most strongly among his readership, I analyzed the reader reviews posted in response to
the book on Amazon.de. Of the 227 reviews posted during the first 8 weeks of the debate,
I selected for close textual analysis the 45 reviews that received over 100 votes from
other users as either “helpful” or “unhelpful.” Reviews were analyzed using the iterative
descriptive coding process outlined by Glaser and Straus (2006).
In addition, I examined articles discussing the book and the surrounding debate
published in Spiegel25 and the Bild. Sections from Sarrazin’s book were pre-circulated in
these two periodicals, placing them at the center of the debate. I conducted searches in
the online archives of Spiegel and Bild for the term “Sarrazin” from August 23, 2010,

25

Including the print Der Spiegel and Spiegel Online.
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when book excerpts were published in Spiegel and Bild, until October 31, 2010. Although
the discussions of the Sarrazin debate continue today, I consider the last major event of
the debate to be Angela Merkel’s declaration of the failure of multiculturalism on
October 16th, 2010. I included Amazon.de reviews posted until two days after Merkel’s
speech. To include reactions to Merkel’s speech, I followed news coverage until the end
of October. The initial periodical search returned 191 results on Bild.de and 243 results
from the Spiegel archives. I eliminated news stories that primarily summarized events
and public statements and I focused on features, commentaries, interviews, and letters-tothe-editor analyzing and debating Sarrazin’s book and the subsequent fallout from its
publication. This resulted in a collection of 46 items from the Bild and 36 items from Der
Spiegel. Press articles were studied to determine the overall development of the mediated
debate.

Table 5: Results for Sarrazin in Bild and Der Spiegel, Aug. 23—Oct. 31, 2010
Periodical

Article type

Bild

Total
46

Feature

6

Commentary/Analysis

28

Letter to the editor

7

Interview

5

Der Spiegel

536
Feature

216

Commentary/Analysis

19

Letter to the editor

6

Interview

5
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Total

982

The Book and its Debate
The book, Germany Does Away with Itself: How We Are Putting Our Country on
the Line (Deutschland schafft sich ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen), opens with a
laudatory statement on the success of the German people in rebuilding their nation from
the ashes of World War II and the “pride and faith in the solidity of its economic and
social models” that carried Germany through four global economic crises (Sarrazin,
2010a, p. 7). According to Sarrazin, the strong values and optimism of the German
people have allowed the nation to prosper and withstand the pressures of globalization.
Unfortunately, he claims, this optimism and success has “clouded the vision of
Germans,” preventing them from seeing the “hazards and putrefaction in the core of
society”i (2010a, p. 7). He attributes this putrefaction to the “quantitative and qualitative”
decline of the German population. The “quantitative decline” is due to the low birthrates
among ethnic Germans. The “qualitative decline” is related to the “ongoing proliferation
of the less stable, the less intelligent, and the less competent”ii (2010a, p. 11). This latter
problem is related, first, to the failure of the social system to properly incentivize hard
work and, second, to the “quality, structure, and cultural background of the migrants in
Germany,”iii (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 17). This, argues Sarrazin, has led to the overall decline
in values and abilities, or “human capital” (Foucault, 2008), that a society needs to be
successful.
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This argument illustrates the link between life and death in biopolitical
governmentality. Sarrazin posits that the excessive success in producing life, in the form
of economic, political, and social rebirth after the World War II, has lead Germans to
become complacent and to allow death to enter in the form of proliferating social
undesirables. As Sarrazin’s arguments show, the focus of biopower on life does not mean
that the function of sovereign power to wield death is eliminated. The flourishing of some
forms of national life (economic) has led to a neglect of other forms (reproductive). In the
introduction to his book, Sarrazin ventriloquizes an imagined “good German,” who
protests that quantitative decline of a national population need not be fatal. A small
nation can have advantages, this person might say. Sarrazin counters his imaginary “good
German” interlocutor, arguing that reproductive decline would not be fatal per se if not
for the simultaneous proliferation of the “wrong sort” of people—especially Muslim
minorities and immigrants. By establishing the wrong types of incentives through the
welfare system, the German state is held responsible for enabling these degenerate
populations to thrive.
Utilizing strategic aggregation and individuation of minority populations,
Sarrazin’s rhetoric facilitates the construction and subsequent condemnation of
congenitally degenerate demographics under the banner of individual responsibility.
Sarrazin reasons that if racism or xenophobia impeded the socioeconomic stability and
success of immigrants and minorities, then all people of color would be affected equally.
Indians and Vietnamese seem at least as foreign as Turks and Arabs and yet
demonstrate far greater success in our society. Causes for difficulties in school,
the job market and in society generally must, thus, be sought out within the
groups themselves; it must have something to do with their own behavior.iv
(Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 60)
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This false logic presumes that all difference from the norm is viewed equally by
normative society, that Germans view all traces of foreignness in the same light. Here,
the success and relatively positive preconceptions garnered by some minority groups
contest the existence of racism rather than representing racism’s other face. Sarrazin
develops this thread in another section of his book that praises European Jews for their
outstanding intelligence and socio-economic success. Sarrazin outlines the Jewish
involvement in the development of intelligence research, and the dismay of National
Socialists in the face of the superior average results of Jews as compared to German
gentiles. Sarrazin explains that he has “gone into detail on the Jewish-German origins of
intelligence research because the discussion of the genetic components of intelligence
often run into strong emotional resistance” (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 97). Raising the
involvement of Jewish researchers in answer to this “emotional resistance” only makes
sense if that resistance is a euphemism for anti-racist criticism. Sarrazin argues that the
participation of Jews in this research, as well as Nazi frustration with it, disproves
criticism of eugenics as racist. He bases this on the spurious assumption that minorities
are incapable of supporting racism. Sarrazin allays the emotional discomfort of readers
whose exposure to liberal ideals of tolerance may have sensitized them to react to claims
such as his. By the same stroke, he characterizes any criticism of his work as racist as
anti-rational.
By invoking positive assessments of Jews within Sarrazin's framework, he intends
to prove that it cannot be racist because it favors Jews, based on their supposedly
heightened intelligence. This evocation of Jews in Sarrazin’s book demonstrates the
narrowness of his view of racism. In the German context, the antisemitic past is taboo to
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the extent that even the word Jude often evokes discomfort (Mandel, 2008). Putting aside
for the moment the fact that Sarrazin’s essentialist philosemitism is not the opposite of
antisemitism but its twin, as Anne Norton (2013) argues, the history of the Jewish
Question in Europe was never simply a matter of the superiority or inferiority of Jews per
se. It was always a question of the nature and future of Europe and its nations. From
Spinoza to Marx, the Jewish question was “the axis on which” modern struggles over
politics, progress, secularism and faith turned (Norton, 2013, p. 2). Beginning with the
Enlightenment, Jews became a means of defining Europe, either as a tolerant place where
even non-Christians might flourish, or as a place under siege and threatened by outsiders
within.
Norton observes that the contemporary clash of civilizations narratives and their
liberal democratic detractors have followed much the same course with the figure of the
Muslim. Today, Norton writes, “Islam is marked as the preeminent danger to politics; to
Christians, Jews, and secular humanists; to women, sex, and sexuality; to the values and
institutions of the Enlightenment” (2013, pp. 2–3). For conservatives, they are a
potentially disloyal and incompatible threat, and for liberals they are an object of
tolerance—to be endured or saved—that reinforces the superiority of "Judeo-Christian"
liberalism. Sarrazin’s book does not mince words in singling out Muslims as his primary
target.
When I speak here about migrants, I am referring exclusively to migrants from
Muslim countries (Turkey, Africa, the Near and Middle East). They are the only
ones who, in large part, have language problems; at the same time, they make up a
considerable part of the lower classes and welfare population of Germany, and
their children have the biggest problems in the German education system. v
(2010a, p. 235)
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Sarrazin equates Muslims with “migrants,” and migrants here are synonymous with
social deficiency and the threat of the decline of Germany. Sarrazin’s use of Jews as a
shield against anti-racist critique only underscores the parallel with the past. As the figure
of the Jew defined the existential questions of Europe's past, so Muslims are mobilized
today. The past shows, however, that this role has potentially lethal consequences.
Sarrazin’s book draws on the legitimating force of scientific objectivity to present
a picture of reality, which he claims is kept secret by the soft-hearted liberals of the
political establishment in Germany. By focusing his analysis at the level of the
population, Sarrazin defines aggregate threats to the nation, while maintaining that, since
he is not speaking about the individual, his claims about the relative intelligence and
productivity of different demographic groups do not constitute a racial project. The
runaway success of Sarrazin’s book derives from its presentation of an “objectively
verified” account of reality that resonates with the intuitive theories of a large part of the
public, combined with a defensive scaffolding built on post-WWII color blindness and
resentment toward the processes of Vergangenheitsbewältigung26, which became part of
official politics in the Federal Republic during the late 1970s and 1980s.
Although Sarrazin’s book is by no means the first to focus on the threat posed by
the “failed integration” of Muslim immigrants and their children (see: Ates, 2008; Heisig,
2010; Hug, 2010; Kelek, 2006; Ulfkotte, 2003, 2010), the relatively quiet reception of

26

Lit. “coming to terms with the past”

297

other such works fueled the perception of the book as groundbreaking. Even though other
recent books from a similar perspective have achieved considerable success, none
received the kind of advanced circulation afforded Sarrazin. The high-visibility precirculation of book segments unleashed a heated debate in the media developed into a
full-scale media-hype. The debate triggered by the publication of Sarrazin’s book took
over the German media sphere in the last months of 2010. Years later, Sarrazin’s book
and the subsequent debate continue to symbolize struggles in Germany over ideals of
integration and the future of Germany as a multiethnic nation.
The first section of this chapter outlines the role of contentious public debate in
constructing and re-constructing social norms and regimes of knowledge. Using print
sources, it examines the trajectory of the debate in the mediated public sphere. The
second section analyzes the reader responses to the book and the debate on Amazon.de.
Responses to the book demonstrate the appeal of Sarrazin’s claims of rationality and
scientism in critiquing Muslims in Germany. They also reveal the strength of economic
logics of social value that hold that government interventions must prioritize free market
mechanisms for the regulation and optimization of the population. This reflects a
biopolitical approach to politics and governance, which uses neoliberal logics and
technologies to selectively cultivate the life of the population (Lemke, 2011, p. 60). The
Sarrazin debate revealed biopolitical social logics that divide the population according to
their supposed potential for integration, which is to say, their potential for productivity
within German society. According to this discourse, productivity is a universal social
good, and thus, apolitical. Meanwhile, anti-racist critiques of Sarrazin are characterized
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as politically motivated, irrational attempts to subvert hard facts by exploiting German
guilt about the past.

The Scandal is a Scandal
The Sarrazin debate does not fit neatly into the categories of media events or
media scandal. While the Sarrazin debate is certainly about the adjudication of social
norms and morality, it is not a scandal in the traditional sense which implies the making
public of morally transgressive private acts (Lull & Hinerman, 1997, p. 8). These acts are
often of a sexual or criminal nature and typically involve celebrities and politicians,
although they may also involve corporations or public institutions. They are highly
personalized and often focus a magnifying attention on the implicated public figures,
turning them into characters. The Sarrazin debate is a scandal composed entirely of ideas
in circulation, revolving around the hero-martyr character embodied by Sarrazin. The
scope of the debate was centripetal, expanding from the figure of Sarrazin to encompass
the German nation and even the “Western World.” What exactly constituted the
fundamental transgression of the Sarrazin debate was contested. In the initial wave of
public reaction, the transgression was the defamatory and racist nature of Sarrazin’s
claims. The backlash against this initial scandal, however, held that the true transgression
was the characterization of Sarrazin’s arguments as defamatory and racist. In short, in the
backlash created by Sarrazin supporters, the scandal itself was the true scandal.
Although the most commonly theorized media scandals are sparked by a material
or embodied occurrence—whether an accident with an uncertain cause, or the revelation
of an ethical transgression by a public figure or institution—the event of the scandal itself
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is always fundamentally a phenomenon of communication. Following Deleuze, Paul
Patton writes that there are "two realms of being, a material realm of bodies and states of
affairs and an incorporeal realm of events. Events are expressed by means of language, in
statements, but they are attributes of bodies and physical states of affairs" (1997b, p. 3).
The corporeal is implicated here, but it is in communication that the corporeal is made
meaningful, and where the potential for change resides. Patton continues to explain that
events are the secondary effect of “corporeal causal interactions: they do not affect bodies
and states of affairs but they do affect other events, such as the responses and actions of
agents. Pure events are both the expressed of statements and the ‘sense’ of what happens”
(1997b, p. 3). The material occurrences of mediated scandals are only made meaningful
in description. Action as embodied occurrence only becomes social, and thus political,
through communication.
While this is true in a strict sense, it is important not to limit the conception of
communication to the verbal. Gesture, the aural and the visual are no less potent forms of
communication than the verbal, although their semantic openness may be more apparent.
However, this chapter, as well as most of this dissertation, is limited to written forms of
communication. Although this encompasses only a fraction of what contributed to the
“sense” of what the Sarrazin debate meant, this fraction was intentionally constructed to
communicate. In written communication, the strategic logics of the affair as it unfolded

300

are still available, often in their original form.27 This is particularly appropriate in the
case of the Sarrazin debate, since, from the outset the scandal consisted of a struggle over
the moral implications of social critiques depending on cultural and racial differentialism.
This type of communication event is located in the social imaginary, but not in the sense
of the imaginary that is opposed to the real. These “collective assemblages of enunciation
might be regarded as a materialist concept of the social imaginary” (Patton, 1997a, p. 30).
This study focuses on a portion of this assemblage of enunciation which remains
accessible in an inscribed form.
Peter Vasterman broadens the focus of literature on visibility and on
concentrations of media attention to offer a theoretical framework for what he calls
“media-hype” (2005). Vasterman centers his framework on the multiplying effects of the
media to account for their impact on common knowledge and political opinion through a
process of social amplification (2005, p. 513). “Media-hype can…be defined as a mediagenerated, wall-to-wall news wave, triggered by one specific event and enlarged by the
self-reinforcing processes within the news production of the media” (Vasterman, 2005, p.
515). The chain reaction of media-hype begins with a “key event” that triggers more
attention than usual for a variety of reasons. The broadness of this definition is
intentional, since the trigger of increased attention is often unpredictable. In the case of

Amazon.de reviews may be edited by reviewers after they are posted. These changes cannot be
tracked by other users. The earliest reviews will often acknowledge that they updated and
expanded their original reviews after finishing to read the book.
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the Sarrazin debate, the kinds of statements and claims about Muslim immigrants that
triggered the hype were not uncommon in the public sphere.28 Yet, its supporters hailed
Sarrazin’s book as fresh, brave and unprecedented. While, as some critics pointed out, the
theses themselves were far from unprecedented (Al-Wazir, 2010), the wave of media
hype unleashed by the pre-circulation of book excerpts in the media supported the
impression that there was something particularly shocking or unexpected about Sarrazin’s
claims.
The key event in the Sarrazin affair was the pre-circulation of sections from the
book in Germany’s most popular newspaper and magazine, the Bild and Der Spiegel, the
week before its general publication. The ability of Sarrazin’s agents to arrange this highprofile debut was likely predicated on Sarrazin’s demonstrated ability to generate mediahype. An unapologetic polemicist, Sarrazin caused a smaller-scale scandal in 2009 that
foreshadowed the arguments he would make in his book. In an interview with the
magazine Lettre International, Sarrazin stated, “I do not have to recognize anyone who
lives off the state, rejects this state, does not properly provide for the education of their
children and constantly produces new little headscarf girls” (Berberich & Sarrazin, 2009,
p. 197). This earlier scandal paved the way for Sarrazin’s 2010 debut, since, as
Vasterman observes, even after the decline of a news wave, media-hype facilitates the
generation of subsequent news waves because of the public’s heightened sensitivity

See, for example, the Ich denke an Deutschland conference inaugurated in 2009, which posed the
question, “When will we have finally gone too far?” http://www.denkichandeutschland.net/24.htm.
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regarding the topic (2005, p. 515). Bild is a tabloid that has a daily circulation of over 3.5
million as of 2010, making it the highest circulating periodical not only in Germany, but
also in all of Europe. From its establishment in 1952, Bild has taken a strong conservative
and nationalist editorial stance. It has long been the target of criticism for its unmatched
influence on politics and the German social imaginary. Bild takes unambiguous stands on
issues and encourages readers to act. One of the paper’s slogans, “Bild dir deine
Meinung” is a play on words meaning “form your own opinion.” In addition to boasting
the highest readership, Bild received more reprimands than any other paper from the
Deutscher Pressrat, Germany’s independent press watch group.29 Although publishing in
Bild provided the maximum quantitative audience for Sarrazin’s work, the paper’s wellknown rightwing populist stance might have allowed the book to be dismissed as merely
another populist provocation.
In contrast to Bild, Der Spiegel distinguishes itself as a national standard of
investigative journalism. Der Spiegel has employed fact checkers since its establishment
in 1947 and currently maintains one of the world’s largest fact checking departments
(Silverman, 2010). Although Der Spiegel has its own history of muckraking and political
maneuvering, it remains one of Germany’s periodicals of reference. Der Spiegel is one of
two sources that is most widely read by German journalists, making it is one of the most
important “orientation media” nationwide (Weischenberg, Malik, & Scholl, 2006, p.
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Since 2006, Bild has been reprimanded over 50 times (“Deutscher Presserat : 2006-2013,” n.d.)
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359). In addition, Spiegel Online, which operates independently from the magazine
counterpart and does not overlap in terms of content, is the second most visited news site
in the German media sphere behind BILD.de (Stein, 2012, p. 36). Publishing in Der
Spiegel lent legitimacy and seriousness to Sarrazin’s claims, making them difficult to
dismiss out of hand. By pre-circulating excerpts in Bild and Der Spiegel, Sarrazin was
guaranteed maximum visibility. Both publications debuted different excerpts on August
23, 2010, and Bild continued to publish a new excerpt every day for a week.
The published sections in Bild and Der Spiegel set the terms for the debate, and
by hitting on a number of hot-button issues unleashed a critical reaction which was
anticipated in the book, and thus strengthened the rhetorical position of the work rather
than undermined it. The “news theme” (Vasterman, 2005) framing the discussion
accepted Sarrazin’s claim—stated in the first section published in Bild and repeated
elsewhere—that the facts and ideas he presented were taboo and that political correctness
prevented their discussion in the public sphere. The rhetorical terms set by Sarrazin that
became the news theme and ensured that any criticism could be construed as confirming
his basic premise. Sarrazin’s leadership position and the hyper-visibility of the text with
its transparent racial provocations demanded responses from public figures, which
contributed to a “positive feedback loop” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 513) generating new
events on which to base stories.
The media sought and published responses from the institutions associated with
Sarrazin, building “interactive media momentum” (Vasterman, 2005). As is typical in
media-hype, the “huge news hunt generates all kinds of responses in society, varying
from individuals reporting similar experiences to statements from official sources and
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interest groups, using the opportunity to promote their views or to announce actions”
(Vasterman, 2005, p. 515). The initial reaction from politicians and public figures was
strongly critical. Indeed, chancellor Angela Merkel made a statement just two days after
the first segments were published, calling them “highly offensive, defamatory, and
polemical” (“Umstrittene Thesen zu Migration,” 2010). Criticism of Sarrazin grew
stronger after an interview with Berliner Morgenpost in which he responded to a question
about the existence of a “genetic identity” that,

“all Jews share a particular gene,

Basques have particular genes, that distinguish them from others”vi (“Thilo Sarrazin—
‘Ich bin kein Rassist,’” 2010). The claim of the existence of a “Jewish gene” sparked
immediate condemnation across the political spectrum (Friedrich, 2011, p. 11). It is
important to note, however, that almost without exception even Sarrazin’s harshest critics
affirmed the value of debating “problems of integration.”
The comment asserting the existence of a Jewish gene, although relatively neutral
compared to Sarrazin’s statements about the inherited intelligence deficits of Muslims,
ignited a new controversy that ensured Sarrazin’s dominance in news coverage across the
media sphere. Although the plausible deniability of the racist theories informing
Sarrazin’s work was maintained by his supporters, Sarrazin’s remark about a “Jewish
gene” crossed the line of deniability for a German public particularly sensitive to
antisemitism after what one journalist euphemistically called, “those murderous twelve
years” (Baum, 2010). While holding firm to the claims of his book, he expressed regret
for broaching the topic of the Jewish gene and the comment was considered a mere gaffe
by Sarrazin’s supporters (Broder, 2010). Reacting to the controversy, the Bundesbank
board and Bundespresident Wullf asked for and received Sarrazin’s resignation from his
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seat on the board of the Bundesbank. The progress of these public reactions and calls to
action provided new opportunities for news outlets to publish on the story as breaking
news.
With the initial backlash keeping the story at the top of the news agenda,
Sarrazin’s book sold faster than it could be printed for the first several weeks after its
publication. Just as importantly, the public condemnation affirmed Sarrazin’s selfpositioning as a teller of “uncomfortable truths,” since, intuitively, if his arguments were
already part of public discussions on the social issues they would not have raised such a
strong backlash. In confirming this assertion, the counter-arguments of Sarrazin’s critics
gained little purchase and the terms of the debate were set as those he had proposed.
Furthermore, this feedback loop provided the counter-opinion necessary to create
uncertainty as to the meaning of Sarrazin’s statements. This uncertainty is necessary for a
story to sustain interest and instigate a public conversation. As Bird writes, “the scandal
story… is not clear and closed, but ‘open’ allowing for many competing versions and
interpretations. As people speculate, they tend to look for answers in their own
experience” (1997, p. 109). Without the condemnation from public figures, Sarrazin’s
statements probably would have faded from public attention.
In the wake of the stark criticism followed a backlash and growing support for
Sarrazin’s arguments and for “freedom of opinion.” This development began already in
the early days of outrage, as media outlets repeatedly reported on the unprecedented
responses from their audiences, mostly in support of Sarrazin (Friedrich, 2011, p. 12). As
the reports of public support for Sarrazin’s work piled up and the book sold out even
before it could hit the shelves, opinions among the elite shifted and discourse refocused
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on the need to respect the feelings of “the people”—referring to the normative German
public. Merkel significantly softened her position less than two weeks after the initial precirculation, saying that although she still maintained that Sarrazin’s work was not helpful
for the integration debate, acknowledgement of the statistically proven elevated tendency
toward violence among devout Muslim youths should not be taboo: “It is a big problem,
and we can talk openly about it without raising the suspicion of xenophobia”
(“Integrationsdebatte ohne Tabus,” 2010). In this interview in Bild’s Sunday edition,
Merkel confirmed the existence of a “taboo” against the discussion of the social
deficiencies of a given group. She went on to warn against the association of violence
with any specific religion, saying that,
Violence by young people is often a sign that they don't see any prospects for
themselves. Only education, education, education can help with that. Our
government is making a lot of offerings in that regard, but the first responsibility
lies with the parents, from which school and society can't relieve them. vii (Merkel,
2010)
Although Merkel attempted to soften and reframe the links that the Bild’s questions
repeatedly proposed between criminality and unemployment and people with a Turkish
and Arab or Muslim background, her reframing did not challenge Bild’s conclusions,
including claims that minorities are threatening and intimidating the police. Her
responses supported an interventionist approach by the government to regulate immigrant
and minority compliance with integration demands, while denying the existence of social
and structural inequality as causes of the poor prospects for minority youth. While
affirming that the state needs to and does provide appropriate education, Merkel located
ultimate responsibility in the private sphere of the family.
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While continuing to deny the value of Sarrazin’s contribution, Merkel adopted the
language and assumptions that framed Sarrazin’s text, implicitly sanctioning the
fundamental validity of his claims about the dangers of failed integration and political
correctness. Without explicitly singling out any group, Merkel mirrored the deficit
narratives proposed in Bild’s questions.
We can expect from those who come here that they integrate into our society, that
they learn our language. That men make it possible for their wives to take part in
societal life, that girls be allowed to go on class trips and take part in physical
education classes. Violence in schools and other deplorable situations must be
openly discussed. Concealment only strengthens prejudice. (Merkel, 2010)
Merkel’s comments frame integration as a problem of minority values and behaviors
clashing with German norms of gender equality, female empowerment, and adherence to
the law. Merkel reproduces Orientalist tropes of the despotic and patriarchal Muslim
(Said, 1979), strengthening the distinction between “our” peaceful and egalitarian
Western norms and “their” Oriental culture. By condemning the most obviously
egregious parts of Sarrazin’s discourse, the racialized assumptions underlying Merkel’s
framing of the enforcement of integration are normalized. Although she resists naming
any particular group, the centuries old familiarity of European publics with latent
Orientalist tropes upholding the fundamental cultural distinction and incompatibility of
East and West is such that no group need be explicitly named. Merkel went a step further
in October, attracting international attention with her claim that “multiculturalism is a
failure” (“Integration,” 2010, “Lob und Empörung,” 2010), a claim she and her fellow
party leaders have made repeatedly over the years. The speed of this rhetorical shift, from
outright condemnation to implicit validation, shows the power of the public backlash
against the initial public condemnation of Sarrazin’s work. This rapid convergence also
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suggests that the forms of knowledge held by Sarrazin’s supporters and his critics were
not as distinct as a polarized understanding of the debate suggests.
The one premise that neither critics nor supporters of Sarrazin disputed in the
media coverage was the idea that “integration problems” were a serious concern in
Germany that needed to be openly and aggressively addressed in policy. In the articles
examined, only one person denied the fundamental premise of “integration” as a social
issue. In an interview with Spiegel Online, white German actor Peter Lohmeyer was
interviewed about the role of soccer in personal and national identity. When asked about
the meaning of the German-Turkish Euro-Cup soccer qualifying match for “integration
debate,” Lohmeyer responded, “Integration discussions really get on my nerves. You
don’t have to talk about it, integration just happens. Period” (“EM-Qualifikation
Deutschland,” 2010). With this exception, “integration” was broadly accepted as an issue
demanding serious scrutiny and debate. In the corpus of articles, integration is never
directly defined, but is outlined by certain associations and indicators: educational
achievement, employment status, and language proficiency are chief among them.
Integration is conceptualized as a personal choice to value education and take
responsibility for economic productivity. In other words, integration is the choice to
dedicate one’s scarce resources to the development of one’s human capital, to be an
effective “entrepreneur of the self” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). Like the notion of
integration itself, the subject of integration is poorly defined but implicitly understood.
The figure of the integrant is referenced by terms such as migrant, immigrant, Muslim,
Turk, Arab, foreigner, and foreign co-citizen. Little or no distinction is made between the
immigrant generations and their German-born descendants, or between foreign nationals
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and German citizens. Supporters and detractors of Sarrazin proposed different sources of
the presumed failure of Muslim populations to achieve integration. While all agreed that
the state should invest in special educational measures for migrants, Sarrazin’s detractors
focused almost entirely on education while supporters demanded that the government
intervene and enforce integration.
The difference between detractors and supporters can be interpreted in terms of
two approaches to neoliberal social politics that Foucault identifies in his 1978 lectures
entitled, The Birth of Biopolitics (2008). Sarrazin’s critics emphasize the need for
maintaining the social protections present in notions of Vitalpolitik (vital politics) that
originated in the German and Austrian “ordoliberal” school of economics.30 Developed
starting in the 1930s, ordoliberal economists developed a new theory of liberalism which
was later implemented as the basis of the post-war political and economic system in West
Germany. Like other forms of neoliberalism, Vitalpolitik accepts and promotes the
extension of the economy to the entire social field, but in addition it maintains the need
for compensating for what is cold, calculating, and mechanical in the economic field of
competition. Philosopher and public intellectual, Richard David Precht (2010) most
clearly encapsulates this approach in his commentary in Der Spiegel identifying a “social
war”—not in terms of a Huntington-style “clash of civilizations,” but in terms of either a
“social” or “dissocial” approach to the economy. Precht calls for a morally sensitive “new

30

The concept of neoliberalism was coined by the German Ordoliberal school (Foucault, 2008).
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idea of growth” centered on measures of happiness. This view resonates with the German
neoliberal version of enterprise society that is “a society for the market and a society
against the market” in that it is oriented towards the market while compensating for the
market’s effects on social values (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). The approach of Sarrazin’s
critics maintains ordoliberalism’s concern for the socially corrosive effects of market
rationality without questioning the economic premises underlying Sarrazin’s work.
In contrast, Sarrazin’s supporters did not accept the ambivalence towards market
rationality inherent in German ordoliberal social politics. As I examine in more detail
below, they saw the social protections it proposes as a hindrance to the proper function of
economic rationality at all levels of the social body. Yet, the call among Sarrazin
supporters was not merely against political intervention in migration and integration, but
rather for interventions that support economic rationality in every aspect of social life,
and most intimately and most urgently, in choices about reproduction. Across the
spectrum of opinion in Der Spiegel and Bild, the question is not whether the state should
intervene to compel the “integration” of transnational populations, but how it should do
so.

Scandal and Online Review Forums
In addition to direct communication with traditional media in the form of letters to
the editor, calls, and comments on online versions of stories, members of the public
registered their reactions on the internet on book review forums. The book review forums
of the internet provided a neutral ground for public response. The first reviews of the
book were posted on Amazon.de within 24 hours of the publication of the first book
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excerpts. Amazon provided a provided a public space for rejoinder moderated primarily
by readers themselves. Unlike the comment sections of online news articles in which the
content of the article guides comments, book review sites allow readers and members of
the public more latitude in the topic and length of their responses. Amazon.de also
includes mechanisms for the public to weigh in on whether the reviews are “helpful” and
to respond directly to reviews.
Internet-based communication allows individual users to achieve a level of
visibility that approaches and sometimes exceeds that of the traditional media. Castells
argues that politics is primarily media politics and that, although “the media are not the
holders of power… they constitute by and large the space where power is decided”
(2007, p. 242). As such, mediated communication plays a fundamental role in the
formation of “the public mind.” For this reason, Castells sees the establishment of
internet-based communication, or what he calls “mass self-communication,” as the basis
of a historical change in the terrain of politics and “counter-power” (2007). The
overwhelming majority of the reviewers of Sarrazin’s book on Amazon.de position
themselves, like the book itself, against what they portray as the German political
establishment.
The Sarrazin debate was so successful because, for supportive reviewers, it
replayed a narrative of beleaguered truth-teller, risking condemnation to speak truth to
power. Sarrazin prepared the ground for this narrative and his credibly was, thus,
increased by his critics. Sarrazin’s critics undermined his theories and analysis, but failed
to provide an equally compelling narrative. As Tomlinson (1997) observes, media
scandals are “middle-order moral events” that function to regulate the unspoken moral
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foundations of a community, providing “contexts for ‘communal’ moral reflection and
debate in modern secular societies” (1997, p. 68). Major moral issues, from starvation
and genocide to climate change are difficult to personalize. They are not easily connected
to or instantiated in the behavior of symbolic individuals. Instead, these high-order events
are so unwieldy that they tend to produce a retreat from moral engagement. In contrast,
scandal attracts and requires the active engagement of people to materialize as an event.
The success of scandal as a middle-order moral event depends in part on the narratability
of scandal, that is, the potential of scandal to be converted into a story with symbolically
significant characters.
In the case at hand, the most significant character was Sarrazin himself. Sarrazin
strategically placed himself as a champion of truth beginning with the epigraph of his
book, which was also opened the first excerpt published in Bild. The epigraph is a quote
from one of the founders of the German Social Democratic Party, Ferdinand Lassalle,
that states, “all political small-mindedness consists of the silencing and concealment of
that which is.”31 This quote sets up the antagonism that Sarrazin expands in the following
text between the champions of truth and reality and the well-intentioned but cowardly
apologists for the true causes of social denigration. Sarrazin’s acquiescence to calls for
his resignation from the Bundesbank completed his transformation into a “martyr” of
political correctness (“Sarrazin-Rücktritt,” 2010).

31

“Alle politische Kleingeisterei besteht in dem Verschweigen und Bemänteln dessen, was ist.”
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If scandal’s particular enduring appeal as a narrative form lies in its ability to help
“people structure their view of what the world is and how it should be” (Bird, 1997, p.
102), the next question is what view of the world a given scandal produces. One of the
most salient features of the Sarrazin affair evident in the Amazon.de reviews is the
personal investment of reviewers in defending the core arguments raised by Sarrazin’s
work. As Tomlinson writes, “what claims priority in our selective attention… is those
experiences that speak most directly to the way in which we continuously narrate our
‘selves’ to ourselves” (1997, p. 73). The Sarrazin debate reveals a clash between political
discourses of tolerance and multiculturalism and the self-narration of many Germans,
which, as reader responses indicated, found its expression in Sarrazin’s portrayal of
Germany’s problems. The magnitude and content of the response suggests that the
backlash against Sarrazin’s perspective piqued the ire of Germans who were weary of the
perceived taboos around cultural differentialism that are seen as a lingering punishment
for the crimes of the Nazi period.

Biopolitical Truth in Reader Responses
Of the 840 reviews published on Amazon.de as of December 28, 2015, more than
a quarter were written within the first two months of the initial pre-circulation of book
excerpts. After five years, new reviews and discussions continue to be added regularly,
although much less frequently than in the early months. This analysis focuses on reviews
published during the critical first two months. Of the 227 reviews posted in the period
August 23-October 18, 2010, the highest impact reviews (those with over 100 votes
registered in response to the question, “Was this review helpful to you?”) were selected
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for close textual analysis assisted by descriptive coding. The great majority of all reviews
posted as of the end of 2015 gave the book the maximum possible score of 5 stars; 82%
of reviews assigned the book four or five stars. Mirroring the opinions expressed in the
review scores, positive reviews were much more likely to earn positive user feedback in
terms of the votes for the review’s helpfulness. Most voters rated negative reviews as
unhelpful. Because negative reviews were more likely to attract high numbers of
(negative) votes, one-star reviews were heavily over-represented in the selected corpus
(table 6). A representative sample of 45 reviews would have included 31 five-star
reviews, 7 four-star reviews, 3 three-star reviews, 1.5 two-star reviews, and 3 one-star
reviews. The overrepresentation of negative reviews in my sample amplified oppositional
opinions that would have been lost in a representative sample.
Table 6: Reviews on Amazon.de that Received Over 100 Votes, Aug. 23-Oct. 18, 2010
Rating
5 Stars
4 Stars
3 Stars
2 Stars
1 Star
Total

Number of
Reviews
27
2
2
1
13
45

Helpful Votes

Unhelpful Votes

11,021
472
819
84
1,368

2,332
96
188
295
2,766

Percentage
Voted Helpful
83
83
81
28
33

While a diversity of opinion is expressed across the body of texts, several themes
predominate. These themes relate to the politics of truth, economics and the dysfunction
of the state’s welfare policies, and the need to exercise and protect the democratic values
of German society. Although the importance of Sarrazin’s most racially charged claims
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was frequently minimized, reviews often defended the validity of such claims using
economic and statistical facts. The reviews, as a corpus, represent an impassioned
defense of society based on a purportedly dispassionate rationality of facts and figures.
The threat to society, as it is constructed here, is not just integration-refusing immigrants,
but more fundamentally, the welfare state that perpetuates this failure to integrate. The
reviewers assert the democratic sovereignty of the people, as represented by the
outpouring of public support for Sarrazin, to check the over-reach of the government.
One of the most common themes repeated in reviews was the strength of the
book’s truth-value, which was based on logic and statistical fact. Reviewers frequently
stated that these statistics and facts are widely known and accepted, yet they also claimed
that they are “swept under the rug” (CyberCynic, 2010) by the liberal elite.
The data presented in the book shows a sad truth, that is well supported by
statistics. Namely, the rejection by some immigrants of the simplest basic rules:
the learning of a foreign language as well as the observance of the laws and rules
of the host society.viii (Olli R., 2010)
In his book, Sarrazin draws on broadly recognized investigations, studies,
scientists and, without exception, on serious sources. He collects statistics,
evaluates them and draws his conclusions in a dispassionate, objective way. As
such, it has less to do with “opinions,” but rather with conclusions about things
that are already known.ix (CyberCynic, 2010)
People accuse Sarrazin that his numerical data are all wrong. As a board member
of the Bundesbank, Sarrazin has access to the best available statistical material.
He would hardly leave himself open, with false data on the birth rates of Turkish
migrant women in relation to German academics.x (Chartleser, 2010)
Sarrazin was described as a disinterested and rational professional, characteristics that
lend legitimacy to his interpretation of the data. In fact, reviewers used the abundance of
data to marginalize Sarrazin’s interpretive role. As one reviewer assessed, “the author has
brought together many facts, that speak a clear language”xi (Naoko, 2010). The
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mechanisms of knowledge invoked to validate Sarrazin’s thesis involve tools of
quantification to analyze and diagnose society. In Foucault’s 1978-79 lectures on the
birth of biopolitics, Foucault emphasizes the need to determine “under what conditions
and with what effects a veridiction is exercised, that is to say... a type of formulation
falling under particular rules of verification and falsification” (2008, p. 36). Foucault is
not interested in empirical truth per se, but rather in the regimes of veridiction that enable
truth claims to be made and widely accepted regardless of their empirical validity. While
the debate often focused on proving or disproving Sarrazin’s data, the most important
part of the debate was its function, not the validity of the science itself. The debate was
and is important because of how it established biopolitics as the relevant mode of
knowledge about society and its Others.
In examining the rise of biopolitics, Foucault identifies the rise of a regime of
truth based on political economy. In his lectures from 1975-1976, Foucault (2003)
defines biopolitics as the massifying mode of power, aimed at the level of the population,
as opposed to disciplinary forms that regulate at the level of the individual. The goal of
biopower is to achieve equilibrium, regularity, and homeostasis across the social body. It
involves a set of processes such as the ratio of birth to death, the rate of reproduction, the
fertility of the population, and it introduces new mechanisms including forecasts,
statistical estimates, and overall measures (Foucault, 2003, p. 246). The goal of these
mechanisms is to cultivate “the power to make live” to optimize the state of life
(Foucault, 2003, p. 247). In seeking to trace the development of biopower in his later
lectures, Foucault turns to the strategic logics of the market and political economy (see
also Chapter 2). With the rise of capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, the market
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moved from being the domain of jurisdiction (justice) to the site of the formation of truth.
In this, the government shifted away from being the arbiter of justice in the market.
Instead, the market took over the determination of what qualifies as good governance.
“The market determines that a good government is no longer quite simply one that is
just…The market must tell the truth (dire le vrai); it must tell the truth in relation to
governmental practice” (Foucault, 2008, p. 32). Foucault calls these two heterogeneous
systems the revolutionary axiomatic, which operates according to public law and the
rights of man, and the empirical and utilitarian, “which defines the sphere of
independence of the governed on the basis of the necessary limitation of government”
(2008, p. 43). Although these regimes of truth are heterogeneous, between them exists “a
ceaseless connection and a whole series of bridges, transits, and joints” (Foucault, 2008,
p. 43). As with universalist and particularist approaches to culture (see Introduction),
while there are clear distinctions between the logic of each, they often work together to
maintain hegemonic norms.
Both systems of truth with their attendant moral schemata are present in the
tensions of the Sarrazin debate. However, it is the empirical and utilitarian approach that
supportive reviewers focus on most heavily. The axiomatic approach does emerge,
however, in the form of the defense of German democratic values that are under threat
from demographic changes favoring the Muslim population. In explaining why Sarrazin
should not be compared to the extreme right, one reviewer wrote:
The NPD [German National Party] is an undemocratic party; Sarrazin, however,
speaks precisely to the point that with migrants from Turkish and Arab countries
undemocratic and anti-human rights tides are infiltrating Germany. Sarrazin has
absolutely nothing against a Turkish migrant who respects German laws, learns
the German language, and feeds his own family.xii (Müller-Güldemeister, 2010)
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When the axiomatic paradigm appears in these reviews, it is often in the context of
defending German moral and demographic values from “incompatible” cultures, which
are epitomized by Turks, Arabs, and Muslims generally. This mode of governance and
social distinction aligns with what Wallerstein (2006) calls “European universalism,”
which, building on a clash of civilizations narrative, holds that Western civilizations are
superior to their Others because they are the only ones based on universal values of
equality and human rights. This comment also shows that the perceived anti-democratic
ideology of Muslim immigrants can be construed as aligning them with the German far
right. Finally, the reviewer upholds the fairness of critiquing the inferior values of Turks
and Arabs by claiming that individuals may act independently and distance themselves
from the statistically proven tendencies of their group. By adhering to the legal, culturallinguistic, and economic norms of German society a Turkish immigrant does not pose a
threat.
Sarrazin supporters also frame anti-racist criticism an existential threat to German
society.
Leaving aside Thilo Sarrazin's sometimes rather coarse articulations, the book
delivers above all verifiable facts that should serve as the basis for a discussion on
necessary changes in our integration politics….in no way do I see his writing as
an inflammatory smear that could serve to threaten the social peace in Germany.
On the contrary: a man writes here, who talks not of assimilation but of
integration, who is primary driven by worries about the future of our country, and
who wants to dissolve the unspeakablility of the clash of cultures by clearly
naming the existing conflicts.xiii (Ulrich Groh, 2010)
Topics that are of true existential significance for our society—and not to forget—
for our children are covered with thought and speech bans. Transgressions are
very effectively punished by the racism cudgel or by banishment to the dirty
brown corner.”xiv (W. F. Schmidt, 2010)
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There have been many attempts to reduce Sarrazin’s very thoroughly presented
self-evident [arguments] to xenophobia. Whoever argues this has not read the
book. Whoever gets drawn into such an argument is squandering our historical
last chance to turn things around and prevent irreparable changes that mean an
uncertain future for us and our children.xv (P. Schmitz, 2010)
Anti-racist discourses here are construed as posing a threat to life and democracy by
silencing the truth necessary to protect German society into the future. In complementary
ways, these reviews deny the racial project of Sarrazin’s work. Here, it is not racism that
threatens German democracy, but rather anti-racist discourses that prevent the
acknowledgement of the real threats to democracy.
The tensions and contradictions inherent in these logics follow, in part, from the
economic and political logics that developed in the Federal Republic after the World War
II. As Foucault demonstrates, the “ordoliberal” (German neo-liberal) economic
philosophy that formed the basis of West German post-war economic policies was based
on the rejection of Nazi economic policy, which was conceived as the consolidation of
four economic policies that had operated before the war: a protected economy, state
socialism, economic planning, and Keynesian interventionism. “Faced with the Nazi
system, the theoretical, speculative coup de force of the German neo-liberals was not to
say, as most people did at the time, and especially the Keynesians: The economic system
the Nazis are setting up is a monstrosity” (Foucault, 2008, p. 109). Instead, ordoliberals
posited that Nazism demonstrated the culmination of the economic logics of these four
economic approaches. The thread that links these approaches is the state’s control over
economic processes. “Since Nazism shows that the defects and destructive effects
traditionally attributed to the market economy should instead be attributed to the state and
its intrinsic defects and specific rationality, then the analyses must be completely
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overturned” (Foucault, 2008, p. 116). The resulting ideal is an inversion: a state
supervised by the market as opposed to a market supervised by the state. Sarrazin aligns
himself with these postwar ideals of a state that directs its interventions according to the
market, and those postwar ideals are firmly associated with Germany’s post-fascist
reconstruction as an exemplary democratic nation.
In Sarrazin’s book and in reviewers’ responses, the misdirected interventions of
the state are the fundamental social and economic barrier preventing democracy—in the
form of the sovereign will of the people—and market rationality from working to solve
the nation’s problems. Reviewers do not denounce government intervention at large, but
only intervention that limits liberty and inhibits the regulatory effects of the market. They
call instead for more active interventions to enforce market rationality, which, in this
view, necessitates integration. One reviewer praised Germany Does Away with Itself as
A long-overdue, rousing book that underpins with numbers where our
government’s laissez-faire [policies] and especially the one-sided media reporting
with its multicultural glorification and prescribed bleeding heart idealism
(Gutmenschentum) has gotten Germany.xvi (Franziska G., 2010)
The unwillingness of government to make active interventions to ensure the future life of
the German population is interpreted as resulting from German guilt over the Nazi past.
Not only are comparisons of Sarrazin’s theories with the eugenics of the Nazi period
dismissed as invalid, guilt about the Nazi period actually threatens the German
population:
We live here in an absolute suck-up society. We stand in the middle of absolute
chaos and our dear politicians silence what is going on here to death. Why?
Because they want to play the nice Germans, the perfect Germans for the whole
world, but don’t have things under control in any way. And why should we and
our children still held responsible for things that someone hatched decades ago.xvii
(S. Staufen-Breisach “Halleluja,” 2010)
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Here, the government’s excess is evident, on the one hand, in the anti-racist political
correctness that seeks to limit the free speech of citizens who speak out against
immigrants and minorities and, on the other, in the welfare state’s meddling with the
proper functioning of the market system. In this view, “social policy cannot have equality
as its objective. On the contrary, it must let inequality function” (Foucault, 2008, p. 143).
This vision of equality is that inequality is the same for all. In this regard, the United
States is invoked as a more appropriate model. In the U.S., social benefits are more
limited and unavailable to newly arrived immigrants.

“Therefore,” writes another

reviewer, “integration there is enforced through the necessity of participation in the labor
process”xviii (Falk Müller, 2010). By focusing on the role of the state in producing this
social dysfunction, reviewers humanize Sarrazin’s critique:
Contrary to what is claimed over and over, Sarrazin does not blame either HartzIV (welfare) recipients or migrants across-the-board, neither does he attack them.
On the contrary, he determines that they behave, like any entrepreneur or
employee, and in fact any economic person, according to the rules of economics,
in that they optimize the relationship between input and output. Whoever can get
something for free would be stupid to pay for it, and whoever earns more without
working in Germany than they would with hard work in their homeland, would be
badly advised not to come here if he could.xix (Müller-Güldemeister, 2010)
By inhibiting the salutary inequality of the market, this quote argues that the state
incentivizes less industrious people to leave their homelands in search of the easy life
provided by Germany’s welfare system. Here the reviewer argues that, not only does
Sarrazin not condemn immigrants who take advantage of the system, he respects their
rational decision to pursue a piece of the German dole. Thus, the only logical conclusion
is to change the incentives driving that decision.
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Along the same lines, reviewers condemn state interventions that support lowincome families with children for encouraging the “wrong sorts” of populations to
proliferate. Incentives governing the rationality of reproduction are among of the most
frequently mentioned concerns in reviews. As another reviewer writes, the welfare
system
Encourages families from the social stratum that cannot or will not survive
through their own impetus to have large numbers of children. Thus, the taxpayer
finances the intellectual thinning [of society], ever more welfare recipients are
coming with ever fewer gainful workers. (P. Schmitz, 2010)
This line of argumentation underscores the death that is always implicit in biopower.
Here the life of the intellectually inferior represents the weakening and death of the
population. The implication is that for the German population to live, power must be
exercised to curb the growth of sub-populations that pose a threat to that life. This
illustrates

the

connection

that

Mbembe

observes

between

“the

generalized

instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and
populations (2003, p. 14). In biopolitics, the destruction of human bodies and populations
is ideally carried out through the optimization of policies aimed at controlling life and
death at the aggregate level. The interventionist state—or, more precisely, the improperly
intervening state—is singled out as the primary enabler of undesirable immigrants.
Political intervention, here, needs to follow and support the logics of the market, creating
the proper incentives to discourage the reproduction of undesirable populations.
Reviewers support the extension of economic rationality into the most intimate private
spheres of life. The market, properly supported by state institutions, would act as a guide
and educator, rooting out the indolent and cultivating the entrepreneurial.
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Although the immigrant underclasses are portrayed here as being all but helpless
in the face of the poorly managed incentive system, the moral critique of Muslim
immigrant indolence usually returns once the discussion turns to individual
responsibility. As the above reviewer continues,
58% of people with Turkish roots do not feel welcome in Germany. But what
better way to achieve recognition in a country than through successful selfintegration of which one can be proud? And those who only want social support,
without integration or without rendering any service at all in return—to them one
has to say: you are really not welcome!xx (Falk Müller, 2010)
In this remark, integration is framed as a tangible accomplishment in which one can take
pride. What exactly this integration entails is not explicit, but it implies the achievement
of social success. In the first case it connotes entrepreneurship, whether social or
economic. Integration is also framed as a possible form of reciprocation for those
receiving public benefits. Either way, integration serves as short hand for the
achievement of social worth.
With the focus on fertility and the political economy of the welfare state, Sarrazin
and his supporters advocate changes that would limit the intervention of the government
in supporting the salutary function of the economy. In biopolitics, “the multiplicity of
individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is” (Foucault, 2009, p. 42). The
discourses and mechanisms of security in biopolitics function, “without prohibiting or
prescribing, but possibly making use of some instruments of prescription and prohibition,
to respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it
responds--nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it” (Foucault, 2009, p. 47). By
eliminating the welfare state, the market would be permitted to operate freely, and would
correct the problems of undesirable immigration. At the same time, public resources
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could be spent modifying conditions to encourage the procreation of “the more
competent” (die Tüchtigeren) (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 174).

Conclusion: Consolidating the People
The book excerpt published in Der Spiegel opened with the sovereign claim that
“it is the right of every society to determine for itself who it will admit. Every country has
the right, thereby, to protect its culture and its traditions”xxi (Sarrazin, 2010b). The social,
political, and economic are all brought together in the Sarrazin’s statistically legitimated
portrayal of the decline of German society. The above statement invokes the sovereign
right of the nation-state to define its borders and decide who within them has the right to
have rights. As Agamben shows, modern biopolitics is characterized by the constant need
to redefine the boundaries of life that define and separate the inside from the outside,
which is to say, to perpetually distinguish between politically relevant and bare life
(1998, p. 131). Given the central role of biopolitics in the eugenicist projects of the Nazi
regime, it is surprising that Sarrazin largely overcame anti-racist critiques of his work.
This may be related to the fact that Sarrazin’s underlying political-economic framework
is taken directly from the post-war ordoliberal economic philosophy, which is associated
with Germany’s return to democracy and economic prosperity. In fact, as was discussed
above, the ordoliberals defined themselves precisely in contrast to their characterization
of Nazi political economy.
However, as Agamben (1998) points out, the ease of transformation of modern
parliamentary democracies to totalitarian states and then back again is only made possible
because of the extent to which politics has become biopolitics. The trajectories of Italy
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and Germany show that their political transformations were primarily a matter of
determining a new form of organization suited to the task of the “care, control, and use of
bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 122). As the troubling binary between the capable and the
incapable in the Sarrazin debate showed, the shadow of biopower’s imperative to “make
live” represents a continuity between modern totalitarian and democratic states. In a
system that operates under the impetus to make live, racism “is primarily a way of
introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break
between what must live and what must die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). These implications
of the cultural binaries drawn in the debate were not lost on all reviewers. One critical
reviewer summarized the central point of Sarrazin’s book as follows: “there is worthy
and there is unworthy life”xxii (Steuber, 2010).
Despite the initial outrage over the genetic elements of Sarrazin’s arguments, the
framing of integration as a cultural, economic, and political problem was generally
accepted on the terms set forth by Sarrazin. In particular, integration is conceived as an
individual process undertaken by non-Germans acting according to economic rationalities
that can be measured by the socio-economic performance of an individual or group. This
is demonstrated by the fact that the Sarrazin debate progressively became an integration
debate, which focused on why some groups were socially deficient. This debate
developed into calls by the leading center-right Christian Democrats for policies to
reform and restrict immigration. Following similar statements from the party’s leader,
Horst Seehofer, chairman of the Christian Social Union argued that, “no additional
immigration should be allowed in the future from cultural groups that reject our German
Leitkultur (leading culture). Integration refusal and the rejection of our German Leitkultur
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are two sides of the same coin”xxiii (Weiland, 2010). Commentators that argued against
the characterization of certain groups as “integration refusers” (Integrationsverweigerer)
tended to rely on individual model immigrants (see El-Sharif, 2010). As the comments
posted below these articles confirm, these sorts of individualized accounts were easily
rejected as irrelevant to broader social trends that confirmed the existence of problem
groups. This view holds that through their supposed rejection of German values, problem
immigrants are condemned to—and deserving of—the social inequality that characterizes
their situation. Thus, if they would only choose to integrate, the success that results from
the superiority of the German canon of values (Wertekanon)32 could also be theirs.
The Sarrazin debate also opened new space for rightwing politics in the German
mainstream, sparking speculation about the foundation of a new rightwing political party
lead by Sarrazin. Although Sarrazin had no interest in founding a party, or even in
leaving his center-left Social Democratic Party, the call for a rightwing alternative was
answered with the establishment of the Euro-skeptic Alternative for Germany (AfD)
party in 2013. The party platform closely follows many of the ideas promoted by
Sarrazin, from a purist approach to economic liberalism to a desire to restrict Muslim
immigration. While the party was founded with a primary focus on economic liberalism,
the anti-immigration and ethnic nationalist elements of their platform have become
increasingly prominent. The AfD has been making consistent gains in the polls since their

For a typical example of the formulation of the role of these canonic values, see (Sarrazin, 2010a, p.
19)

32
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founding, and has overtaken in the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats to
become the second party in several states. The Sarrazin debate set the objectives and
galvanized the public for a new political movement on the right in Germany.
The previous chapters have examined distinct occurrences of celebration and
condemnation of immigrants and their descendants, while also drawing them into relation
through their common foundation in biopolitical discourses that seek to manage
difference in the government of life. The next chapter examines where these two modes
of integration discourse overlap and collide in cases where minority celebrities serve as
models of integration or its failure. It will also address the role of ideas about the German
language that emerge repeatedly throughout integration discourse. The creation of prizes
honoring “examples of successful integration” and campaigns that mobilize exceptional
minority individuals celebrates an ideal of diversity that supports normative German
values. Successful individuals prove the cosmopolitan and meritocratic character of
German society and, at the same time, gloss over the myriad differences that distinguish
the experiences of first generation immigrants from those of their children and
grandchildren. Minority celebrities play several different roles in this form of integration
narrative, from “migrant” strawman to minority hegemonic enforcer. The cases in the
next chapter underscore the never-resolved status of the candidate for integration by
tracing examples that cross back and forth between celebrating success and reifying
failure.
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“Dieser Grundoptimismus und die Jahrzehnte des fas ungetrübten Erfolgs haben aber die Sehschärfe der
Deutschen getrübt für die Gefährdungen und Fäulnisprozesse im Innern der Gesellschaft.”
ii
“Über die schiere Abnahme der Bevölkerung hinaus gefährdet vor allem die kontinuierliche Zunahme der
weniger Stabilen, weniger Intelligenten und weniger Tüchtigen die Zukunft Deutschlands,”
iii
“…um die Qualität, die Struktur und den kulturellen Hintergrund der Migranten in Deutschland.”
iv
Inder und Vietnamesen wirken in Deutschland mindestens so fremdartig wie Türken und Araber und
haben doch viel größere Erfolge in unserer Gesellschaft vorzuweisen. Ursachen für die Schwierigkeiten
in der Schule, am Arbeitsmarkt und generell in der Gesellschaft müssen daher wohl auch in den
Gruppen selbst gesucht werden; sie dürften also durchaus etwas mit deren eigenem Verhalten zu tun
haben.
v
Im Kern ist das deutsche Bildungsproblem vor allem auch ein Problem der muslimischen Migranten.
Wenn hier von Migranten gesprochen wird, sind ausschließlich Migranten aus den muslimischen
Ländern gemeint (Tü rkei, Afrika, Naher und Mittlerer Osten). Sie haben als Einzige zu großen Teilen
Sprachprobleme, sie bilden zugleich einen wesentlichen Teil der Unterschicht und Transfer bevölkerung
in Deutschland, und ihre Kinder haben die größten Schwierigkeiten im deutschen Bildungssystem
vi
“Alle Juden teilen ein bestimmtes Gen, Basken haben bestimmte Gene, die sie von anderen
unterscheiden.”
vii
Das ist ein großes Problem, und wir können offen darüber sprechen, ohne dass der Verdacht der
Fremdenfeindlichkeit aufkommt. Aber ich warne davor, Gewalt mit einer bestimmten Religion zu
verbinden. Das führt in die Irre. Gewalt bei jungen Menschen ist oft ein Zeichen dafür, dass sie keine
Perspektive für sich sehen. Und da hilft nur Bildung, Bildung, Bildung. Unser Staat macht da viele
Angebote, aber die Hauptverantwortung liegt bei den Eltern, die ihnen Schule und Gesellschaft nicht
abnehmen können.
viii
Die im Buch vorgestellte Datenlage zeigt eine traurige Wahrheit, die statistisch gut unterlegt wurde.
Namentlich die Weigerungshaltung einiger Immigranten die einfachsten Grundregeln zu beachten: das
Erlernen der fremden Sprache sowie die Beachtung der Gesetze und Regeln des Aufnahmelandes.
ix
Sarrazin bezieht sich in seinem Buch auf allgemein anerkannte Untersuchungen, Studien, Wissenschaftler
und durchweg seriöse Quellen. Er erfasst Statistiken, wertet diese aus und zieht seine Schlüsse in einer
unaufgeregten sachlichen Weise. Es handelt sich also weniger um "Meinungen", sondern um
Konklusionen dessen, was bereits bekannt ist.
x
Man wirft Sarrazin vor das seine Zahlenangaben alle falsch sind. Sarrazin hat als Bundesbankvorstand
Zugang zu dem besten verfügbaren statistischen Material. Er wird sich kaum die Blöße geben, dass seine
Zahlenangaben zu den Geburtenraten türkischer Migrantinnen bzw. deutscher Akademikerinnen falsch
sind.
xi
Der Autor hat viele Zahlen zusammengetragen, die eine deutliche Sprache sprechen.
xii
Die NPD ist eine undemokratische Partei; Sarrazin wendet sich aber gerade dagegen, dass mit Migranten
aus türkischen und arabischen Ländern demokratie- und menschenrechtsfeindliche Strömungen nach
Deutschland eindringen. Gegen einen türkischen Migranten, der die deutschen Gesetze achtet, die
deutsche Sprache lernt und sich und seine Familie selbst ernährt, hat Sarrazin rein gar nichts.
xiii
Sieht man einmal von der zuweilen etwas deftigen Artikulation des Thilo Sarrazin ab, so liefert das Buch
in erster Linie verifizierbare Fakten, die als Diskussionsgrundlage für notwendige Änderungen in unserer
Integrationspolitik herhalten sollen und diesen Anspruch auch erfüllen. Keineswegs hingegen verstehe
ich seine Schrift als aufwieglerische Hetze, die dazu geeignet sein könnte, den sozialen Frieden in
Deutschland zu gefährden. Im Gegenteil: Hier schreibt ein Mann, der nicht der Assimilation, sondern der
Integration das Wort redet, den primär die Sorge um die Zukunft dieses Landes umtreibt und der die
i
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Sprachlosigkeit der aufeinanderprallenden Kulturen auflösen will, indem er die bestehenden Konflikte
klar benennt.
xiv
Aber Themen, welche für unsere Gesellschaft und—nicht zu vergessen—für unsere Nachkommen von
wahrlich existenzieller Bedeutung sind, werden mit Denk- und Redeverboten belegt. Verstöße werden
sehr erfolgreich mit der Rassismuskeule bzw. dem Verweis in die braune Schmuddelecke geahndet.
xv
Es wird vielfach versucht, die von Sarrazin sehr ausführlich dargestellten Selbstverständlichkeiten auf
angebliche Ausländerfeindlichkeit zu reduzieren. Wer so argumentiert, hat dieses Buch nicht gelesen.
Wer sich auf so eine Argumentation einlässt, verspielt die historische letzte Chance, das Ruder noch
herumzureißen und unumkehrbare Veränderungen zu verhindern, die eine ungewisse Zukunft für uns
und unsere Kinder bedeuten.
xvi
Ein längst überfälliges, aufrüttelndes Buch, das mit Zahlen untermauert, wohin das Laissez-faire unserer
Regierungen und besonders die einseitige Medienberichterstattung mit ihrer Multikultiglorifizierung und
verordnetem Gutmenschentum Deutschland gebracht haben
xvii
Wir leben hier in einer absoluten Schleim-Gesellschaft. Wir stehen mitten im absoluten Chaos und
unsere lieben Politiker schweigen es tot was hier abgeht. Warum? Weil sie der ganzen Welt die lieben
Deutschen, die Perfekten Deutschen vorspielen wollen, es aber in keinsterweise im griff haben. Und,
warum sollen wir und unsere Kinder immer noch für dinge zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, die
irgend jemand vor Jahrzehnten angezettelt hat.
xviii
“Dort hat man erst nach mehreren Jahren Aufenthalt Anspruch auf Sozialhilfe, die relativ gering und
zudem auf 5 Jahre begrenzt ist. Dadurch wird Integration dort schon durch die notwendige Teilnahme am
Arbeitsprozess erzwungen.”
xix
Im Gegensatz zu dem, was immer wieder behauptet wird, beschuldigt Sarrazin weder Hartz-IVEmpfänger noch Migranten pauschal, noch greift er sie an. Im Gegenteil, er stellt fest, dass sie sich, wie
jeder Unternehmer oder Arbeitnehmer, überhaupt jeder wirtschaftende Mensch, nach den Grundsätzen
der Ökonomie verhalten, indem sie das Verhältnis zwischen Input und Output optimieren. Wer etwas
umsonst kriegen kann, wäre dumm, etwas dafür zu bezahlen, und wer in Deutschland ohne Arbeit mehr
verdient als in seinem Heimatland mit harter Arbeit, wäre schlecht beraten, nicht hierher zu kommen,
wenn er es könnt.
xx
58% der Menschen türkischer Abstammung fühlen sich in Deutschland nicht willkommen. Aber wie
kann man Anerkennung in einem Land besser erreichen, als durch eigene Integrationsleistung, auf die
man selbst auch stolz sein kann? Und wer nur Sozialleistungen will, ohne Integration oder überhaupt
Gegenleistung—dem muss man sagen: du bist wirklich nicht willkommen!
xxi
“Es ist das Recht einer jeden Gesellschaft, selbst zu entscheiden, wen sie aufnehmen will, und jedes
Land hat das Recht, dabei auf die Wahrung seiner Kultur und seiner traditionen zu achten”
xxii
“Die Kernaussage dieses Buches ist: Es gibt wertes und es gibt unwertes Leben.”
xxiii
"Es darf in Deutschland künftig keine zusätzliche Zuwanderung aus Kulturkreisen geben, die unsere
deutsche Leitkultur ablehnen. Integrationsverweigerung und Ablehnung unserer deutschen Leitkultur
sind zwei Seiten einer Medaille."

330

CHAPTER 7 – MODELS AND MISCREANTS: INTEGRATION BY CELEBRITY
EXAMPLE

Over the course of the first decade of the new millennium, the oxymoronic
category of “foreign co-citizens” (ausländiche Mitbürger) that arose in the 1980s began
to give way to the cumbersome “people with a migration background” (Menschen mit
Migrationshintergrund). This new term maintains an emphasis on the foreign, conflating
the crucial differences in the experiences of immigrants and their German-born children
and grandchildren. Those whose foreignness remains visible through somatic
characteristics, or through names and dress, are categorized apart from the German
national collective. More precisely, the category turns them into perpetual candidates for
integration, who may be approved as a valuable member of the national population one
day and classified as a threat the next. This chapter further examines the construction of
qualifications for integration success and failure that surfaced in the 2010 Sarrazin affair
using two celebrity-focused media projects broadcast during the same year. The first
project is the creation of a new prize category honoring “integration” by one of
Germany’s most important media award programs. The second is a print media campaign
that displayed pictures of successful immigrants and people of color ostensibly to
encourage German language learning.
Unlike the Sarrazin affair, which began from a place of condemnation, these two
media projects purport to celebrate and support integration success. However, closer
analysis reveals the shared underlying assumptions about the positive value of normative
Germanness and the social and intellectual deficits of immigrants and minority
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Germans—groups that are conflated under the umbrella term “migrant.” The famous
entertainers at the center of these projects used the platforms they provided to stake a
claim to full citizenship as “new Germans” (see also Chapter 5). In doing so, however,
they often supported the same discourses of integration that perpetuate the divide
between normative citizens and those who must perpetually prove their value.
The first example this chapter examines is the debut of the category of the
“Integration Bambi,” created in 2010 for Herbert Burda Media’s annual Bambi Awards,
one of Germany’s most important media awards. The inaugural Integration Bambi was
presented to national soccer team member, Mesut Özil. The son of Turkish immigrants,
Özil has been widely celebrated and heavily scrutinized in the German public since his
successful debut on the national team in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. The
creation of the new award and the celebration of Özil as an “example of successful
integration” were received with little comment by the media. Evidently, the award and its
recipient fit with generally accepted narratives and, thus, remained soft news of only
passing interest. The 2011 recipient, on the other hand, attracted significant attention.
The selection of then 33-year-old rapper Bushido, born Anis Mohamed Youssef
Ferchichi, for an integration award was considered scandalous and sparked a series of
protests by former Bambi recipients and activist groups representing LGBT and feminist
interests. Although Bushido has received numerous awards for his music without raising
controversy, his acknowledgement in the context of integration was treated differently. In
rejecting Bushido as an example of successful integration, evidence was marshaled to
show how he is in fact an example of failed integration. In criticizing Bushido’s selection,
critics reified the value of the prize and consolidated a portrait of its inverse. The corpus
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for this section is the website for the Bambi awards as well as a recording of the speeches
presenting the award to Mesut Özil in 2010 and to Bushido in 2011. The news coverage
of the inaugural award for Özil was sparse; it was mentioned in most of the news pieces
summarizing the event, but it did not inspire significant commentary. In contrast,
Bushido’s receipt of the award inspired heavy coverage and commentary. Since the
corpus of press coverage of the Bushido award is too large for close textual analysis, I
limited my search to articles written from the day of the ceremony and the following two
days (November 10-12, 2011), which I determined was the period of most intensive
coverage. In this period, 24 articles were returned from Google Custom Searches of the
top German periodicals (see Introduction for source selection methodology) using the
search terms Bambi AND Bushido AND integration (see table 7). My analysis asks how
the contrast between these two award recipients defined and entrenched the discourse of
integration.
Table 7: Top Periodical Results for Bambi AND Bushido AND Integration,Nov. 10-12, 2011

Source

Articles

Bild

6

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

2

Focus

1

Frankfurter Rundschau

5

Handelsblatt

1

Der Spiegel

3

Stern

2
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Süddeutsche Zeitung

2

Die Tageszeitung (taz)

1

Die Welt

3

Total

24

The second example I analyze is a self-described “integration campaign” that
debuted in early 2010, which was created through the cooperation of the German Federal
Government and the Association of German Periodical Publishers (Verband Deutscher
Zeitungsverleger). Analysis of this example reveals an important theme in integration
discourse: the inadequacy of minority usage of the German language. The campaign,
titled “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben”33(henceforth Out with It), featured
photographs of prominent individuals “with immigration backgrounds” sticking out their
black, red, and gold striped tongues to indicate their ability to speak German. The
campaign, which claims to “to encourage immigrants to learn German,” argues that
speaking the language is the key to a successful life in Germany. What is not clear is how
someone without fluency in German and significant knowledge of German popular
culture would understand the ads. This logical gap notwithstanding, the campaign was
honored with the prestigious Cultural Prize for the German Language (Kulturpreis
Deutsche Sprache). This section will analyze the assumptions about immigrant and

Lit. “Out with language, into life.” Raus mit der Sprache is an idiom, which loosely translates to “speak
up” or “out with it.” In this chapter, I will refer to this as the Out with It campaign.

33
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minority Germans that motivate the campaign as well as the kind of citizenship
performed by exceptional bodies of color in the campaign. Furthermore, it will address
the how ideas about the German language play into the construction of the category of
“integrant.”
After an outline of the institutional and logical scaffolding of the Out with It
campaign, I analyze the song that was selected as the theme for the second iteration of the
campaign in late 2010 in the wake of the Sarrazin debate. The song, Nur ein Augenblick34
by rapper Harris, was used in a music video showing the making of the campaign. The
original video for the song debuted on October 3, 2010, on German Unity Day. The video
shows washed out images of the German flag waving masses on the Berlin “Fan Mile”,
the stretch of road between the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory Column that has been
set up for public viewings of national soccer matches during the men’s FIFA World Cup
(see Chapter 3). The song’s text calls out integration refusers (Integrationsverweigerer),
condemning them for their criminal tendencies and their complaints about Germany
while denying the significance of racism. The sources for this section are the
advertisements featuring 27 minority and immigrant models and the two videos for the
campaign theme song, Nur ein Augenblick. I also examine press coverage of the
campaign and its theme song to understand how they were interpreted in the mainstream
media. While this campaign attracted considerable praise from across the press sphere, it

34

Lit. “Just a Blink of an Eye”
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was generally considered uncontroversial and, thus, did not spur a large volume of
coverage. As such, I expanded my search to include results from the German press
archive, WISO35 in addition to Google Custom Searches of the top German periodicals.
The searches for the campaign slogan, “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben,” returned
33 articles discussing the campaign. Searches for Harris AND Integration AND rapper
returned 20 articles, 18 of which appeared in late 2010 when the campaign chose his song
as its theme. Table 8 shows the combined results of both searches, which totaled 35
unique articles.
Table 8: Combined Results for “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben” plus Harris AND
Integration AND Rapper

Periodical Type

Total

Top Periodicals

Local/Regional

11

0

National

24

22

Total

335

22

As with the Du bist Deutschland campaigns from 2005 and 2007 (see Chapter 4), this
campaign and the new Bambi award category tout the diversity of German society, while
also reaffirming the normativity of whiteness. These projects, which are all primarily led
by the German media industry, mobilize minority bodies to affirm the cosmopolitan,
tolerant, and meritocratic character of contemporary Germany. However, as the projects

35

WISO-net.de is an academic archive that includes 188 local, regional, and national periodicals.
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in this chapter show, defining integration success through celebrity example also
constructs integration failure as a matter of individual choice.

Prize Logic in the Public Sphere: The Bambi and German Social Cohesion
In 2010, Germany’s oldest media prize, the Bambi, added a new category; the
jury awarded the first Bambi prize for “Integration” to the national soccer team
midfielder Mesut Özil. With the German team’s third place finish at the 2010 FIFA
World Cup the previous summer, soccer played a prominent part in the Bambi ceremony,
reflecting its impact in the media sphere for the year. The creation of the Integration
Bambi is also a reflection of anxieties over a changing Germany, which erupted three
months earlier with the publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s anti-Islam polemic, Deutschland
schafft sich ab (Germany Does Away with Itself) (see Chapter 6). What came to be known
as the Sarrazin Debate stirred up national sentiments and surprised many public figures
by revealing the popularity of Sarrazin’s stance against Muslim minorities (see Follath,
2010). By selecting a prominent, widely popular figure to stand as an “outstanding
example of successful integration,” the Bambi jury provided a counter-example to
Sarrazin’s disparaging pseudo-scientific analysis of Muslims in Germany.
However, while the Bambi for Integration ostensibly celebrates the presence of
minority identities as part of Germany, it simultaneously circumscribes those identities,
supporting notions of distinct cultural sources. Successful integration is defined as the
acquisition of distinctly German cultural traits and traditions, while maintaining a pure
connection to what is described as one’s “cultural roots.” The Integration Bambi is
emblematic of attempts by the media to define an acceptable place in the nation for
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minority identities, while still maintaining a normative core concept of a German culture
independent of and distinct from that of minority cultures. Despite the problematics
raised by the proscriptive qualifications for belonging inherent in a cultural prize for
integration, the German press generally failed to question the category itself. In part, this
failure can be traced to the logic and structure of the cultural prize itself. The critical and
deliberative press essential for complex cultural dialogue in the mediated public sphere is
short circuited by the cultural prize which, as James English (2008) shows, is not only
resistant to critique, but requires critique to thrive.
This section investigates the nature of the public sphere created by this prize. This
case illuminates the German media’s investment in the definition of national identity as
well as the role and definition of the concept of culture in this national project.
Entertainment-focused cultural prizes mobilize the symbolic value of celebrity for
political, social, and economic purposes. Although this is also true of cultural prizes in
general, pop culture prizes such as the Bambi are built explicitly on the logic of celebrity,
which consists of a virtuous circle in which media presence creates celebrity and
celebrity, in turn, legitimates the media.
The Bambi has claimed the space of adjudicator in the German media sphere.
Although it embraces the populism of the most commercial media offerings, the Bambi
does not hesitate to arbitrate the weightiest public issues. It has positioned itself as a hub
of circulation in the public sphere. The Bambi selects from and amplifies images, events,
and discourses circulated in the media in each year. As Michael Warner put it, “a public
is the social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse” (2002, p. 62). The
Bambi presumes to create a space for the appraisal and appreciation of everything that
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ostensibly matters in the mediated German public sphere, including well-known
international figures like Jane Goodall (Our Earth Bambi 2010), international celebrities
like Justin Bieber (Entertainment Bambi 2014), and national soccer players Miroslav
Klose and Phillip Lahm (Jury Prize 2014).
The 2010 Bambi awards were in conversation with a variety of issues of public
interest at the time. This is particularly clear in the case of the creation of the new
category: The Bambi for “Integration.” The introduction of this award category reflects
the preoccupation with identity and the evolving ethnic makeup of Germany. As I
suggested above, it responds to a recent flair-up of social tension national self-reflection
surrounding the publishing of Sarrazin’s controversial but extremely popular anti-Islam
book (see Chapter 6). It also mobilizes the relatively uncomplicated and presumably
apolitical sentiments of national cohesion formed around the German national soccer
team and the FIFA World Cup (see Chapters 3-5). These events, too, are part of a larger
process of national reflection on the meaning of Germanness. As the 2010 Sarrazin
debate from Chapter 6 shows, although citizenship law changes at the turn of the
millennium were an essential step in opening conceptions of Germanness to include
ethnic and religious minorities, the threat posed by minorities to national normativity
continues to be a source of considerable societal anxiety among majority Germans.
Although politicians were generally united in their immediate condemnation of Sarrazin’s
book, the popularity of his ideas among the majority population caused almost immediate
backsliding,

culminating

in

Chancellor

Merkel’s

multiculturalism had “failed utterly” (Smee, 2010).
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statement

declaring

that

Since the international soccer spectacle was a major focus of media attention in
2010, the Bambi organizers had planned to relive some of the World Cup enthusiasm
with a performance by Shakira of the official World Cup song, “Waka Waka (This Time
for Africa).” In a long tradition of Bambi awards for the national soccer establishment,
the national team coach and training team received a jury’s choice Bambi. In creating the
category of Bambi for “integration” and awarding it to Mesut Özil, the jury weighed in
on the public debate, projecting onto the athlete their conception of “successful
integration.” Composed of players from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds, 2010
national team was celebrated in the press as a representation of, in Özil’s words, “a
colorful new Germany” (Bambi 2010, 2010). Özil, whose talent and Turkish heritage has
made him the subject of intense interest in the press, emerged in 2010 as one of the
team’s strongest players.
The Bambi awards mobilized Özil’s celebrity to conceptualize and celebrate a
notion of social cohesion, in which minorities “hold onto their roots” without publically
challenging or changing the norms of German society. As David Marshall argues,
celebrity is a powerful and malleable sign at the media’s disposal with its “capacity to
house conceptions of individuality and simultaneously to employ or help embody
‘collective configurations of the social world’” (1997, p. xi). To understand what it means
to be a celebrity, or Prominente, in Germany, we can look to the highest-ciruculating
German periodical, the daily tabloid Bild. The Bild website includes a “theme page”
dedicated to “Deutsche Promis” (German Celebs) that outlines a political economy of
attention, in which individuals give up their privacy and submit to public scrutiny
because “they live from regularly being in the media, since it increases their fame and
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with it their market value”i (“Deutsche Promis - Stars aus Musik, Fernsehen, Kunst und
Kultur,” n.d.). The examples of celebrities in the article include television moderators,
actors, musicians, and athletes. In answer to the question of “why we need celebs,” Bild
theorizes that “most people need role models. Not only to imitate them, but also to
distance themselves, following the motto, ‘That is totally not okay!’”ii Mediations of
celebrity lives, thus, create a symbolic space for drawing connections and boundaries in
the public ajudication of norms governing the body politic.
The Integration Bambi, like many of the other “social” Bambis that celebrate
celebrity charity, separates the celebrity from the ostensible source of their fame—their
work as professionals—and uses the social capital of their pure renown to make a
statement about society. Particularly for socially-oriented prizes, that which is being
honored is often as much about defining that which is unacceptable. As such, the
definition of Mesut Özil as an “outstanding example of successful integration” creates a
discursive framework by which minorities can be judged as successes or failures of
integration.
The discourses of the award, particularly as exemplified by author and television
moderator Nazan Eckes’s introductory speech, are constructed to soothe majority
German anxieties around Muslim minorities. Eckes, through her dress as much as her
words, presents herself as a model of non-threatening diversity. In her dress, which was
the object of great interest in the press for having the lowest cut décolleté of the evening,
she literally revealed herself to the German public. Her dress stands in opposition to the
veiled femininity of the Muslim “parallel society,” assuring the audience that she does
not represent the disturbing closure of Muslim modesty. In another conciliatory gesture to
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the presumed values of her audience, Eckes opens with a story of transformation from her
childhood:
I was born in Cologne, or Kölön, as they say in Turkey. My parents are Turks.
When I was six years old, I asked my mother about Saint Nicholas. She said to
me, Nazan, kisim - my daughter—there is no Saint Nicholas. And I was the only
one in my class who didn’t have sweets in their boots on the sixth of December.
And today, almost thirty years later, Saint Nicholas comes to my house too. That
is proof. I have arrived, arrived in my home, Germany.iii (Bambi 2010, 2010)
Eckes’s inclusion of Turkish words establishes her cultural authority to speak as a
Turkish-German minority. The story of her disappointment at being excluded from the
Christian German tradition of Saint Nicolas Day ended with the redemptive claim of her
choice as an adult to partake in German cultural—and religious—traditions. Her anecdote
acknowledges and accepts the Christian core of German traditions, modeling a form of
integration that leaves the majoritarian foundations of the nation unchanged. Like the
statement Eckes makes with her dress, her story is a counter-example to prevailing
discourses of Muslim fundamentalism. She communicates that her religious beliefs—
whatever they may be—are not a hindrance to her participation in Germany’s “JudeoChristian Leitkultur” (Wittrock, 2010). The presentation celebrates Özil’s universal
popularity across distinct lines of cultural difference. Both Germans and Turks celebrate
Özil, and, in Eckes’s words, “his relaxed association with his Turkish roots and the
German national jersey is an example to us all” (Bambi 2010, 2010). The 2010
integration award congratulates Germans for their meritocratic and cosmopolitan country,
which, as Eckes claims, “opened opportunities that [she] would never have had
elsewhere.” As one journalist swooned, the Eckes’s words on integration were powerful
enough to make you forget the Sarrazin debate (Albers, 2010). With sweeping emotions
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and glittering celebrities, the issue of the problematics inherent in creating a categorical
award adjudicating the qualifications for “successful integration” was never seriously
engaged in the press coverage of the award.
Those problematics were thrown into sharp relief by the debate around the 2011
Bambi for Integration recipient, Tunisian-German rapper Bushido. As Özil served to
outline the qualities of the desirable minority—defined by his success and his agreeable,
uncontroversial personality—Bushido functioned as a counter-example. With his lyrics
composed for maximum shock value, in addition to being Germany’s most successful
rapper he has long been a controversial figure on the German cultural scene. His selection
for the integration Bambi was based, according to the jury, on his success despite his
difficult upbringing and on his transformation into an interlocutor for politicians and the
media on behalf of many Germans with a “migration background.” They also honored
him for his charity work in recent years supporting the integration of young people from
“migration backgrounds.”
Bushido’s Bambi had two main consequences of significance for this analysis:
first, it caused a national scandal, drawing enormous attention to the award and, second, it
evoked well-worn stereotypes of the criminal and intolerant Muslim Other. The press
coverage of the Bushido Bambi scandal dominated the coverage of the awards, and
generated far more original commentary than the years surrounding it. Whereas most of
the other years’ coverage consisted largely of boilerplate wire service stories and press
releases, Bushido’s Bambi inspired commentary and debate across the mediated and the
public sphere. Following the intensified discourse around Bushido’s award, the Bambi’s
ratings spiked in 2011 drawing six million viewers, or over 20% of the television
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audience. The uncontroversial 2012 awards only managed to draw in 2.6 million viewers
(“Zuschauerzahlen: Bambi im Rekordtief,” 2012). A handful of journalists remarked on
this spike in attention, speculating that the controversial selection of Bushido might have
been a calculated move to generate publicity and increase the perception of the Bambi’s
cultural relevance (Buß, 2011; Frank, 2011). Most of the coverage, however, centered on
the critiques of Bushido as an unworthy recipient of the award.
Following the logic of cultural prizes (English, 2008), in offering a Bambi award
for Integration, the recipient may be critiqued as undeserving, but that critique only
further reifies the category. Critics ended up enumerating the ways that Bushido fails to
be a good example for integration without questioning the basic premise of the award.
Most critics made it clear that their outrage was not inspired by Bushido being honored
per se but by the fact that that honor was being bestowed in a social category of which he
was unworthy.
Bushido can win all the prizes in the world—from Kreuzberg to Hollywood, just
NOT ONE for “integration.”iv (Gensing & Varro, 2011)
Bushido calls for violence against gays and lesbians in his texts and statements. I
understand “successful integration” to be something different. v (Green Party state
representative Claudia Stamm quoted in Gottschild, 2011)
Whoever propagates contempt for women and gay people has not earned a prize
for successful integration.vi (Green Party politician Völker Beck quoted in
Gottschild, 2011)
In the opinion of [Green Party Leader Claudia Roth], he is certainly not an
example for successful integration, but “rather an extremely successful cultural
figure who makes big bucks off the backs of minorities.”vii (“Entscheidung stößt
auf heftige Kritik,” 2011)
Far from harming the institution of the Bambi, the critics generally accepted the category
of integration proposed by the institution, but merely critiqued the jury’s judgment in this
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particular choice. The debate brought Bambi coverage into more prominent spaces in the
German media sphere, with prestige publications like Der Spiegel, Die Welt, Die
Tageszeitung, and Die Süddeutsche Zeitung devoting attention to the award and the
protest it unleashed among activist groups. This follows James English’s assertion that
scandal is the lifeblood of the prize. He writes that prize scandals function to “clarify and
disseminate, as well as at times to assist in modifying, the contemporary rules governing
the behaviors and dispositions of ‘artists’ or other authorities in matters of art” (2008, p.
196). In this case, however, the prize claims authority to characterize the behavior of
immigrants and minorities as represented by celebrities. The criticism of prizes reinforces
the value hierarchies critics seek to adjudicate. By criticizing Bushido as unworthy of the
honor, even observers on the left—such as the Green party politicians quoted above—
who might in other cases be critical of integration discourse ended up supporting the
legitimacy of the integration prize.
The second consequence of the award was to provide fodder for the reification of
the idea of the unassimilable Other. The discussion around the prize left little room for
reflexivity around the notion of an integration prize. It focused almost exclusively on the
question whether the winner was worthy of the prize, whether he lived up to the values it
is designed to reward. The arguments in favor of the award—which in my investigation
were primarily voiced by Bambi affiliates— were based on the idea of the prize
symbolizing a “second chance.”
It is clear to [Hessian Minister for Integration Jörg-Uwe] Hahn: “He now has the
duty to distinguish himself as a bridge builder”viii (“Bambi-Gala,” 2011)
Bushido was not honored with the Bambi for his earlier texts, said Peter Maffay.
“On the contrary: Bushido has very clearly distanced himself from his statements
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of ten years ago. He has long admitted his mistakes openly. My intention was,
with all respect for those [Bushido] discriminated against, to build a bridge. ix
(“Nach Wirbel um Bambi für Bushido,” 2011)
The gift the prize conferred was the possibility of Bushido turning over a new leaf and
leaving behind undesirable behavior of the past, behavior that—everyone agreed—was
contrary to the ideals of the prize. It was framed as a pedagogical tool, an incentive for
the winner to follow the “right path.” This was particularly clear in the speech by aging
rock artist, Peter Maffay, who presented Bushido with the Bambi for Integration.
Although Maffay was collaborating with Bushido on a project entitled “Growing Up,” his
speech was half-hearted. He distanced himself, saying that he knew Bushido “too little,”
but felt that what they had in common was their willingness to “row toward unknown
shores.” He concluded by expressing his confidence that Bushido “would live up to” the
ideals of the prize. When Maffay announced weeks later that he was dissolving his
partnership with Bushido, it was interpreted as confirmation of what all the critics knew
all along: Bushido was irredeemable—a veritable counter-example for “integration.”
Most of the criticism of Bushido’s receipt of the award came from the political
left and from activists for social justice. Bushido’s critics accused him of exploiting
inflammatory texts for financial gain, as when Green Party leader Claudia Roth
condemned Bushido for making “big bucks off the backs of minorities” (quoted above).
This left-wing critique was met by a reaction from several conservative commentators
who celebrated Bushido for his bold “political incorrectness” and for his material
success.
Bushido is a perfect example of successful integration. The scandal around his
award shows the phoniness of the self-proposed heralds of migrants…. The
friends and devotees of migrants are outraged that, of all people, a rapper who is
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successful under capitalism and incorrect in his political discourse is awarded an
Integration prize.x (Poschardt, 2011)
To me, this whole do-gooder fuss stinks. What happened, after all? Bushido is a
superstar. He’s no pantywaist, but rappers never are. Not everyone can sing about
love and tra-la-la.xi (Gensing & Varro, 2011)
The conservative distain for identity-based political activism emerges here as support for
Bushido’s “taboo breaking rap style” (Miklis, 2011). Debate about Bushido’s award
disrupts minoritarian identity politics by pitting gender- and sexuality-based minorities
and their supporters against integrants, typically conceptualized as Muslim immigrants
and minorities. For conservatives, this reveals the hypocrisy of all identity-based social
justice projects. The conservative commentators quoted above double down on a
definition of integration based on meritocratic economic success (see also Chapter 6).
Bushido’s self-presentation as a hyper-masculine outlaw appealed to some conservative
sensibilities. However, it simultaneously played into conservative discourses of
immigrants and minorities as a potential security threat. Crucially, both conservative and
liberal partisans in this debate tended to validate the categorization of minorities as either
integration successes or failures.
Even if Bushido had succeeded in making good on his “second chance,” his story
is constructed as a quintessential example of the binaries dividing Muslim immigrant
cultures from native Christian German culture. The Integration Bambi demonstrates how
easily strong multiculturalist conceptions of culture can shift to nativist ones; when a
strong conception of cultural difference remains, it is a simple matter to switch focus
from celebrating the “color” and “diversity” of immigrant cultures to condemning those
same cultures as reactionary and illiberal. Even if the Integration Bambi holds that
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minorities can—and should—acquire traits of the majority society, the constituent parts
of their identities are seen as distinct: one should be integrated in the majority culture
without losing contact with their “roots.” The result of the Bushido scandal was both to
boost the presence of the Bambi on the national stage and to rehash arguments about
undesirable qualities of immigrants. Bushido became a “migrant” straw man.
In the end, Bushido was turned into an anti-hero, a counter-example that further
ingrained discourses of the intractable immigrant who stands against the enlightened
values of liberal German society. Although most of the press coverage avoided explicitly
labeling Bushido as a typical undesirable immigrant, one journalist in the liberal prestige
newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung was more direct, writing that “Bushido embodies the
young man with a migration background and thug-attitude, who acts out violently against
minorities and won’t be confined by the rules of society” (Grill, 2011). This construction
draws a distinction between the angry young (Muslim) men of the undesirable immigrant
class and the minorities that must be protected from their violence.
This construction of masculine Muslim violence was repeated with the selection
of the 2012 Integration Bambi recipient. Rabbi Daniel Alter was awarded in the
integration category after being assaulted by a group of young men who were “presumed
to be Arab.” In addition, during the 2012 Bambis, the sister of a young Thai-German man
who was murdered by young Turkish-Germans in Berlin’s Alexanderplatz was honored
in the category “Courage.” The choice to honor victims in two cases that were framed as
acts of Muslim intolerance against other minorities reinforces the idea of the threats
posed by dangerous Arab and Turkish “migrants” to the purportedly liberal-cosmopolitan
ideals of the new Germany. While the fight against race and identity-based violence is
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valuable regardless of the identities of the perpetrator, the choice of which perpetrators
and victims are represented and which are ignored demands scrutiny.
The choice to highlight two cases of Muslim intolerance with Bambi awards in
2012 is particularly notable given the revelation that year about a famous series of
previously unsolved murders committed by a right-wing extremist group, the National
Socialist Underground (NSU). After two of the group leaders were found dead in a
burning trailer home in November 2011, the authorities discovered that the group had
been responsible for the murders of 9 small business owners of Turkish and Greek
descent from 2000 to 2006. This series of murders, committed across Germany with the
same weapon, had been a long-standing subject of media speculation. Police
investigations and media speculation focused in entirely the wrong direction: the victims
were assumed to have been killed by Turkish perpetrators as part of a transnational
organized crime ring. The victims’ families were accused of hindering the investigation
by keeping a code of silence, following the “characteristic hierarchical Turkish family
structure” (Denso, 2006). As late as August 2011, the case was described in Der Spiegel
as evidence of the threat of Turkish organized crime:
Since [the murder series from 2000 to 2006], dozens of police officers and state
attorneys have hunted perpetrators and weapons; officers from the domestic
security and intelligence service are attempting to penetrate the mafia-style
organization of Turkish nationalists in Germany, responsible for the blood-letting.
The murders, this much investigators know, are the reckoning for debts from
criminal businesses or revenge on deserters.xii (Neumann & Ulrich, 2011)
Investigators in the so-called “Bosporus” special commission ignored clues assembled by
profilers in 2006 pointing to right-wing perpetrators, in part because the commission’s
preference for a theory linking victims to Turkish organized crime (“Falsche Annahme
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des Profilers bei den NSU-Morden,” 2013). After over a decade of criminalizing the
victims of xenophobic hate and their families, the revelations in late 2011 and 2012
revealed the deadly consequences of widely-held criminal stereotypes of Turkish and
Arab immigrants and minority Germans. Throughout the investigation, the victims of the
flippantly named “kebab murders” (Döner-Morde) were characterized in the media and
by investigators as criminals, as deserving of their fate.
In discourses reminiscent of American stereotypes of ethicized criminality, from
the tropes of the Italian Mafia to discussions of “black-on-black” crime, the victims
symbolized Others who introduce organized crime into Germany. Even in their deaths
they represented a danger to the normative population. When it was discovered that the
murders were hate crimes committed by German neo-Nazis, the case raised profound
questions about the unwillingness of authorities and the media to see and take seriously
the threat of racist violence by the German right. During 2012, one of the most important
stories in the German media showed the influence of racism at both the margins and in
the core institutions of German society, but this story was absent from consideration
during the Bambi prizes that year. This absence would not necessarily be significant had
the Bambi not chosen to highlight the victims of Muslim violence in two separate awards
that year, including the Integration Bambi.
The celebrity and prize logics that support cultural awards cannot avoid having
putatively normative consequences when applied to a social category of identity and
belonging. The prize inhibits the expression of individual subjectivities and instead
imposes its evaluative criteria to define valuable examples of diversity. The celebrity in
Burda’s Bambi awards is rendered significant according to the categories of the prize,
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which is to say, as candidates for integration. The celebrity within the construction of the
cultural prize is rendered a mobile sign whose significance is articulated through the
values embodied in the prize. The prize forecloses the notion of the “subject-in-process”
(S. Hall, 1996) since the award functions as a conclusion. By awarding a cultural prize
for integration to individuals born and raised in Germany, the prize maintains a division
between those who qualify categorically as Germans and those who must strive to be
considered integrated in German society. It does so under the guise of liberal
cosmopolitanism.
Even with the problem posed by the subjectification between normative national
and “migrant” candidates for integration inherent in the Integration Bambi, social critics
in the media sphere failed to analyze the underlying problem with the award category.
The logic of the prize undercuts the function of a critically reflexive public media sphere.
Critics of the prize cannot help but participate in the discourses constructed by it; critique
of cultural prizes, no matter how appropriate, tends to bolster their circulation in the
public sphere. Since representation and circulation is tantamount to importance, heated
debate and criticism only raise the profile of cultural prizes. After all, “the direction of
our glance can constitute our social world” (Michael Warner, 2002, p. 62). The Bambi
demonstrates the resilience of the cultural prize format, which, when wedded to the
celebrity power of the popular entertainment media, forms a unique stage for the
articulation of identities.

“Out with It”: Language Politics and Celebrity Enforcers
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The introduction of the Integration Bambi in 2010 coincided with the debut of
another celebrity-oriented integration project. The Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben
campaign was a pro-bono social marketing campaign created by the newly minted
German Foundation for Integration (Deutschlandstiftung Integration), an organization
founded by the Association of German Periodical Publishers (Verband Deutscher
Zeitschriftenverleger) and supported by the German government. The foundation’s board
of trustees is chaired by Hubert Burda, owner of Hubert Burda Media and the Bambi
awards, and Maria Böhmer, the first German Commissioner for Integration. Chancellor
Angela Merkel is the organization’s honorary patron. This organization reflects the
private and public institutionalization that has accompanied the rise in integration
discourse.
According to its website, the Foundation for Integration aims to support the
achievement of “equality of opportunity for people with a background of migration in
Germany” (“Deutschlandstiftung Integration: Deutschlandstiftung,” n.d.). This framing
of their mission suggests a focus on structural issues, on creating the conditions for equal
opportunity. Although, the foundation’s activities, as listed on its website, include a
scholarship fund for talented young people, they primarily focus on so-called
“information campaigns” such as their inaugural Out with It campaign from 2010. Both
the scholarship project and the media campaigns select highly successful individuals and,
like the Bambi award, display them as examples of successful integration. In fact, the
foundation recently inaugurated its own integration award, the Golden Victoria, which
Angela Merkel personally awarded to Polish-born national soccer team member Miroslav
Klose in 2014 (“Sie sind Sympathieträger und wunderbares Vorbild,” 2014). Instead of
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acknowledging the conditions that contribute to “equality of opportunity” or its lack, the
foundation’s actions focus on minority individuals who have already achieved success.
These “information campaigns” single out successful individuals and then divine the
characteristics or skills that contributed to their success.
The Foundation for Integration’s projects raise several important issues in relation
to discourses of integration. First, they offer a chance to investigate minority participation
in hegemonic projects regulating minorities and immigrants. Second, they highlight the
strength of discourses of language in defining valid citizenship and a life worth living.
This section examines the first question through a textual analysis of the Out with It
campaign’s theme song, “Just a Blink of the Eye” (Nur ein Augenblick) by the Black
German rapper Harris. Then, it analyzes the politics of discourse around language using
press coverage of the Out with It campaign and its theme song. Reflecting and
elaborating issues raised in other chapters, analysis of this campaign reveals blind spots
in critical thinking about racism, nationalism, and the perpetuation of second-class
citizenship.
The Foundation for Integration’s first project, the Out with It campaign, gathered
elite athletes, politicians, and entertainers with transnational backgrounds to, as the Bild
put it, “motivate migrants living in Germany to learn our language” (“Kampagne für
Integration,” 2010). This motivation took the form of print ads featuring celebrities
sticking out their tongues, which were digitally altered to display the colors of the
German flag. The ads included prominent politicians Aygül Özkan, Christian Democratic
minister in Lower Saxony and Green Party politician Özcan Mutlu (see figure 11)
displaying their painted tongues. While the outstretched tongue could be read as a defiant
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gesture through which visible minorities break rules of decorum to claim the German
language as their own, press descriptions show that it was interpreted primarily as an
exhortation to other minorities to speak “good” German (for example “Kampagne für
Integration,” 2010).

Figure 11: Green Party politician Özcan Mutlu sticks out his tongue for the Out with It campaign. This is
one of over two dozen campaign ads displaying the digitally altered tongues of minority German
celebrities.
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The most common term used to describe the gesture in the corpus analyzed here is
frech, which translates to impudent, cheeky, or saucy. The infantile associations of this
term and the depicted gesture problematize a straightforward interpretation of the gesture
as empowering. It is difficult to imagine normative German politicians, such as the
campaign’s official patron Angela Merkel, consenting to publically perform this intimate
and childish gesture. In the only scholarly critique of the campaign I was able to locate,
Mita Banerjee (2011) considers this question of agency and defiance. She uses the
relatively recent German academic field of “xenology” (Fremdverstehen, which literally
translates to “understanding the foreign”) to position the campaign within broader
changes in German society beginning in the 1990s. When the third generation of TurkishGermans did not generally shed all vestiges of foreignness, Banerjee writes that German
politicians and intellectuals shifted their focus to a well-meaning effort to understand
foreigners and, through this understanding, to solve the “immigrant problem.” TurkishGermans were the “pivot point” of this effort; their supposed failure to assimilate served
as the standard by which to compare other immigrant groups (Banerjee, 2011, p. 197).
The xenologist acts as an ethnographer with a crucial difference; although ethnographers
long understood their work as a project of understanding the Other, even in its earliest
forms the observer sought to participate and to learn the language and the ways of their
subjects. The xenologist, on the other hand, asks their participants to explain themselves
“in the fieldworker’s terms” (Banerjee, 2011, p. 198). Banerjee observes that while the
depicted gesture is meant to be shocking and perhaps defiant, the politics of its framing is
to domesticate the subjects’ foreignness, pushing them to justify themselves in statesanctioned language. Banerjee claims that the ad’s photographs “could only have been
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taken by a xenologist” (2011, p. 199). This is only partially true, since, in a campaign
such as this, there are many creators. The concept was developed by Patricia Scheder of
the advertising agency DDB for the Integration Foundation and the photographer was
Murat Aslan, a Berlin-based photographer of Turkish descent. The minority participants
all joined voluntarily and expressed enthusiasm for the project in the occasional quote
printed in the media. These minority celebrities are co-authors of the photographs
alongside the normative German xenologists.
The interest of minority and transnational Germans in participating in this project,
and others like the Integration Bambi, suggests that participation may be a means of
taking on, however temporarily, a position as normative citizen. It is important to ask,
however, if the significance of their status as apparent minorities—which is the reason for
their participation—will be changed by the campaign or action. More concretely, do
projects like the Integration Bambi or the Out with It campaign challenge common
narratives of cultural or intellectual deficiency? The following analysis argues that
examples of minority celebrity success may serve more to support the idea of Germany as
a just and meritocratic society than to undermine widespread negative stereotypes of
transnational minority communities. The Out with It campaign also shows that
essentialist notions of culture and race allow some minority celebrities to take staunchly
xenophobic positions without provoking serious reproach. In its choice of an aggressive
song condemning intransigent immigrants as its theme song, this government and media
industry supported campaign shows examples of exceptional minority citizens as proof of
the potential for minorities to succeed under the current hegemonic system while
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simultaneously condemning those who fail for their lack of loyalty and commitment to
the German nation.

Ungrateful Immigrants in Good-Hearted Germany
The title of the campaign’s theme song, “Just a Blink of the Eye,” by rapper
Harris (see figure 12), refers to racism in Germany. The song opens with Harris’s claim
to understand the experiences of minorities who have endured open prejudice and
antagonism from white German society.
You are young, black hair, brown eyes, dark skin.
Believe me, I know that shitty look too
That particular “You, fucking Kanacke36 look”
But that’s not Germany, that is just a blink of the eye
[Du bist jung, schwarze Haare, braune Augen, dunkle Haut
Glaube mir, ich kenn diese scheiß Blicke auch
Dieser bestimmte „Du scheiß Kanacke-Blick“
Aber das ist nicht Deutschland, das ist nur ein Augenblick]
This opening strophe establishes Harris’s minority credentials, airing the fact that racism
exists as a part of everyday life in Germany. At the same time, he invalidates the
significance of these experiences of racism, arguing that they are an aberration that does
not represent the German nation. Racism, here, is ephemeral and insignificant. It is not an
inevitable byproduct of the global political system of nation-states that divides the

36

Kanake is a strongly pejorative term for foreigners that was originally used against immigrants from
southern Europe but which has come to be associated with Turkish and Arab minorities. The term was
“reclaimed” in the 1990s as part of the Kanak Attak movement (see Göktürk, Gramling, & Kaes, 2007).
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population into normative nationals and foreign strangers, nor is it a reason to criticize
majority society.

Figure 12: Rapper Harris displays his body, prominently tattooed in old German Fraktur script with
the word, Deutschland.

Having invalidated a minority position critiquing systematic racism, Harris opens
an attack on intransigent, intolerant, and ungrateful immigrants:
How is it that you’ve lived in this country for over 10 years?
Maybe longer, and you still don’t speak the German language?
You say Germans are shit, German women are trash.
Please do Germany a favor and get out!
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[Wieso wohnst du in diesem Land über 10 Jahre?
Vielleicht länger und sprichst trotzdem nicht die deutsche Sprache?
Du sagst Deutsche sind scheiße, Deutsche Frauen sind Dreck
Tue Deutschland bitte einen Gefallen und zieh weg!]
Harris’s imagined interlocutor is the stereotypical nightmare of failed integration. He is
young and presumably male, based on the alleged intolerance of emancipated German
women. The first sign of the immigrants’ failure is his lack of German language ability. It
both symbolizes his rejection of German society and further invalidates any criticism he
raises of conditions in Germany. After all, if he does not speak German, it is assumed that
he cannot possibly understand German society. Such a person holds no value to the
nation, and Harris exhorts them to “get out.” Harris even offers, “If you don’t know
where the airport is, I’ll bring you. I’ll pay for your ticket and souvenirs,” claiming that
they would soon miss Germany and that they “don’t know how good [they] have it here.”
The text is primarily aimed at immigrants, but the critique also applies the whole
population of visible minorities who act as though they “do not want to be here” and who
do not properly perform their respect and appreciation for their place in Germany. Harris,
foregrounding his status as a visible minority, condemns fellow minorities who do not
share pride in their Germanness.
In addition to their lack of appropriate appreciation for Germany, Harris
condemns his interlocutor as infantile and self-segregating, suggesting that a poor attitude
and work ethic are responsible for immigrants’ problems, not racism, economic
inequality or systemic disadvantage. The projected interlocutor’s audacity to critique
Germany without fulfilling the affective performance of loyal citizenship incites Harris,
who places himself in the role of pedagogue.
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But when I see and hear how they speak about Germany…
If they can’t go back to a war, that I can understand
But you’ve got to behave yourself, that’s just how it is!
If you don’t look German, that’s just the way it is.
Be proud of your roots, stick your chest out and walk tall
But you can’t live here and talk shit about everything
And think that everyone should be nice to you too
Above all, if you don’t respect the Germans.
[Aber ich sehe und höre doch wie sie über Deutschland reden
Wenn man nicht in den Krieg zurück kann, kann ich das verstehen
Aber man muss sich benehmen, es ist einfach so!
Wenn du dich nicht als deutsch siehst, ist das einfach so
Sei stolz auf deine Wurzeln, Brust raus und gerade gehen
Du kannst hier aber nicht leben und alles schlecht reden
Und denken, dass man dann auch noch nett ist zu dir
Vor allen dingen, wenn du die Deutschen nicht respektierst]
The immigrant’s demand for respect is invalidated by his criticisms of Germany,
according to Harris. This passage starts with Harris’s frustration with negative talk about
Germany, building on the familiar trope that if majority society is so bad, if it is “all
Nazis,” then immigrants should simply leave. While conceding that some people do not
have the choice to go back to their war-torn homelands, Harris claims that they have the
responsibility to “behave themselves.” The stance advocated by Harris resonates closely
with American “respectability politics.” In the words of Michelle Smith (2014), this
approach proposes that “marginalized classes will receive their share of political
influence and social standing not because democratic values and law require it, but
because they demonstrate their compatibility” with mainstream society. Respectability
politics are “the first resort of marginalized classes.” They circulate within marginalized
communities and are reinforced by mainstream discourses that locate the source of social
inequality in personal and cultural deficits, disavowing the legitimacy of anger stoked by
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inequality. Harris acknowledges that carrying visible difference can have negative
consequences, “but that’s just the way it is.” This passage, in a subtler way than the main
chorus, delegitimizes critiques of social exclusion based on visible difference, claiming
that a respectful attitude towards majority society and appropriate pride in one’s “roots”
is the solution to exclusion.
The demand for gratitude to Germany returns throughout the text. Harris’s text
personifies Germany, giving the nation a body with organs and affect; “Germany is
generous and has a big heart.”xiii Harris is offended by the interlocutor’s lack of
appreciation for the safety, stability, and opportunity Germany provides, and his laziness
and “ignorance.” Harris rebukes, chides, and infantilizes his interlocutor. “You’re lucky,
you’re here now,” Harris proclaims. “So behave yourself, do your work, grow up, and
don’t be childish…You should be ashamed to speak so badly of Germany!” xiv Although
Harris appears to hear all of the negative things that his interlocutor says about Germany,
he claims to be unable to understand his interlocutor’s explanation of his position. In the
manner of xenologist, Harris demands explanation from the foreign Other, only to ignore
it when it does not come in a normative form.
What is this shit all about? How ignorant do you have to be?
You don’t want to learn German, but you want to stay in Germany
That is too much for me, I can’t understand that
Can you please explain it to me? Oops, I don’t understand you
And that’s why you stay among yourselves, you can’t speak any German!
[Was soll der Scheiß? Wie Ignorant muss man sein?
Du willst kein Deutsch lernen, aber in Deutschland bleiben
Das ist mir zu viel, ich versteh das nicht
Kannste mir das bitte erklären? Ups, ich versteh dich nicht
Und darum bleibt ihr unter euch, ihr könnt kein Deutsch!]
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The supposed inability to communicate in German invalidates the claim to full political
personhood including the right to participate in social critique. Harris classifies language
deficits as a result of intellectual deficits as well as a lack of will; he ties segregation to
these deficits as opposed to broader questions of class or to decades of policy choices on
guest worker housing, city planning decisions, and everyday racism in housing (see
Mandel, 2008). Harris’s song is an unveiled attack defining and maligning socially
undesirable immigrants and minorities. He gleefully acknowledges the potential
interpretation of his text as racist, rapping, “If I were blond with blue eyes, you would say
that I am a Nazi,”xv a sentiment he repeats in interviews (Harris, 2010b). For Harris—and
apparently also for the government officials, and marketing and nonprofit agents who
chose this song as the theme for the campaign—his status as a visible minority makes it
impossible for him to promote racism. The selection of this song reveals a serious
misapprehension of the nature and function of racism in the most influential echelons of
the public. If racism is a materially significant discourse that uses demographic features
to fracture the population into Life that must be protected and life that is a threat to the
politically relevant population (see Introduction), it is the logic of the discourse itself that
matters, not the demographic characteristics of its promoter. Harris uses his minority
status to undermine anti-racist critiques of discourses like his, which claim that
immigrants’ purported disdain for the majority population and their supposed lack of
motivation or ability are harmful to the nation. From these firmly essentialist foundations,
Harris uses his position to become the ideal enforcer of normative national hegemony.

Language and Life
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The Out with It campaign positions itself as a helping hand to “migrants” to
encourage them to learn German and, thereby, become full citizens. Instead, its theme
song and the campaign’s content suggest that it is an internal discussion among
normative German society and its minority elite defining the requirements for national
membership and the responsibility for social inequality. To understand the campaign,
audiences must also be familiar enough with the German public sphere to recognize the
campaign models as nationally known politicians, athletes, and entertainers. Furthermore,
to understand the campaign’s theme song, audiences must have a strong command of the
German language. The campaign requires cultural and linguistic knowledge that would
not be available to the purportedly isolated population it claims to target. The relationship
in Harris’s song between language and politically legitimate personhood is also expressed
in the more benignly framed discussions around the Out with It campaign. This final
section analyzes discussions of the campaign in the press to understand the role of ideas
of language in integration discourse.
The idea of language as both a means for and a measure of integration is one
central themes in integration discourse that earlier chapters addressed only in passing.
Arguments foregrounding the importance of speaking German appear frequently, whether
in common experiences of German-born minorities who are regularly praised for their
“good German” (see for example Bota et al., 2012) or in complaints about the purported
refusal of immigrants in “parallel societies” to learn German. This issue also arose in
discussions surrounding Bushido’s Bambi for Integration as a possible justification for
the award:
If he sees to it that his friends and fans maybe learn German better, then that is a
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really a good approach.xvi (Actress Uschi Glas quoted in Gottschild, 2011)
He makes use of nasty clichés, but he also uses his popularity to spread good
messages, like: Foreigners who live here must learn the German language.xvii
(Hessian Integration Minister Jörg-Uwe Hahn quoted in Gottschild, 2011)
These quotes argue that Bushido’s utility in convincing “foreigners who live here”—a
descriptor that presumably refers to his friends and fans—to speak (better) German is
more valuable than the potential harms posed by his clichéd gangsta-rap texts. Using
press discussion around the Out with It campaign, this section examines how discourse
about language supports and validates processes dividing the population into normative
nationals and integrants. Although German language acquisition by first generation
immigrants differs greatly from language acquisition by children raised in the German
school system, these distinctions are erased in integration discourse. All integrants may
be scrutinized and praised or condemned for their use of the German language. Focusing
on the purported unwillingness or inability of integrants to speak “proper German” places
responsibility for social exclusion on integrants themselves, protecting the idea of a
meritocratic German society in the face of persistent education and opportunity gaps for
immigrants and their descendants.
The discussions of the Out with It campaign in the press were not generally
contentious. With a few exceptions, press accounts described the campaign in positive
terms, uncritically conveying the stated meanings and motivations of its creators and
participants. What emerges in the articles describing the campaign is a concept of
integration that uses a symbolic notion of the German language use as a metonym for full
citizenship and, thus, full political personhood. This notion of language is portrayed as
equally accessible to all who are willing to work for it, opening a putatively egalitarian
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space of citizenship. However, by using examples of minority celebrities who were raised
in Germany, the campaign sets minority German speakers apart from their ethnic German
counterparts. Regardless of the fact the featured celebrities they have been exposed to
German since childhood, their dominance of standardized German is portrayed as
particularly relevant for German language learners, or candidates for integration. The
following excerpts characterize the imagined targets and motivation for the campaign.
With this campaign, the [Integration Foundation] seeks to make it clear how
important it is for people with a migration background living in Germany to
dominate the German language.xviii (Rausch, 2010)
The campaign titled Out with It, should motivate migrants living in Germany to
learn our language.xix (“Kampagne für Integration,” 2010)
Celebrities want to be role models for migrant children.xx (Fröhlich, 2010)
In order to get, in particular, children and young adults to increase their
willingness to learn German, celebrities with foreign roots have made themselves
available for the second series of the Integration Foundation campaign. xxi (Fietz,
2010)
A poster campaign aims to move migrants to learn German…. The campaign
primarily targets migrants and their children, who hardly speak German despite
having been born in Germany.xxii (Lachmann, 2010)
These five quotes target the broad range of individuals under the category of “people with
a migration background,” explicitly including those born and raised in Germany. All,
here, are equally candidates for integration. Successful examples, embodied here by
celebrities, have been mobilized to “motivate” those whose failure to integrate is
signified by their supposed inability or unwillingness to “speak German.” By focusing on
children and young people, these quotes position unqualified, normative German
language against youth vernacular forms. The existence of a correct, standard, and
normal German language is taken for granted in these quotes. This is framed as “our”
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language, the language that normative Germans speak. Non-standardized forms of
German spoken by the children of immigrants are deemed invalid. The final section of
this paper will contextualize this determination within a long tradition of language
standardization as the basis for constructing the nation state. First, I will discuss examples
from the press coverage that situate language-as-integration as the prerequisite for
legitimate political and economic personhood.
Crucially, German and “language” in this corpus refers not to actual speech or
communication practice, but to a symbolic ideal of “correct” standardized German. This
point is driven home by the campaign’s mode of representation. Celebrities are mobilized
as bodies; their language is not heard, but is symbolized through the display of their
tongues, branded with the national colors. The campaign empties the representatives’
speech of all content, rendering their bodies as symbolic nodes for integration discourse.
In a distortion of the deliberative democratic model (J. Habermas, 1974), the
communication of ideas as the ideal basis for active citizenship is displaced by the tongue
itself as an instrument for producing a standardized national form of language. Language
is valuable as a symbolic performance rather than as a means of communication and
contestation in an agonistic public sphere. As Harris’s song demonstrates, ideas
communicated outside the proper register can be dismissed as incomprehensible and
illegitimate. The final quote above comes from a scathing opinion piece from the
nationally circulating Die Welt titled with the question, Are Germans ashamed of their
language? The column takes the campaign as an opportunity to air grievances about poor
appreciation for the national language among minorities and normative Germans alike.
The extended quote reads,
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The campaign primarily targets migrants and their children, who hardly speak
German despite having been born in Germany. [Integration Commissioner Maria]
Böhmer says to them, “Language is more than communication—it is a tie that
binds us.” It should be anyway.
But since that is still not the case today, we have this good and important poster
campaign. After all, after five decades of immigration, young people in social
combustion points [soziale Brennpunkte] in big cities stammer out a so-called
“Kanak-Sprak” and are not capable of formulating grammatically correct
sentences in German.”xxiii (Lachmann, 2010)
This piece not only stigmatizes and delegitimizes minority German spaces and
vernaculars, it interprets the supposedly lax attitude among majority Germans towards
policing and correcting minority language as a failure of national pride. The myth of
German (or any standardized national language) as a discrete, transparent, and concrete
linguistic entity invites all those hailed as the national “we” to judge if speech meets the
standard of qualifying as “German.” Although Harris recognizes that he is not perceived
as part of the normative national collective because of his appearance, he asserts his
national legitimacy, in part, by passing judgement on the linguistic deficits of his fellow
minorities.
Although the campaign’s provocation is broadly presented and interpreted as a
positive, cheerful, and lighthearted call to encourage “migrants” to follow the successful
example of minority celebrities, the descriptions of a generalized migrants figure that
appear in the corpus are most often negative. The campaign’s inclusion of minority
hegemonic enforcers, like Harris, facilitates explicit discourses of blame and
condemnation of “integration refusers” (Integrationsverweigerer). Discussions of the
campaign define the trope of the “enemy of integration,” typically described as a young
urban male of Arab or Turkish descent. Harris condemns people that he describes as his
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own friends, with whom he grew up in Berlin’s Kreuzberg neighborhood. He uses his
own experience as a troubled young man who saw the error of his ways and achieved
success to invalidate his friends who felt marginalized:
The excuse was always: Germany doesn’t give us a chance. But that’s not true. I
myself was at a school for the “difficult to educate” (Schwererziehbare). There
were remedial classes, there were extra remedial classes and remedial classes for
remedial classes. No one can say that Germany doesn’t do anything for these
teens. They refuse!xxiv (Harris, 2010b)
Of course: When Sarrazin says that young criminals are often “black-heads,” he is
unfortunately right. At least in Berlin. Now all the black-heads say: Fucking
Sarrazin. I say: What do you mean, fucking Sarrazin, man? These criminal Alis37
screw up the reputation of well-integrated Arabs and Turks.xxv (Harris, 2010b)
An article from the same author who exalted in Nazan Eckes’s speech for the integration
Bambi, wrote an article praising Harris, claiming that “soccer and music have done more
for integration than all the politicians combined” (Albers, 2010). In it, she quotes selfidentifying minority fans of Harris who support his critique of minorities who refuse to
take responsibility for their problems:
“You get straight to the point, man”; “Yes, we are also at fault that things are the
way they are”; fans who write “I am young. I am a Turk. I passed my A-levels
and I’m completely integrated. And I hate these Kanake, who can’t behave
themselves here.”xxvi (Albers, 2010)
The aggressively pejorative language in this quote is presented as acceptable, since it
comes from self-identified minorities. Harris’s anger and disgust with enemies of
integration overflows in another article in response to the topic of “honor killings.”

37

The common Arabic name Ali is used here as a racialized slur associating Arab men with criminality.
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“Fucking parallel society!” Harris spits out his contempt with the words. “And we
are supposed to handle these people with kid gloves? They should be
deported.”xxvii (Pham, 2010)
Harris’s impassioned denunciations of the “parallel society” and his casual use of
designations like “black-head” and “criminal Ali” are accepted without challenge, since,
as a self-designated in-group member, Harris claims to be incapable of supporting racist
projects. He expresses irritation with anti-racist critique, claiming that essentially the only
thing about the Sarrazin debate that concerns him is the accusation that Sarrazin is racist.
In response, he posed the question, “why must the cudgels be brought out anytime
anyone says anything about foreigners?”38 (Pham, 2010). This comment points to idea,
common in integration “debates” (see Chapter 6), that anti-racist critique abuses and
victimizes normative Germans.
The national symbolic meaning of language in this corpus resonates with the
political and economic discourses of integration and citizenship explored throughout this
dissertation. The campaign creators saw their campaign as perfectly timed to meet
intensified scrutiny of minorities and their integration status, as the second series debuted
at the peak of the “integration debate” unleashed by Sarrazin (Fröhlich, 2010). The
campaign supports the tautological associations in the Sarrazin debate that define
integration as the achievement of social and economic success. Language-as-integration
defines the difference between success and failure, and more fundamentally, between life
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and existence. As one of the campaign’s models, DJ Chino, explained,
The German language is the BEST! Only when you understand and are
understood can you begin to live and not merely to exist.xxviii (“IntegrationsKampagne,” n.d.)
This quote situates language at the base of the distinction between the politically
qualified, valuable version of life (zoe) and bare life (bios) (Agamben, 1998). There is a
persistent tension in the corpus that emerges from the intentional ambiguity surrounding
language and communication. In this quote, DJ Chino discusses the basic ability to
communicate, to understand and be understood. However, the press coverage of this
campaign explicitly denies language as a simply, or even primarily, a matter of
communication. As the quote above from politician Maria Böhmer states, “language is
about more than communication—it is the tie that binds us.” The ambiguity around
language and communication only serves to consolidate a normative notion of proper
German.
Proper language is legitimated as a fundamental requirement for valid and active
citizenship. It is frequently linked to the achievement of a “good” and politically
meaningful life.
Whoever wants to become someone in Germany, and doesn’t speak the language,
has no chance…. The Integration Commissioner of the Federal Government,
Maria Böhmer said, “Good language knowledge opens the doors for a successful
life in our country.”xxix (“Integrations-Kampagne startet,” 2010)
[Maria Böhmer] said, in essence, whoever does not speak German can never
become anything in Germany. In contrast, whoever speaks good German can
make a contribution to society.xxx (Lachmann, 2010)
“Only those who speak the German language have a chance,” warns [CDU
minister Aygül] Özkan, promising, “In this country anyone can become
anything”xxxi (Fröhlich, 2010)
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The message is clear: NO FUTURE WITHOUT A COMMON LANGUAGE!xxxii
(Herrmann, 2010)
Speaking the right form of German is required for the successful life of any individual
person. Furthermore, the normalization of language is the prerequisite for the future of
society itself, as the last quote emphasizes in capitalized text. Language-as-integration
posits that the success associated with normative belonging is equally accessible to all,
since language learning is flexible and technically available to all people. Those who
refuse to learn German or speak properly cannot expect “to become anything” or even
participate in society. In Maria Böhmer’s words, “whoever can’t speak German is only an
onlooker in our country”xxxiii (Ehrenstein, 2010). Language-as-integration discourse
erases discrimination and structural inequality, asserting that the solution to social and
economic inequality among minority populations lies with the individual. At a more
fundamental level, it affirms that those without proper speech cannot have active,
politically relevant lives.

Shifting Definition of Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Monolingualism
On its face, enabling immigrants to learn the German language poses clear
benefits to immigrants as well as society at large. However, discussions about language
deficits among “migrants” are built on a fuzzy concept of language. These discussions
ignore the diversity of immigrant and minority experiences as well as the contextual
factors that contribute to different levels of fluency and speech style. Furthermore, while
campaigns like Out with It publicize the idea of language deficiency among minorities
and immigrants, they do not include concrete plans to address the chronically insufficient
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resources dedicated to instruction of German as a foreign language offered as part of
“integration classes” (“Haushaltsplan,” 2014; Kocaman, 2010).
In one of the only critical articles written about the campaign, freelance writer
Mely Kiyak (2010) investigated the language course offerings aggregated on the website
ich-spreche-deutsche.de, the only concrete service offered by the initiative. She framed
the article as an open letter to the politician Aygül Özkan, the first female TurkishGerman minister who also posed for the Out with It campaign. Kiyak attempted to find a
language course that would serve her imaginary retired 55-year-old mother with limited
German skills. She called 10 of the 36 programs listed on the site and found that their
offerings all targeted foreign students and business people or new immigrants. She also
called local and national government ministries dedicated to assisting immigrants. She
could not find a single German course that was appropriate—either in terms of cost or
content—for her hypothetical mother. Kiyak concludes that “the market has not reacted
to the political demand on migrants to learn better German. Likewise, politicians have no
solutions. And you, [Aygül Özkan]? You model for a PR campaign by an industry group
and stick your tongue out at migrants”xxxiv (Kiyak, 2010). While four other articles in the
corpus included skepticism about the campaign’s purpose and effectiveness, Kiyak’s
column was the only example that seriously addressed the lack of resources available for
immigrants to meet language standards demanded in the German public sphere.
This focus on German language acquisition coalesced around the turn of the
millennium at the same time as the introduction of jus soli citizenship. Like the concept
of integration, the multilingualism introduced by foreign labor had been a topic of
political debate since the mid-1970s (Gramling, 2009). However, they only became a
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major political and public focus after citizenship laws were changed to acknowledge the
reality of Germany’s status as an immigrant country. Previously, the priority of linguistic
policy for labor migrants and their children had been to foster the “readiness-to-return”
(Rückkehrbereitschaft) by funding instruction in heritage languages. German language
instruction for first generation immigrants was neglected by the government. Only after
pluralism was legally acknowledged as a German reality did linguistic pluralism become
a target of state control. David Gramling (2009, 2016) identifies this “linguistic turn” as a
new model of civic belonging based on the idea of jus linguarum (right of languages), or
“cosmopolitan monolingualism.” Gramling argues that, unlike the previous models based
on “blood” or “soil,” jus linguarum does not seek to establish a uniform “civic essence,”
but rather reacts to the existence of linguistic plurality by introducing “segregative
strategies” to reduce its impact on public life (2009, p. 131). Cosmopolitan
monolingualism upholds the idea of “cultural diversity while discouraging the public use
of multiple heritage languages.” In the early to mid-2000s, the “salutary neglect” of the
Kohl government in the 1980s and 1990s gave way to a rapid proliferation of new laws
and policies tying social assistance and visa renewal to the demonstration of progress in
German language courses. Lest they be considered coercive, these policies were justified
in terms of civil rights, arguing the immigrants had the “right” to learn German as a
means of achieving autonomy and equality in Germany. In a remarkably fast turnaround,
the center-right political coalition effectively resignified the German language “not as an
inherited ethnic possession but as a pan-ethnic lingua franca” that represented the
solution to the specter of cultural relativism and parallel societies ascribed to
multiculturalism.
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In the politics of integration of the early to mid-2000s, cosmopolitan
monolingualism emerged as a panacea for problems of social cohesion and became the
key symbolic performance of civic unification. However, as German language
competency became an increasingly important symbolic tool, public debates about civic
belonging only served to obscure the complexity of language practices among
multilingual people, including the fact that for those raised in the German school system
German may not be their “mother tongue” but it is certainly one of their native languages.
The norm of monolingualism is so strong in Germany, as in most other European
countries and their settler-colonialist offshoots (Auer & Wei, 2007), that multilingualism
is seen as a problem that interferes with the proper acquisition of the majority language.
In a proposal that inspired national ridicule, the Christian Social Union (CSU) party of
Bavaria went so far as to propose that immigrants and asylum seekers speak German not
only in public but also in the home, arguing at their party convention in 2014 that
“whoever wants to live here permanently should be urged to speak German in the public
sphere and at home”xxxv (“Sprachregeln für Zuwanderer,” 2014). This proposal inspired
near universal opposition, as the incursion into the private sphere was deemed invasive
and impractical.
However, many critical responses to the CSU’s German-everywhere proposal
actually revealed the strength of underlying monolingual language ideologies. Robert
Moore (2015) recently compared EU policy documents on language pluralism in the
European Union with early language standardization projects at the dawn of the modern
European nation-state. In Moore’s analysis, the ideal multilingual Europe consists of a
collection of monolingual states, each with its own mother tongue. Each of these
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monolingual Europeans should then be encouraged to learn one language of choice and
one language for international and practical use. Moore relates this policy to fears, on the
one hand, of the dominance and threat of contamination posed by the lingua franca
English and, on the other, fears of social disintegration through linguistic diversity of
non-EU immigrants. In contemporary Europe, diversity is hailed as a “benefit,” a cultural
advantage in a global age. At the same time, persistent anxieties circulate about the
potential for chaos and miscommunication resulting from “poorly managed” diversity.
Like the integration discourses examined throughout this dissertation (see, in particular,
Chapter 2), linguistic difference is understood through a political economy of life that
sees it as both a means of future growth through innovation and a potential threat in the
form of those who “opt out” (Wiese, 2015), refusing to participate in the national project.
With little to no interest in actual linguistic practices, symbolic language politics are a
means of consolidating European norms in the face of changes brought by the new
mobility within the European Union and by global political and economic projects.
There has been substantial research on new youth vernaculars in Western
European countries showing similar constructions of these vernaculars as inferior and
threatening to national language and majority culture (see Wiese, 2014). In research from
across Europe, vernaculars associated with minority youth are associated with negative
behavior such as violence and sexism even while they are sometimes seen as fashionable
or “cool.” This simultaneous devaluation and appropriation of minority sociolects will
sound familiar to those acquainted with debates around “Ebonics” (African American
Vernacular English) in the United States. Despite scholarly research to the contrary,
public reactions frequently equate deviations from standard German in minority
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vernaculars with mistakes made by learners of German as a foreign language (Wiese,
2015). Furthermore, this use of “flawed” German is perceived as a willful attack on
German norms, as “opting out” of majority society and, thus, as an act of aggression and
a threat to social cohesion (Wiese, 2015, p. 356). This minoritized form of speech is also
associated with laziness, with the unwillingness to expend the effort to speak “properly.”
High German, in contrast, is a skill to be cultivated with care and, thus, is worthy of its
elevated cultural capital. Whereas regional dialects are considered part of national history
and local folk culture and are seen as compatible with learning High German, minority
German vernaculars are commonly seen as an outside imposition (Wiese, 2014, 2015).
The CSU’s German-only proposal mentioned above comes into conflict with
cosmopolitan monolingualism because it threatens the integrity of pure language
transmission. In their zeal to eliminate all language diversity, the CSU proposal
introduced the possibility of parents transmitting “faulty” or “broken” language to their
children. The CSU violates the modern ideals of plural monolingualism by encouraging
the possibility of corrupting a pure language. This commitment to language purity is
illustrated by the leader of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir, who responded to the CSU
proposal, arguing,
One reason why I can speak reasonably good High German, and not only Swabian
chatter or broken German is because my parents didn’t speak German with me. If
my parents had tried to speak mangled German with me, I certainly would not
have become the chair of Alliance ‘90/The Greens, or a member of the German
parliament, instead I would have ended up a car mechanic or some such thing.
Which is to say, thank God my parents didn’t listen to the CSU, because when
parents teach their children a language badly, the best teacher in the world can’t
counteract it.xxxvi (D. Müller & Özdemir, 2014)
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Özdemir, who is one of the most consistent and outspoken advocates for immigrants,
asylum seekers, and minorities in the German government, bases his condemnation of the
CSU proposal on the value of language purity. In this view, learning anything but the
standard dialect of a language makes it impossible to acquire the standard dialect, even
with “the best teachers in the world.” High German, which was originally a geographic
distinction, is now a qualitative distinction. The only road to upward mobility and the top
echelons of society, here, is through the standard dialect. Although Wiese’s research
shows that regional dialects are considered authentically German and, thus, valuable,
speaking only regional dialect is a sign of poor education. Özdemir’s comment reflects
well-established European monolingual narratives, which hold that regional dialects and
“mangled” forms of standard language spoken by foreigners threaten standard language
learning (Moore, 2015). Ignoring the realities of linguistic flexibility and the prevalence
of code-switching, this “language decay” narrative (Moore, 2015) is a foundational topos
of monolingual ideology that persists from the early days of the European nation-state
(Gramling, 2009; Wiese, 2015). Özdemir’s statement promotes an orderly and managed
multilingualism, that minimizes linguistic decay through provincial and “flawed” speech.
And while Özdemir’s leftist politics would typically align him with those who would be
critical of classist structures that denigrate local knowledge, this statement uncritically
accepts that competence in High German is a reasonable prerequisite for socio-economic
success.
The CSU proposal was almost universally rejected not because its
monolingualism was too extreme, but instead because it violated the kind of
cosmopolitan monolingualism and managed multilingualism that have emerged as ideals
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in German and the European Union. In contrast, language bans that impose monolingual
speech in official and public spaces, such as the schoolyard, have been widely celebrated.
One school in Berlin, where 90 percent of students grew up multilingual, was even
awarded the prestigious “German National Prize” in 2006 for their implementation of a
German-only policy (Gramling, 2009). Although the policy evoked a heated national
debate—including condemnation from Özdemir’s Green Party colleague, Özcan Mutlu,
who appeared in the Out with It campaign (see figure 2) (Ohlert, 2014, p. 550)—the
students affected by the policy did not find it problematic (Gramling, 2009). In interviews
about the policy, students, as competent code-switchers, were not overly concerned with
the policy, nor did they see it as particularly burdensome. Instead, students used the
opportunity to raise other concrete issues of concern to them, such as reducing class size
and improving opportunities after graduation. These concerns were largely ignored in the
press.
What these discourses overlook is that speaking German is already a normal part
of everyday life for multilingual students. Although they may have grown up speaking
another language at home, the overwhelming monolingualism of the media sphere and
public life makes it almost impossible for young people to avoid significant exposure to
German even before they begin formal education. Still, young multilingual citizens, for
whom code-switching is the norm, are subjected to scrutiny for their German language
skills under the same rubric as those who learn German as a foreign language. They are
congratulated when they speak with ease in formal registers or criticized for their “bad
German” when they use informal youth sociolects. The Out with It campaign is an
excellent example of the congratulatory mode, since the minority celebrities featured all
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grew up multilingual with German as one of their native languages. They are held up as
examples not for their fluency in multiple languages, but solely for their ability to speak
“proper” German.
However, the everyday minority Germans—actual or hypothetical—who appear
in the articles do not emerge from scrutiny as well as the celebrity role models. In the Out
with It corpus, the characterizations of non-celebrity integrants was overwhelmingly
negative. The positive descriptions of immigrants and minorities generally revolve
around the role model celebrities as examples of the achievements possible through
successful integration. One typical example paraphrases a statement by one of the
advertising executives responsible for the campaign, explaining that “the prominent
ambassadors are living proof that in Germany everything is possible when you integrate
yourself. And when you are good”xxxvii (Fröhlich, 2010). Although “being good” is often
implied within integration, this example shows that, in this campaign, language takes
center stage in defining integration.
The negative assessments of everyday minorities are concentrated in seven of the
39 articles examined, most of which speak about “migrants” in the abstract or through
anecdotes told by Harris. One article from Stern, titled “The Sad Reality of Integration:
The Germans, They Are the Others”xxxviii (Albers, 2010) claims to break this pattern of
“speaking about integration” without speaking with “migrant children.” It follows Harris
as he visits a majority minority school in Berlin’s Wedding neighborhood at the
invitation of their German teacher. Harris faces off with a boy who wants to know about
Harris’s origins. Harris insists that he is German, despite the student’s continued
questioning. The journalist describes the scene: “A boy and a man. Both born and raised
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in Germany. Both marked as foreign by their dark hair, eyes, and skin. But only the boy
feels foreign”xxxix (Albers, 2010). This assessment casts social exclusion as a matter of
individual choice, erasing the power differential between the celebrity man and the
unknown boy. The students are said to identify with Harris, because of his status as a
visible minority.
They tell him stories from their lives as migrant children, of everyday racism,
prescribed social roles, hateful Germans, of life in their own world and of the fear
of life in the other world. Harris tries to destroy the clichés that a generation grew
up with, that also serve a defensive function. However, he had to ask for
clarification, since even though these children grew up in Germany, none of them
speaks the national language perfectly”xl
The author does not specify which clichés Harris was attempting to clear up, but the
context suggests that Harris answered their accounts of discrimination and social
exclusion by telling students that their impressions of Germans are stereotypical and that
they are using racism as an excuse for their problems. By characterizing students’ speech
as incomprehensible, the author underscores the idea of students’ isolation from
normative society and plays into common deficit narratives associated with the
descendants of immigrants.
The author goes on to say that students are aware of the problem of inadequate
speech in their community, paraphrasing their comments:
It is “ungood” that the soccer star Mesut Özil was awarded the Bambi for
Integration, since he couldn’t speak correct German, says one boy. “My dad
thinks that he can speak super good German, but when I hear him on the
telephone, I think, what kind of talk is that,” admits another. Encouraged, a pair of
girls finally told of parents who can’t speak German. “I am ashamed sometimes,”
said one quietly.xli
The author reminds us again of students’ language deficits, transcribing the error in the
boy’s unfavorable assessment of Mesut Özil’s speech capacity, a deficit that he deems
significant enough to disqualify Özil from consideration for an Integration award. The
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students’ internalization of the national language ideology is so deep that it elicits shame
for themselves, their families, and even the most celebrated members of their community.
The article concludes with a quote from a boy who resigns himself to the reasonable
expectation of social and economic failure if he cannot perform properly in the
hegemonic linguistic register, saying “if I can’t hack it—with the language and
everything—then I won’t make it here in Germany.”xlii This recognition is presented as
the desired conclusion of Harris’s visit, as a positive step towards pushing young
minority students to put aside complaints of social exclusion and accept the narrative of
personal responsibility and language normativity as the road to success.

Conclusion
The celebrities and successful individuals celebrated in the Out with It campaign
act as minority enforcers of the hegemonic norms of cosmopolitan monolingualism. Their
success is attributed to their competence in standardized German, implying—and in the
case of Harris’s song explicitly stating—that individuals not fluent in standard German
are responsible for any social and economic problems they face in Germany. In Harris’s
terms, racism “is just the blink of an eye,” insignificant in comparison to the individual’s
rejection of German society evidenced by their inability to communicate in the
sanctioned standard vernacular. The celebration of minority role models in the Bambi for
Integration and the Out with It campaign were accompanied in equal or greater measure
by condemnations of minority straw men and tropes of young Muslim males’ antagonism
towards Germans and their liberal democratic national project.
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Celebrities are presented as examples of successful integration, proof that, as
campaign model and women’s national soccer team player Celia Okoyino da Mbabi put
it, “there is equality of opportunity in Germany for children with a migration background
too”xliii (Fietz, 2010). Celebrities are portrayed as successful because they are integrated,
and their success proves their integration. Forms of diversity that fit neatly into an
imagined ideal of German and “Western” values—summarized in one article as “respect
for civil society, democratic rules, the defense of human rights, the freedom to think
differently”xliv (Malzahn, 2010)—are positioned as a threat to the nation and to the “good
immigrant.” Only with a “German foreground” can candidates for integration hope to
live. “If we are not successful in defending this [German] foreground, we will lose entire
city sections forever—and with them the people”xlv (Malzahn, 2010). In other words,
threatening forms of difference embodied by enemies of integration must be eliminated to
enable the life of successful candidates for integration as well as normative nationals.
In popular public narratives, diversity is valuable when it is well-managed and
contributes to national political and economic projects. Diversity is proof that “Western
values” are tolerant and permit “the freedom to think differently.” Difference is valuable
when it adds “color” and inspires innovation, spurring growth. However, diversity that
overflows or challenges hegemonic projects, that puts spaces and populations beyond the
reach of the state, threatens the power of the nation-state to make live. In the conclusion,
I will consider how these narratives of celebration and of the threat of uncontrolled
diversity are playing out in the German reaction to the global refugee crisis.
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Deutsche Promis…leben davon, regelmäßig in den Medien zu sein, denn es steigert ihre Bekanntheit und
damit ihren Marktwert leben davon, regelmäßig in den Medien zu sein, denn es steigert ihre Bekanntheit
und damit ihren Marktwert.
ii
Die meisten Menschen brauchen Vorbilder. Nicht nur zum Nachmachen, sondern auch, um sich
abzugrenzen, nach dem Motto: „Das geht ja gar nicht!“
iii
Ich bin in Köln geboren, oder Kölön, wie man in der Türkei sagen würde. Meine Eltern sind Türken. Als
ich sechs Jahre alt war, habe ich meiner Mutter nach dem Nikolous gefragt. Sie sagte zu mir, Nazan,
kisim, (meine Tochter) der Nikolaus gibt es nicht. Und ich war die einzige an der Klasse, die am sechsten
Dezember keine Süssigkeiten im Stiefel hatte. Und heute, fast dreizig Jahre spatter, kommt der Nikolaus
auch zu mir. Das ist der Beweis, ich bin angekommen, angekommen in meine Heimat Deutschland.
iv
Bushido kann alle Preise dieser Welt bekommen—von Berlin-Kreuzberg bis nach Hollywood. Aber
KEINEN für „Integration“.
v
„Bushido ruft in seinen Texten und Statements zu Gewalt gegen Schwule und Lesben auf. Unter
„gelungener Integration“ verstehe ich etwas anderes.“
vi
„Wer Frauen- und Schwulenverachtung propagiert, hat keinen Preis für gelungene Integration verdient“
vii
Er sei ihrer Meinung nach sicher kein Beispiel für gelungene Integration, „sondern eine äußerst
erfolgreiche Kunstfigur, die auf dem Rücken von Minderheiten große Kasse macht“
viii
Für Hahn ist klar: „Er hat jetzt den Auftrag, sich als Brückenbauer zu profilieren.“
ix
Bushido sei nicht für seine frühen Texte mit dem Bambi ausgezeichnet worden, sagte Peter Maffay. „Im
Gegenteil: Bushido hat sich ganz klar von seinen Aussagen von vor zehn Jahren distanziert. Er hat sich
schon lange öffentlich zu seinen Fehlern bekannt. Meine Absicht war, bei allem Respekt gegenüber den
Diskriminierten, eine Brücke zu bauen.”
x
Bushido ist ein Musterbeispiel gelungener Integration. Der Skandal um seine Auszeichnung zeigt auch die
Verlogenheit der selbsternannten Herolde der Migranten… Die Freunde und Verehrer der Migration sind
nun empört, dass ausgerechnet ein im Kapitalismus erfolgreicher und im Diskurs politisch unkorrekter
Rapper einen Integrations-Preis bekommt
xi
Mir stinkt dieses ganze Gutmenschen-Getue. Was ist denn schon passiert? Bushido ist ein Superstar. Kein
Warmduscher, aber das sind Rapper nie. Können halt nicht alle von Liebe und Schwuppiduppi singen.
xii
Seither jagen Dutzende Polizisten und Staatsanwälte Täter und Waffe, Verfassungsschützer versuchen,
die mafiöse Organisation türkischer Nationalisten in Deutschland zu durchdringen, die für das
Blutvergießen verantwortlich sein soll. Die Morde, so viel wissen die Ermittler, sind die Rechnung für
Schulden aus kriminellen Geschäften oder die Rache an Abtrünnigen.
xiii
Deutschland ist großzügig und hat ‘n großes Herz
xiv
Du hast Glück, bist jetzt hier, also benimm dich. Mach deine Arbeit, werd erwachsen, sein nicht
kindisch! [...] Schäm dich über Deutschland so schlecht zu reden!
xv
Wär ich blond mit blauen Augen, würdest du sagen, dass ich ein Nazi bin.
xvi
Wenn er sich jetzt darum kümmert, dass seine Freunde und Fans vielleicht besser Deutsch lernen, ist das
schone in guter Ansatz.
xvii
Er bedient üble Klischees, aber er nutzt auch seine Popularität, um gute Botschaften zu verbreiten, etwa:
Ausländer, die hier leben, müssen die deutsche Sprache lernen.
xviii
Die 2008 vom Verband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (VDZ) gegründete Stiftung will mit der
Werbekampagne deutlich machen, wie wichtig es für in Deutschland lebende Menschen mit
Migrationshintergrund ist, die deutsche Sprache zu beherrschen.
xix
„Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben“, heißt die Kampagne mit der in Deutschland lebende Migranten
animiert werden sollen, unsere Sprache zu lernen.
xx
Promis wollen Migrantenkindern Vorbilder sein.
i

383

xxi

Um gerade bei Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen die Bereitschaft zu erhöhen, Deutsch zu lernen,
haben sich nun Prominente mit ausländischen Wurzeln für eine zweite Staffel der Kampagne der
„Deutschlandstiftung Integration“ zur Verfügung gestellt.
xxii
Eine Plakataktion soll Migranten zum Deutschlernen bewegen.... Die Aktion richtet sich vornehmlich an
Migranten und deren Kinder, die kaum Deutsch sprechen, obwohl sie in Deutschland geboren wurden.
xxiii
Die Aktion richtet sich vornehmlich an Migranten und deren Kinder, die kaum Deutsch sprechen,
obwohl sie in Deutschland geboren wurden. Ihnen sagt Böhmer: "Sprache ist mehr als bloße
Kommunikation - sie ist das Band, das uns verbindet." So sollte es zumindest sein. Weil das aber bis
heute leider nicht so ist, gibt es diese gute und wichtige Plakataktion. Denn nach fünf Jahrzehnten
Zuwanderung stammeln die Jugendlichen in den sozialen Brennpunkten der Großstädte eine sogenannte
"Kanak-Sprak" und sind nicht in der Lage, grammatikalisch korrekte Sätze auf Deutsch zu formulieren.
xxiv
Die Rechtfertigung lautete immer: Deutschland gibt uns keine Chance. Aber das stimmt nicht. Ich
selber war auf einer Schule für Schwererziehbare. Da gibt es Förderkurse, da gibt es Extra-Förderkurse
und Förderkurse für Förderkurse. Da kann keiner sagen, dass Deutschland nichts für diese Jugendlichen
macht. Die wollen nicht!
xxv
Klar: Wenn Sarrazin sagt, dass junge Kriminelle oft Schwarzköpfe sind, hat er damit leider recht.
Zumindest in Berlin. Jetzt sagen all die Schwarzköpfe: Scheiß-Sarrazin. Ich sage: Wieso ScheißSarrazin, Alter? Diese kriminellen Alis versauen den Ruf aller gutintegrierten Araber und Türken.
xxvi
("Du bringst es auf den Punkt, Alter", "Ja, wir sind auch Schuld daran, dass es so ist, wie es ist"), Fans,
die schreiben ("Ich bin jung, ich bin Türke, ich hab mein Abi gemacht, ich bin komplett integriert. Und
ich hasse diese Kanaken, die sich hier nicht benehmen können"), zig SMS voll des Lobes.
xxvii
»Scheiß-Parallelgesellschaft!« Harris spuckt die Verachtung mit dem Wort aus. »Und solche Leute soll
man mit Samthandschuhen anfassen? Abschieben sollte man den.«
xxviii
Die deutsche Sprache ist HAMMER! Erst wenn man versteht und verstanden wird, kann man anfangen
zu leben und nicht bloß zu existieren.
xxix
Wer in Deutschland was werden will und die Sprache nicht spricht, hat keine Chance…. Die
Integrationsbeauftragte der Bundesregierung Maria Böhmer, sagte: „Gute Sprachkenntnisse öffnen die
Türen für ein erfolgreiches Leben in unserem Land.“
xxx
Dabei sagte [Maria Böhmer (CDU)] sinngemäß, wer nicht Deutsch spreche, könne in Deutschland
nichts werden. Wer hingegen gut Deutsch spreche, könne sich in die Gesellschaft einbringen.
xxxi
"Nur, wer die deutsche Sprache spricht, hat eine Chance", mahnt Özkan und verspricht: "In diesem
Land kann jeder alles werden."
xxxii
Die Botschaft ist klar: KEINE ZUKUNFT OHNE EINE GEMEINSAME SPRACHE!
xxxiii
"Wer kein Deutsch kann, ist nur Zaungast in unserem Land"
xxxiv
Der Markt reagiert nicht auf die politischen Forderungen an Migranten, besseres Deutsch zu lernen.
Die Politik findet ebenfalls keine Lösungen. Und Sie? Modeln für die Imagekampagne einer
Wirtschaftsvereinigung und strecken den Migranten die Zunge heraus!
xxxv
Wer dauerhaft hier leben will, soll dazu angehalten werden, im öffentlichen Raum und in der Familie
deutsch zu sprechen.
xxxvi
Einer der Gründe, warum ich halbwegs Hochdeutsch kann und nicht nur Schwäbisch schwätze oder
gebrochenes Deutsch, liegt daran, dass meine Eltern mit mir nicht Deutsch gesprochen haben. Denn
hätten meine Eltern versucht, mit mir radebrechend Deutsch zu reden, wäre das Ergebnis gewesen, dass
ich ganz sicher nicht Parteivorsitzender von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen geworden wäre, oder
Bundestagsabgeordneter, sondern dann wäre ich irgendwie Kfz-Mechaniker oder sonst was geworden.
Das heißt, Gott sei Dank haben meine Eltern nicht auf die CSU gehört, denn wenn Eltern mit ihren
Kindern eine Sprache schlecht lernen, kann der beste Lehrer der Welt dagegen kaum noch ankommen.
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xxxvii

Die prominenten Botschafter seien der lebende Beweis dafür, dass in Deutschland alles möglich sei,
wenn man sich integriert. Und wenn man gut ist, ergänzt Schoeffler.
xxxviii
Die traurige Realität der Integration: Die Deutschen, das sind die anderen
xxxix
Ein Junge und ein Mann. Beide in Deutschland geboren und aufgewachsen. Beide wegen ihrer dunklen
Haare, Augen und Haut als Ausländer abgestempelt. Doch nur der Junge fühlt sich auch so.
xl
Sie erzählen ihm Szenen und Geschichten aus ihrem Leben als Migrantenkinder. Von alltäglichen
Rassismen, festgelegten Rollen, hässlichen Deutschen, dem Leben in der eigenen Welt und der Angst vor
der Zukunft in der anderen. Harris versucht, die Klischees zu zerschlagen, mit denen eine ganze
Generation groß geworden ist, die auch Schutzfunktion haben. Allerdings muss er immer wieder
nachfragen, denn auch wenn diese Kinder in Deutschland groß geworden sind, spricht keines von ihnen
einwandfrei die Landessprache.
xli
Es sei "ungut", dass Fussballstar Mesut Özil mit dem Bambi für Integration ausgezeichnet worden sei,
schließlich könne er selbst nicht richtig Deutsch, sagt ein Junge. "Mein Vater meint, er kann voll gut
Deutsch, aber wenn ich ihn am Telefon höre, denke ich, was redet der da", verrät ein anderer. Ermutigt
erzählen schließlich auch ein paar Mädchen von Eltern, die kein Deutsch können. "Ich schäme mich
manchmal", sagt eines ziemlich leise.
xlii
Wenn ich es nicht packe - mit der Sprache und so -, dann schaffe ich es nicht hier in Deutschland.
xliii
Ich habe durch den Sport gelernt, dass es auch für Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland
Chancengleichheit gibt.
xliv
Dieser deutsche Vordergrund besteht in der Achtung zivilgesellschaftlicher, demokratischer Regeln, der
Verteidigung von Menschenrechten, der Freiheit von Andersdenkenden.
xlv
Wenn es uns nicht gelingt, diesen Vordergrund zu verteidigen, werden wir auf Dauer ganze Stadtteile
verlieren - und mit ihnen die Menschen.
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CONCLUSION

This dissertation assembles case studies from the past decade to investigate how
discourses of integration have emerged as a tool for managing Germany’s internal
Others, modifying and strengthening the category of the normative national in the
process. The cases in this dissertation show how nativist logics form the foundation of
integration, helping to explain the ease with which the xenophobic extreme right is
entering mainstream politics in Germany and across the continent. Conceptions of
integration are not monolithic; in fact, they are most often decidedly vague and
malleable. However, this dissertation demonstrates how discourses of integration
facilitate the racialized division of society from a platform justified by the promise of
improving the life of the German population, including willing candidates for integration.
The perception of the propensity of some groups to integrate has come to distinguish the
deserving from the undeserving, the beneficial from the threatening; these processes have
become increasingly important and fraught as the global refugee crises began to impact
Europe in recent years.
This dissertation asked how mediated discourses of integration reproduce norms
of national culture and identity that operate to manage minority and immigrant
populations in the German context. The discourse of integration has become a norm
across Europe, and in Germany it has guided the first attempts by the government to
implement policy dealing with the long-term inclusion of transnational populations in the
German body politic. To understand integration discourse it is necessary to situate it in
relation to broader discourses of culture and the meaning of national belonging. The first
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two chapters in this dissertation outlined the contemporary development of two major
foundations of German national ideas: The Romantic nation represented by the idea of
Heimat (homeland) and the rational, European universalist Germany founded on
constitutional patriotism and pride through productivity. The two chapters in this section
examined the theoretical underpinnings of these schemas of identity as well as the place
of “new Germans” within them. The second section examined the construction of “the
new Germany” in the first decade of the new millennium through the development of
“soccer patriotism” and the celebration of immigrant patriots. The three chapters in this
section analyzed three cases that illuminate the relationship between patriotism and
productivity and the role of diversity in this new national formation. The third section
investigated the idea of integration failures and the threat they pose to the future of the
German population. The cases examined in these final two chapters each entail a process
of dividing the valuable from the unproductive and threatening integrants, showing the
relation between processes of celebration and condemnation. Integrants are both a
valuable resource for the renewal of the German population and a potentially mortal
threat to the fabric of German society. The cases in this section trace the process of
evaluation that separates the productive from the harmful, and seeks to manage the
threats posed by harmful difference to re-establish the stability of the population.
In Germany, sports have emerged as a key mechanism and narrative tool in
integration policy and media discourse, wherein elite national sports and amateur youth
sports play different but complementary goals. At the amateur level, sports integration
supports the practical goals of providing regulated spaces of contact, as well as symbolic
goals of reinforcing the superiority of normative German values. As was discussed in
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Chapter 2, the embodied practice of sport is conceived as a means of instilling discipline
among multiethnic youth to render them as docile bodies. It is an attractive form of
governmentality that paves the way for other lessons on becoming an entrepreneurial and
productive subject. In teams that include a mix of normative nationals and immigrants,
youth sports can also provide opportunities for contact and solidarity across categories of
difference. Literature produced by youth sports institutions invested in sporting
integration praise this potential for contact, while providing normative guidelines to
manage difference by prioritizing universal rules and German monolingualism.
At the elite national level, minority athletes become symbols of the German
nation. As the cases in this dissertation show, as the bodies of visible minorities have
come to symbolize the nation, they allow the nation to celebrate its own conversion into a
cosmopolitan space. Permitting minorities to symbolize the nation is evidence that the
national category is capacious and tolerant. However, the structure of broadcast sports
also functions as a panopticon (Foucault, 1977), in which the audience and announcers
frame, zoom in, scrutinize and interpret the meaning of players’ gestures as artifacts of
integration. While players know that they are being viewed, they cannot know or control
the lens's movement, focus, or length. Others have the power to interpret and
semantically fix their bodily expression. Of course, this power to affix meaning is not
complete, and players may recover some of this power by breaking the script, by
speaking out of place or refusing to follow the norms and expectations of the field.
Nevertheless, the athlete is there first and foremost as a physical performer. In the context
of integration discourse, athletes provide a performance waiting to be captured by
cameras and interpreted by the media.
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Two key media events inspired this dissertation: the men’s FIFA World Cup of
2006, which was hosted in Germany, and the 2010 debate unleashed by the publication
and popular success of a eugenicist book by politician and Bundesbank board member,
Thilo Sarrazin. The extensive national self-reflection catalyzed by these seemingly
unrelated events contributed to intertwining discourses defining the characteristics and
practices of a healthy German population as well as the threats to that population. In the
first case, pride in Germany through sporting spectacle is defined as a salutary practice
that is open to the whole population. It is a means for Others to show their commitment to
national well-being. At the same time, the participation of Others is highlighted to
demonstrate the constructive nature of “soccer patriotism,” distinguishing it from
harmful, exclusionary forms of nationalism.
The case of the Sarrazin debate exemplifies the flip side of integration discourse.
While sporting integration is about national renewal, the Sarrazin debate outlines the fear
of the imminent collapse of the normative German nation under pressure from Muslim
immigrants and their descendants who ostensibly refuse to integrate. The Sarrazin debate
makes the hierarchy within the category of the integrant explicit. Integration discourse
may attach itself to any identifiable traces of the transnational or the foreign, but the
Sarrazin debate reveals the racialized category of the Muslim as paradigmatic figure of
problematic difference at the center of integration discourse. At the same time, Sarrazin
praises East and South Asians, Jews, and other minorities to obscure the fundamentally
racializing aims of his project. The etic category of the Muslim organizes the large
population of Arab and Turkish immigrants and their descendents into an essentialized
religio-cultural group, in much the same way as historical Antisemitism (Mandel, 2008;
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Norton, 2013). This “negative essentialism” converts Islam into an explanatory
framework for all manner of social ills, without the need or even the possibility of
empirical evidence connecting it to an actual group of people (Semati, 2011). In reality,
the religious practices and cultural norms of Muslims in Germany reflect the diversity of
practices of the many national and sub-national populations that make up Germany’s
transnational population. Contemporary representations of Muslim peril implicit and
sometimes explicit in integration debates, recall the tradition of Orientalist discourses
(Said, 1979) situating the East and, more precisely, Islam as the “constitutive outside,”
thus stabilizing the self-definition of Europe.
The Sarrazin debate shows how biopolitical logics divide the population into
categories of the worthy and the unworthy, those who must live and those who pose a
threat to life. Still, a strong distinction between the constructive and destructive modes of
integration discourse is not tenable. As the cases in this dissertation show, integration
discourse moves easily between celebration and condemnation, supported by the
neoliberal strategic logics at the core of biopolitics. Biopolitics refers to a historical
process by which “life” emerged as the center of political strategies (Lemke, 2011, p. 33).
As it was developed by Foucault, biopolitics refers to an assemblage of strategies of
governance, forms of political legitimacy, and technologies of security and population
management. Binding Sarrazin’s anti-Muslim arguments and the promotion of sporting
patriotism and integration are underlying values of social well-being through
productivity. In tandem with common sense thinking about migration and difference at
the level of the population, integration discourse operates at the individual level through
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initiatives oriented towards cultivating disciplined, docile bodies, for example, through
the kinds of sports integration programs analyzed in Chapter 2.
Whereas most of the contemporary research on migration and cultural difference
in Germany and Europe focus on immigrants themselves, examining their levels of
educational or economic attainment or investigating their experiences of exclusion and
accommodation, this dissertation focuses attention on the function of integration
discourse for the construction of the normative population. This conclusion extends the
findings of this dissertation to the reactions to the ongoing refugee crisis. The cases in
this dissertation elucidate the continuities between the outpouring of enthusiastic public
support for refugees in the summer of 2015 and the simultaneous implementation of new
policies that further restrict asylum laws. The development of integration discourse in the
mediated public sets up a logical framework for the selective and always provisional
inclusion of immigrant and minority populations as part of the new “colorful” Germany.

Asylum and the Future of Integration
The mediated public discourse in Germany around new peaks in demand for
asylum during 2015 dramatically exemplifies how integration discourse strengthens
national norms. As I will briefly outline below, the responses to the refugee crisis in 2015
followed many of the patterns established in other cases examined in this dissertation.
Representations reflected Germany’s recent rise as one of the most admired countries in
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the world, as reflected in the Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index 39 surveys measuring the
“soft power” of nation branding, as discussed in Chapter 4. As during the World Cups in
2006 and 2010, Germans were praised for their welcoming and open culture, showing
that they had learned from the lessons of the past to become a global moral leader.
Domestically, journalists and commentators marveled at “how deeply our country has
changed since those macro-crimes, that one could only slowly begin to speak of decades
after the war” (Liebsch, 2015). Unfortunately, the celebratory discourse and action in this
case was accompanied from the beginning by the other tools of securitization and
responsibilization that characterize integration discourse. Finally, I turn to critical voices
outside the mainstream public sphere, who critique the triumphalism of the response to
the refugee crisis. They relate these responses to Germany’s recent history of selfcongratulatory national spectacle, which denies structural and institutional racism in
mainstream Germany. Against dualistic conception of Germany (as voluntary-helpers or
the racist fringe) and of immigrants and minorities (as productive and colorful or
threatening and strange) these writers advocate an agonistic and critical transcultural
approach to politics and representation in Germany.

Good Germany, Bad Germany

39

See: http://nation-brands.gfk.com/
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During a visit to Berlin in June 2014, I was waiting for the S-Bahn when I noticed
a sticker on the sign indicating the name of the stop (figure 13). The sticker showed a
colorful cartoon of a panicked eagle in a boat, scrambling to pull a life preserver labeled
“right to asylum” out of a sea of grasping discolored hands. At the bow of the boat,
behind the eagle, the German flag waves. The boat's rudder is painted with the German
national colors and topped with the European Union flag. The top of the sticker proclaims
that “the boat is full.”

The bottom portion of the sticker was partially ripped up,

obscuring the letters in the bottom right corner. The complete image, shown in the right
panel of figure 20, displays the initials of the far-right National Democratic Party that
produced it. The sticker showed some weathering, suggesting it had been there for some
time.

Figure 13: Left and center: Photos of NPD sticker from a train platform (by author); Right: Full image
found with Google Image search

This sticker and its partial removal symbolize several the key discourses and
political tensions explored in this dissertation around nationalism and the control of
393

difference in Germany. The slogan at the top of the sticker is a well-established nativist
metaphor, which proposes that immigration threatens to swamp the nation that is at
capacity. This resembles the “wave” metaphor for migration, which is common across
languages and national contexts. This depiction takes the metaphor to its logical extreme,
making explicit the biopolitical logics suggested by the boat. In this image, refugees are
completely stripped of their humanity. They are rendered as the living dead. The shred of
life they possess, in the form of the reanimated hands grasping towards the safety in the
Europe-boat, is only relevant insofar as it poses a threat to the national population,
represented by the petrified eagle. Because of its limited capacity, the small asylum life
preserver cannot possibly serve as an aid. Instead, it functions as a lure that pulls undead
hands towards the boat.
The sticker clearly demonstrates the position of its neo-Nazi authors. In short, the
valuable life of the national population is under threat from refugees, whose lives
represent the death of the national population. As this dissertation demonstrates, this
discourse also operates in the center of the popular mediated public sphere, most
obviously in the Sarrazin debate but also in positively framed discussions about the value
of properly managed and curated diversity. The choice of passersby to remove the letters
indicating the sticker's authorship while leaving the message fully intact represents the
acceptability of the discourses of the right, while denying their connections to racism in
German society.
Reactions to the refugee crisis in Germany involved both the kinds of euphoric
celebration that characterized the 2006 World Cup and new regulations restricting asylum
rights based on biopolitical criteria of value under the imperative of integration. These
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criteria amplify the threat posed by failed candidates for integration from “incompatible”
cultures. These associations are supported by well-meaning programs, such as the sports
integration programs explored in Chapter 2, as well by the anti-Muslim polemics of Thilo
Sarrazin (Chapter 6) and the denials of racism by rapper Harris (Chapter 7). Although
these discourses circulate freely in the mainstream public sphere, their mobilization and
intensification as part of a growing xenophobic populist politics has raised alarm among
many politicians and prominent Germans. Like the alteration of the NPD sticker, public
responses to rising anti-refugee violence sought to exile open racism without attacking
the roots of racist discourse in the mainstream. As the critics at the end of this conclusion
argue, the refugee crisis became another spectacle, offering the opportunity to show the
world the welcoming and tolerant new Germany while characterizing racism as a
marginal phenomenon outside the boundaries of the normative nation.

Introducing the World to Willkommenskultur
As the international press observed with great approval (Kämper, 2015), Germany
sent a message of support for refugees at a time when many other European countries
were building fences. However, even as Germany gave the world the neologism
Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture) (Akrap, 2015), the domestic reality was much
more complicated: In 2015 lawmakers aggressively passed laws restricting asylum law
and the movement of “concerned citizens” (besorgte Bürger) coalesced behind the new
rightwing party, Alternatives for Germany (AfD). Indeed, a similar electoral shift to the
right has been building across Europe, gaining strength from the political and economic
instability in the Euro Zone and anxieties induced by record numbers of people forcibly
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displaced by war and economic desolation, primarily from Syria, Somalia, and
Afghanistan. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016)
determined that the overwhelming majority of refugees and displaced people are living in
low- and middle-income countries, in the late summer of 2015 stories of a “European
migrant crisis” dominated international news cycles. Images of crowds moving along
train tracks and overloaded boats on the Mediterranean flooded the media. Still, of the
65.3 million people forcibly displaced in 2015, only 6% of them were hosted in Europe
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). Both in terms of pure numbers
and as a percentage of the total population in European countries, European and other
high-income countries have provided refuge for relatively few forcibly displaced people.
Whereas only months before Germany had played role of cold hardliners by
proposing harsh austerity measures for Greece as its economy collapsed, in the late
summer of 2015, Germans enjoyed international admiration for publicly welcoming
refugees on train platforms and for Merkel’s statement that, “We can do it” (wir schaffen
das) in regards to accommodating refugees. International news outlets praised Germany,
while explaining that Germans’ welcoming response to refugees was due to their rational
recognition that, with their rapidly aging population, Germany needed to welcome
foreigners.40 The Washington Post published an article proclaiming that a demographic

Unfortunately, these narratives did not play out as expected; a survey of Germany’s top firms revealed
that by September 2016, the 30 companies in Germany’s DAX stock exchange had only hired 63 refugees,
50 of whom were employed by the Deutsche Post (DHL) (Prodhan, 2016).

40
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map of fertility rates shows “why some European countries reject refugees and others
love them” (Noack, 2015), confirming that Germany’s embrace was solidly based in the
statistically supported recognition of national interests in a time of population decline. A
Globe and Mail headline from earlier that year dubbed Germany as “the place where the
refugee flood is a solution, not a problem” (Saunders, 2015). In addition to the narrative
of pragmatic self-interest, an article in The Washington Post also draws on the popular
narrative of the “good-hearted German,” doing penance for the crimes of the Nazi period:
Empathy and the country's Nazi-past — which turned Europe into a battlefield
and later forced many Germans themselves to flee the war — might explain the
country's enthusiasm for helping today's refugees. But there is another factor that
few would openly acknowledge right away: Germany really needs them. (Noack,
2015)
This combination of rational self-interest and moral fortitude established a narrative in
which Germans were the European heroes of the refugee crisis. Although this narrative
functioned well internationally as a counterpoint to the outright hostility against refugees
by many European leaders, it does not hold up under closer scrutiny of domestic politics.
Without diminishing the substantial work of activists and concerned citizens in Germany,
it is misleading to characterize the German response to the increased demand for asylum
as enthusiastic in a durable sense or as responding to a rational desire to counteract the
demographic decline of the German population
The narratives of good Germans amongst duty-shirking European neighbors was
partly based on valid foundations, but it is an oversimplification of Germany’s
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complicated and ambivalent stance towards asylum seekers (see figure 1441). On the one
hand, Germany made the exceptional move to temporarily suspend the Dublin rules
requiring refugees to apply for asylum in the EU country of first arrival in August 2015
(Holehouse, 2015). Furthermore, despite pressure from within her party, Merkel
expressed her commitment to upholding the German constitution and the obligations of
the Geneva Convention by refusing to put a limit on the number of asylum cases
Germany would hear (“Merkel’s Conservative Allies,” 2015). On the other hand, by the
end of September the German federal government had drafted and approved new
restrictions reducing benefits and making asylum in Germany less accessible (“Neues
Asylrecht,” 2015). Still, in the second half of 2015, images of refugees holding up
pictures of Angela Merkel or handmade signs expressing their love and appreciation of
Germany contrasted sharply with images of crowds of people caged or fleeing armed
guards in Hungary. Although Germany’s exceptionally welcoming position was shortlived, it made a strong international impression.
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Timeline sources: Abé et al. (2015), Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2016), Bundesregierung
(2016), Connor (2016), Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD (2015), Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD
(2016), Deutsche Welle (“Germany reinstates Dublin rules,” 2015), United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (2016)
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Figure 14: Timeline of Responses to Refugee Crisis
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While international stories focused on the felicitous confluence of German
pragmatism and moral commitments to human rights, domestically Germany struggled
with a surge in arson attacks on refugee hostels in 2015. As concerns about “waves” of
migrants “flooding” into Europe intensified, so did the violence against refugees and the
hostels that housed them. An investigation by Die Zeit (Paul Blickle et al., 2015)
determined that 222 serious violent attacks against refugees hostels had taken place in the
first 11 months of 2015. In 169 of those cases no suspects were identified and only four
cases resulted in convictions. In August, a multiday riot rocked the small town of
Heidenau near Dresden. Groups of people, mostly men, greeted newly arrived refugees
with flying bottles, rocks and racist slurs. A video posted on YouTube by one of the
rioters shows smoke filled streets as people aim fireworks at police in riot gear (Hannes
Kling, 2015). Dozens of people stand in and along the sides of the streets, pulling down
police barriers, smashing concrete blocks, and throwing the resulting rubble at the police.
At several points, they chant “Wir sind das Volk” (we are the people). None of the rioters
were arrested. Although Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière promised that the
rioters would come to feel “the full severity of the state” (Zeit wieder rechte
ausschreitungen in Heidenau), it took three months for investigations of suspects to begin
and, as of the time of this writing, there have been no convictions (“Heidenau,” 2016).
As shocking as the events in Heidenau were, for the purposes of this dissertation,
the most interesting part about them is not the actions of these extremist youth but the
way their actions and statements were taken up in public discourse. The violent riots of
Heidenau provided an undeniable and unambiguous incidence of racist hate against
which mainstream society could unite in condemnation. Against the acts of Heidenau,
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President Joachim Gauck made a statement praising the actions of ad hoc volunteer
networks that had gathered to support the incoming asylum seekers. Gauck framed these
actions, in Manichean terms, as the helper-citizens against the malicious extremist
minority, claiming that volunteers “show that there is a light German, that is represented
here shining against the dark Germany that we sense when we hear about attacks against
asylum

seeker

housing

or

any

xenophobic

actions

against

people”i

(“Fremdenfeindlichkeit,” 2015). Gauck goes on to say,
These lovely examples, that is the Germany we are building and that we depend
on. And that this is a crystal-clear answer to the malicious agitators and arsonists,
who spoil the image of our country. We will tell them, “You don’t represent us.”
And we will absolutely not tolerate that lawbreakers—either abroad or
domestically—stand for this Germany, which has shown itself to be open and
willing to help.ii (“Fremdenfeindlichkeit,” 2015)
Gauck’s statement came as part of a wave of enthusiasm for volunteering and
demonstrating the welcoming character of Germany. The day after Gauck’s speech,
Germany’s most popular periodical, Bild, rolled out a new public campaign under the
slogan “We Help #refugeeswelcome” (Wir Helfen #refugeeswelcome). The campaign
was introduced by Bild with the statement,
“With the campaign, WE HELP, BILD wants to set an example of
humanitarianism. We want to show that the noisy troublemakers and foreignerhaters do NOT bellow in our name! That Germany has a heart for people who
need help!”iii (“Große Hilfs-Aktion von BILD für Flüchtlinge,” 2015)
The Bild campaign gathered stories of companies, celebrities, and professional soccer
teams who signed on to wear and proclaim the slogan “We help,” soliciting stories from
their readers of their actions to help refugees. Gauck’s statement and the framing of the
Bild campaign share a preoccupation with demonstrating to Germans themselves and to
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the international community that Germany is a good and ethical nation. The asylum
seekers provide the opportunity to showcase this goodness, framed as a national trait.
At the same time, as with soccer patriotism, the celebration of the helper nation is
portrayed as incompatible with—and even antithetical to—nationalism. Professor of
philosophy, Burkhard Liebsch made this argument three weeks after Gauck’s speech in
an article in Die Zeit titled, Our Country Surprises Itself

iv

(2015). Liebsch points to the

growth of volunteer movements in Germany to help refugees and argues that “hospitality
does not lend itself to national pride and narcissism.”v Liebsch points out that the
domestic and international press “surprised us with the discovery that we are a hospitable
people. Apparently, no one had predicted this. And yet, the truly lovely pictures from
train stations in Munich, Frankfurt, and Dortmund appear to unambiguously confirm this
image.”vi According to Liebsch, these images of people holding signs welcoming the
refugees who had been subjected to such brutal treatment on their way to Germany are a
sign of the establishment of a post-ethnic conception of collective identity.
Liebsch’s text makes the enthusiastic reaction to refugees the center of a new
national identity, while denying the political utility of this move. First, he sketches a new
German historiography of an original Germanic hospitality that was lost during the rise of
nationalism, culminating in the ultimate transgression of hospitality: The Holocaust. In its
zeal for eliminating difference, Liebsch proposes that the National Socialist mission
would have eventually reached all people including, presumably, normative Germans.
After all, “don’t we all arrive as foreigners in this world?” Having learned from the Nazi
era that the community of ethnicity (Volksgemeinschaft) “can only be a totalitarian
fiction,” Liebsch claims that only the extremist fringe wants “to belong unconditionally,
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to lose oneself in a political community” anymore. Second, Liebsch proposes that the
refugee crisis offers the opportunity to recover the soul of the country, which since the
end of the war, has been on the road to “freedom, not to pursue shameless and antisocial
wealth covered over with a positive self-image, but in the sense of the freedom to answer
others worldwide who need a place to dwell.”vii Here Liebsch critiques the economic
rationality that provided a primary foundation of the Federal Republic (see Chapter 2).
Liebsch sees the crisis as a “historically singular opportunity” to freely choose
hospitality in the Derridian sense (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000) —unbound from the
unitary norms, customs, and religious dictates requiring hospitality in “supposedly
backward countries and cultures” (2015). This ideal form of hospitality belongs to no
one, “least of all those who would write it on their flag” in order “to show who they are
or what they would like to be.” In this, Liebsch contrasts true “hospitality” with the
“welcome culture” that “was propagated during that special sporting mega event,”
referring to the 2006 men’s soccer World Cup. The latter was predicated on the limited
stay of the foreign guests “after leaving their money here.” Self-interest, calculation, and
conditionality is the antithesis of Liebsch’s ideal of hospitality.
While Liebsch’s laudable ideal may well describe the disposition of the ranks of
volunteers dedicating their time and resources to answer the call for shelter, Liebsch’s
claim that the public statements and images of hospitality run contrary to strengthening
symbolic nationalism is spurious. So long as national borders and citizenship regimes
determine “the right to have rights,” the kind of hospitality desired by Liebsch is bound to
the rule of law. Citizens may mobilize to offer shelter and care, but the law determines
who may enjoy the sanction and protection of legal residency. The progression of
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increasing restrictions on the right to asylum during 2015 and 2016 contradicts the claim
that Germany’s response to refugees represents a new era of disinterested hospitality.
Without a legal commitment to relinquish sovereignty as part of the pledge to asylum
(Bosswick, 2000), the heavily mediatized welcome provided by citizens and volunteers
risks becoming little more than a part of a symbolic narrative of national virtue.
Liebsch was not alone in making the connection to the enthusiasm for playing
host to the world during 2006 World Cup. For Liebsch, the economic motivations of the
2006 World Cup make it a counterexample to the welcoming images from train stations
in 2015. However, as the discussions of soccer patriotism and the World Cup throughout
this dissertation show, whatever economic benefits there may be to the country hosting a
sports mega event, the symbolic and affective significance of hosting is paramount. The
symbolic political value of these events is such that, despite increasing research showing
the likelihood of public debt and economic harm to host countries and cities, countries
still compete heavily for the opportunity to host. The media coverage of these events also
belies the claim that the desire to lose oneself in a national community has disappeared
except among the extremist fringe. In Liebsch’s account, the asylum seekers themselves
disappear except as a call that “our country” might answer, making itself whole again as a
community of individuals constituted through moral action rather than ethnicity. By
denying the significance and even the utility of national self-celebration of Germany’s
welcoming culture (Willkommenskultur) for symbolic politics, Liebsch reinforces the
binary dividing self-interested and chauvinistic nationalism from good forms of collective
solidarity. As with the discourses of patriotism and integration examined throughout this
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dissertation, this discourse denies nationalism while taking for granted the nation as the
primary definition of that community.

Beyond the Binary: Voices for a Critical Transnational Public
The delight of rediscovering Germany’s hospitable national character was
observed with skepticism by a handful of commentators writing outside the mainstream
press, most of them self-identified as the children of guest workers, refugees, or
immigrants. This dissertation analyzes the mediated public discourse of mainstream
publications, the government, and private sector foundations. These cases demonstrate
the frequently limited and curated participation of minority voices: athletes and
celebrities invited to speak as role models of integration or immigrant patriots whose
choice to promote a more inclusive civic nationalism matches journalistic interest in
surprising stories that validate national values and create distance from shameful pasts. In
this conclusion, I would like to turn to some of the critical voices that have been too rare
in the archives examined in this dissertation. In their criticism of reactions to the refugee
crisis, they raise concerns of the individualization of the problem of racism, the
depoliticization of inequality, and the ephemerality of solidarity built on selfcongratulatory national spectacles—issues that reverberate throughout cases assembled
here.
This dissertation argues that, in a political, economic, and social system governed
by biopolitical norms and logics, integration discourse performs the function of racism in
Foucault’s sense (2003). It divides the population into normative nationals and candidates
for integration. The cases in this dissertation have dealt primarily with the valuation of
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the national category, in part through the process of assessing the achievement of
integration by immigrants and minorities. The reactions to the refugee crisis include
politics and discourses of integration, but they also protect the category of the national on
another front, by assigning blame for racism to the antisocial (asoziale) fringe.
As critical commentators point out, the public enthusiasm for volunteering and the
reaction to rightwing violence create a “simplified binary dividing society into ‘good
white Germans’ and ‘bad white Germans’” (Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). This is
exemplified by Gauck’s division of society into “light” and “dark,” fragmenting and
isolating undesirable elements by categorizing them as social pathology. The problematic
association of light with good and dark with bad in a discussion of white nationalist
violence went largely unnoticed in the mainstream public sphere. The kinds of
pathologies typically associated with “integration refusers” are associated here with “dark
Germany.” Bloggers Ellen Kollender and Janne Grote write critical commentary from the
self-conscious position as Germans “without an apparent migration background.” In an
article for the alternative online periodical Migazin, Kollender and Grote assemble many
examples of prominent citizens that have attempted to marginalize racism through
ridicule by characterizing those who express rightwing views as useless and intellectually
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deficient people.42 As a key example, they point to a celebrated quote by the popular
musician Farin Urlaub, stating that
As long as there are people who can't do anything, who don't know anything, and
have never achieved anything, there will also be racism. Since these people want
to feel good about themselves and to be proud of something. So, they look for
someone who is different from them and they consider themselves superior. Or
they are crazily proud to be “German,” something for which no effort was
necessary on their side.viii (Kollender & Grote, 2015)
Kollender and Grote observe that this formulation projects racism onto the “losers” of
society, those who have failed because of their “self-imposed lack of work and prospects”
(2015). Likewise, in an article posted on the platform Medium, graduate students and
former asylum seekers Elif Kücük and Sinthujan Varatharajah see in this binarism a
familiar discriminatory schema in which “low secondary school qualifications, lacking
intelligence, poor spelling or welfare (Hartz IV) are shortsightedly and arrogantly
declared as reasons for racism” (2015). The useless human described in the Farin Urlaub
quote above bears a striking resemblance to descriptions of “problem migrants.” Theirs is
characterized as a worthless form of life, a form that is harmful to the growth of a healthy
population.
As part of this process of drawing divisions, the “helper nation” joined in public
displays of generosity and kindness towards refugees. Critical commentators expressed
discomfort and skepticism about this sudden outpouring of enthusiasm, even as they

See, for example, the satirical version of a popular Sarah Conner’s song by comedian Carolin Kebekus
“How Stupid You Are” (Wie Blöd Du Bist).

42
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admitted feeling a spark of hope that this time the support would be more durable than
the anti-racism concerts and demonstrations of “upstanding citizens” following the antirefugee violence of the 1990s. In the 1990s, these symbolic public acts against racism did
nothing to stop the laws undoing the strong protections for refugee rights in the
constitution. Liebsch and critical commentators draw a common parallel between the
representations of the response to refugees and the spectacle of heroism and hospitality
celebrated during the men’s World Cup—a tradition that firmly took hold in 2006. As
Doris Akrap writes in the Guardian, “it’s as if a year after the World Cup triumph in Rio,
Germans desperately want to be world champions again—this time as the globe’s most
welcoming country for refugees” (Akrap, 2015). Bahareh Sharifi echoes this sentiment in
an article written for Migazin, writing that it is not the political protests of refugee
activists over the past several years at have brought people onto the streets, but instead—
referring to the 2006 World Cup, known as the Summer Fairytale—the “spreading drive
to have been part of the Germany Summer Fairytale Part 2” in which everyone seeks to
outdo each other in the “mediated presentation as world champions of welcoming culture
(Willkommenskultur)”ix (Sharifi, 2015). Sharifi’s use of the past perfect progressive here
emphasizes the self-consciousness of the actions by participants imagining their future
selves looking back on the historical narrative they are creating. Writing in late
September 2015, Kücük and Varatharajah elaborate this idea, imagining how “the past
several months will remain in memory as the ‘summer of refugees and great solidarity.’
A supposedly well-earned nostalgia”x (2015). Following the script of the World Cup
mobilizations and victories, these commentators observe in the mediated outpouring of
support for refugees the preparation of narratives in the present as the basis of future
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collective memory. The pattern is so well known, that nostalgia is already present while
events are in process.
Writing in mid-August, blogger Nadia Shehadeh observed the formation of this
narrative.
About a week and a half ago the German Summer Fairytale took off, a wonderful
story of solidarity, harmony, and Occidental diligence that unfolded through
volunteer action and the generosity on the part of all kinds of ascetics. Selfies in
front of masses of donations were shot and uploaded onto the networks, because
do good and talk about it! The talk was of the victory of civil society and of evil
and of “goosebump moments.”xi (2015)
In this description, the refugee crisis provided a moment of collective self-affirmation
that picked up and even exceeded the breadth and power of the World Cup due to the
seriousness of the task of saving lives and the “evil” antagonist of rightwing violence.
Shehadeh goes on to vent her frustration as she watches her Facebook feed fill up with
stories and images that could serve as architypes of the white savior complex. Shehadeh
wryly notes that “this is the summer of the heroes, this summer 2015, above all the
German heroes, and it didn't even require a soccer team”xii (2015). Shehadeh also focuses
attention on the ways that social media has created an echo chamber amplifying the
spectacle of the good. In an even more pointed commentary in the weekly business news
magazine, Wirtschaftswoche, famous Turkish-German comedian and cabaret artist,
Serdar Somuncu, expressed his frustration with the mediatized helper-ism in
unambiguous terms: “The sympathy with refugees is degenerating into a spectacle of
self-representation.... the common sense of welcoming culture is starting to make me
sick…. last year it was the Ice Bucket Challenge, now it is refugees” xiii (Somuncu,
2015). Somuncu sees in the social media virality of refugee boosterism a competitive
spectacle and predicts that the cause célèbre—in this case the mortal plight of refugees—
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will evaporate from public concern once the rash of excitement has passed. What will be
left is the self-satisfaction and the security of the conviction that your community is on
the side of the good.
Beyond the simple frustration with the self-congratulation of majority Germans,
commentators argue that the spectacle of the good poses several problems for addressing
the needs and rights of refugees—problems that are intertwined with broader struggles to
validate the political claims of minority Germans. As in integration discourse aimed at
immigrants and minority Germans, the process of division separating the bad nationals
from the good personalizes and, thus, depoliticizes issues of racism, inequity, and the
place of diversity in German society. Both the condemnation of the bad and the
celebration of the good draw attention away from cultural, structural, and institutional
politics that materially impact the lives of refugees and minorities. Volunteerism risks
setting up a paternalistic relationship between majority society and refugee supplicants
(Kollender & Grote, 2015), rather than a relationship based on political commitments to
human rights in which refugees themselves are recognized as legitimate political actors
(Sharifi, 2015).
Volunteerism also sets up a relationship based on the “symbolic violence”
(Bourdieu, 1994) of the gift that must be met with appreciation and comes with the
expectation of reciprocation. This prepares the way for the kinds of economic
rationalities that have come to govern integration discourse since the beginning of the
millennium, as the cases in this dissertation have shown. Kücük and Varatharajah see in
Angela Merkel's asylum policy a desire to bind asylum policy and economic utility. This
can be seen in the approving discussions of Germany's pragmatic approach to admitting
410

refugees as a solution for German labor shortages mentioned above. They write that,
“refugees are welcome then, so long as they are useful, not least of all as apprentices,
skilled workers and tax payers. But what about the illiterate, the aged and the
psychologically and physically ill? Are the then less ‘worthy of saving,’ less welcome?”
(Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). Here, through the question of economic utility, the
biopolitical line dividing worthy from unworthy life emerges again. As Agamben argues,
the refugee, who has lost all other claims but that of humanity, should be the ultimate
embodiment of human rights, but “signals instead the concept’s radical crisis” (1998, p.
126). Kücük and Varatharajah observe, even in the heady days of “welcome fever”
(Kollender & Grote, 2015), the continuity of economic utilitarian discourse mobilized to
assess those with nothing left but the claim to human rights. The poverty of those claims
concerns Doris Akrap, who in listening to “good Germans” often asks herself,
What is going to happen, when the new refugees demand more than a tent, a
bottle of water and a slice of bread? How will German society deal with this next
turning point? What if it turns out that not every refugee has the skills to equip
them for the “made in Germany” brand?
When the asylum comes in the form of a personal gift, the political demands a refugee
might make appear as an affront to the host-guest relationship. The limits of this
arrangement materialize the moment refugee political claims condemn the inhumane
conditions of detention, the “camp as a form of violence” (Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015).
The limits have also emerged in the year since the “summer of heroes,” as two new
revisions of asylum law have further restricted mobility and the forms of resources
available to asylum seekers.
In a development that in retrospect appears almost inevitable, the state has also
responded to the crisis by implementing the first federal “Integration Law”
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(Integrationsgesetz) in July 2016, which makes access to benefits dependent on
attendance of “integration courses” and allows authorities to place restrictions on place of
residence. The law also ties the continued permission to stay in Germany to successful
participation in occupational training and employment. Picking up on the now welldeveloped theme of integration discourse, the motivation for the law is summarized as
“demand and support” (fördern und fordern). The law facilitates access to the job market
for those with a strong likelihood of being granted asylum (guter Bleibeperspektive) and
sanctions those who are unable or unwilling to participate. While the law commits to
increasing resources for critical programs, including language classes, the emphasis on
requirements and sanctions suggests that the problem with “integration” lies with the
refusal on the part of asylum seekers to participate. As Pro Asyl’s (2016) position paper
on a draft of the new law points out, in reality the problem is that the demand for
language courses far outpaces the supply. The emphasis on penalties supports the
prejudicial and counterfactual position that problems with “integration” lie solely in the
refusal of refugees and immigrants to participate.
In the actions of public volunteerism and legal restriction over the past year, the
critical commentators introduced above point to a crucial missing piece: the voices of
those impacted—both contemporary and former refugees as well as guest workers, their
descendants, and all those whose “migration background” is apparent, making them
perpetual candidates for integration. Sharifi argues that “legal protection and political
participation” are necessary, but must also be accompanied by the possibility of “active
co-determination of societal and cultural self-conception” (2015). Reactions to the
refugee situation underscore the importance of this kind of interpretational
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enfranchisement. As the electoral success of the new rightwing political party,
Alternatives for Germany (AfD), shows, a clear division between “dark” and “light”
Germany—between the good normative national and the bad racist failed national—is a
myth. Reactions to the increased demand for asylum in Germany demonstrate how
biopolitical fragmentation operates as part of the acceptance of a new “colorful”
Germany. In Serdar Somuncu’s words, “The most important task that we in this
thankfully ever more diverse nation have is not to unthinkingly allocate affection and
rejection, but rather to learn to weigh things and to allow argumentation in”xiv (2015). To
achieve this, minority narratives must be part of mediated public discourse even when
they contest majority norms and point to the uncomfortable issues of the structural and
racialized components of poverty and inequality.
The

apparent

polarization

and

division

of

the

society

into

the “helper nation” (Helfer-nation) and “dark Germany” (dunkeles Deutschland)
obscures the intertwining of the celebration and condemnation of integration discourse.
Narratives of integration facilitate the easy swing from one stance to the other,
maintaining the positive self-conception of the normative national as tolerant and
pragmatic while cordoning off the non-normative into the ambiguous category of the
integrant. The conception of Germany as a paragon of Willkommenskultur was cemented
by images of Germans celebrating refugees. The narrative that German support emerged
from individual moral and empathetic commitments (based on having learned from the
Nazi past) and out of pragmatic and thus durable economic self-interest established this
welcoming reputation domestically and abroad. As the same time, the policy changes
implemented in 2015 and 2016 represent a continuation of the restrictions of the 1990s,
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when the “asylum compromise” abolished the sacrifice of sovereignty contained in the
constitution's original commitment to asylum rights. The voices of refugees, along with
their political organizing and their contestation of disappearing rights and inhumane
conditions, remain marginal.

Integration and the Citizen
Less than two decades after the introduction of jus solis citizenship, integration
discourse has become a cultural and a juridical norm, deepening political and cultural
commitments to biopolitical rationalities for the cultivation of valued forms of life. The
two major revisions of asylum law since 2015 were followed by the implementation of
Germany’s first Integration Law in 2016, building on and significantly expanding the
integration mandates of the Germany's first Immigration Law from a decade before. This
dissertation argues that the positive and apolitical nature of concepts and mandates
associated with integration should not be taken for granted. Instead, we need to carefully
consider what function the idea of integration plays wherever it is mobilized to define the
rules for belonging and citizenship. Integration discourse depends on an evaluative
framework that classifies the population first by their status as national or integrant, and
second according to the threats and benefits they represent for the population at large.
The category of the integrant must constantly be evaluated and managed to determine,
both at the individual level and at the level of the group, whether integrants fall into the
subcategory of successes or failures of integration. This evaluation determines whether
non-nationals are beneficial or deleterious to the national population. Crucially, it is a
perpetual evaluation that can never be definitively settled. As several of the cases studied
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in this dissertation show, an integrant who is celebrated as a “successful example” in one
situation may later be judged a failure or traitor to the cause of integration based on
another situation.
The topic of integration emerges where difference is seen as most insurmountable,
and the paradigmatic Other is now the figure of the Muslim. While new generations of
European-born Muslims are increasingly visible as national sports heroes, pop artists, and
politicians, their success is too often mobilized to support the conviction that through
integration success is equally accessible to all. This meritocratic myth perpetuates
cultural deficiency models for explaining achievement and economic gaps, and erases the
history of structural and interpersonal discrimination faced by immigrants and, especially,
Turkish labor immigrants and refugees from predominantly Muslim countries. The cases
in this dissertation focus on high-profile mobilizations of integration since it arose as a
major national concern at the turn of the millennium. These cases also all involve the
definition of Germanness, the proper performance of national affiliation, and the
projection of Germany’s future. Putting these cases in conversation with each other
reveals the development of more inclusive social imaginaries as well as the entrenchment
of racial narratives in an economic guise. Across Europe, the rejection of
multiculturalism and its associated deliberative approaches in favor of integration has
shifted the focus of public discussions on difference from a paradigm of action based on
negotiation, contestation, and self-narration to a paradigm based on the management of
life itself.
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i

Die zeigen es gibt ein helles Deutschland, das hier sich leuchtend darstellt gegenüber dem
Dünkeldeutschland, das wir empfinden, wenn wir von Attacken auf Asylbewerber Unterkünfte oder gar
Fremdenfeindliche Aktionen gegen Menschen hören.
ii
Das ist dies schöne Beispiele, das ist das Deutschland, das wir bauen und auf das wir uns stützen. Und das
ist diese überdeutliche Antwort an Hetzer und Brandstifter, die das Angesicht unseres Landes
verunzieren…. wir werden den sagen, Ihr repräsentiert uns nicht, und wir werden schon gar nicht dulden,
dass Rechtsbrecher, im Grunde im Ausland und im Inland für dieses Deutschland stehen, das sich heute
als offenes und hilfsbereites darstellt.
iii
Mit der Aktion WIR HELFEN will BILD ein Zeichen der Menschlichkeit setzen. Wir wollen zeigen, dass
Schreihälse und Fremdenhasser NICHT in unserem Namen grölen! Dass Deutschland ein Herz hat für
Menschen, die Hilfe brauchen!
iv
Unser Land überrascht sich selbst
v
Gastfreundschaft eignet sich nicht für nationalen Stolz und Narzissmus.
vi
In- und ausländische Presse überrascht uns mit dem Befund, dass wir ein gastfreundliches Volk sein
sollen. Das hat offenbar niemand vorausgesehen. Und doch scheinen die in der ganzen Welt verbreiteten,
wirklich sehenswerten Aufnahmen von den Münchener, Frankfurter und Dortmunder Bahnhöfen dieses
Bild eindeutig zu bestätigen.
vii
Aber nicht im Sinne der Befreiung zu schamlosem und asozialem Reichtum, den man durch ein positives
Selbstbild bemäntelt, sondern im Sinne der Freiheit, weltweit anderen, die auf eine Bleibe angewiesen
sind, zu antworten.
viii
Solange es Leute gibt, die nichts können, nichts wissen und nichts geleistet haben, wird es auch
Rassismus geben. Denn auch diese Leute wollen sich gut fühlen und auf irgendetwas stolz sein. Also
suchen sie sich jemanden aus, der anders ist als sie und halten sich für besser. Oder sie
sind bekloppterweise stolz darauf, ‚Deutsch‘ zu sein, wozu keinerlei Leistung ihrerseits nötig war.
ix
So waren es auch nicht die politischen Kämpfe der Geflüchteten-Aktivist*innen am Rindermarkt 2013,
die die Menschen in München auf die Straße brachten, sondern der derzeit um sich greifende Drang
beim deutschen Sommermärchen Teil 2 dabei gewesen zu sein. Es scheint, als wollen sich alle bei ihrem
Einsatz überbieten, gefolgt von dem sich gegenseitig auf die Schulter klopfen und der medialen
Inszenierung als Weltmeister der Willkommenskultur.
x
Die vergangenen Monate werden wohl in Zukunft als “Sommer der Flüchtlinge und der großen
Solidarität” in Erinnerung bleiben. Eine vermeintlich wohlverdiente Nostalgie.
xi
Vor ungefähr anderthalb Wochen ging das doitsche Sommermärchen los, eine wundersame Fabel aus
Zusammenhalt, Harmonie, abendländischem Fleiß der sich in ehrenamtlichem Engagement entfaltete und
Großzügigkeit jenseits jeglicher Askese. Selfies vor Spendenmassen wurden geschossen und in
Netzwerken hochgeladen, denn tue Gutes und spreche darüber! Vom Sieg der Zivilgesellschaft über das
Böse und von Gänsehautmomenten war die Rede.
xii
Es ist ein Sommer der Held_innen, dieser Sommer 2015, vor allem der deutschen Held_innen, und es
brauchte nicht mal eine Fußballmannschaft dafür.
xiii
Die Anteilnahme mit Flüchtlingen artet in ein Selbstdarstellungsspektakel aus. Was kotzt mich
mittlerweile dieser Common Sense von Willkommenskultur an…. Letztes Jahr war’s noch
die Icebucketchallenge, jetzt sind es die Flüchtlinge…. so unglaubwürdig ist die Anteilnahme, wenn sie
Teil eines Spektakels wird, bei dem es vielmehr um das Image des engagiertesten Wohltäters zu gehen
scheint, als um die Frage, wie man aus den Fehlern der Vergangenheit lernen kann.
xiv
Die wichtigste Aufgabe, die wir in den nächsten Jahren in dieser Gott sei Dank immer vielfältiger
werdenden Nation haben, ist es, nicht blind Zuneigung und Ablehnung zu verteilen, sondern das
Abwägen zu lernen und Argumentationen zuzulassen.

416

APPENDIX

Chapter 3 News Corpus
Search Results for Fußball AND Patriotismus, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2006 from Der Spiegel,
Spiegel Online, and Mittledeutsche Zeitung

Bellinger, I. (2006, September 29). «Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen» entfacht
Hochstimmung. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1158738
263373&calledPageId=987490165154
Bergmann, K., & Richter, A. (2006, October 4). Publikum feiert «Deutschland. Ein
Sommermärchen». Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1158738
264971&calledPageId=987490165154
Bernstein, S. (2006, June 23). Ein Oranjer in Sangerhausen. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung.
Retrieved from http://www.mz417

web.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1150384
434885&calledPageId=987490165154
Biallas, J. (2006a, June 19). Die Begeisterung trägt Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1150384
429116&calledPageId=987490165154
Biallas, J. (2006b, July 9). Deutschland nach der WM: Ein guter Gastgeber, der viel erlebt
und viel gelernt hat. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Halle. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/meinungen/deutschland-nach-der-wm-ein-guter-gastgeber--der-viel-erlebtund-viel-gelernt-hat,20641344,19025660.html
Bilger, A., Langenau, L., & Stolzenberg, C. (2006, June 27). Linksextremismus: Wider
den nationalen Taumel. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/linksextremismus-wider-den-nationalentaumel-a-423249.html
Bock, C. (2006a, January 16). Du bist Deutschland und wir alle fühlen wie Fußballfans.
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1137318
372777&calledPageId=987490165154
Bock, C. (2006b, December 8). Der Sommer war Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1165425
072335&calledPageId=987490165154

418

Bock, C., & Reuther, A. (2006, June 12). Mann, Frau und Kind tragen Schwarz-RotGold. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1149748
371457&openMenu=1013083806405&calledPageId=1013083806405&listid=10188
81578737
Broder, H. M. (2006, January 6). Patriotismus-Debatte: Entdeckung des Schweinebratens.
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/patriotismus-debatte-entdeckung-desschweinebratens-a-419191.html
Bundestagspräsident Lammert ist mit seinem Volk zufrieden. (n.d.). Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung, p. 2006.06.22.
Deggerich, M., & Linden, A. (2006, July 20). Patriotismus: Kein Ende der Fahnenstange.
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/patriotismus-kein-ende-der-fahnenstangea-427359.html
Deutsche Polizisten mit deutschen Fahnen sind ein Problem. (2006, June 14).
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1149748
372760&openMenu=987490165154&calledPageId=987490165154&listid=0
Deutschland hisst Flagge. (2006, June 14). Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1149748
372782&calledPageId=987490165154
419

Deutschland in Schwarz-Rot-Gold: Köhler und Künast erfreut über Fahnenmeer. (2006,
June 18). Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/deutschland-in-schwarz-rot-gold-koehlerund-kuenast-erfreut-ueber-fahnenmeer-a-422011.html
Entspannter Blick auf Fahnenmeer. (2006, June 13). Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Halle.
Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1149148
396048&calledPageId=987490165154
Fußball-WM: Die Deutschland-Party. (2006, June 19). Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/sptv/thema/a-422320.html
Hoch, J., & Main, F. am. (2006, August 10). Diskutieren über Deutschland: “Nation ist
ein Gefühl.” Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/literatur/diskutieren-ueber-deutschland-nation-ist-eingefuehl-a-441433.html
John, U. (2006, December 13). Tränen, Triumphe und ein Kopfstoß. Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1165591
275217&calledPageId=987490165154
Karpe, C. (2006, July 12). Geht mit Klinsmann auch die Begeisterung? Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1150384
460629&calledPageId=987490165154

420

Kleines Finale: Das letzte große Volksfest. (2006, August 7). Spiegel Online. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/kleines-finale-das-letzte-grossevolksfest-a-425750.html
Knobloch, C. (2006, October 24). «Die alten Erinnerungen kommen hoch» [Newspaper].
Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1161675
670998&calledPageId=987490165154
Kurbjuweit, D. (2006, December 6). Im Lande Winnetous. Der Spiegel, 24. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47209096.html
Kurbjuweit, D., Allgöwer, K., Brinkbäumer, K., Buse, U., Feldenkirchen, M., Gutsch, J.M., … Matussek, M. (2006, June 19). Deutschland, ein Sommermärchen. Der
Spiegel, 25. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47282143.html
Landesweite Party: Millionen feierten das deutsche Team. (2006, September 7). Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/landesweite-partymillionen-feierten-das-deutsche-team-a-425775.html
Lüneberg, D. (2006, October 4). Aus Liebe zum Spiel. Halle. Retrieved from
http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1158910
869474&calledPageId=987490165154
Malzahn, C. C. (2006a, May 7). Stimmungsturbo WM: Heiter so, Deutschland! Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/stimmungsturbo-wmheiter-so-deutschland-a-425159.html

421

Malzahn, C. C. (2006b, June 14). Fußball-Wahn: Deutschland, Deutschland, bald ist es
vorbei. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/fussball-wahn-deutschland-deutschland-baldist-es-vorbei-a-421372.html
Matussek, M. (2006, March 6). Debatte: Sind Patrioten Strauchdiebe? Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/debatte-sind-patriotenstrauchdiebe-a-419561.html
Mohr, R. (2006a, June 24). Mohrs Deutschlandgefühl: Wie die Ikea-Kassiererin das
Schweden-Fiasko erlebte. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/mohrs-deutschlandgefuehl-wie-die-ikeakassiererin-das-schweden-fiasko-erlebte-a-423433.html
Mohr, R. (2006b, June 28). Mohrs Deutschlandgefühl: Zeit fürs neue Fräuleinwunder.
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/mohrsdeutschlandgefuehl-zeit-fuers-neue-fraeuleinwunder-a-424013.html
Mohr, R. (2006c, July 7). Mohrs Deutschlandgefühl: Verdampfte Traurigkeit. Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/mohrsdeutschlandgefuehl-verdampfte-traurigkeit-a-425541.html
Mohr, R. (2006d, September 6). Mohrs Deutschlandgefühl: Der Patriotismus-Pegel.
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/mohrsdeutschlandgefuehl-der-patriotismus-pegel-a-420451.html
Montag, A. (2006a, June 15). Fahnen satt, Freude riesig. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung.
Retrieved from http://www.mz-

422

web.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1150384
423562&calledPageId=987490165154
Montag, A. (2006b, July 19). Die Party ist vorbei, die Laune wie üblich. Retrieved from
http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1150384
465794&calledPageId=987490165154
Pfeifer, T. (2006, June 16). Nur Goleo ohne Hose hat es schwer. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung.
Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1150384
426019&calledPageId=987490165154
Reif, M. (2006, June 23). «Erfreulich unverkrampft». Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1150384
435263&calledPageId=987490165154
Schnibben, C. (2006a, June 19). Maskenball der Völker. Der Spiegel, 25. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47282147.html
Schnibben, C. (2006b, December 6). Der seufzende Kleinbürger. Der Spiegel, 24.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47209111.html
Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut. (2006, June 8). Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Stuttgart.
Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1149748
369664&calledPageId=987490165154
Supp, B. (2006, March 7). Die Integrierten. Der Spiegel, 27. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47441168.html
423

Todt, J. (2006, December 6). Schwarz-rot-goldener Boom: Flaggenparade der WMPatrioten. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/schwarz-rot-goldener-boom-flaggenparadeder-wm-patrioten-a-420927.html
Tuma, T. (2006, March 7). Flagge zeigen? Der Spiegel, 27. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47441233.html
Umfrage zur WM: “Wir verlieren bald den Verstand.” (2006, June 14). Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/umfrage-zur-wm-wirverlieren-bald-den-verstand-a-420928.html
Westerwelle will «neuen» Patriotismus in Deutschland nutzen. (2006, August 31).
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1156492
893381&calledPageId=987490165154
WM für Organisatoren «sensationell». (2006, June 18). Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved
from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1149748
374408&calledPageId=987490165154
WM-Dritter: Reaktionen auf Deutschlands Erfolg. (2006, August 7). Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/wm-dritter-reaktionen-aufdeutschlands-erfolg-a-425777.html
WM-Eindrücke: “Ich dachte, Ihr hättet keinen Humor.” (2006, August 7). Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/reise/aktuell/wm-eindruecke-ich-dachte-ihrhaettet-keinen-humor-a-425742.html
424

WM-Euphorie wird als neuer Patriotismus begrüßt. (2006, June 15). Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1149748
373193&calledPageId=987490165154

Chapter 4 News Corpus
Results for Stakeholder-focused coverage, selected from search for “Du bist
Deutschland” AND Kampagne in Focus, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Spiegel,
Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stern, Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt, and Die Zeit

Aust, M. (2006, February 22). Prozac fürs Volk. Die Tageszeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/archivstart/?ressort=tz&dig=2006/02/22/a0138&cHash=3f501fa295
Ax, M. (2005, December 5). Wirtschaft übernimmt Verantwortung für dieses Land. Welt
Online. Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article182224/Wirtschaftuebernimmt-Verantwortung-fuer-dieses-Land.html
Bauchmüller, M. (2006, February 21). Meinungsbild: Du bist der Aufschwung.
sueddeutsche.de, p. 20.
Böcking, D., Feldenkirchen, M., Geyer, M., Gutsch, J.-M., Hoppe, R., Hujer, M., …
Smoltczyk, A. (2006, February 25). Alles wird gut. Der Spiegel, 9. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46046431.html

425

Bovensiepen, N. (2005, June 12). Land der Ideen: Ärger statt Aufbruch. Sueddeutsche
Zeitung, p. 43.
Brenner, J., Buse, U., Ehlers, F., Fichtner, U., Goos, H., Gutsch, J., … Scheuermann, C.
(2008, April 21). Der König von Deutschland. Der Spiegel. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-56670297.html
Deutschland hat noch mehr Ideen. (2006, June 12). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, p.
15. Berlin.
Erenz, B. (2005, November 30). Glosse: Kreatives Grenzland. Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/online/2005/48/denn_du_bist_deutschland
Goy, D. G. F. M. (2009, February 22). Die Kunst, Gefühle in Worte zu kleiden. Welt Am
Sonntag. Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/wams_print/article3250503/Die-KunstGefuehle-in-Worte-zu-kleiden.html
Grimberg, S. (2006, January 28). Da ist etwas losgetreten. Die Tageszeitung. Retrieved
from http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/?dig=2006/01/28/a0193
Hoff, H. (2005, October 3). WM 2006: Abschied vom Fabrikarbeiter. Die Zeit. Retrieved
from http://www.zeit.de/online/2005/40/land_der_ideen
Holzapfel, N. (2006, August 9). “Social Marketing”: Du bist ... für Reformen.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/social-marketing-du-bist-fuer-reformen1.656720
Iken, M., & Gerlach, J. (2008, January 19). Was steckt hinter der Kinderkampagne? Welt
Online. Retrieved from

426

http://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/article1570933/Was-steckt-hinter-derKinderkampagne.html
Ingeborg, H. (2006, March 19). Unordnung is das neue Schwarz. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung, p. 35.
Jarchow, K. (2006, April 15). Der Verkünder der frohen Wirtschaftsbotschaft. Die
Tageszeitung. Retrieved from http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/?dig=2006/04/15/a0062
Jessen, J. (2005, October 6). Glosse: Du bist Werbeagentur. Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/2005/41/Spitze_41
Kaiser, A. (2005, November 21). Kampagne: Das kleine Du und das große Deutschland.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, p. 9.
Kaiser, T. (2007, December 13). Du bist Deutschland wirbt für Kinderfreundlichkeit.
Welt Online. Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article1456241/Du-bistDeutschland-wirbt-fuer-Kinderfreundlichkeit.html
Kampagne “Du bist Deutschland” für die Bundeskanzlerin ein Erfolg. (2008, April 7).
Welt Online. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article2176120/Kampagne-Du-bist-Deutschland-fuerdie-Bundeskanzlerin-ein-Erfolg.html
Kampagne “Du bist Deutschland” geht weiter: Mit Fernsehspots zur
Kinderfreundlichkeit. (2007, December 12). Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/kampagne-du-bist-deutschland-geht-weitermit-fernsehspots-zur-kinderfreundlichkeit-1.344802
Panster, C. (2006, September 8). Kampagnen: Emotionen statt Argumente. Die
Tageszeitung. Retrieved from http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/?dig=2006/08/09/a0070
427

Plakat-Kampagnen: Wer ist Deutschland? (2006, August 8). Stern.de. Retrieved from
http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/plakat-kampagnen-wer-ist-deutschland567284.html
Rühle, A. (2006, June 4). Bestaune die Amöbe. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, p. 11.
Schmidt, T. E. (2005, June 9). Wir sind was. Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/2005/24/Wir_sind_was
von Petersdorff, W. (2005, June 15). Noch eine Kampagne fürs Vaterland. Frankfurter
Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, p. 45.
Voss, O. (2009, April 25). Krisen sind doch gut für Kreative. Welt Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article3622066/Krisen-sind-doch-gut-fuerKreative.html
Wer bezahlt Du bist Deutschland? (2007, April 16). Der Spiegel, 16. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-51211771.html
Weyerer, G. (2007, October 12). Alle Wege führen nach Gütersloh. Sueddeutsche
Zeitung, p. 8.
Wir in Deutschland. (2005, September 23). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved
from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/netzwirtschaft/kampagne-wir-indeutschland-1256557.html

Chapter 5 News Corpus
Combined search Results for Bassal and Germany in LexisNexis and Google Custom
Search of 234 German Periodicals
428

Akrap, D. (2011, 07). Die B-Note: Jalla, jalla Deutschland. Die Tageszeitung. Retrieved
from http://www.taz.de/!74211/
Alke, W. (2010, July 5). Bitte gelassen bleiben. Die Tageszeitung, p. 17.
Amerikaner staunen über “Germany.” (2010, October 7). Westfälische Nachrichten.
Angelos, J. (2010, July 3). Many Germans Would Rather Waive the Flag. Wsj.com.
Retrieved from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704699604575343004038839936.h
tml
Anker, J. (2010a, June 25). In Neukölln ist ein Fahnenstreit entbrannt. Berliner
Morgenpost. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.morgenpost.de/berlinaktuell/article1332648/In-Neukoelln-ist-ein-Fahnenstreit-entbrannt.html
Anker, J. (2010b, June 29). Neuköllner Deutschland-Flagge wird Politikum. Berliner
Morgenpost. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.morgenpost.de/sport/fussballwm/article1334924/Neukoellner-Deutschland-Flagge-wird-Politikum.html
Anker, J. (2010c, July 3). Linksautonome kontra Migranten: Fahnenstreit an der
Sonnenallee. Berliner Morgenpost, p. 3.
Anwar, A., Arsenschek, R., Diederichs, B., Nazarewska, B., & Scholl, S. (2010, July 6).
Deutschland und die Welt - eine neue (WM)-Perspektive. Http://Www.merkurOnline.de. Retrieved from http://www.merkuronline.de/aktuelles/politik/deutschland-welt-eine-neue-wm-perspektive-831670.html

429

Bassal verteidigt Flagge gegen Autonome. (2010, June 30). DerWesten. Berlin. Retrieved
from http://www.derwesten.de/sport/Bassal-verteidigt-Flagge-gegen-Autonomeid3361495.html
Bassals gucken WM. (2010, July 4). Berliner Kurier, p. 7.
Bein, H.-R. (2010, July 6). Integration: Fiebern mit der Internationalmannschaft.
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mz-web.de/fussball/integrationfiebern-mit-der-internationalmannschaft,20642322,17722878.html
Chaoten klauen ihre Deutschland-Flagge. (2010, June 29). Berliner Zeitung. Berlin.
Retrieved from http://www.bz-berlin.de/bezirk/neukoelln/chaoten-klauen-ihredeutschland-flagge-article901007.html
Deutsche Internationalmannschaft Elf der 23. (2010, July 7). Bonner General-Anzeiger,
p. 25.
Deutschland-Hasser terrorisieren Fußball-Fans Linke Chaoten zerstören die Riesen-Fahne
einer Neuköllner Einwanderer-Familie: WM-Fieber in Berlin. (2010, June 30).
Berliner Kurier, p. 8. Neukölln.
Ebmeyer, M. (2014, April 29). Noch ist Schland nicht verloren. Welt Online. Retrieved
from http://www.welt.de/kultur/literarischewelt/article127401473/Noch-ist-Schlandnicht-verloren.html
Engel, E. (2010, July 6). Fans, Patrioten: Schland in Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Aachener
Nachrichten, p. 3.
Fahnenkrieg in der Sonnenallee: Arabischstämmige Ladenbesitzer flaggen Schwarz-RotGold - die linke Szene randaliert Der Film “Sonnenallee.” (2010, June 28). Die Welt,
p. 1.
430

Fans froh und erschöpft - Paul tippte perfekt. (2010, July 11). Financial Times
Deutschland. Retrieved from http://www.ftd.de/50142367.html
Flagge zeigen: Multikulti in Schwarz-Rot-Gold. (2010, June 29). Frankfurter Rundshau.
Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/fr-videos/flagge-zeigen-multikulti-inschwarz-rot-gold,1473512,4445926.html
Für die Internationalmannschaft: Meilen-Multi-Kulti - WM 2014. (2010, July 6). Weser
Kurier. Retrieved from http://www.weser-kurier.de/sport/wm2014_artikel,-Fuer-dieInternationalmannschaft-Meilen-Multi-Kulti-_arid,274580.html
Grabitz, M. (2010a, July 2). Anitfa zündelt: Meine Fahne, deine Fahne. Stuttgarter
Nachrichten. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.stuttgarternachrichten.de/inhalt.anitfa-zuendelt-meine-fahne-deine-fahne.158ab89b-67b748b7-b49d-307104e13c54.html
Grabitz, M. (2010b, July 2). Anitfa zündelt: Schwarz-rot-gold goes Multikulti.
Zeitungsverlag Waiblingen. Retrieved from
http://www.zvw.de/inhalt.aktuelles.bfa9974f-f3a0-407f-9100b005169a9281.brightcove.html?token=svqfLoIVHVIyNah1mrnUTmYO4zq4pHeogqtOyj9UwaEnxojrzt8sQ..&width=335&playerIds=122542
7820001&playlistIds=64632046001&url=%2Fvideos
Grieshaber, K. (2010a, July 1). German World Cup patriotism still touchy issue. The
Associated Press. Berlin.
Grieshaber, K. (2010b, July 2). Immigrants wave the German Flag. The Scotsman.
Grieshaber, K. (2010c, July 3). Why Germans are still too scared to cheer. The Advertiser,
p. 66.
431

Hagen, K. (2010a, June 28). Mein Laden, mein Land, meine Flagge. Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,703370,00.html
Hagen, K. (2010b, June 29). Immigrants Defend the Flag While Left-Wing Germans Tear
It Down. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,703533,00.html
Hagen, K. (2010c, August 7). Trommeln, Tröten, Tränen. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/0,1518,705268,00.html
Hesselmann, M., Leopold, J., Mohnhaupt, J., Myrrhe, A., & Altun, A. (2010, October 9).
Deutschland - Türkei: Alles rund ums Spiel. Der Tagesspiegel Online. Retrieved
from http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/weblog-deutschland-tuerkei-alles-rund-umsspiel/1952090.html
In der Sonnenallee hängt wieder Berlins größte und längste Deutschland-Flagge. (2011,
June 28). B.Z., p. 7. Berlin.
Keseling, U. (2006, April 9). Heimweh und blinde Wut. Große Familien und kleine
Gesten der Integration. Berliner Morgenpost. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/wwbm/article268917/Heimweh-und-blindeWut-Grosse-Familien-und-kleine-Gesten-der-Integration.html
Klatt, T. (2010, September 29). Einheit: Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Jüdische Allgemeine, p. 2.
Lau, J. (2010, July 2). Fahnenträger: Nachtwache an der Sonnenallee. Die Zeit. Retrieved
from http://www.zeit.de/2010/27/Tuerken-Linke-Berlin
Leftists harass immigrants for supporting Germany. (2010, June 28). The Local.
Retrieved from http://www.thelocal.de/society/20100628-28147.html

432

Linke bekämpfen vermeintlich zu deutsche Araber. (2010, June 27). Welt Online.
Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article8199113/Linkebekaempfen-vermeintlich-zu-deutsche-Araber.html
Linksextremisten bekennen sich zum Flaggen-Klau. (2010, July 14). JUNGE FREIHEIT.
Berlin-Neukölln. Retrieved from
http://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2010/linksextremisten-bekennen-sichzum-flaggen-klau/
Linksradikale reißen Deutschlandflaggen ab. (2010, June 30). Augsburger Allgemeine.
Retrieved from http://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/Linksradikale-reissenDeutschlandflaggen-ab-id8072461.html
Maguire, H. (2010, July 7). Football team tackles German perceptions of integration.
Deutsche Presse Agentur. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.prokerala.com/news/articles/a149204.html
Mohr, R. (2010, June 29). Anti-Sommermärchen in Neukölln. Spiegel Online. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/tv/0,1518,703447,00.html
Nachtsheim, K. (2010, July 15). Das Haus mit der Fahne: Berlin-Neukölln, Sonnenallee
36. BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/news/2010/news/das-haus-mit-derfahne-teil-1-13174524.bild.html
Paterson, T. (2010, July 3). Why Germany’s immigrants fly the flag for their adopted
country. The Independent. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/why-germanysimmigrants-fly-the-flag-for-their-adopted-country-2017259.html

433

Patriotismus: Suche nach dem Sinn. (2010, July 12). Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2010-07/patriotismus-zusammenhaltfussball-wm
Reichardt, V. (2010, August 23). Fahnen-Verteidiger treffen Verteidigungsminister.
BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/regional/berlin/berlin-regional/fahnenverteidiger-treffen-verteidigungsminister-13712876.bild.html
Reinsch, M. (2010, July 11). Wir sind deutsche Ausländer. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung, p. 13.
Reitz, T. (2010, June 28). WM 2010: Presseschau: Das Jahrhundertspiel der Rasselbande.
sueddeutsche.de. Retrieved from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/sport/wmpresseschau-das-jahrhundertspiel-der-rasselbande-1.966568-2
Rennefanz, S. (2010, October 2). Die Beirut-Belzig-Verbindung. Berliner Zeitung. Berlin.
Retrieved from http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/die-probleme-derostdeutschen-sind-so-aehnlich-wie-ihre--findet-familie-bassal---und-haengt-zumfeiertag-eine-grosse-deutsche-fahne-raus-die-beirut-belzigverbindung,10810590,10746370.html
Richter, M. (2010, July 8). Wir sind wer: Der Trend zur Individualisierung nimmt zu,
Gemeinschaftsgefühle sind austauschbar geworden. Märkische Allgemeine.
Scally, D. (2010, June 30). Football brings to surface complex changes in German
identity. The Irish Times, p. 10.
Schupelius, G. (2010, June 30). CDU-Dregger hisst mit Neuköllner Türken Schwarz-RotGold. Warum nur er? B.Z., p. 13.

434

Schwarz-rot-bunt. (2010, June 30). Usinger Anzeige. Retrieved from https://www.wisonet.de:443/document/USAN__14065370001277848800
Spieler mit Migrationshintergrund zeigen, dass auch Kinder von Einwanderern in
Deutschland eine Chance haben. (2010, July 7). Lausitzer Rundschau, p. 3. Berlin.
Stawski, D. (2010, July 8). Wer hat/die Längste? Süddeutsche Zeitung, p. 40.
Stollowski, C. (2010, June 28). Autonome zerstören Deutschland-Fahnen türkischer
Berliner. Tagesspiegel, p. 11. Berlin.
Stollowsky, C. (2010). WM 2010: Autonome zerstören Türken die Deutschlandfahne. Die
Zeit. Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/sport/2010-06/wm-deutschlandfahneautonome
Strauss, S. (2010, June 30). Patriotismus provoziert. Berliner Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/youssef-bassal-hat-eine-grossedeutschlandfahne-ueber-seinen-laden-gehaengt--einigen-passt-das-nichtpatriotismus-provoziert,10810590,10726648.html
Streit um Mega-Flagge in Berlin. (2010, July 2). Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.merkur-online.de/aktuelles/welt/streit-mega-flagge-zr-826599.html
The Dream Dies: Germans Crushed as National Team Falls to Spain. (2010, August 7).
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/thedream-dies-germans-crushed-as-national-team-falls-to-spain-a-705333.html
Und auch das Fahnenhaus flaggte Trauer: B.Z. besuchte die Fußballparty in der
Sonnenallee 36. (2010, July 8). B.Z., p. 6.
Uthoff, J. (2014, 06). Patriotismus und Fußball: Die Außenspiegel tragen Schlüpfer. Die
Tageszeitung. Retrieved from http://www.taz.de/!139999/
435

Westervelt, E. (2010, July 2). A Flag Isn’t Just A Flag In Soccer-Crazed Germany. All
Things Considered. Retrieved from
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128267395
Wie deutsch ist Berlin? (2010, December 7). Retrieved from
http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/digitaz/artikel/?ressort=ba&dig=2010%2F12%2F07%2F
a0159&cHash=27be2c78061ee8c44617190dc0607095
Wierth, V. A. (2010, May 7). Fussballgucken: Beten und beten lassen. Die Tageszeitung.
Retrieved from http://www.taz.de/!55101/
„Wir werden die deutsche Fahne verteidigen”. (2010, June 28). JUNGE FREIHEIT.
Retrieved from http://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2010/wir-werden-diedeutsche-fahne-verteidigen/
Wroe, D., & Michaelson, R. (2010, September 16). The streets of Neukölln: Has
integration failed? The Local. Retrieved from
http://www.thelocal.de/20100916/29851
Yücel, D. (2010, June 30). Deutsch-türkische Fußball-Fans: Mit Allah für Deutschland.
Die Tageszeitung, p. 1.
Zehrt, M. (2010, July 7). Türken und Araber werden in Berlin zu fröhlichen Patrioten und bringen Autonome gegen sich auf. Leipziger-Volkszeitung, p. 3. Berlin.

Chapter 6 News Corpus
Search results for Sarrazin August 23, 2010-October 31, 2010 in Der Spiegel and Bild
436

Al-Wazir, T. (2010, August 30). Ein rassistischer Unsinn. Der Spiegel, 35. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73479914.html
Backhaus, M. (2010, September 5). BamS-Kommentar von Michael Backhaus: Der
Sarrazin-Alarm. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-von-michael-backhaus13859262.bild.html
Bartels, H.-P. (2010, September 13). Reden, reden, reden? Ja, genau. Der Spiegel, 37.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73791917.html
Bartsch, M., Dahlkamp, J., Fleischhauer, J., Hammerstein, K. von, Kleinhubbert, G.,
Mittelstaedt, J. von, … Verbeet, M. (2010, September 13). Bündnis der Weggucker.
Der Spiegel, 37. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d73791863.html
Bartsch, M., Erb, S., Fröhlingsdorf, M., Neumann, C., Verbeet, M., & Windmann, A.
(2010, October 18). Das Ausschlussverfahren. Der Spiegel, 42. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74549658.html
Betz, M., & Eichinger, R. (2010, October 10). Große BamS-Umfrage nach der WulffRede: Was die Deutschen wirklich über den Islam und Integration denken. BILD.de.
Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/was-die-deutschen-wirklichueber-islam-und-integration-denken-14249472.bild.html
BILD-Leser-Umfrage - Zwischenergebnis: Wulff soll Sarrazin-Rauswurf stoppen. (2010,
September 10). BILD.de. Retrieved from

437

http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/wulff-soll-rauswurf-stoppen13892972.bild.html
Blech, J. (2010, June 9). Was das Hirn begehrt. Der Spiegel, 36. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73600128.html
Blome, N. (2010a, August 30). Thilo Sarrazin - Zwischenruf: Warum fallen alle über
Sarrazin her? BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/thilosarrazin/warum-fallen-jetzt-alle-ueber-ihn-her-13811116.bild.html
Blome, N. (2010b, September 2). BILD-Kommentar von Nikolaus Blome: Wulff in der
Zwickmühle. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/kommentar/kommentar-von-nikolaus-blome13838870.bild.html
Blome, N. (2010c, September 16). BILD-Kommentar von Nikolaus Blome: Kein
Ruhmesblatt! BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-von-nikolaus-blome13977306.bild.html
Blumencron, M. M. von, & Sauga, M. (2010, September 13). Es war ein Erdbeben. Der
Spiegel, 37. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73791868.html
Bode, K., Blech, J., Elger, K., Feldenkirchen, M., Fleischhauer, J., Hickmann, C., …
Windmann, A. (2010, June 9). Es gibt viele Sarrazins. Der Spiegel, 36. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73599990.html
Brandt, A., & Popp, M. (2010, September 13). Attacken aus dem Hinterhalt. Der Spiegel,
37. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73791870.html

438

Bringschuld der Gesellschaft. (2010, April 10). Der Spiegel, 40. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74090605.html
Broder, H. M. (2010, June 9). Thilo und die Gene. Der Spiegel, 36. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73600019.html
Bruns, H. (2010, September 2). THILO SARRAZIN: Wer ist der Mann, über den ganz
Deutschland streitet? BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/thilosarrazin/ueber-wen-streitet-ganz-deutschland-eigentlich-13826662.bild.html
Bruns, H., & Koch, T. (2010, September 13). BILD traf ihn zum Interview: Wie geht’s
jetzt weiter, Herr Sarrazin? BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/thilo-sarrazin/wie-geht-es-jetzt-weiter13951060.bild.html
Bruns, H., & Koch, T. (2010, September 15). Thilo Sarrazin spricht im 2. Teil des großen
BILD-Interviews über seinen Rückzug: „Wäre ich stur geblieben, hätte ich den
Bundespräsidenten beschädigt“. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/haette-den-bundespraesidenten-christianwulff-beschaedigt-13964178.bild.html
Bundesrepublik Absurdistan: 7 Fälle, die zeigen, wie schlecht Integration in Deutschland
funktioniert. (2010, September 8). BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/schlecht/bundesrepublik-absurdistan13888368.bild.html
Deggerich, M., Ertel, M., Mittelstaedt, J. von, Rohr, M. von, Schlamp, H.-J., & Simons,
S. (2010, September 27). Kontinent der Angst. Der Spiegel, 39. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73993708.html
439

Die große Aktion: Briefe an Bundespräsident Christian Wulff „So denken Deutsche
wirklich über Thilo Sarrazin“. (2010, September 10). BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/so-denken-deutsche-wirklich-ueber-thilosarrazin-13900302.bild.html
Die Provokation und die Debatte: Hier diskutieren 7 prominente Köpfe die
Ausländerthesen des Bundesbankers. (2010, August 29). BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/und-die-debatte-13786492.bild.html
Die Rechnung zahlt der Staat. (2010, September 20). Der Spiegel, 38. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73892325.html
Diez, G., & Voigt, C. (2010, April 10). Tochtersprache. Der Spiegel, 40. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74090750.html
Draxler, A. (2010, September 9). BILD-Kommentar von Alfred Draxler: ArmutsZeugnis! BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-von-alfred-draxler13914722.bild.html
Elitz, E. (2010a, August 31). BILD-Kommentar von Ernst Elitz: Abregen, anpacken!
BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-vonernst-elitz-13802276.bild.html
Elitz, E. (2010b, September 7). BILD-Kommentar von Ernst Elitz: Mit Sarrazin fliegt die
Wahrheit raus! BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/ernst/kommentar-von-ernst-elitz13888012.bild.html

440

Ernst, S., & Büser, W. (2010a, October 16). Das wollen Muslime alles vor Gericht
einklagen. BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/vorgericht-einklagen-14304718.bild.html
Ernst, S., & Büser, W. (2010b, October 16). Das wollen Muslime alles vor Gericht
einklagen - 2. Teil Multi-Kulti-Irrsinn. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/was-muslime-vor-gericht-einklagen14318482.bild.html
Fischer, M. (2010, September 12). Thesen von Thilo Sarrazin: Berlin-Neukölln im Test.
BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/news/2010/news/im-thilo-sarrazin-testthesen-1-13930944.bild.html
Fleischhauer, J. (2010, October 18). Es reicht! Der Spiegel, 42. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74549660.html
Follath, E. (2010a, August 30). Deutschland, deine Amokläufer. Der Spiegel, 35.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73479913.html
Follath, E. (2010b, September 13). Der Islam ist wie eine Droge. Der Spiegel, 37.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73791912.html
Görlach, A., & Solms-Laubach, F. (2010, September 11). Sarrazin-Rücktritt: Das sagen
die BILD.de-Leser und Blogger im Netz dazu. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/blogger-community-das-denkt-das-netz13919072.bild.html
Grossekathöfer, M. (2010, October 18). Kanzlerin im Sperrgebiet. Der Spiegel, 42.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74549749.html

441

Gutsch, J.-M. (2010, October 18). Mesut und die Wahhabiten. Der Spiegel, 42. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74549718.html
Hahne, P. (2010, August 29). Gedanken am Sonntag: Die Politik hat Integration zu lange
vernachlässigt. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/gedanken-am-sonntag-13785336.bild.html
Hammerstein, K. von, & Schmid, B. (2010, April 10). Sarrazin ist nicht Wilders. Der
Spiegel, 40. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74090646.html
Hickmann, C. (2010, September 20). Rechtsaußen in der Mitte. Der Spiegel, 38.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73892358.html
Homans, J. (2010, September 20). Integrationsdebatte: Günter Wallraff fordert klare
Grenzen für Islamisten. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/buch-ehrenmord-integrationsdebattemuslime-14016388.bild.html
Humus für Bauernfängerei. (2010, June 9). Der Spiegel, 36. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73599972.html
Husmann, R. (2010, September 27). Provozieren wie Sarrazin ist in Mode, aber nicht
leicht. Lernen Sie von Experten. Der Spiegel. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/kulturspiegel/d-73965137.html
Jenseits des Kuschel-Mainstreams. (2010, September 20). Der Spiegel, 38. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73892328.html
Jungholt, S., Baldauf, A., & Thewalt, A. (2010, October 6). Gehört der Islam zu
Deutschland: Wütende Bürger schreiben an den Bundespräsidenten. BILD.de.

442

Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/wuetende-buerger-schreibenan-den-bundespraesidenten-14203828.bild.html
Kleine, R. (2010, September 17). Streit um Sarrazin: Was darf ein Bundespräsident und
was nicht? BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/wasdarf-ein-bundespraesident-und-was-nicht-13991106.bild.html
Klingholz, R. (2010, August 30). Ausländer her. Der Spiegel, 35. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73479915.html
Koch, T. (2010, September 21). Wochenend-Ausflug nach Istanbul: Wie war’s in der
Türkei, Herr Sarrazin? BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/wochenendausflug-nach-istanbul14029206.bild.html
Kühn, A. (2010, October 18). Es geht um Respekt. Der Spiegel, 42. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74549682.html
Kurbjuweit, D. (2010, November 10). Der Wutbürger. Der Spiegel, 41. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74184564.html
Kurbjuweit, D., & Pfister, R. (2010, September 13). Die Wehrpflicht wird abgeschafft.
Der Spiegel, 37. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d73791866.html
Martens, C., Reichardt, V., & Hense, K. (2010, October 16). Integration: Wenn aus
Türken Deutsche werden... BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/wenn-aus-tuerken-deutsche-werden14321626.bild.html

443

Merkel, A. (2010, September 5). BamS-Interview mit der Bundeskanzlerin: Gehen die
Politiker deshalb so auf Sarrazin los, weil sie selbst so viele Fehler gemacht haben,
Frau Merkel? [Newspaper]. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/ueber-thilo-sarrazin-und-deutschemigranten-teil-1-13857588.bild.html
Meyer, J., & Ronzheimer, P. (2010, October 5). Fakten zum Islam in Deutschland.
BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/bild-klaert-auf14192966.bild.html
Müller, M. U. (2010, September 20). Anonyme Aggression. Der Spiegel, 38. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73892446.html
Müller-Vogg, H. (2010a, September 12). BILD-Kommentar von Hugo Müller-Vogg:
Aufpassen, CDU! BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-mueller-vogg13938874.bild.html
Müller-Vogg, H. (2010b, October 4). BILD-Kommentar von Hugo Müller-Vogg: Der
Integrations-Präsident. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-mueller-vogg14177658.bild.html
Nackenschläge fürs Prekariat. (2010, September 13). Der Spiegel, 37. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73791848.html
Neun unbequeme Meinungen und die Fakten: Diese Sätze muss man sagen dürfen, weil...
(2010, September 4). BILD.de. Retrieved from

444

http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/neun-unbequeme-meinungen-und-fakten13851388.bild.html
Özkök, E. (2010a, October 6). BILD-Kolumne Ertugrul Özkök: Hier schreibt ein Türke
an seine Landsleute & die Deutschen. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/oezkoek-ertugrul/hier-schreibt-ein-tuerke-an-seinelandsleute-und-die-deutschen-14203826.bild.html
Özkök, E. (2010b, October 16). Deutschland, Du kannst stolz sein! BILD.de. Retrieved
from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/deutschland-kann-stolz-sein14321624.bild.html
Precht, R. D. (2010, September 27). Soziale Kriege. Der Spiegel, 39. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73989843.html
Safranski, R. (2010, September 20). Die Zähmung des Menschen. Der Spiegel, 38.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73892435.html
Sarrazin bewegt Deutschland: So reagieren die Leser auf die BILD-Schlagzeile. (2010,
September 6). BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/schlagzeile/so-reagieren-bild-leser13864558.bild.html
Sarrazin, T. (2010a, August 23). Thilo Sarrazins drastische Thesen über unsere Zukunft:
Deutschland wird immer ärmer und dümmer! Deutschland schafft sich ab! BILD.de.
Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/deutschland-immer-aermerund-duemmer-13712294.bild.html
Sarrazin, T. (2010b, August 23). Was tun? Der Spiegel, 34. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73388944.html
445

Sarrazin, T. (2010c, August 24). Klartext-Politiker Thilo Sarrazin: Will ich den Muezzin
hören, dann reise ich ins Morgenlan. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/neues-buch-deutschland-schafft-sich-ab13723998.bild.html
Sarrazin, T. (2010d, August 29). Thilo Sarrazin: „Diese Art von Buntheit möchte ich
nicht“. BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/mit-haticeakyuen-13784224.bild.html
Scheuermann, C. (2010, September 20). Allahs Marktplatz. Der Spiegel, 38. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73892367.html
Scholz, O. (2010, September 5). Gast-Kommentar: Erneut mehr Demokratie wagen.
BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/von-olaf-scholz13859316.bild.html
Seegers, A. (2010, September 4). Wir wollen keine Sprechverbote! BILD.de. Retrieved
from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/wir-wollen-keine-teil-113852238.bild.html
Sontheimer, M. (2010, September 28). Mein Nachbar, der Feind. Der Spiegel. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/spiegelgeschichte/d-73966946.html
Stoiber, E. (2010, September 4). Meinungsfreiheit: Edmund Stoiber fordert Mut zur
Offenheit im Umgang mit Bürgern. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/regional/muenchen/muenchen-regional/fordert-mut-zuroffenheit-im-umgang-mit-buergern-13852136.bild.html
Thilo Sarrazin. (2010, August 30). Der Spiegel, 35. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73479935.html
446

Thilo Sarrazin - Held oder Hetzer: Das sagen seine Kritiker und Befürworter. (2010,
September 3). BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/thilosarrazin/das-sagen-seine-kritiker-und-befuerworter-13847758.bild.html
Tiedje, H. H. (2010a, September 2). BILD-Kommentar von Hans Hermann Tiedje: Thilo
Sarrazin: Genie & Wahn. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-von-hans-hermann-tiedje13814620.bild.html
Tiedje, H. H. (2010b, September 9). BILD-Kommentar von Hans Hermann Tiedje:
Schluss mit dem Sprachmüll! BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/news/kommentar-von-hans-hermann-tiedje13912770.bild.html
Volksheld Sarrazin: Warum so viele Deutsche einem Provokateur verfallen. (2010, June
9). Der Spiegel, 36. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d73600062.html
Wagner, F. J. (2010, August 27). Post von Wagner: Lieber Thilo Sarrazin, Ihr neues Buch
entzündet die Republik. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/news/standards/franz-josef-wagner/post-von-wagner13735438.bild.html
Weingärtner, C. (2010, October 5). BILD.de-Reporterin Claudia Weingärtner: SIE macht
den Türken-Test. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/den-tuerken-test-14189596.bild.html

447

Wulffs Islam-Rede: So denken die Deutschen. (2010, October 5). BILD.de. Retrieved
from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/das-halten-die-deutschen-von-wulffsrede-islam-gehoert-zu-deutschland-14197514.bild.html
Wulffs Rede zur Einheit: Gehört der Islam wirklich zu Deutschland? (2010, October 4).
BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/zur-einheitgehoert-der-islam-wirklich-zu-deutschland-14184032.bild.html

Chapter 7 News Corpus
Results for Bambi AND Bushido AND Integration, Nov. 10-12, 2011, in Focus,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Handelsblatt, Der Spiegel, Die
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stern, Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt, and Die Zeit

Alexander Möthe. (2011, November 11). Bambi-Verleihung: Der schleichende Tod des
Medienpreises. Handelsblatt. Düsseldorf. Retrieved from
http://www.handelsblatt.com/panorama/reise-leben/bambi-verleihung-derschleichende-tod-des-medienpreises/5826460.html
Bambi 2011: Pfiffe auf dem Roten Teppich. (2011, November 10). Frankfurter
Rundshau. Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/panorama/bambi-2011-pfiffeauf-dem-roten-teppich,1472782,11131996.html
Bambi-Gala: Mit langen Unterhosen zu Lady Gaga. (2011, November 10). Frankfurter
Rundshau. Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/panorama/bambi-gala-mitlangen-unterhosen-zu-lady-gaga,1472782,11130510.html
448

Belz, N., & Wiesbaden. (2011, November 11). Bambi-Gala : „Rosenstolz“ gegen das
goldene Reh für den Rapper. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/menschen/bambi-gala-rosenstolz-gegen-dasgoldene-reh-fuer-den-rapper-11524957.html
Börchers, S., & Wiesbaden. (2011, November 11). Bambi-Verleihung in Wiesbaden: Die
perfekte Party. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/rhein-main/bambi-verleihung-in-wiesbaden-die-perfekteparty-11526019.html
Buß, C. (2011, November 10). Bushido und der Bambi: Pöbeln, bis der Preis kommt.
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/tv/bushido-und-derbambi-poebeln-bis-der-preis-kommt-a-796979.html
Empörter Heino gibt Bambi wegen Bushido zurück. (2011, November 12). Welt Online.
Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/prominente/article13713003/Empoerter-Heino-gibtBambi-wegen-Bushido-zurueck.html
Entscheidung stößt auf heftige Kritik: Bushido bekommt Integrations-Bambi. (2011,
November 10). Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/bambi-fuer-integration-scharfkritisiert-20933416.bild.html
Frank, V. A. (2011, November 11). Burda liebt Bushido : Bambi fürs Geschäftsmodell.
Die Tageszeitung. Retrieved from http://taz.de/Burda-liebt-Bushido-/!81729/
Gensing, C., & Varro, D. (2011, November 12). Pro und contra: Hat Bushido den Bambi
zu Recht bekommen? Die Bild. Retrieved from
449

http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/hat-bushido-den-bambi-zu-rechtbekommen-20964070.bild.html
Gottschild, K. (2011, November 11). Integrations-Bambi für Bushido – finden Sie das
richtig? Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/erster-liebesauftritt-mit-anna-marialagerblom-sarah-connor-schwester-20951692.bild.html
Grill, M. (2011, November 11). Protest gegen Bambi für Bushido : Trostpflaster für einen
“Gar-nix-Checker.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/protest-gegen-bambi-fuer-bushido-warmeswiesbaden-laeuft-sturm-gegen-proll-1.1185881
Heino gibt Bambi wegen Bushido zurück. (2011, November 12). Focus Online. Retrieved
from http://www.focus.de/kultur/diverses/medien-heino-gibt-bambi-wegen-bushidozurueck_aid_683608.html
Hoff, H. (2011, November 12). Zum Streit um die Bambi-Verleihung 2011: Bushido und
Integration ist wie Bohlen und Pädagogik. Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/zum-streit-um-die-bambi-verleihung-bushidound-integration-ist-wie-bohlen-und-paedagogik-1.1187206
Kritik an Bushido und Jury: Kleiner Eklat bei Bambi-Gala. (2011, November 11).
Frankfurter Rundshau. Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/panorama/kritik-anbushido-und-jury-kleiner-eklat-bei-bambi-gala,1472782,11133242.html
Miklis, K. (2011, November 11). Integrationspreis für Bushido: Bambi für den
Bösewicht. Stern. Retrieved from http://www.stern.de/1749879.html

450

Nach Wirbel um Bambi für Bushido: Laudator Peter Maffay wollte nur vermitteln. (2011,
November 12). Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/meldet-sich-nach-bambi-verleihungzu-wort-20972380.bild.html
Oversohl, M., & Hendrich, I. (2011, November 11). Rosenstolz und Bushido – der
Bambi-Eklat. Welt Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/aktuell/article13711500/Rosenstolz-und-Bushido-der-BambiEklat.html
Pittelkau, M. (2011, November 12). Wegen Bushido: Heino gibt seinen Bambi zurück!
Die Bild. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/heino/gibt-wegenbushido-seinen-bambi-zurueck-20963966.bild.html
Poschardt, U. (2011, November 12). Die Grünen sollten Verständnis für Bushido haben.
Welt Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article13713685/Die-Gruenen-solltenVerstaendnis-fuer-Bushido-haben.html
Protest gegen Bushidos Bambi: Heino gibt seinen Bambi zurück - Musik. (2011,
November 12). Stern. Retrieved from http://www.stern.de/kultur/musik/protestgegen-bushidos-bambi-heino-gibt-seinen-bambi-zurueck-1750340.html
Wer den Integrations-Bambi noch verdient hätte. (2011, November 12). Frankfurter
Rundshau. Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/rhein-main/wer-den-integrationsbambi-noch-verdient-haette,1472796,11133964.html
Wirbel um Integrations-Bambi für Bushido: In Video metzelt er Wachmänner nieder.
(2011, November 12). Die Bild. Retrieved from
451

http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/bambi-preistraeger-metzelt-in-videowachmaenner-nieder-20957566.bild.html
Zinser, D. (2011, November 11). Ein Bambi für den Bad Boy. Spiegel Online. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/preis-fuer-bushido-ein-bambi-fuerden-bad-boy-a-797111.html

Combined search results for “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben” plus Harris AND
Integration AND Rapper, in WISO and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Spiegel,
Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stern, Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt, and Die Zeit

Albers, S. (2010a, October 8). Deutschland vs. Türkei: Integration ist rund und hat einen
Beat. Stern. Retrieved from http://www.stern.de/kultur/musik/deutschland-vstuerkei-integration-ist-rund-und-hat-einen-beat-1611942.html
Albers, S. (2010b, November 19). Die traurige Realität der Integration: Die Deutschen,
das sind die anderen. Stern. Retrieved from
http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/die-traurige-realitaet-der-integration-diedeutschen-das-sind-die-anderen-1625611.html
Bax, D. (2012a, 2012). Dann geht mal schön! Die Tageszeitung, p. 15.
Bax, D. (2012b, September 15). Trikotwerbung für Integrationsprojekt: Dann geht mal
schön! Die Tageszeitung. Retrieved from http://www.taz.de/!5083983/

452

Besecke, M. (n.d.). Sprache ist der Schlüssel zum Erfolg! Die Bild. 2010.12.08. Retrieved
from http://www.bild.de/regional/frankfurt/promis-strecken-zunge-raus14963794.bild.html
Die schwarz-rot-goldene Zunge der Integration. (2010, October 21). Hamburger
Abendblatt, p. 32.
Edler, T. (2013, July 25). Alles in Butter! Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Lokales.
Ehrenstein, C. (2010, October 20). Zuwanderer zeigen Zunge und werben für Deutsch.
Welt Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10437656/Zuwanderer-zeigen-Zungeund-werben-fuer-Deutsch.html
Fietz, M. (2010, November 4). Was sich vom Fußball lernen lässt. Focus Online.
Retrieved from http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/integrationsdebatte-wassich-vom-fussball-lernen-laesst_aid_568754.html
Fröhlich, V. (2010, October 22). Ohne Deutsch nur Zaungast. Nürnberger Zeitung, p. 4.
Berlin.
Hamburger Abendblatt prämiert die Anzeige des Jahres. (2010, November 12).
Hamburger Abendblatt, p. 12. Altona.
Harris, O. (2010, October 25). Wieso sind die Bullen schuld? Der Spiegel, 43. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74735320.html
Herrmann, D. M. (2010, October 20). Ministerin Aygül Özkan: Neue Werbe-Kampagne
für Deutsche Sprache. Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/regional/hannover/neue-werbe-kampagne-fuer-deutsche-sprache14358002.bild.html
453

Integration: Wer deutsch spricht, kann es nach oben schaffen. (2010, December 8).
Nürnberger Nachrichten, p. 5.
Integrations-Kampagne: Stars bitten: Lernt Deutsch! (n.d.). Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/lernt-deutsch-11911816.bild.html
Integrations-Kampagne startet: Maria Böhmer wirbt für Sprachkurse. (2010, March 24).
Die Bild. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/maria-boehmer-wirbt-fuersprachkurse-11925022.bild.html
Janovsky, S. (2010, October 22). Die deutsche Zunge. Berliner Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/die-deutsche-zunge,10810590,10750170.html
Kampagne für Integration: Diese Promis werben für Deutsch-Kurse. (2010, October 20).
Die Bild. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/deutsch-sprechen-rausmit-der-sprache-14356484.bild.html
Kiyak, M. (2010, October 23). Liebe Aygül Özkan! Berliner Zeitung, p. 4.
Kuhlhoff, B. (2013, March 1). Das Spiel meines Lebens: Harris 03.12.2008, Hertha BSC
- Galatasaray Istanbul 0:1 Harris, 36, Rapper. Der Tagesspiegel, p. 20.
Lachmann, G. (2010, October 22). Schämen sich die Deutschen für ihre Sprache? Welt
Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10463938/Schaemen-sich-dieDeutschen-fuer-ihre-Sprache.html
Malzahn, C. C. (2010a, November 3). Deutsch allein ist kein Garant für Integration. Welt
Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article10693803/Deutsch-allein-ist-keinGarant-fuer-Integration.html
454

Malzahn, C. C. (2010b, November 13). Der deutsche Vordergrund. Die Welt. Retrieved
from http://www.welt.de/print/welt_kompakt/debatte/article10703316/Der-deutscheVordergrund.htmlv
Merholz, A. (2010, November 25). Harris: Ein Rapper spricht Klartext! Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/musik/spricht-klartext-integration14768836.bild.html
Pham, K. (2010, November 19). Integration: Deutscher Patriot. Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/2010/47/Rapper-Harris
Prominente werben fürs Deutschlernen. (2010, December 8). Frankfurter Neue Presse, p.
3. Frankfurt.
Rausch, K. (2010, July 2). Schwarz-rot-goldene Zunge ist Anzeige des Monats Mai.
Berliner Morgenpost, p. 15.
Rein ins Leben. (2010, December 8). Welt Kompakt, p. 16.
Schulte am Hülse, J. (2010, October 24). Zunge raus. Welt Am Sonntag, p. B4.
Skepsis und Kritik: Auch Berliner Politiker lehnen Erdogans Forderung nach mehr
türkischen Schulen in Deutschland ab. (2010, March 26). Der Tagesspiegel, p. 10.
Berlin.
Strauss, S. (2010, October 28). Ein Leid für Deutschland. Berliner Zeitung, p. 22.
Tönnesmann, J. (2011, December 12). Innovation statt Imbissbude. Wirtschafts Woche, p.
94.
Wer Ausländer sagt: Die Werbepause. (2010, October 22). Die Tageszeitung, p. 14.
Willemsen, R. (2010, December 9). Es wird Winter. Die Zeit, p. M44.

455

WM-Fußballerinnen werben für Integration. (2011, July 2). Schweriner Volkszeitung, p.
7.

456

BIBLIOGRAPHY
2009 Integrationspreis des Deutschen Fussball-Bundes und von Mercedes-Benz. (2010).
Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Fussball-Bund. Retrieved from
http://www.dfb.de/fileadmin/_dfbdam/13323-DFB-Integrationspreis-09Broschuere.pdf
2010 Integrationspreis des Deutschen Fussball-Bundes und von Mercedes-Benz. (2011).
Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Fussball-Bund. Retrieved from
http://www.dfb.de/fileadmin/_dfbdam/13321-DFB-Integrationspreis-2010Broschuere.pdf
2011 Integrationspreis des Deutschen Fussball-Bundes und von Mercedes-Benz. (2012).
Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Fussball-Bund. Retrieved from
http://www.dfb.de/fileadmin/_dfbdam/13319Integrationspreis_BroschuereA5_RZ.pdf
2012 Integrationspreis des Deutschen Fussball-Bundes und von Mercedes-Benz. (2013).
Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Fussball-Bund. Retrieved from
http://www.dfb.de/fileadmin/_dfbdam/16015-Broschuere2012.pdf
2013 Integrationspreis des Deutschen Fussball-Bundes und von Mercedes-Benz. (2014).
Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Fussball-Bund. Retrieved from
http://www.dfb.de/fileadmin/_dfbdam/16009-Broschuere2013.pdf
2014 Integrationspreis des Deutschen Fussball-Bundes und von Mercedes-Benz. (2015).
Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Fussball-Bund. Retrieved from
http://www.dfb.de/fileadmin/_dfbdam/57806-BroschuereA5_IP1415_web.pdf
457

Abé, N., Amann, M., Gude, H., Müller, P., Neukirch, R., Pfister, R., … WiedmannSchmidt, W. (2015, September 19). Regierung: Herzdame. Der Spiegel, (39), 16–
24.
Abraham, D. (2008). Constitutional patriotism, citizenship, and belonging. International
Journal of Constitutional Law, 6(1), 137–152.
Adelson, L. A. (2007). Against Between: A Manifesto. In D. Göktürk, D. Gramling, &
A. Kaes (Eds.), Germany in Transit: Nation And Migration, 1955-2005 (pp. 265–
270). University of California Press.
Adorno, T. W. (2012). The Meaning of Working Through the Past. In Critical Models:
Interventions and Catchwords (pp. 89–103). Columbia University Press.
Agamben, G. (1998). Homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life. Stanford University
Press.
Ahmed, S. (2010). Happy Objects. In M. Gregg & G. J. Seigworth (Eds.), The Affect
Theory Reader (pp. 29–51). Duke University Press.
Akrap, D. (2015, September 6). Germany’s Response to the Refugee Crisis Is
Admirable. But I Fear It Cannot Last. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/06/germany-refugee-crisissyrian
Albers, S. (2010a, October 8). Deutschland vs. Türkei: Integration ist rund und hat einen
Beat. Stern. Retrieved from http://www.stern.de/kultur/musik/deutschland-vstuerkei-integration-ist-rund-und-hat-einen-beat-1611942.html
Albers, S. (2010b, November 12). Bambi-Preisverleihung 2010: “Please relax tonight,
gell?!” Stern.de. Retrieved from http://www.stern.de/1623148.html
458

Albers, S. (2010c, November 19). Die traurige Realität der Integration: Die Deutschen,
das sind die anderen. Stern. Retrieved from
http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/die-traurige-realitaet-der-integration-diedeutschen-das-sind-die-anderen-1625611.html
Alke, W. (2010, July 5). Bitte gelassen bleiben. Die Tageszeitung, p. 17.
Al-Wazir, T. (2010, August 30). Ein rassistischer Unsinn. Der Spiegel, 35. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73479914.html
American Viewer. (2011, April 22). Der ewige Tod von Multi-Kulti. Retrieved from
http://americanviewer.wordpress.com/2011/04/22/der-lange-tod-von-multi-kulti/
Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg. (2011). Einwohnerinnen und Einwohner im Land
Berlin am 30. Juni 2011 (Statistischer Bericht No. A I 5 – hj 1 / 11).
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. Verso.
Angelos, J. (2010, July 3). Many Germans Would Rather Waive the Flag. Wsj.com.
Retrieved from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704699604575343004038839936.
html
Anholt, S. (2006). Is Place Branding a Capitalist Tool? Place Branding, 2(1), 1–4.
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.pb.5990039
Anholt, S. (2007). Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities
and Regions. Palgrave Macmillan.

459

Anker, J. (2010a, June 25). In Neukölln ist ein Fahnenstreit entbrannt. DIe Welt.
Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/regionales/berlin/article8185368/In-Neukoellnist-ein-Fahnenstreit-entbrannt.html
Anker, J. (2010b, June 29). Neuköllner Deutschland-Flagge wird Politikum. Berliner
Morgenpost. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.morgenpost.de/sport/fussballwm/article1334924/Neukoellner-Deutschland-Flagge-wird-Politikum.html
AntiraBündnis44. (2010, July 13). Diebe der Neuköllner Riesenfahne melden sich zu
Wort. Retrieved April 1, 2016, from
https://linksunten.indymedia.org/en/node/22675
Applegate, C. (1990). A nation of provincials: The German idea of Heimat. Univ of
California Press.
Arendt, H. (1973). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Retrieved from
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=zLrKGGxBKjAC&oi=fnd&pg=PT
4&dq=arendt&ots=xsdUtUgB4U&sig=HMwZRG1wUSCYWdHO9LVxU9BinZI
asozial. (n.d.). Duden online. Retrieved from
http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/asozial
Aspinall, P. J. (2002). Collective Terminology to Describe the Minority Ethnic
Population The Persistence of Confusion and Ambiguity in Usage. Sociology,
36(4), 803–816. https://doi.org/10.1177/003803850203600401
Assmann, A. (2003). Two Forms of Resentment: Jean Améry, Martin Walser and
German Memorial Culture. New German Critique, (90), 123–133.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3211112
460

Ates, S. (2008). Der Multikulti-Irrtum: Wie wir in Deutschland besser zusammen leben
können. Ullstein Taschenbuch.
Auer, P., & Wei, L. (2007). Handbook of Multilingualism and Multilingual
Communication. Walter de Gruyter.
Autonome Neuköllner Antifa. (2010, July 6). Zum “Fahnenkrieg” in Neukölln: Ein
Diskussionsbeitrag. Retrieved from http://antifa-neukoelln.net/
Ax, M. (2005, December 5). Wirtschaft übernimmt Verantwortung für dieses Land. Welt
Online. Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article182224/Wirtschaftuebernimmt-Verantwortung-fuer-dieses-Land.html
Bairner, A. (2001). Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization: European and North
American Perspectives. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Bambi-Gala: Mit langen Unterhosen zu Lady Gaga. (2011, November 10). Frankfurter
Rundshau. Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/panorama/bambi-gala-mitlangen-unterhosen-zu-lady-gaga,1472782,11130510.html
Banerjee, M. (2011). Race Matters in Cologne: Migration, Aesthetics, and Popular
Culture. In C. C. Waegner, P. R. Laws, & G. De Laforcade (Eds.), Transculturality
and Perceptions of the Immigrant Other: “From-Heres” and “Come-Heres” in
Virginia and North Rhine-Westphalia (pp. 196–214). Cambridge Scholars
Publishing. Retrieved from
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hqAnBwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=P
R5&dq=Transculturality+and+Perceptions+of+the+Immigrant+Other&ots=ip4K9p
356a&sig=j4GTk81J3_UO3MLm5UffI0Mp9VI

461

Bassal verteidigt Flagge gegen Autonome. (2010, June 30). DerWesten. Berlin.
Retrieved from http://www.derwesten.de/sport/Bassal-verteidigt-Flagge-gegenAutonome-id3361495.html
Bauchmüller, M. (2006, February 21). Meinungsbild: Du bist der Aufschwung.
sueddeutsche.de, p. 20.
Bauman, Z. (1990). Modernity and Ambivalence. In M. Featherstone (Ed.), Global
Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity: A Theory Culture and Society
Special Issue (1st ed.). Sage Publications.
Bein, H.-R. (2010, July 6). Integration: Fiebern mit der Internationalmannschaft.
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mz-web.de/fussball/integrationfiebern-mit-der-internationalmannschaft,20642322,17722878.html
Belina, B., & Wehrheim, J. (2011). “Gefahrengebiete” : durch die Abstraktion vom
Sozialen zur Reproduktion gesellschaftlicher Strukturen. Soziale Probleme, 23(2),
207–229.
Benhabib, S. (2002). The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era.
Princeton Univ Pr.
Berberich, F., & Sarrazin, T. (2009, September 30). Klasse statt Masse. Lettre
International, 86, 197.
Berlant, L. G. (1997). The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex
and Citizenship. Duke University Press.
Berlant, L. G. (2011). Cruel optimism. Duke University Press.
Berlant, L., & Prosser, J. (2011). Life Writing and Intimate Publics: A Conversation with
Lauren Berlant. Biography, 34(1), 180–187. https://doi.org/10.1353/bio.2011.0008
462

Berlin, I. (1976). Vico and Herder: Two studies in the history of ideas. Hogarth Press
London. Retrieved from http://www.getcited.org/pub/101718279
Biallas, J. (2006, June 19). Die Begeisterung trägt Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=115038
4429116&calledPageId=987490165154
Bilger, A., Langenau, L., & Stolzenberg, C. (2006, June 27). Linksextremismus: Wider
den nationalen Taumel. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/linksextremismus-wider-den-nationalentaumel-a-423249.html
Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage Publications.
Bird, S. E. (1997). What a Story! Understanding the Audience for Scandal. In J. Lull &
S. Hinerman (Eds.), Media Scandals: Morality and Desire in the Popular Culture
Marketplace (pp. 99–121). Columbia University Press. Retrieved from
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GHp8ZOzlfIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=media+scandals&ots=ybbgINjVsP&sig=LccNqtuO_yHU9v_m92MlkJS9Ik
Blickle, P. (2004). Heimat: a critical theory of the German idea of homeland. Columbia,
S.C.; Woodbridge: Camden House ; Boydell & Brewer.
Blickle, P., Biermann, K., Faigle, P., Geisler, A., Hamann, G., Jacobsen, L., … Venohr,
S. (2015, December 4). Violence against refugees: Germany in flames. Die Zeit.
Hamburg. Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-11/antiimmigrant-violence-germany
463

Blommaert, J., & Bulcaen, C. (2000). Critical discourse analysis. Annual Review of
Anthropology, 447–466.
Bock, C. (2006a, January 16). Du bist Deutschland und wir alle fühlen wie Fußballfans.
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=113731
8372777&calledPageId=987490165154
Bock, C. (2006b, December 8). Der Sommer war Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=116542
5072335&calledPageId=987490165154
Bock, C., & Reuther, A. (2006, June 12). Mann, Frau und Kind tragen Schwarz-RotGold. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=114974
8371457&openMenu=1013083806405&calledPageId=1013083806405&listid=101
8881578737
Böss, G. (2009, February 19). Statt “Deutsches Ding” nun “Du bist Deutschland.” Welt
Online. Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/debatte/weblogs/Boess-inBerlin/article6065842/Statt-Deutsches-Ding-nun-Du-bist-Deutschland.html
Bosswick, W. (2000). Development of Asylum Policy in Germany. Journal of Refugee
Studies, 13(1), 43–60. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/13.1.43
Bota, A., Özlem, T., & Pham, K. (2012). Wir neuen Deutschen: wer wir sind, was wir
wollen. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag GmbH.

464

Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge. Retrieved from
http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19175674/
Bourdieu, P. (1994). Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power.
In N. B. Dirks & G. H. Eley (Eds.), Culture, Power, History: A Reader in
Contemporary Social Theory (pp. 155–199). Princeton University Press.
Breuer, C., Hallmann, K., & Wicker, P. (2011). Determinants of sport participation in
different sports. Managing Leisure, 16(4), 269–286.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13606719.2011.613625
Brinks, J. H. (2000). Children of a New Fatherland: Germany’s Post-war Right Wing
Politics. I.B.Tauris.
Broder, H. M. (2010, June 9). Thilo und die Gene. Der Spiegel, 36. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73600019.html
Brown, W. (2009). Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire.
Princeton University Press.
Buchanan, I. (2010). A Dictionary of Critical Theory. Oxford University Press.
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. (2016). Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2015: Asyl,
Migration und Integration. Nuremberg, Germany: Bundesamt für Migration und
Flüchtlinge. Retrieved from
http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Broschueren/bundesa
mt-in-zahlen-2015.html?nn=1367528
Bundesregierung. (2007). Der Nationale Integrationsplan: Neue Wege - Neue Chancen
(p. 199). Berlin. Retrieved from

465

https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/IB/2006-10-27ib-nationaler-integrationsplan.html
Bundesregierung. (2016, June 20). Entwurf eines Integrationsgesetzes. Bundestag.
Retrieved from
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21.web/searchDocuments/simple_search_result.do?sel
Id=60906&tablename=drsTable&method=selectDrs&offset=0&anzahl=100&sort=
4&direction=desc
Bundesverwaltungsamt. (n.d.). Schriftliches Aufnahmeverfahren. Retrieved September
12, 2016, from
http://www.bva.bund.de/DE/Organisation/Abteilungen/Abteilung_S/Spaetaussiedle
r/schriftverfahren/schriftverfahren-node.html
Buschkowsky, H. (2012). Neukölln ist überall. Berlin: Ullstein.
Buß, C. (2011, November 10). Bushido und der Bambi: Pöbeln, bis der Preis kommt.
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/tv/bushido-und-derbambi-poebeln-bis-der-preis-kommt-a-796979.html
Butler, J. (2011). Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” Abingdon,
Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Camerra-Rowe, P. (2004). Agenda 2010: Redefining German Social Democracy.
German Politics & Society, 22(1 (70)), 1–30.
Canovan, M. (2000). Patriotism Is Not Enough. British Journal of Political Science,
30(3), 413–432. https://doi.org/null

466

Caplan, J., Frei, N., Geyer, M., Nolan, M., & Stargardt, N. (2006). The Historikerstreit
Twenty Years On. German History, 24(4), 587–607.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0266355406070334
Carpentier, N., & De Cleen, B. (2007). Bringing discourse theory into Media Studies:
The applicability of Discourse Theoretical Analysis (DTA) for the Study of media
practises and discourses. Journal of Language and Politics, 6(2), 265–293.
Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society.
International Journal of Communication, 1(1), 238–266.
Chaoten klauen ihre Deutschland-Flagge. (2010, June 29). Berliner Zeitung. Berlin.
Retrieved from http://www.bz-berlin.de/bezirk/neukoelln/chaoten-klauen-ihredeutschland-flagge-article901007.html
Chartleser "Ralf Neubauer. (2010, August 27). Ich bin ein Fan von Autobahnen - Bin ich
jetzt ein NAZI? Book Review. Retrieved from
https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309
Confino, A. (1998). Edgar Reitz’s Heimat and German Nationhood: Film, Memory, and
Understandings of the Past. German History, 16(2), 185–208.
Confino, A. (2004). Telling about Germany: Narratives of Memory and Culture. The
Journal of Modern History, 76(2), 389–416. https://doi.org/10.1086/422934
Confino, A. (2005). Remembering the Second World War, 1945–1965: Narratives of
victimhood and genocide. Cultural Analysis, 4, 46–75.
Connerton, P. (2009). How Modernity Forgets. Cambridge University Press.

467

Connor, P. (2016, August 2). Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3
Million in 2015. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-ofrefugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/
Corinth, E. (2005, September 26). Hurra, ich bin Deutschland! Telepolis. Retrieved from
http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/21/21014/1.html
Cornelissen, S. (2007). Crafting Legacies: The Changing Political Economy of Global
Sport and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM. Politikon: South African Journal of
Political Studies, 34(3), 241–259. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340801962510
Council of the European Union. (2004). Immigrant Integration Policy in the European
Union (No. 14615/04 (Presse 321)).
Cross, B. (2009, Spring). Isn’t it time to stop using the term “minority” to describe all
individuals, racial and ethnic groups who are not White? The Diversity Factor,
17(2). Retrieved from
http://www.workforcediversitynetwork.com/res_articles_termminority.aspx
Crouch, C., & Streeck, W. (1997). Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping
Convergence and Diversity (1 edition). London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE
Publications Ltd.
CyberCynic. (2010, August 31). Klartext. Book Review. Retrieved from
https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309
Das Manifest: “Du bist Deutschland” im Wortlaut. (2005, September 29). Hamburger
Abendblatt. Hamburg. Retrieved from
http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/deutschland/article355173/Das-Manifest-Du-bistDeutschland-im-Wortlaut.html
468

de Vos, G. (1995). Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accomodation. In L. Romanucci-Ross
& G. de Vos (Eds.), Ethnic identity: creation, conflict, and accommodation (pp. 15–
47). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Debatte um Nationalhymne „überflüssig“: Nach Löw keilt auch Khedira gegen seine
Kritiker. (2012, August 14). Focus Online. Retrieved from
http://www.focus.de/sport/fussball/wm-2014/debatte-um-nationalhymneueberfluessig-nach-loew-keilt-auch-khedira-gegen-seine-kritiker_aid_799775.html
Denso, C. (2006, May 30). Auf der Jagd nach einem mörderischen Phantom. Hamburger
Abendblatt. Retrieved from
http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/deutschland/article107121385/Auf-der-Jagd-nacheinem-moerderischen-Phantom.html
Der Tag, als Multikulti für tot erklärt wurde. (2010, October 17). Welt Online. Retrieved
from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10360199/Der-Tag-alsMultikulti-fuer-tot-erklaert-wurde.html
Derrida, J., & Dufourmantelle, A. (2000). Of Hospitality. Stanford University Press.
Deutsche Promis - Stars aus Musik, Fernsehen, Kunst und Kultur. (n.d.). Die Bild.
Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/themen/specials/deutsche-promis/nachrichtennews-unterhaltung-stars-fotos-videos-02-42508634.bild.html
Deutscher Fussball-Bund. (2016). Mitglieder-Statistik 2016.
Deutscher Presserat : 2006-2013. (n.d.). Retrieved December 9, 2013, from
http://www.presserat.info/inhalt/dokumentation/chronik-der-ruegen/2006-2013.html
Deutschland in Schwarz-Rot-Gold: Köhler und Künast erfreut über Fahnenmeer. (2006,
June 18). Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
469

http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/deutschland-in-schwarz-rot-gold-koehlerund-kuenast-erfreut-ueber-fahnenmeer-a-422011.html
Deutschland ist Weltmeister: Jugendliche über Nationalstolz. (2014, July 15). Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/leben/deutschland-istweltmeister-jugendliche-ueber-nationalstolz-a-980908.html
Deutschland-Hasser terrorisieren Fußball-Fans Linke Chaoten zerstören die RiesenFahne einer Neuköllner Einwanderer-Familie: WM-Fieber in Berlin. (2010, June
30). Berliner Kurier, p. 8. Neukölln.
Deutschlandstiftung Integration: Deutschlandstiftung. (n.d.). Retrieved May 10, 2016,
from http://www.deutschlandstiftung.net/
DiAngelo, R. (2011). White Fragility. The International Journal of Critical Pedagogy,
3(3). Retrieved from http://libjournal.uncg.edu/ijcp/article/view/249
Diel, J. (2006). “Du bist Deutschland!”-eine Kampagne in der Kritik-Weblogs als
kritische Meinungsführer. Universität Siegen.
Diner, D. (2000). Beyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the
Holocaust. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press.
Diskussion ums Halbfinal-Aus bei der EM: „Kaiser“ und Politiker fordern: Spieler
müssen Hymne singen. (2012, July 2). Focus Online. Retrieved from
http://www.focus.de/sport/fussball/em-2012/deutschenationalmannschaft/diskussion-ums-halbfinal-aus-bei-der-em-kaiser-und-politikerfordern-spieler-muessen-hymne-singen_aid_775738.html

470

Doctor, K. (2013, October 3). The newsonomics of the German press’ tipping year.
Retrieved from http://www.niemanlab.org/2013/10/the-newsonomics-of-thegerman-press-tipping-year/
DOSB. (2014). DOSB Integration und Sport – Ein Zukunftsfaktor von Sportvereinen und
Gesellschaft (p. 14). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Deutscher Olympischer
SportBund.
Dowse, S. (2011). Power Play: International Politics, Germany, South Africa and the
FIFA World Cup (Occasional Paper No. 82) (p. 19). South African Institute of
International Affairs.
Dubois, L. (2010). Soccer Empire: The World Cup and the Future of France. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Durkheim, E. (1995). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. (K. E. Fields, Trans.).
New York: Free Press.
Edy, J. A. (1999). Journalistic uses of collective memory. Journal of Communication,
49(2), 71–85.
Ehrenstein, C. (2010, October 20). Zuwanderer zeigen Zunge und werben für Deutsch.
Welt Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10437656/Zuwanderer-zeigen-Zungeund-werben-fuer-Deutsch.html
El-Sharif, Y. (2010, December 10). Deutschlands Muster-Immigranten: Zugewandert,
integriert, erfolgreich. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/deutschlands-muster-immigrantenzugewandert-integriert-erfolgreich-a-722404.html
471

EM-Qualifikation Deutschland. (2010, August 10). Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/em-qualifikation-deutschland-tuerkeilasst-sie-einfach-fussball-spielen-a-721864.html
English, J. F. (2008). The Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the Circulation of
Cultural Value. Harvard University Press.
Entscheidung stößt auf heftige Kritik: Bushido bekommt Integrations-Bambi. (2011,
November 10). Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/bambi-fuer-integration-scharfkritisiert-20933416.bild.html
Ersanilli, E., & Koopmans, R. (2010). Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations
and the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France and
Germany. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(5), 773–791.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13691831003764318
Eshel, A. (2000). Vom eigenen Gewissen. Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte und der Ort des
Nationalsozialismus in Selbsbild der Bundesrepublik. Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift
Fur Literaturwissenschaft Und Geistesgeschichte, 74(2), 333–360.
Eshel, A. (2001). Jewish Memories, German Futures: Recent Debates in Germany about
the Past. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University. Retrieved from
http://www.indiana.edu/~jsp/docs/AmirEschel.pdf
Esmer, M. (2014, January 29). Wir sind alle Nazis! Deutschland braucht dringend eine
neue Erinnerungskultur. MiGAZIN. Retrieved from
http://www.migazin.de/2014/01/29/wir-nazis-deutschland-erinnerungskultur/
Ezli, G. S. Ö. (2014). Das Neue Deutschland. Paderborn: Konstanz University Press.
472

Fairclough, N. (2001a). Critical discourse analysis. In A. McHoul & M. Rapley (Eds.),
How to Analyze Talk in Institutional Settings: A Casebook of Methods (pp. 25–38).
Fairclough, N. (2001b). Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific
research. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis
(pp. 121–136). SAGE Publications Ltd.
Falsche Annahme des Profilers bei den NSU-Morden. (2013, March 6). Welt Online.
Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/regionales/muenchen/article114195828/Falsche-Annahme-desProfilers-bei-den-NSU-Morden.html
Fans froh und erschöpft - Paul tippte perfekt. (2010, July 11). Financial Times
Deutschland. Retrieved from http://www.ftd.de/50142367.html
Feddersen, A., Grötzinger, A. L., & Maennig, W. (2009). Investment in Stadia and
Regional Economic Development–Evidence from FIFA World Cup 2006.
International Journal of Sport Finance, 4(4), 221–239.
Feldenkirchen, M. (2015, October 17). Land der Trickser. Der Spiegel, 43. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-139341552.html
Fietz, M. (2010, November 4). Was sich vom Fußball lernen lässt. Focus Online.
Retrieved from http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/integrationsdebatte-wassich-vom-fussball-lernen-laesst_aid_568754.html
FIFA. (2010). FIFA Fan Fest: Frequently Asked Questions. Zurich. Retrieved from
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/fanfest/01/14/09/88/fifafanfestfaqs.pdf

473

Flagge zeigen: Multikulti in Schwarz-Rot-Gold. (2010, June 29). Frankfurter Rundshau.
Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/fr-videos/flagge-zeigen-multikulti-inschwarz-rot-gold,1473512,4445926.html
Flores-Gonzalez, N. (2001). Paseo Boricua: Claiming a Puerto Rican Space in Chicago.
CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, 13(2), 6–23.
Follath, E. (2010, August 31). Germany Is Becoming Islamophobic. Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-sarrazin-debategermany-is-becoming-islamophobic-a-714643.html
Foucault, M. (1971). Orders of discourse. Social Science Information, 10(2), 7–30.
https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847101000201
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Random House
LLC.
Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. New York: Random House.
Foucault, M. (2002). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London : New York: Routledge.
Foucault, M. (2003). “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France,
1975-1976. (D. Macy, Trans.). New York: Picador.
Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 19781979. (G. Burchell, Trans.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Foucault, M. (2009). Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France
1977–1978. (F. Ewald & A. Fontana, Eds., G. Burchell, Trans.) (Vol. 4).
Macmillan.

474

Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD. (2015, September 29). Entwurf eines
Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetzes. Deutscher Bundestag. Retrieved from
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/061/1806185.pdf
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD. (2016, February 16). Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Einführung beschleunigter Asylverfahren. Bundestag. Retrieved from
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/075/1807538.pdf
Frank, V. A. (2011, November 11). Burda liebt Bushido : Bambi fürs Geschäftsmodell.
Die Tageszeitung. Retrieved from http://taz.de/Burda-liebt-Bushido-/!81729/
Franziska G. (2010, September 5). Hexenjagd auf Sarrazin als Mahner in der Wueste.
Amazon.de. Book Review. Retrieved from https://www.amazon.de/Deutschlandschafft-sich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309
Fraser, N. (1992). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the public
sphere (pp. 109–142). The MIT Press.
Fremdenfeindlichkeit: Gauck spricht von Dunkeldeutschland. (2015, August 26). DIe
Welt. Retrieved from
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article145651584/Gauck-spricht-vonDunkeldeutschland.html
Friedrich, S. (2011). Rassismus in der Leistungsgesellschaft: Analysen und kritische
Perspektiven zu den rassistischen Normalisierungsprozessen der
“Sarrazindebatte.” Münster: Ed. Assemblage.
Fröhlich, V. (2010, October 22). Ohne Deutsch nur Zaungast. Nürnberger Zeitung, p. 4.
Berlin.
475

Geertz, C. (1977). The Interpretation Of Cultures. Basic Books.
Geisler, M. E. (2005). National symbols, fractured identities: contesting the national
narrative. Lebanon, NH: Middlebury College Press.
Geissler, R., & Pöttker, H. (Eds.). (2006). Integration durch Massenmedien: Medien und
Migration im internationalen Vergleich. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.
Gellner, E. (2006). Nations and nationalism. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Gensing, C., & Varro, D. (2011, November 12). Pro und contra: Hat Bushido den Bambi
zu Recht bekommen? Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/hat-bushido-den-bambi-zu-rechtbekommen-20964070.bild.html
German Olympic Sports Confederation. (2012). Integration durch Sport: Ein Program
stellt sich vor (p. 47). Frankfurt am Main.
Germany Reinstates Dublin Rules for Syrian Refugees. (2015, November 10). Deutsche
Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/germany-reinstates-dublin-rules-forsyrian-refugees/a-18842101
Giebenhain, H. (1995). Die gesellschaftliche Integration von Fremden durch den Sport.
In S. Müller, H.-U. Otto, & U. Otto (Eds.), Fremde und Andere in Deutschland
Nachdenken über das Einverleiben, Einebnen, Ausgrenzen (pp. 164–178).
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Giesen, B. (2004). Triumph and Trauma. Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Publishers.
Gillis, J. R. (1994). Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. Princeton
University Press.

476

Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (2006). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies
for Qualitative Research. Transaction Books. Retrieved from
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rtiNK68Xt08C&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&
dq=grounded+theory&ots=UUAXVlZH0L&sig=ZZgmE1wfWkSedcaX6HQv5cxra
SQ
Göktürk, D., Gramling, D., & Kaes, A. (Eds.). (2007). Germany in Transit: Nation And
Migration, 1955-2005. University of California Press.
Gottschild, K. (2011, November 11). Integrations-Bambi für Bushido – finden Sie das
richtig? Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/erster-liebesauftritt-mit-anna-marialagerblom-sarah-connor-schwester-20951692.bild.html
Grabitz, M. (2010, July 2). Anitfa zündelt: Meine Fahne, deine Fahne. Stuttgarter
Nachrichten. Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.stuttgarternachrichten.de/inhalt.anitfa-zuendelt-meine-fahne-deine-fahne.158ab89b-67b748b7-b49d-307104e13c54.html
Gramling, D. (2009). The New Cosmopolitan Monolingualism: On Linguistic
Citizenship in Twenty‐First Century Germany. Die Unterrichtspraxis/Teaching
German, 42(2), 130–140. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-1221.2009.00047.x
Gramling, D. (2016). The Invention of Monolingualism. New York: Bloomsbury
Academic.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. (Q.
Hoare & G. N. Smith, Eds.). New York: International Publishers.
477

Grieshaber, K. (2010, July 1). German World Cup Patriotism Still Touchy Issue. The
Associated Press. Berlin.
Grill, M. (2011, November 11). Protest gegen Bambi für Bushido : Trostpflaster für
einen “Gar-nix-Checker.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/protest-gegen-bambi-fuer-bushido-warmeswiesbaden-laeuft-sturm-gegen-proll-1.1185881
Grimberg, S. (2006, January 28). Da ist etwas losgetreten. Die Tageszeitung. Retrieved
from http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/?dig=2006/01/28/a0193
Grossberg, L. (2010). Affect’s Future: Rediscovering the Virtual in the Actual. In M.
Gregg & G. J. Seigworth (Eds.), The Affect Theory Reader (pp. 309–338). Duke
University Press.
Große Hilfs-Aktion von BILD für Flüchtlinge. (2015, August 29). Die Bild. Retrieved
from http://www.bild.de/news/inland/fluechtlingshilfe/so-funktioniert-die-grossehilfs-aktion-von-bild-42369204.bild.html
Guild, E., Groenendijk, C. A., & Carrera, S. (Eds.). (2009). Illiberal liberal states
immigration, citizenship and integration in the EU. Farnham, Surrey ; Burlington,
VT: Ashgate.
Habermas, J. (1974). The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964). New German
Critique, (3), 49–55.
Habermas, J. (1992, December 11). Die zweite Lebenslüge der Bundesrepublik: Wir sind
wieder „normal“ geworden. Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/1992/51/die-zweite-lebensluege-der-bundesrepublik-wir-sindwieder-normal-geworden
478

Habermas, J. (1997). A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany. U of Nebraska Press.
Hage, G. (2003). “Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm”: Understanding Palestinian
Suicide Bombers in Times of Exighophobia. Public Culture, 15(1), 65–89.
Hagen, K. (2010a, June 28). Mein Laden, mein Land, meine Flagge. Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,703370,00.html
Hagen, K. (2010b, June 29). Immigrants Defend the Flag While Left-Wing Germans
Tear It Down. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,703533,00.html
Hall, S. (1996). Who Needs Identity? In P. du Gay & S. Hall (Eds.), Questions of
Cultural Identity. SAGE Publications.
Hall, S. (Ed.). (1997a). Representation: cultural representations and signifying
practices. London ; Thousand Oaks ; New Delhi: Sage.
Hall, S. (Ed.). (1997b). The Spectacle of the “Other.” In Representation: cultural
representations and signifying practices (pp. 223–290). London ; Thousand Oaks ;
New Delhi: Sage.
Hall, S. (2000). Conclusion: The Multi-cultural Question. In B. Hesse (Ed.), Un/settled
multiculturalisms: diasporas, entanglements, “transruptions” (pp. 209–240). Zed
Books.
Halm, D. (2006). Turkish immigrants in German amateur football. In A. Tomlinson & C.
Young (Eds.), German football: history, culture, society (pp. 73–92). Psychology
Press.

479

Hammerstein, K. von, Kramer, J., Neukirch, R., Palmer, H., Schmitz, C., Schult, C., &
Steingart, G. (2004, November 22). FC Wahlkampf 06. Der Spiegel, 48. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-37494651.html
Hannes Kling. (2015). [Netzfund] Rassistische Ausschreitungen und Neonazi-Randale in
Heidenau am 22.8.15. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrtMPJzX4WM
Harris. (2010a). Nur ein Augenblick [Just a blink of the eye]. In Der Mann im Haus [The
man of the house] (CD). Berlin, Germany: Murderbass.
Harris, O. (2010b, October 25). Wieso sind die Bullen schuld? Der Spiegel, 43.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-74735320.html
Haushaltsplan: Für Integrationskurse hat das Innenministerium kein Geld. (2014, May
9). Migazin. Retrieved from http://www.migazin.de/2014/05/09/fuerintegrationskurse-hat-das-innenministerium-kein-geld/
Heidenau: Fünf Verfahren noch offen. (2016, August 13). Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk.
Retrieved from http://www.mdr.de/sachsen/dresden/ermittlungen-ein-jahr-nachheidenau-100.html
Heisig, K. (2010). Das Ende der Geduld: Konsequent gegen jugendliche Gewalttäter
(2nd ed.). Verlag Herder.
Herf, J. (1980). The “Holocaust” Reception in West Germany: Right, Center and Left.
New German Critique, (19), 30–52. https://doi.org/10.2307/487971
Hermes, J. (2005). Burnt Orange Television, Football, and the Representation of
Ethnicity. Television & New Media, 6(1), 49–69.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476403255819
480

Herrmann, D. M. (2010, October 20). Ministerin Aygül Özkan: Neue Werbe-Kampagne
für Deutsche Sprache. Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/regional/hannover/neue-werbe-kampagne-fuer-deutschesprache-14358002.bild.html
Hindess, B. (2000). Citizenship in the international management of populations.
American Behavioral Scientist, 43(9), 1486–1497.
Hink, W. (2011). Integration fängt bei mir an: Praxishandbuch. Frankfurt am Main:
Deutscher Fussball-Bund.
Hinze, A. (2013). Turkish Berlin: integration policy and urban space.
Hoberman, J. (1997). Darwin’s Athletes: How Sport Has Damaged Black America and
Preserved the Myth of Race. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth,
Reality. Cambridge University Press.
Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. O. (Eds.). (1992). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge
University Press.
Hoch, J., & Main, F. am. (2006, August 10). Diskutieren über Deutschland: “Nation ist
ein Gefühl.” Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/literatur/diskutieren-ueber-deutschland-nation-ist-eingefuehl-a-441433.html
Hoff, H. (2005, October 3). WM 2006: Abschied vom Fabrikarbeiter. Die Zeit. Retrieved
from http://www.zeit.de/online/2005/40/land_der_ideen
Holehouse, M. (2015, August 24). Germany drops EU rules to allow in Syrian refugees.
Retrieved from
481

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11821822/Germanydrops-EU-rules-to-allow-in-Syrian-refugees.html
Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (1998). The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass
Deception. In Dialectic of enlightenment (Vol. 15, pp. 120–167). New York:
Continuum. Retrieved from
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=lwVjsKcHW7cC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9
&dq=dialectic+of+enlightenment&ots=8QHs26KUvl&sig=y3lwGPlukqsrsnAUE8z
927cIrLI
Hug, S. (2010). Migrantengewalt: Wie sich unser Staat selbst entmachtet (1.). Bublies.
Hunt, J. (2006). The Economics of German Reunification. The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics, 1–71.
Hvenegård-Lassen, K. (2005). Realistic grown-ups? (AMID Working Paper Series No.
44). Aalborg, Denmark: Aalborg University.
Iken, M., & Gerlach, J. (2008, January 19). Was steckt hinter der Kinderkampagne? Welt
Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/article1570933/Was-steckt-hinter-derKinderkampagne.html
Innovationsgipfel: “Eine Partnerschaft für Innovation gründen.” (2004a, January 16).
Stern. Retrieved from http://www.stern.de/518920.html
Innovationsgipfel: Gründen, machen, wichtig. (2004b, January 16). Manager Magazin.
Retrieved from http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/a282084.html

482

Innovationsgipfel: Regierung sucht Partner. (2004c, January 16). Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/innovationsgipfelregierung-sucht-partner-a-282064.html
Integration: Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert. (2010, October 16). Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integrationmerkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html
Integrations-Kampagne: Stars bitten: Lernt Deutsch! (n.d.). Die Bild. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/lernt-deutsch-11911816.bild.html
Integrations-Kampagne startet: Maria Böhmer wirbt für Sprachkurse. (2010, March 24).
Die Bild. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/maria-boehmer-wirbtfuer-sprachkurse-11925022.bild.html
International FIFA Fan Fest Berlin. (2010). Retrieved May 1, 2011, from
http://www.berlinfifafanfest.com/home-english.html
Isin, E. F., & Nielsen, G. M. (2008). Acts of citizenship. London : New York: Zed Books.
Jessen, J. (2005, October 6). Glosse: Du bist Werbeagentur. Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/2005/41/Spitze_41
Joel, H., & Schütt, E. C. (2008). Chronik des deutschen Fußballs: die Spiele der
Nationalmannschaften von 1908 bis heute. wissenmedia Verlag.
Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants
in Western Europe. West European Politics, 30(1), 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380601019613
Jørgensen, M. W., & Phillips, L. J. (2002). Discourse analysis as theory and method.
SAGE Publications Limited.
483

Kaes, A. (1992). From Hitler to Heimat: The return of history as film. Harvard
University Press. Retrieved from
http://books.google.de/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ci9OQSHM6MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=kaes+heimat&ots=QFuMq562ZY&sig=W3MtjYlqhrRCZBRDupr1ZdjJuk
Kaiser, A. (2005, November 21). Kampagne: Das kleine Du und das große Deutschland.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, p. 9.
Kaiser, T. (2007, December 13). Du bist Deutschland wirbt für Kinderfreundlichkeit.
Welt Online. Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article1456241/Du-bistDeutschland-wirbt-fuer-Kinderfreundlichkeit.html
Kampagne für Integration: Diese Promis werben für Deutsch-Kurse. (2010, October 20).
Die Bild. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/deutsch-sprechen-rausmit-der-sprache-14356484.bild.html
Kämper, V. (2015, September 1). Ausländische Presse zur Flüchtlingskrise: Vorbild
Deutschland. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlingskrise-auslaendische-medienloben-deutschland-als-vorbild-a-1050931.html
Kaneva, N. (2011). Nation Branding: Toward an Agenda for Critical Research.
International Journal of Communication, 5, 25.
Kansteiner, W. (2006a). In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics
after Auschwitz (1 edition). Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
Kansteiner, W. (2006b). Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle: The Legacy of
Nazism, World War II, and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany. In
484

R. N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner, & C. Fogu (Eds.), The Politics of Memory in Postwar
Europe. Duke University Press.
Kelek, N. (2006). Die fremde Braut: Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des türkischen Lebens
in Deutschland (1st ed.). Goldmann Verlag.
Keseling, U. (2006, April 9). Heimweh und blinde Wut. Große Familien und kleine
Gesten der Integration. Berliner Morgenpost. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/wwbm/article268917/Heimweh-und-blindeWut-Grosse-Familien-und-kleine-Gesten-der-Integration.html
Kiyak, M. (2010, Oktober). Kolumne zu Deutschkursen: Liebe Aygül Özkan!
Frankfurter Rundshau. Retrieved from http://www.fr-online.de/meinung/kolumnezu-deutschkursen-liebe-ayguel-oezkan-,1472602,4767140.html
Klatt, T. (2010, September 29). Einheit: Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Jüdische Allgemeine, p. 2.
Knoppers, A., & Anthonissen, A. (2003). Women’s soccer in the United States and the
Netherlands: Differences and similarities in regimes of inequalities. Sociology of
Sport Journal, 20(4), 351–370.
Kocaman, B. (2010, November 8). Massive Unterfinanzierung der Integrationskurse
wird fortgesetzt. Migazin. Retrieved from
http://www.migazin.de/2010/11/08/massive-unterfinanzierung-derintegrationskurse-wird-fortgesetzt/
Kohn, H. (1955). Nationalism: Its meaning and history. van Nostrand.
Kollender, E., & Grote, J. (2015, September 14). Deutschland im Willkommensfieber.
Retrieved from http://www.migazin.de/2015/09/14/die-fluechtlinge-die-rassistenund-wir/2/
485

KOMM, KOMM, KOMM - GEH, GEH, GEH. (1970, October 19). Der Spiegel, 43.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43801107.html
Koonz, C. (1996). Between Memory and Oblivion: Concentration Camps in German
Memory. In J. R. Gillis (Ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity
(pp. 258–280). Princeton University Press.
Krüger, A. (1987). Sieg Heil to the most glorious era of German sport: continuity and
change in the modern German sports movement. The International Journal of the
History of Sport, 4(1), 5–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523368708713611
Kücük, E., & Varatharajah, S. (2015, September 24). Das Selbstgespräch brechen:
Perspektiven auf Asyl von ehemaligen Geflüchteten. Retrieved from
https://medium.com/@varathas/das-selbstgespr%C3%A4ch-brechen-perspektivenauf-asyl-von-ehemaligen-gefl%C3%BCchteten-3d5b6216e224
Kurbjuweit, D. (2006, December 6). Im Lande Winnetous. Der Spiegel, 24. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47209096.html
Kurbjuweit, D., Allgöwer, K., Brinkbäumer, K., Buse, U., Feldenkirchen, M., Gutsch, J.M., … Matussek, M. (2006, June 19). Deutschland, ein Sommermärchen. Der
Spiegel, 25. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47282143.html
Kurbjuweit, D., Böll, S., Buschmann, R., Holm, C., Hornig, F., Middelhoff, P., …
Winter, S. (2014, July 14). Die entkrampfte Nation. Der Spiegel, 29. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-128101533.html
Kuzio, T. (2002). The myth of the civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn’s
framework for understanding nationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25(1), 20–39.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870120112049
486

Lachmann, G. (2010, October 22). Schämen sich die Deutschen für ihre Sprache? Welt
Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10463938/Schaemen-sich-dieDeutschen-fuer-ihre-Sprache.html
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2001). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics (2nd ed.). Verso.
Lang, K., & Lang, G. E. (1989). Collective memory and the news. Communication,
11(2), 123–139.
Lau, J. (2010, July 2). Fahnenträger: Nachtwache an der Sonnenallee. Die Zeit.
Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/2010/27/Tuerken-Linke-Berlin
Lee, B. (1997). Talking Heads: Language, Metalanguage, and the Semiotics of
Subjectivity. Duke University Press Books.
Leftists Harass Immigrants for Supporting Germany. (2010, June 28). The Local.
Retrieved from http://www.thelocal.de/society/20100628-28147.html
Lemke, T. (2011). Biopolitics: an advanced introduction. NYU Press.
Lentin, A. (2014, June). Race, Post-Race. Lecture presented at the Constituting Wholes,
Institute for Cultural Inquiry Berlin. Retrieved from https://www.iciberlin.org/event/569/
Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (2011). The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal
Age. London; New York: Zed Books.
Levitt, T. (1983). The Globalization of Markets. Harvard Business Review, (May/June),
92–102.

487

Liebsch, B. (2015, September 18). Flüchtlingshilfe: Unser Land überrascht sich selbst.
Die Zeit. Hamburg. Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2015-09/fluechtlingegastlichkeit-deutschland-essay/komplettansicht
Linke bekämpfen vermeintlich zu deutsche Araber. (2010, June 27). Welt Online.
Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article8199113/Linkebekaempfen-vermeintlich-zu-deutsche-Araber.html
Linksradikale reißen Deutschlandflaggen ab. (2010, June 30). Augsburger Allgemeine.
Retrieved from http://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/Linksradikale-reissenDeutschlandflaggen-ab-id8072461.html
Lob und Empörung: Merkels Multikulti-Absage sorgt für weltweites Aufsehen. (2010,
October 19). Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/lob-und-empoerung-merkels-multikultiabsage-sorgt-fuer-weltweites-aufsehen-a-723993.html
Ludewig, A. (2014). Screening Nostalgia: 100 Years of German Heimat Film. transcript
Verlag.
Lull, J., & Hinerman, S. (1997). Media Scandals: Morality and Desire in the Popular
Culture Marketplace. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GHp8ZOzlfIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=media+scandals&ots=ybbgINjVsP&sig=LccNqtuO_yHU9v_m92MlkJS9Ik
Maennig, W., & Feddersen, A. (2010). Sectoral Labour Market Effects of the 2006 FIFA
World Cup. SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1873196
488

Maguire, H. (2010, July 7). Football Team Tackles German Perceptions of Integration.
Deutsche Presse Agentur. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.prokerala.com/news/articles/a149204.html
Maier, C. S. (1997). The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National
Identity. Harvard University Press.
Malzahn, C. C. (2006, May 7). Stimmungsturbo WM: Heiter so, Deutschland! Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/stimmungsturbo-wmheiter-so-deutschland-a-425159.html
Malzahn, C. C. (2010, November 13). Der deutsche Vordergrund. Die Welt. Retrieved
from http://www.welt.de/print/welt_kompakt/debatte/article10703316/Derdeutsche-Vordergrund.htmlv
Mandel, R. E. (2008). Cosmopolitan anxieties: Turkish challenges to citizenship and
belonging in Germany. Duke University Press.
Mangan, J. A. (2004). Militarism, Sport, Europe: War Without Weapons. Routledge.
Retrieved from
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=x0mQAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=P
P1&dq=militarism+sport+europe&ots=4H3hIpT2F&sig=17YRWZjWEphKpPsxRTrMREti6z0
Markovits, A. S., & Hellerman, S. L. (2003). Women’s Soccer in the United States: Yet
Another American “Exceptionalism.” Soccer & Society, 4(2–3), 14–29.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970512331390805
Marshall, P. D. (1997). Celebrity and Power: Fame in Contemporary Culture.
Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press.
489

Marvin, C., & Ingle, D. W. (1996). Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Revisiting Civil
Religion. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 64(4), 767–780.
Marvin, C., & Ingle, D. W. (1999). Blood sacrifice and the nation: totem rituals and the
American flag. Cambridge University Press.
Marx, K. (2005). Early Writings. Penguin Books Limited.
Matussek, M. (2006, March 6). Debatte: Sind Patrioten Strauchdiebe? Spiegel Online.
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/debatte-sind-patriotenstrauchdiebe-a-419561.html
Mbembé, J.-A. (2003). Necropolitics. Public Culture, 15(1), 11–40.
Menz, G. (2010). “After Agenda 2010 is before the Elections”: Consolidation, Dissent,
and the Politics of German Labour Market Policy under the Grand Coalition.
German Politics, 19(3–4), 446–459. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2010.515833
Merkel, A. (2010, September 5). BamS-Interview mit der Bundeskanzlerin: Gehen die
Politiker deshalb so auf Sarrazin los, weil sie selbst so viele Fehler gemacht haben,
Frau Merkel? [Newspaper]. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/ueber-thilo-sarrazin-und-deutschemigranten-teil-1-13857588.bild.html
Merkel’s conservative allies call for limit on number of refugees. (2015, October 5).
Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/merkels-conservativeallies-call-for-limit-on-number-of-refugees/a-18761007
Mesut Özil & Nazan Eckes @ Bambi Integration 2010. (2010) ([Video Recording]).
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zgoH-WH7DBQ

490

Meyer-Gatermann, A. (2005, November 26). Eine pikante Parallele. Sueddeutsche
Zeitung, p. 15.
Miklis, K. (2011, November 11). Integrationspreis für Bushido: Bambi für den
Bösewicht. Stern. Retrieved from http://www.stern.de/1749879.html
Minton Beddoes, Z. (2013, June 15). Europe’s reluctant hegemon, (Special Report:
Germany), 2–6.
Mohr, R. (2006a, June 24). Mohrs Deutschlandgefühl: Wie die Ikea-Kassiererin das
Schweden-Fiasko erlebte. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/mohrs-deutschlandgefuehl-wie-die-ikeakassiererin-das-schweden-fiasko-erlebte-a-423433.html
Mohr, R. (2006b, July 7). Mohrs Deutschlandgefühl: Verdampfte Traurigkeit. Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/mohrsdeutschlandgefuehl-verdampfte-traurigkeit-a-425541.html
Mohr, R. (2006c, September 6). Mohrs Deutschlandgefühl: Der Patriotismus-Pegel.
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/mohrsdeutschlandgefuehl-der-patriotismus-pegel-a-420451.html
Mohr, R. (2010, June 29). Anti-Sommermärchen in Neukölln. Spiegel Online. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/tv/0,1518,703447,00.html
Moon The Loon “Pro Gamer.” (2010, August 31). Er spricht die Wahrheit, und nichts als
die Wahrheit! Amazon.de. Book Review. Retrieved from
https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309

491

Moore, R. (2015). From Revolutionary Monolingualism to Reactionary Multilingualism:
Top-down Discourses of Linguistic Diversity in Europe, 1794-Present. Language &
Communication, 44, 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langcom.2014.10.014
Moring, A. (2005, September 29). Schluß mit Jammern - eine Kampagne für
Deutschland. Hamburger Abendblatt. Retrieved from
http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/deutschland/article355171/Schluss-mit-Jammerneine-Kampagne-fuer-Deutschland.html
Müller, D., & Özdemir, C. (2014, December 9). Deutsch in Migranten-Familien - “Gott
sei Dank haben meine Eltern nicht auf die CSU gehört.” Deutschlandfunk.
Retrieved from http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/deutsch-in-migranten-familien-gottsei-dank-haben-meine.694.de.html?dram:article_id=305621
Müller, F. (2010, August 24). Kommende Generationen werden für das Buch dankbar
sein. Amazon.de. Book Review. Retrieved from
https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309
Müller, F., Zoonen, L. van, & Roode, L. de. (2007). Accidental Racists: Experiences and
Contradictions of Racism in local Amsterdam Soccer Fan Culture. Soccer &
Society, 8(2–3), 335–350. https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970701224608
Müller, J.-W. (2008). Constitutional Patriotism. Princeton University Press.
Müller-Güldemeister, L. (2010, August 24). Erst lesen, dann meckern. Amazon.de. Book
Review. Retrieved from https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unsersetzen/dp/3421044309
Nach Wirbel um Bambi für Bushido: Laudator Peter Maffay wollte nur vermitteln.
(2011, November 12). Die Bild. Retrieved from
492

http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/bushido/meldet-sich-nach-bambi-verleihungzu-wort-20972380.bild.html
Nachtsheim, K. (2010, July 15). Das Haus mit der Fahne: Berlin-Neukölln, Sonnenallee
36. BILD.de. Retrieved from http://www.bild.de/news/2010/news/das-haus-mit-derfahne-teil-1-13174524.bild.html
Naoko. (2010, August 27). Stärken und Schwächen beim Namen nennen! Book Review.
Retrieved from https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unsersetzen/dp/3421044309
Nathans, E. (2004). The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and
Nationalism (1st ed.). Berg Publishers.
Neues Asylrecht - Die wichtigsten Punkte im Asylpaket. (2015, September 30). Migazin.
Retrieved from http://www.migazin.de/2015/09/30/die-wichtigsten-punkte-imasylpaket/
Neumann, C., & Ulrich, A. (2011, August 22). Verbrechen: Versteck in der Schweiz.
Der Spiegel, 2011(34), 32–33.
Newitz, A., & Wray, M. (2013). White Trash: Race and Class in America. Routledge.
Noack, R. (2015, September 8). This Map Helps Explain Why Some European Countries
Reject Refugees, and Others Love Them. Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/08/this-map-helpsexplain-why-some-european-countries-reject-refugees-and-others-love-them/
Nolan, M. (1988). The Historikerstreit and Social History. New German Critique, (44),
51–80. https://doi.org/10.2307/488146

493

Nolte, E. (1986, June 6). Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will: Eine Rede, die
geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten werden konnte. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
Nora, P. (1998). Realms of Memory: Traditions. Columbia University Press.
Norton, A. (2013). On the Muslim Question. Princeton University Press.
Ohlert, M. (2014). Zwischen „Multikulturalismus“ und „Leitkultur“: Integrationsleitbild
und -politik der im 17. Deutschen Bundestag vertretenen Parteien. Springer-Verlag.
Olli R. (2010, September 8). Hmmm ... Book Review. Retrieved from
https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309
Ong, A. (2003). Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America. University
of California Press.
Ortmeyer, B. (2006). Argumente gegen das Deutschlandlied: Geschichte und Gegenwart
eines Lobliedes auf die deutsche Nation. Frankfurt am Main, Germany:
Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft.
P. Schmitz. (2010, August 27). Ein Volk in Agonie! Amazon.de. Book Review.
Partner für Innovation - Mission. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2012, from
http://www.innovationen-fuer-deutschland.de/initiative_partner/mission/index.php
Partridge, D. J. (2012). Hypersexuality and Headscarves: Race, Sex, and Citizenship in
the New Germany. Indiana University Press.
Paterson, T. (2010, July 3). Why Germany’s Immigrants Fly the Flag for Their Adopted
Country. The Independent. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/why-germanysimmigrants-fly-the-flag-for-their-adopted-country-2017259.html

494

Patton, P. (1997a). Social (media) events from a Deleuzian point of view. Continuum:
Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 11(2), 23–32.
Patton, P. (1997b). The World Seen from Within: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Events.
Theory & Event, 1(1). Retrieved from
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.1patton.html
Penninx, R. (2005). Integration of migrants: Economic, social, cultural and political
dimensions. In M. Macura, A. L. MacDonald, & W. Haug (Eds.), The new
demographic regime: Population challenges and policy responses (pp. 137–152).
New York; Geneva: United Nations.
Pfeifer, T. (2006, June 16). Nur Goleo ohne Hose hat es schwer. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung.
Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=115038
4426019&calledPageId=987490165154
Pfister, G. (2003). The Challenges of Women’s Football in East and West Germany: A
Comparative Study. Soccer & Society, 4(2–3), 128–148.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970512331390875
Pfister, G., Fasting, K., Scraton, S., & Vázquez, B. (2002). Women in Football - A
Contradiction? The Beginnings of Women’s Football in Four European Countries.
In S. Scraton & A. Flintoff (Eds.), Gender and Sport: A Reader. Psychology Press.
Pham, K. (2010, November 19). Integration: Deutscher Patriot. Die Zeit. Retrieved from
http://www.zeit.de/2010/47/Rapper-Harris

495

PMG Presse-Monitor. (2014). Meistzitierte deutsche Medien. Berlin. Retrieved from
http://www.pressemonitor.de/fileadmin/assets/pmg/Pressemitteilungen/2014-0603_ZR-Folien_PMG.pdf
Poschardt, U. (2011, November 12). Die Grünen sollten Verständnis für Bushido haben.
Welt Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article13713685/Die-Gruenen-solltenVerstaendnis-fuer-Bushido-haben.html
Precht, R. D. (2010, September 27). Soziale Kriege. Der Spiegel, 39. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73989843.html
Prins, B., & Saharso, S. (2010). From Toleration to Repression: The Dutch Backlash
Against Multiculturalism. In S. Vertovec & S. Wessendorf (Eds.), The
Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices (pp. 72–
91). London: Routledge.
Pritchard, D. M. (2009). Sport, War and Democracy in Classical Athens. The
International Journal of the History of Sport, 26(2), 212–245.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09523360802513272
Pro Asyl. (2016, May 9). Stellungnahme zum Referentenentwurf des
Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Soziales und des Bundesministeriums des
Innern. Retrieved from https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/201605-19-PRO-ASYL-Stellungname-Integrationsgesetz.pdf
Prodhan, G. (2016, September 14). Top German Companies Say Refugees Not Ready
for Job Market. Reuters. Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Retrieved from

496

http://www.reuters.com/article/europe-migrants-germany-companiesidUSL8N1BP49T
Räthzel, N. (1994). Harmonious “Heimat” and disturbing “Ausländer.” Feminism &
Psychology, 4(1), 81–98. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959353594041005
Rausch, K. (2010, July 2). Schwarz-rot-goldene Zunge ist Anzeige des Monats Mai.
Berliner Morgenpost, p. 15.
Reents, E. (2006, January 3). Deutschland-Kampagne: Sprüche und Schliche.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/deutschland-kampagne-spruecheund-schliche-1306098.html
Reif, M., & Drecker, M. (2006, June 23). «Erfreulich unverkrampft». Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=115038
4435263&calledPageId=987490165154
Reitz, E. (1988). The Camera Is not a Clock (Regarding My Experiences Telling Stories
from German History). In E. Rentschler (Ed.), West German Filmmakers on Film:
Visions and Voices. Holmes & Meier New York. Retrieved from
https://www.rienner.com/title/West_German_Filmmakers_on_Film_Visions_and_
Voices
Reitz, T. (2010, June 28). WM 2010: Presseschau: Das Jahrhundertspiel der
Rasselbande. sueddeutsche.de. Retrieved from
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/sport/wm-presseschau-das-jahrhundertspiel-derrasselbande-1.966568-2
497

Renan, E. (1990). What Is a Nation? In H. K. Bhabha (Ed.), Nation and Narration.
Psychology Press.
Roche, M. (2000). Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of
Global Culture. London: Routledge.
Roll, E. (1998, December 7). Ein Schwein kennt kein Scham. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
Berlin, Germany. Retrieved from
http://www.hagalil.com/archiv/98/12/antisemit.htm
Rosaldo, R. (1994). Cultural citizenship and educational democracy. Cultural
Anthropology, 9(3), 402–411.
Rothberg, M., & Yildiz, Y. (2011). Memory Citizenship: Migrant Archives of Holocaust
Remembrance in Contemporary Germany. Parallax, 17(4), 32–48.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2011.605576
Rowe, D., & Stevenson, D. (2006). Sydney 2000: Sociality and Spatiality in Global
Media Events. In A. Tomlinson & C. Young (Eds.), National identity and global
sports events: culture, politics, and spectacle in the Olympics and the football
World Cup (pp. 197–214). SUNY Press.
S. Staufen-Breisach “Halleluja.” (2010, September 10). Eine grossen Dank an diesen
Mann. Book Review. Retrieved from https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafftsich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309
Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.
Samy Deluxe. (2009). Dis Wo Ich Herkomm [Dis where I come from] (CD). London,
England: EMI.

498

Sarrazin, T. (2010a). Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen.
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
Sarrazin, T. (2010b, August 23). Was tun? Der Spiegel, 34. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73388944.html
Sarrazin, T. (2010c, August 24). Klartext-Politiker Thilo Sarrazin: Will ich den Muezzin
hören, dann reise ich ins Morgenlan. BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/neues-buch-deutschland-schafft-sich-ab13723998.bild.html
Sarrazin-Rücktritt - das sagen die Zeitungen: „Dieser Abgang macht Sarrazin zum
Märtyrer“. (2010, November 9). BILD.de. Retrieved from
http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/nach-dem-ruecktritt-dieser-abgang-machtsarrazin-zum-maertyrer-13916058.bild.html
Sarrazin-Thesen: Merkel fordert Integrationsdebatte ohne Tabus. (2010, April 9). Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/sarrazin-thesenmerkel-fordert-integrationsdebatte-ohne-tabus-a-715728.html
Saunders, D. (2015, May 23). Germany: Where the Refugee Flood Is a Solution, Not a
Problem. The Globe and Mail. Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Retrieved from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/germany-where-the-refugee-flood-is-asolution-not-a-problem/article24565583/
Scally, D. (2010, June 30). Football brings to surface complex changes in German
identity. The Irish Times, p. 10.
Schiller, H. I. (1976). Communication and Cultural Domination. White Plains, NY:
International Arts and Sciences Press.
499

Schmidt, K. (2006, July 21). Flagge zeigen. Der Freitag. Retrieved from
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/der-freitag/flagge-zeigen
Schmidt, W. F. (2010, September 19). Das “Ruck”-Buch. Amazon.de. Book Review.
Retrieved from https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unsersetzen/dp/3421044309
Schmitt, C. (2007). The Concept of the Political (Expanded ed). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Schmitz, M. (2011). The Current Spectacle of Integration in Germany: Spatiality,
Gender, and the Boundaries of the National Gaze. In M. Möhring, M. Stein, & S.
Stroh (Eds.), Hybrid Cultures - Nervous States: Britain and Germany in a
(Post)Colonial World. (pp. 253–275). Rodopi.
Schnath, G. (1958). Heimat und Staat: Betrachtungen eines Niedersachsen. Niemeyer.
Schnibben, C. (2006, June 19). Maskenball der Völker. Der Spiegel, 25. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47282147.html
Schnibben, C. (2013, August 13). Circulation Declines Hit German Papers a Decade
after America. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/circulation-declines-hit-germanpapers-a-decade-after-america-a-915574.html
Schröder, J. (2010, July 12). Trotz Internet: Fernsehnachrichten boomen. MEEDIA.
Hamburg. Retrieved from http://meedia.de/2010/12/07/trotz-internetfernsehnachrichten-boomen/
Schröder zu Innovation: “Zuerst über Chancen und dann erst über Risiken sprechen.”
(2004, January 16). Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from
500

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/schroeder-zu-innovation-zuerst-ueber-chancenund-dann-erst-ueber-risiken-sprechen-1.804448
Schulz, S. (2009, August 28). SPD-Integrationspolitiker wechselt in Berlins CDU.
Berliner Morgenpost, p. 12. Berlin.
Schupelius, G. (2010, June 30). CDU-Dregger hisst mit Neuköllner Türken SchwarzRot-Gold. Warum nur er? B.Z., p. 13.
Schütz, E. (1996). Berlin: A Jewish Heimat at the Turn of the Century? In J. Hermand &
J. D. Steakley (Eds.), Heimat, Nation, Fatherland: The German Sense of Belonging
(pp. 57–86). Peter Lang.
Schwarz-rot-bunt. (2010, June 30). Usinger Anzeige. Retrieved from https://www.wisonet.de:443/document/USAN__14065370001277848800
Schwarz-Rot-Gold: Flaggenboom in Deutschland. (2006). Spiegel Online. Retrieved
from http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/schwarz-rot-gold-flaggenboom-indeutschland-fotostrecke-14296.html
Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut. (2006, June 8). Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Stuttgart.
Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=114974
8369664&calledPageId=987490165154
Scott, J. C. (1999). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press.
Scott, J. W. (2007). The Politics of the Veil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Semati, M. (2010). Islamophobia, Culture and Race in the Age of Empire. Cultural
Studies, 24(2), 256–275.
501

Semati, M. (2011). Communication, Culture, and the Essentialized Islam.
Communication Studies, 62(1), 113–126.
Senders, S. (2002). Jus sanguinis or jus mimesis? Rethinking “Ethnic German”
Repatriation. In D. Rock & S. Wolff (Eds.), Coming Home to Germany?: The
Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal
Republic (pp. 87–101). Berghahn Books.
Senocak, Z., & Tulay, B. (2000). Germany - Home for Turks? A Plea for Overcoming
the Crisis Between Orient and Occident. In L. A. Adelson (Ed.), Atlas of a tropical
Germany: Essays on Politics and Culture, 1990-1998 (pp. 1–9). Lincoln: U of
Nebraska Press.
Sharifi, B. (2015, October 7). Deutungshoheit und die (Willkommens)Kultur - Warum
eine Rassismus-Debatte in Deutschland unmöglich ist. Migazin. Retrieved from
http://www.migazin.de/2015/10/07/deutungshoheit-willkommens-kultur-warumrassismus/
Shehadeh, N. (2015, August 17). „Hallo Nadia, Joerg möchte das Flüchtlingsproblem
lösen!". Retrieved from https://shehadistan.com/2015/08/17/hallo-nadia-joergmoechte-das-fluechtlingsproblem-loesen/
Sick man walking. (2003, December 18). The Economist. Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com/node/2304703
Sie sind Sympathieträger und wunderbares Vorbild. (2014, September 11). Welt Online.
Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/sport/fussball/article132162984/Sie-sindSympathietraeger-und-wunderbares-Vorbild.html

502

Silk, M. L., Andrews, D. L., & Cole, C. L. (2005). Sport and Corporate Nationalisms.
Berg Publishers.
Silverman, C. (2010, April 9). Inside the World’s Largest Fact Checking Operation.
Retrieved from
http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/inside_the_worlds_largest_fact.php
Simmel, G. (1950). The stranger. The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 402–408.
Simmel, G. (2011). Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms. (D. Levine, Ed.).
University of Chicago Press.
Simon, P., & Sala Pala, V. (2010). “We’re not all multiculturalists yet” France swings
between hard integration and soft anti-discrimination. In S. Vertovec & S.
Wessendorf (Eds.), The Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies
and practices (pp. 92–110). London: Routledge.
Smith, M. (2014). Affect and Respectability Politics. Theory & Event, 17(3). Retrieved
from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/559376
Somuncu, S. (2015, September 8). Klatschspalte: Das ist so typisch deutsch. Retrieved
from http://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/klatschspalte-das-ist-so-typischdeutsch/12267808.html
Soysal, L. (2004). Rap, Hiphop, Kreuzberg: Scripts of/for Migrant Youth Culture in the
WorldCity Berlin. New German Critique, (92), 62–81.
Speth, R. (2004). Die politischen Strategien der Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft.
Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.dgbjugend.de/ausbildung/online-beratung/mediabig/5615A_original.pdf

503

Speth, R. (2006). Die zweite Welle der Wirtschaftskampagnen: Von „Du bist
Deutschland” bis zur „Stiftung Marktwirtschaft” (Arbeitspapier No. 127).
Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Retrieved from
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_arbp_127.pdf
Spoerr, K. (2014, June 26). Sollten alle deutschen Spieler die Hymne singen? Welt
Online. Retrieved from
http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article129454350/Sollten-alle-deutschenSpieler-die-Hymne-singen.html
Sprachregeln für Zuwanderer: CSU will Deutsch-Pflicht für Migranten. (2014,
December 5). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/csu-will-deutsch-pflicht-fuer-migranten13305503.html
Statistisches Bundesamt. (n.d.). Personen mit Migrationshintergrund: Methodische
Erläuterungen. Retrieved November 21, 2015, from
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/Migratio
nIntegration/Migrationshintergrund/Aktuell.html
Stawski, D. (2010, July 8). Wer hat/die Längste? Süddeutsche Zeitung, p. 40.
Stein, C. (2012). Die Sprache der Sarrazin-Debatte: Eine diskurslinguistische Analyse.
Marburg: Tectum.
Sterkenburg, J. van. (2013). National Bonding and Meanings Given to Race and
Ethnicity: Watching the Football World Cup on Dutch Tv. Soccer & Society, 14(3),
386–403. https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2013.801267

504

Steuber, T. (2010, October 10). Wer wenig weiß, muss alles glauben. Amazon.de. Book
Review. Retrieved from https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unsersetzen/dp/3421044309
Stevens, V. F. A. L. (2010, June 3). For German Soccer, a Lyric Debate. Wall Street
Journal. Retrieved from
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703340904575284720357621884
Stewart, K. (2007). Ordinary Affects. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books.
Stollowsky, C. (2010a). WM 2010: Autonome zerstören Türken die Deutschlandfahne.
Die Zeit. Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/sport/2010-06/wm-deutschlandfahneautonome
Stollowsky, C. (2010b, June 28). Autonome zerstören Deutschland-Fahnen türkischer
Berliner. Tagesspiegel, p. 11. Berlin.
Streeck, W. (1997). German Capitalism: Does It Exist? Can It Survive? New Political
Economy, 2(2), 237–256.
Supp, B. (2006, March 7). Die Integrierten. Der Spiegel, 27. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-47441168.html
Süssmuth, R. (2001). Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern: Bericht der
unabhängigen Kommission’Zuwanderung’. Berlin: Ministry of Interior Affairs.
Taussig, M. (1992). Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (First
Edition). Routledge.
Taylor, C. (1999). Two theories of modernity. Public Culture, 11(1), 153–174.
Taylor, C. (2005). The Politics of Recognition. In S. P. Hier (Ed.), Contemporary
sociological thought themes and theories (pp. 465–480). Toronto: Canadian
505

Scholars’ Press. Retrieved from
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nla
bk&AN=148000
Thilo Sarrazin - “Ich bin kein Rassist.” (2010, August 28). Berliner Morgenpost. Berlin.
Retrieved from http://www.morgenpost.de/berlin-aktuell/article1385382/ThiloSarrazin-Ich-bin-kein-Rassist.html
Threadgold, T. (2003). Cultural studies, critical theory and critical discourse analysis:
Histories, remembering and futures. Linguistik Online, 14(2), 3.
Todt, J. (2006, December 6). Schwarz-rot-goldener Boom: Flaggenparade der WMPatrioten. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/schwarz-rot-goldener-boom-flaggenparadeder-wm-patrioten-a-420927.html
Tomlinson, A., & Young, C. (2006). National Identity and Global Sports Events:
Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World Cup.
SUNY Press.
Tomlinson, J. (1997). “And Besides, the Wench is Dead”: Media Scandals and the
Globalization of Communication. In J. Lull & S. Hinerman (Eds.), Media scandals:
Morality and desire in the popular culture marketplace (pp. 64–84). Columbia
University Press.
Trommeln für Deutschland. (2006). SpiegelTV. Retrieved from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KK0dp3_1YyI&feature=youtube_gdata_player
Ulfkotte, U. (2003). Der Krieg in unseren Städten. Wie radikale Islamisten Deutschland
unterwandern. Eichborn.
506

Ulfkotte, U. (2010). Kein Schwarz. Kein Rot. Kein Gold: Armut für alle im »Lustigen
Migrantenstadl« (1st ed.). Kopp, Rottenburg.
Ullrich, P., & Tullney, M. (2012). Die Konstruktion “gefährlicher Orte”. Eine
Problematisierung mit Beispielen aus Berlin und Leipzig. Sozialraum.de, 4(2).
Retrieved from http://www.sozialraum.de/die-konstruktion-gefaehrlicher-orte.php
Ulrich Groh. (2010, August 25). Thilo Sarrazin: Mahner gegen die Sprachlosigkeit
aufeinanderprallender Kulturen. Book Review. Retrieved from
https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-schafft-sich-unser-setzen/dp/3421044309
Umstrittene Thesen zu Migration: Merkel entrüstet über Sarrazin. (2010, August 25).
Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umstrittene-thesen-zu-migration-merkelentruestet-ueber-sarrazin-a-713752.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016a). Figures at a Glance.
Retrieved October 15, 2016, from http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-aglance.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016b). Global Trends: Forced
Displacement in 2015 (p. 66). Geneva Switzerland. Retrieved from
http://www.unhcr.org/
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016c). Refugees/Migrants
Emergency Response - Mediterranean. Retrieved October 30, 2016, from
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php

507

Vasterman, P. L. (2005). Media-Hype Self-Reinforcing News Waves, Journalistic
Standards and the Construction of Social Problems. European Journal of
Communication, 20(4), 508–530.
Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (Eds.). (2010). The Multiculturalism Backlash:
European discourses, policies and practices. London: Routledge.
von Koppenfels, A. K. (2002). The Decline of Privilege: The Legal Background to the
Migration of Ethnic Germans. In D. Rock & S. Wolff (Eds.), Coming Home to
Germany?: The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in
the Federal Republic (pp. 103–118). New York, N.Y: Berghahn Books.
von Petersdorff, W. (2005, June 15). Noch eine Kampagne fürs Vaterland. Frankfurter
Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, p. 45.
Wæver, O. (2005). European Integration and Security: Analysing French and German
Discourses on State, Nation, and Europe. In D. R. Howarth & J. Torfing (Eds.),
Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy, and governance (pp. 33–
67). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wallerstein, I. (1990). Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern WorldSystem. Theory, Culture and Society, 7(2–3), 31–55.
Wallerstein, I. (2006). European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power. The New Press.
Walser, M. (1998, October). Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. Presented
at the Friedenspreis des deutschen Buchhandels. Retrieved from
http://www.friedenspreis-des-deutschenbuchhandels.de/sixcms/media.php/1290/1998_walser.pdf
Warner, M. (2002). Publics and counterpublics. Public Culture, 14(1), 49–90.
508

Weiland, S. (2010, October 10). Empörung in Regierung und Opposition: Proteststurm
gegen Seehofers Ausländer-Offensive. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/empoerung-in-regierung-und-oppositionproteststurm-gegen-seehofers-auslaender-offensive-a-722308.html
Weischenberg, S., Malik, M., & Scholl, A. (2006). Journalismus in Deutschland 2005.
Media Perspektiven, (7), 353–358.
Wenner, L. (Ed.). (2002). MediaSport. London: Routledge.
Wiese, H. (2014). Voices of linguistic outrage: standard language constructs and the
discourse on new urban dialects. Working Papers in Urban Language and
Literacies. Retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Heike_Wiese2/publication/261402367_Voices
_of_linguistic_outrage__Standard_language_constructs_and_the_discourse_on_ne
w_urban_dialects/links/00b7d5342f609f19f3000000.pdf
Wiese, H. (2015). “This Migrants’ Babble Is Not a German Dialect!”: The Interaction of
Standard Language Ideology and “us”/“them”dichotomies in the Public Discourse
on a Multiethnolect. Language in Society, 44(3), 341–368.
Williamson, J. (1978). Decoding advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising
(Vol. 4). Marion Boyars London. Retrieved from
http://www.charlesacramer.com/sf1110/study-guide3/ewExternalFiles/Williamson,%20Decoding%20Advertisements%20smaller.pdf
Willing, M. (2003). Das Bewahrungsgesetz (1918-1967): eine rechtshistorische Studie
zur Geschichte der deutschen Fürsorge. Mohr Siebeck.

509

Wilson, W. A. (1973). Herder, folklore and romantic nationalism. The Journal of
Popular Culture, 6(4), 819–835.
Wir in Deutschland. (2005, September 23). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved
from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/netzwirtschaft/kampagne-wir-indeutschland-1256557.html
„Wir sind wieder wer“. (1996, December 23). Der Spiegel, (52). Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-9140539.html
„Wir werden die deutsche Fahne verteidigen”. (2010, June 28). Junge Freiheit.
Retrieved from http://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2010/wir-werden-diedeutsche-fahne-verteidigen/
Wittrock, P. (2010, October 20). CDU-Spitze beschwört die deutsche Leitkultur. Spiegel
Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/antrag-zumparteitag-cdu-spitze-beschwoert-die-deutsche-leitkultur-a-724259.html
WM-Euphorie wird als neuer Patriotismus begrüßt. (2006, June 15). Mitteldeutsche
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.mzweb.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=114974
8373193&calledPageId=987490165154
Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is About - A Summary of its History, Important Concepts
and its Developments. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of Critical
Discourse Analysis (pp. 1–14). SAGE Publications Ltd.
Wulf, J.-H. (2005, September 26). Offensive für Deutschland. Die Tageszeitung.
Retrieved from https://www.taz.de/1/archiv/archiv/?dig=2005/09/26/a0134

510

Yack, B. (1996). The myth of the civic nation. Critical Review, 10(2), 193–211.
https://doi.org/10.1080/08913819608443417
Young, C. (2006). Munich 1972: Re-presenting the Nation. In A. Tomlinson & C.
Young (Eds.), National identity and global sports events: culture, politics, and
spectacle in the Olympics and the football World Cup (pp. 117–132). SUNY Press.
Young, R. (1995). Colonial desire: hybridity in theory, culture, and race. London ; New
York: Routledge.
Zehrt, M. (2010, July 7). Türken und Araber werden in Berlin zu fröhlichen Patrioten und bringen Autonome gegen sich auf. Leipziger-Volkszeitung, p. 3. Berlin.
Zelizer, B. (1992). Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and the
Shaping of Collective Memory. University of Chicago Press.
Zelizer, B. (2008). Why Memory’s Work on Journalism Does Not Reflect Journalism’s
Work on Memory. Memory Studies, 1(1), 79.
Zimbalist, A., & Maennig, W. (2012). International Handbook on the Economics of
Mega Sporting Events. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Zuschauerzahlen: Bambi im Rekordtief. (2012, November 23). Spiegel Online.
Hamburg/Düsseldorf. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/tv/bambiverleihung-2012-mit-katastrophaler-quote-a-868870.html
Zysman, J. (1983). Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the
Politics of Industrial Change. Cornell University Press.

511

